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Chapter 1–Issues in the legal protection of Australian archaeological 
heritage 
 
1.1 Defining the problem 
 
This thesis examines the legal and policy regimes for protecting 
archaeological heritage in Australia. Its aim is twofold, the first being to situate 
archaeological heritage law within an environmental law framework, based in 
a notion of ‘public good conservation’. Public good conservation is a 
philosophical position derived from the environmental movement, which holds 
that conservation should not merely be an end unto itself but should provide 
wider benefits to society. The second aim of the thesis is to identify and argue 
for practical reforms in both the legal protections for archaeological heritage 
and the practices of archaeologists or heritage managers who operate within 
those frameworks, to implement ‘public good’ conservation outcomes for 
archaeological heritage in Australia. This approach considers archaeological 
heritage from a heritage management perspective and endeavours to link the 
legal protection of archaeological heritage to a broad ‘public good’ outcome, 
which may include but is not restricted to archaeological research outcomes.  
 
Laws protecting and controlling archaeological heritage have existed in one 
form or another for thirty or more years in most Australian jurisdictions, with 
the very first domestic legislation introduced in 1955, to protect Aboriginal 
heritage places in the Northern Territory.1 These regimes were established 
with the good intention of protecting Australia’s archaeological past, primarily 
at the instigation of archaeologists. However they now reflect an 
understanding of Australian archaeology which seems simplistic and 
anachronistic. This is partly due to the fact that the archaeologists who lobbied 
for the initial legislation were based in a particular academic tradition.2 A law, 
when made, captures a moment in time and should be revisited as society 
changes.3 In the case of the Australian law for the protection of archaeological 
heritage, that moment was principally the 1960s and 1970s and the academic 
traditions of that time.4 Few fundamental changes have occurred in the body 
of Australian archaeological heritage law since the laws were initially enacted. 
 
However, since the enactment of archaeological protection laws in Australia, 
there have been substantial changes in archaeological practice as well as in 
heritage and environmental conservation philosophy. Undoubtedly the 
                                            
1  Native and Historic Objects Heritage Protection Ordinance (1955) Northern Territory. Repealed 1991. 
2  Colley, S. (1996). "Caught in the web: Cultural policy, cultural places and Australian archaeology." Culture and 
Policy 7 (2): 141-154.  
Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. 109-112. 
3  A highly pertinent example for this thesis of the revisiting of a legal construction in Australian law is the legal 
concept of terra nullius, which held that the Australian continent was an ‘empty land’ not owned by indigenous 
peoples and therefore the taking of that land by British settlers was justified. This concept held from the 18th 
century until it was over turned in the Mabo High Court case of 1992. Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2) 
(1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014.  
For a discussion of this issue see, for example:  
 Bennett, S. (1999). White politics and black Australians. St Leonards, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 154-174. 
 Cordell, J. (1993). Who owns the land? Indigenous involvement in Australian protected areas. The law of mother: 
protecting indigenous peoples in protected areas. E. Kemf. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books: 104-113.  
 Reynolds, H. (1982). European justification for taking the land. Black Australians: the prospects for change. E. 
Olbrei. Townsville, James Cook University of North Queensland: 2-6.  
4  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 87-95. 
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individuals involved in the establishment of the earliest heritage legislation did 
not envisage the shape of Australian archaeology as it stands today. Changes 
have come from a number of directions, including changes in archaeological 
theoretical positions (discussed in Chapter 2) and in archaeological practice. 
The other aspect of these changes has been the influence protective 
legislation has had on the discipline, which has driven archaeological practice 
in particular directions.5 In some instances, archaeological practice has been 
fundamentally modified by the legal framework. One simple example of this is 
in the selection of which sites to investigate archaeologically: prior to the 
existence of heritage legislation, the selection of archaeological sites for 
investigation could be based on a theoretical position or research question 
which an archaeologist wished to investigate. Now sites are more commonly 
investigated solely because of the legislative requirements which stipulate 
investigation or excavation prior to impact by development or other work,6 with 
little or no reference to any wider theoretical position, research aim or broader 
understanding of heritage significance. 
 
It appears that lawyers who drafted the early legislation had an inadequate 
understanding of the archaeological issues and the archaeologists an 
inadequate understanding of the legal ramifications of some of the choices 
made in their efforts to protect archaeological heritage. Analysis such as that 
undertaken here can attempt to reconcile the problems which have arisen in 
archaeological heritage law. It is argued here that changes in emphasis and 
interpretation of heritage legislation have had significant consequences for the 
discipline of archaeology in Australia.7 Perhaps unintentionally, the discipline 
of archaeology in Australia has been very much shaped by the legislation 
which governs it. In some instances there has been a naive assumption by 
archaeologists that having legislation alone would “fix” the problem of 
destruction of archaeological heritage from development pressures, 
unintentional damage or deliberate destruction.8 Unforseen changes have 
arisen over the last thirty years in the wider body of Australian law, public 
policy and community values which necessitate a reconsideration of the 
underlying legal principles which relate to the protection of the archaeological 
heritage. Similar changes have occurred within the discipline of archaeology 
itself.9 By examining early decisions in the drafting of legislation, viewed 
against the evolution in thinking in the areas of heritage and environmental 
conservation and public policy, it is clear that archaeological heritage 
protection has diverged significantly from its original intent, and often does not 
                                            
5  Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pp 45-50. 
 Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 125-155.  
6  See particularly the discussion in Chapters 6 and 7 of this thesis. 
7  Ward, G. K. (1983). Archaeology and legislation in Australia. Australian Field Archaeology: A Guide to 
Techniques. G. Connah. Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies: 18-42.  Pg 18. 
8  Flood, J. (1993). Cultural resource management in  Australia: the last three decades. A Community of Culture: 
The People and Prehistory of the Pacific. M. Spriggs, D. E. Yen, W. Ambroseet al. Canberra, Australian National 
University. 21: 259-265.  Flood observes that “legislation was of varying quality and scope, but at least it helped 
curtail illegal collection or excavation of artefacts or destruction of sites by developers”, however she provides no 
evidence that the legislation has in fact been successful in this regard. Like comments by some other 
archaeologists throughout the literature, Flood comes across as dismissive of there being any other legitimate 
interest in archaeological sites outside of the discipline of archaeology.  
9  E.g. Hodder, I. (1999). The Archaeological Process: An Introduction. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.  
 Johnson, M. (1999). Archaeological theory: an introduction. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.  
 Dark, K. R. (1995). Theoretical archaeology. London, Duckworth.  
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reflect the needs of the legal, public policy and conservation landscape of 
today. This divergence is part of the problem investigated by this thesis. 
 
1.2 Shifting power structures 
 
The establishment of a regulatory framework for archaeology redirected the 
discipline from a primarily academic one and transformed archaeology into a 
matter of broad public interest, which had unintended consequences. One 
major consequence was the loss by archaeologists of being the sole arbiters 
of what aspects of the past or type of materials were worthy of investigation or 
protection and, to a large extent, even ownership of the notion of what was 
“archaeological” has been lost.10 Prior to legislation, what constituted the 
“archaeological past” or what was an “archaeological site” or “archaeological 
object” and whether such was worthy of attention was a consideration 
principally based on the research interests of one or more archaeologists.11 
The legislative approach has however largely been to define a boundary 
around aspects of the archaeological past in order to protect it. The 
development and application of such legal definitions has not rested solely 
with archaeologists, although the discipline has had influence in their 
development. This approach has required the establishment of criteria based 
around the significance, physical nature or location of materials to allow them 
to be deemed “archaeological” and therefore be protected under legislation. 
The consequence of this has been that materials now protected under strict 
legal definitions of what is “archaeological” may bear little resemblance to the 
types of materials which may have been of interest to archaeologists and 
others (such as amateur collectors) prior to the enactment of legislation. 
 
The other significant consequence of the establishment of legislation was that 
many more parties have become involved in the practice of archaeology, due 
to the need to comply with or administer heritage legislation. This has included 
legislators, lawyers, planners, architects, developers, landowners, public 
servants and the public, to name but a selection. Different laws have been 
designed to include or exclude certain groups. In some instances legislation 
has been directed to primarily included archaeologists12 and, in other 
circumstances, to include indigenous people.13 In almost all circumstances, 
the general public has been excluded from archaeological places, except as 
passive observers. The law now requires archaeological work to be 
undertaken in instances where, prior to the enactment of legislation, such 
work may not have been done, even by archaeologists. A particular locale or 
site may not have been investigated under a research-oriented archaeological 
paradigm, but it may be protected by the law nevertheless, under the guise of 
protecting “research significance”. This situation has been reinforced through 
legalistic interpretations of the archaeological statutes and the nature of 
                                            
10  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 72-74. 
11  Hodder, I. (1999). The Archaeological Process: An Introduction. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers. Pp 9-19. 
 Trigger, B. (1989). A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pp 275-279. 
 Watson, P. J., S. A. LeBlanc, et al. (1984). Archeological explanation: the scientific method in archeology. New 
York, Columbia University Press. Pp 155-186. 
12  E.g. the excavation permit requirements of the NSW Heritage Act 1977, discussed in Chapter 7. 
13  E.g. the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), discussed in Chapter 5. As will 
be shown later in the thesis, much indigenous heritage legislation has been designed to include those indigenous 
people who can demonstrate a past cultural affiliation with a place, at the exclusion of other indigenous groups. 
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“research significance”14 is often reduced to “research potential”, a matter 
which is explored at some length in Chapter 2.  
 
The end result of these changes over the last thirty or more years is that the 
profession of archaeology in Australia (and overseas) has fragmented into 
different strands, including university- and museum-based academics, 
government heritage managers and commercially operating archaeological 
consultants. This last group, the archaeological consultant, represents the 
largest of the groups and owes its rise directly to the fact that a range of 
parties other than archaeologists must comply with heritage legislation. 
Meeting the needs of this growing body of ‘archaeological consumers’ has 
seen the numbers of consulting archaeologists dramatically expand, while the 
population of archaeologists based in Australian educational institutions has 
stayed steady or declined.15 Heritage managers responsible for 
archaeological sites have generally been based within government agencies 
with responsibility for implementing heritage legislation or for agencies acting 
as custodians of public heritage assets, including archaeological sites. This 
change in the demographic of Australian archaeologists has been strongly 
driven by the nature of archaeological heritage protection legislation.16 While 
there has been some re-convergence of these groups, particularly in the field 
of “public archaeology”,17 they continue to have different goals and priorities. 
 
1.3 Considering the law related to archaeology 
 
The Australian archaeological community, particularly the archaeological 
consulting community, has taken few opportunities to challenge or debate the 
legal regimes for archaeological heritage protection since their establishment. 
While there has been limited discussion within the discipline itself,18 this has 
                                            
14  Bowdler, S. (1986). "Recent directions in Tasmanian prehistory and the role of cultural resource management." 
Australian Archaeology 23: 11-24.  
15  Ulm, S., S. Nichols, et al. (2005). "Mapping the shape of contemporary Australian archaeology: implications for 
archaeology teaching and learning." Australian Archaeology 61: 11-23.  
16  Statistics on the exact demographics of practicing Australian archaeologists cannot be precisely established as 
there is no licensing or registration procedure required to work as an archaeologist in Australia. The Australian 
Association of Consulting Archaeologists Incorporated (AACAI - http://www.aacai.com.au/) provides a Code of 
Ethics and establishes certain minimum criteria for membership. However there is no requirement that an 
archaeologist be a member of AACAI in order to work in Australia. As of June 2006, AACAI had 30 Full Members 
and 56 Associate Members across Australia, but this is by no means a comprehensive accounting of all 
professional archaeologists operating in Australia. AACA Consultants Register - 
http://www.aacai.com.au/register/index.html. Accessed 30 June 2006. 
 A competing group was established briefly in the late 1990s, the Australian Institute of Professional 
Archaeologists Incorporated (AIPA), but it appears this group is now defunct. Chapter 7 of this thesis contains 
statistical analysis of permits issued under the NSW Heritage Act and the Victorian Heritage Act which analyses 
the relative number of permits issued for academic versus consulting archaeological purposes, with the number 
of academic permits representing a very minor portion of total approvals issued. It is clear anecdotally that there 
are hundreds of consulting archaeologists operating across Australia, although even the best-resourced 
academic department has no more than 5 or 6 archaeological staff. See also Ibid.  
17  Smith, G. S. and J. E. Ehrenhard (2002). Protecting the Past to Benefit the Public. Public Benefit of Archaeology. 
B. J. Little. Gainsville, University Press of Florida: 121-129. See also discussion of several specific “public 
archaeology” projects in Australia, including: 
 Casey, M. (2005). The road to controversy. Object lessons: archaeology & heritage in Australia. J. Lydon and T. 
Ireland. Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing: 148-166.  
 Murray, T. and A. J. C. Mayne (2003). "(Re) Constructing a Lost Community: "Little Lon," Melbourne, Australia." 
Historical Archaeology 37 (1): 87-101.  
18  For example, the Bibliography of Historical Archaeology in Australia, published in four parts in the Australian 
Journal of Historical Archaeology between 1983 and 1987 identifies only 20 references related to archaeological 
heritage legislation in Australia pre-1987. Approximately half of these relate to legislation for protecting historic 
shipwrecks and a quarter are ‘how to’ overviews of legislative protections and their administration aimed at 
practicing archaeologists. Less than half a dozen references are related to any substantial discussion of the 
interface between archaeology and law. More recent Australian journals have debated issues such as ‘heritage’ 
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rarely translated into a deep analysis of the underlying legal issues which 
have changed the discipline. This thesis seeks to draw the strands of law and 
archaeology together, by analysing issues arising from the current situation to 
establish a basis for reform in both archaeological practice and archaeological 
heritage law. Future legal and heritage management frameworks must keep 
better pace with the changing purposes of archaeology19 and the needs and 
expectations of Australian society, if archaeology is to remain relevant and 
worthy of the significant investment required through heritage management 
and legislative compliance processes. One important element of this is what 
these protective efforts are providing to the non-archaeological community–
the notion of ‘public good conservation’.20 This is linked to ‘sustainability’–the 
balancing of economic, environmental and social factors–a concept which is 
coming to the fore in the areas of environmental protection and heritage 
conservation and is discussed in Chapter 4.  
 
The notion of the ‘public good’ has been in existence for quite some time, 
generally tied to economic concepts or broad public projects which benefit 
society widely. The elimination of a disease such as smallpox21 or the 
establishment of much of our public infrastructure22 represents a benefit to the 
public which is not exclusive to a particular group or interest. These are often 
described as ‘public good’ undertakings. The entire concept of heritage 
conservation carries within it the ‘public good’ concept as, in general, the goal 
of heritage conservation is to retain significant aspects of the past for present 
and future generations, without restriction to a particular period or interest 
group and to make those protected remains accessible to all. The UNESCO,23 
Unidroit24 and World Heritage25 Conventions all support this concept, as do 
domestic instruments such as the Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter.26 With 
archaeological heritage conservation in Australia however the main 
beneficiaries of protective legislation over much of the last thirty years have 
been the archaeological community, particularly the archaeological consulting 
community, which has seen enormous growth in the number of projects and 
                                                                                                                             
(i.e. cultural resource management) archaeology versus academic archaeology in Australia (for pro and anti 
positions, see Mackay and Karskens 1999 and Murray 2002) or the place of archaeology within the planning 
system (Iacono 2002). 
19  Connah, G. (1997). "The purpose of archaeology." Australian Archaeology 45: 48-53.  
 Little, B. J. (2002). Archaeology as a Shared Vision. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, 
University Press of Florida: 3-19. , Smith, G. S. and J. E. Ehrenhard (2002). Protecting the Past to Benefit the 
Public. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, University Press of Florida: 121-129.  
20  For different, but related conceptions of ‘public good’ considerations, see for example:  
 Kaul, I. (2000). "What is a public good?" Le Monde Diplomatique Online. from 
http://mondediplo.com/2000/06/16riviere.  
 Allas, M. (2001). "Federal inquiry into public good conservation: farmers push for compensation?" National 
Environmental Law Review (2): 40-43.  
 Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage House of Representatives. Parliament. Australia (2001). 
Public Good Conservation: Our Challenge for the 21st Century: Interim report of the inquiry into the Effects upon 
Landholders and Farmers of Public Good Conservation Measures Imposed by Australian Governments. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
21  Kaul, I. (2000). "What is a public good?" Le Monde Diplomatique Online. from 
http://mondediplo.com/2000/06/16riviere.  
22  Wilkenfeld, G. and P. Spearritt (2004). Electrifying Sydney. Sydney, EnergyAustralia. Pg 4. 
23  UNESCO (1970). Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of 
Ownership of Cultural Property. UNESCO Convention.  
24  Unidroit (1995). Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. Unidroit Convention.  
25  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention.  
26  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter.   
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people involved in it.27 Much of the legislation and policy remains embedded 
in a strict scientific/research conception of the value of the physical remains of 
the past, making little consideration of other values of archaeological heritage, 
beyond knowledge of the past, to the broader community. This is examined in 
greater detail in Chapters 2 and 3 and reconciliation of this issue is central to 
the conclusions of the thesis. 
 
The concept of ‘public good conservation’ argues that, given the high level of 
societal resources invested in conservation and the impacts and burdens this 
can place on the community, there needs to be some definable benefit back to 
the community, beyond mere conservation for its own sake. The ‘public good’ 
concept holds that, if societal resources are directed to an undertaking, 
particularly where that undertaking is mandated in law, any benefit derived 
from that process should flow to society at large. Kaul described the essence 
of ‘public good’ undertakings as “once they exist, they are there for all to 
enjoy.”28 Some of this thinking is already inherent in the area of ‘public 
archaeology’29 and heritage interpretation generally, which seek engagement 
and dialogue between heritage sites, practitioners and the public. But the 
present legal and policy regimes do not support strong efforts in this direction 
for archaeological heritage, and rarely are community or public values 
considered, other than the provision of a short-term ‘public benefit’. The 
importance of considering broader ‘public good conservation’ issues for 
archaeological heritage is examined in detail in Chapters 3 and 4. 
 
The main criticisms of existing Australian legal regimes for protecting 
archaeological heritage can thus be summarised in two points: 
 
 The aims and practices of the discipline of archaeology, and the 
societal expectations for archaeology, have developed considerably 
from the position of thirty years ago, while the law and its 
implementation has not; and 
 
 Much of the body of Australian heritage law as it presently stands does 
not in fact protect what is most important about the archaeological 
heritage or facilitate conservation on a ‘public good’ basis, as the 
majority of current laws are based in misconceived or outdated legal 
definitions of what is significant about the archaeological past. 
 
These contentions form the backbone of the critique of Australian heritage 
legislation in the following chapters. 
 
                                            
27  See for example the statistical analysis of heritage approvals in NSW and Victoria in Chapter 7. See also Ulm, S., 
S. Nichols, et al. (2005). "Mapping the shape of contemporary Australian archaeology: implications for 
archaeology teaching and learning." Australian Archaeology 61: 11-23.  
Australian Archaeological Association (2005). Australian Archaeology in Profile: A Survey of Working 
Archaeologists 2005, Australian Archaeological Association.  
28  Kaul, I. (2000). "What is a public good?" Le Monde Diplomatique Online. from 
http://mondediplo.com/2000/06/16riviere.  
29  ‘Public archaeology’ being defined here as archaeological work which deliberately attempts to engage with the 
public. See general discussion on this matter in Little, B. J., Ed. (2002). Public Benefits of Archaeology. 
Gainsville, University Press of Florida.  
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 1–Issues in the legal protection of Australian archaeological heritage 7 
1.4 From lecture rooms to board rooms 
 
Since the 1970s, Australian archaeology–historical and Aboriginal–has largely 
moved from an academically-funded, university-based exercise, to a 
principally client-funded, commercially-based consulting archaeology.30 This 
has been, in part, due to the huge expansion in Australia’s urban centres and 
rural heavy industries over the last thirty years. Developers, miners and other 
proponents of major projects are subject to complex and often inflexible legal 
regimes for environmental and heritage protection set up by the 
Commonwealth, States, Territories and, in some circumstances, local 
government. These regimes require archaeological investigation in the form of 
survey, assessment and/or excavation well beyond the capacity of the pool of 
academic or government archaeologists to undertake the work. This demand 
for skills, fuelled strongly by development and construction, has given rise to a 
class of consulting archaeologists who have turned archaeology into as 
legitimate and necessary a business as any other field of environmental 
consulting.31  
 
But in doing so, the nature of Australian archaeological practice has changed. 
Prior to the late 1960s, Australian archaeologists were principally operating 
within an academic tradition and seeking to advance particular research 
interests while government archaeologists were managing or excavating 
prominent government-owned sites. Legislation was initially drafted to protect 
the raw material of archaeological scientific analysis, generally referred to as 
“relics”. This protective regime was strongly influenced by the dominant 
disciplinary paradigm of the period.32 Demands on the discipline have 
substantially changed since that initial period and, by contrast, consulting 
archaeologists must, by their very nature, be focused on client needs, cost-
effective work practices and compliance with legislation,33 limiting the analysis 
undertaken of the archaeological record. As they are working on behalf of a 
paying client, they must ensure that they are helping that client meet their 
legal obligations under heritage legislation while remaining commercially 
competitive. Thus few, if any, consulting archaeologists can or do undertake 
comprehensive research into the aspects of the archaeological past they 
investigate for commercial clients, in circumstances where the main concerns 
of the client are compliance with the technical legal requirements of the 
heritage legislation rather than a desire to better understand some aspect of 
the past.34 Rather, consultant archaeologists gather data35 to prevent its loss 
or destruction (often described as ‘research potential’ or ‘research 
                                            
30  Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pp 39-44. 
31  Mackay, R. and G. Karskens (1999). "Historical archaeology in Australia: historical or hysterical? Crisis or 
creative awakening?" Australasian Historical Archaeology 17: 110-115.  
 Iacono, N. Z. (2002). "Beyond the breach: advancing strategies for archaeological management plans." 
Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 39-47.  
 Murray, T. (2002). "But that was long ago: theory in Australian historical archaeology 2002." Australasian 
Historical Archaeology 20: 8-14.  
32  Ellis, B. (1994). "Rethinking the paradigm: cultural heritage management in Queensland." Ngulaig 10. Pp 7-9. 
33  Hodder, I. (1999). The Archaeological Process: An Introduction. Oxford, Blackwell Publishers.  Pg 17. 
34  There are of course occasional exceptions to this, as some consulting archaeologists do publish papers on 
specific projects in peer-reviewed forums such as the Australasian Journal of Historical Archaeology or Australian 
Archaeology, but very few could be said to have an ongoing research program, particularly as the selection of 
sites for investigation is based upon client requirements. 
35  Connah, G. (1998). "Pattern and purpose in historical archaeology." Australasian Historical Archaeology 16: 3-7.  
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significance’36), as required under the law, in the hope that at some future 
date it may be further analysed, researched and understood. 
 
Over the period which heritage legislation has been operating in Australia, a 
divide has grown between the academic archaeologists with research-
oriented goals and the consultant archaeologists, who have of necessity been 
compliance-focused. In the initial period of the legislation’s operation, 
archaeological work was often undertaken by academic archaeologists 
working on projects through the university or museum system, particularly on 
prominent government-owned sites. As archaeological work became 
increasingly undertaken by the private sector, this situation changed. 
Furthermore, pressure on university departments has meant that archaeology 
departments have been tending to shrink rather than grow, even as student 
numbers increase.37 Australian university archaeology departments are 
increasingly becoming partners with private sector consulting archaeologists, 
which bring a research focus into projects which are fundamentally driven by 
legislative compliance.38 This in fact may lead to a more in-depth 
consideration of archaeological issues in commercially-based projects. But 
such projects are still being driven by the requirements of the client and the 
legislation, rather than any academically-based research agenda. Similarly, 
those archaeologists employed by the public sector in Australia do not 
generally undertake site-based work and are increasingly moved into the role 
of administering or project managing consulting archaeologists working on 
behalf of government.39 
 
The lack of research undertaken by those involved in consulting archaeology 
should not be taken as an inherent criticism of this area per se. A number of 
Australian authors have demonstrated that archaeology can and does have 
value outside of the academic arena.40 Rather, there must be an 
                                            
36  NSW Heritage Office and Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (1996). Archaeological Assessments. 
Sydney, NSW Government.  
 Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter.  
37  For a general discussion of the state of archaeological education in Australia, see: Colley, S. (2000). 
"Archaeology and education in Australia." Antiquity 74: 171-177.  
 Balme, J. and M. Wilson (2004). "Perceptions of archaeology in Australia amongst educated young Australians." 
Australian Archaeology 58: 19-24.  
 Colley, S. (2004). "University-based archaeology teaching and learning and professionalism in Australia." World 
Archaeology 36 (2): 189–202.  
 Ulm, S., S. Nichols, et al. (2005). "Mapping the shape of contemporary Australian archaeology: implications for 
archaeology teaching and learning." Australian Archaeology 61: 11-23.  
38  For example, the present phase of the ‘Little Lon’ project in Little Lonsdale Street, Melbourne. The La Trobe 
university staff and students effectively operate as research consultants to the consulting archaeologists. Op cit 
Murray 2002; Murray, T. and A. J. C. Mayne (2001). Imaginary landscapes: reading Melbourne's "Little Lon". The 
Archaeology of Urban Landscapes: Explorations in Slumland. A. J. C. Mayne and T. Murray. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press: 89-105.  Murray, T. and A. J. C. Mayne (2003). "(Re) Constructing a Lost 
Community: "Little Lon," Melbourne, Australia." Historical Archaeology 37 (1): 87-101.  
39  There are of course occasional exceptions to this, as some government agencies which employ archaeologists 
will undertake field projects, although these tend to be small in scale and are generally run by agencies with 
archaeological assets and a cultural heritage brief (e.g. in New South Wales the Department of Environment and 
Conservation or the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority, which manages The Rocks in Sydney). Crossover 
exists in the other direction as well, with both the New South Wales and the South Australian public service 
maintaining heritage consulting groups which work on a commercial basis. 
40  Ireland, T. (1996). Excavating national identity. Sites: nailing the debate: archaeology and interpretation in 
museums. C. Paine. Sydney, Historic Houses Trust of NSW: 85-106.  
 Ireland, T. (2001). An Artefact of Nation: Historical archaeology, heritage and nationalism in Australia. Prehistoric 
and Historical Archaeology. Sydney, University of Sydney: 346.  
 Ireland, T. (2002). "Giving value to the Australian historic past: historical archaeology, heritage and nationalism." 
Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 15-25. Pp 126-153. 
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acknowledgement that contemporary archaeological practice in Australia has 
shifted considerably away from its academic roots, particularly those founded 
in the “scientific” or processual archaeology of the 1960s and 1970s. This 
change should not be unexpected and Murray noted that, for the discipline of 
archaeology in Australia, “survival depends on being relevant and having a 
clear understanding of goals and purposes”.41 This question of relevance, 
Murray was aware, extends beyond just being relevant to other members of 
the archaeological discipline, but being relevant to the wider society in which 
archaeology is practiced. And while Orser is sceptical of there being a clear 
“public” use for archaeologists, it is still necessary for archaeologists to 
consider the wider impacts of their research and the relationship and 
interaction of the discipline with modern society.42 The criticism then lies with 
the nature of the outcomes required by archaeological heritage legislation. As 
a body of law it inadequately reflects what Australian heritage protection 
advocates set out to achieve (discussed in detail in Chapter 3) and has driven 
contemporary practice into an unsustainable corner by enshrining in 
legislation antiquated notions of archaeological practice. This has created a 
tension between the needs and goals of academic and consulting 
archaeologists, government heritage administrators, indigenous people, 
property owners and the wider community. 
 
In examining this tension, this thesis considers the genesis of archaeological 
protection in Australia. It argues that many of the problems which have arisen 
for contemporary archaeological practice stem from the manner in which the 
protective legislation has been constructed. The changing nature of Australian 
archaeology and the imperatives of the legislation have shifted much of 
Australian archaeology from a ‘culture of research’ to a ‘culture of 
compliance’, with significant implications for Australian society and its 
expectations for heritage protection. Cuts to academic grants programs have 
been a significant factor in this shift,43 with an unspoken assumption that 
compliance-based archaeology funded from the private sector may be able to 
fill the gap in the absence of academic funding. Newer concepts, such as 
‘public good conservation’ are unable to be adequately achieved within the 
existing legal frameworks due to the inflexibility of those frameworks. This 
thesis identifies areas necessary for reform and makes concrete suggestions 
as to how both archaeological heritage legislation and archaeological practice 
need to change to ensure that archaeological heritage is adequately dealt with 
according to the significance and broad public value of individual sites. 
 
                                                                                                                             
 Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin.  
 Du Cros, H. (2002). Much more than stones and bones: Australian archaeology in the late twentieth century. 
Carlton, Vic., Melbourne University Press.  Pp 41-68. 
41  Murray, T. (1993). Communication and the importance of disciplinary communities: who owns the past? 
Archaeological theory - who sets the agenda? N. Yoffee and A. Sherratt. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 105-116. Pg 114. 
42  Orser, C. E. (1996). A historical archaeology of the modern world. New York, Plenum Press. Pp 201-204. 
43  Colley, S. (2004). "University-based archaeology teaching and learning and professionalism in Australia." World 
Archaeology 36 (2): 189–202.   
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1.5 Methodology of this thesis 
 
In this thesis, the material and evidence used for analysis includes the laws, 
charters, policies and court judgments which relate to archaeological heritage 
protection. This involves a process of historical research and literature review, 
philosophical discussion and textual analysis. To achieve its aims–an 
enumeration of the types of changes to archaeological law and practice which 
are required to implement ‘public good conservation’–the thesis takes the 
methodological path set out below. 
 
Historical analysis 
 
Documentary research has been undertaken into the historical development 
of archaeological heritage management principles in Australia and 
internationally, to track the change in perceptions and aims over time. This 
has included analysis of documents such as international treaties and 
charters, government reports, parliamentary debates and published literature. 
This research has identified a range of underlying legal protective principles 
for archaeological heritage, which are manifested in Australian heritage 
legislation in varying ways. Evans is in favour of an historical approach such 
as this when interpreting legislation, particularly noting the importance of 
understanding the “historical setting” and the “previous state of the law”. He 
further notes that parliamentary history44 must be used with care, due to the 
subtle distinction between the intent of the legislature in making the Act and 
the words used in its actual drafting.45 Levin cautions against an “originalist” 
approach to both jurisprudential and heritage interpretation, as reconstructing 
the original intent of lawmakers is as much an exercise in historical recreation 
as interpreting an historical place or event. He feels that social progress made 
since an historical event or the passing of a piece of legislation should not be 
denied, in a quest to determine an historical or legal original truth.46 
 
Butt and Castle observe that in the interpretation of laws there are both 
internal and external factors to consider. Internal factors relate to the 
interpretation of the content of the legal document itself; external factors may 
be considerably broader and include consideration of the intent of the 
document,47 though not necessarily the intent of the parties bound by the 
document.48 Both are relevant to the interpretation of the document by those 
bound by it and the courts. They further note that lawyers drafting documents 
such as legislation are inherently conservative and tend to favour the familiar, 
borrowing from what has been used in the past.49 It should therefore be 
unsurprising that many Australian heritage statutes are similarly framed and 
                                            
44  Based principally in parliamentary documentary sources such as records of debates (Hansard), parliamentary 
papers and supporting documentation. 
45  Evans, J. (1988). Statutory Interpretation: Problems of Communication. Melbourne, Oxford University Press.  pp 
274-289.   
46  Levin, D. (2004). "Federalists in the attic: original intent, the heritage movement and democratic theory." Law and 
Social Inquiry 29 (1): 105-126.  
47  Butt, P. and R. Castle (2001). Modern legal drafting: a guide to using clearer language. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. Pp 38-39. 
48  Aitken, J. K. and P. Butt (2004). Piesse, The elements of drafting (10th edition). Pyrmont, NSW, Lawbook Co. Pp 
10-14. 
49  Butt, P. and R. Castle (2001). Modern legal drafting: a guide to using clearer language. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. Pp 6-12. 
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worded. Acts have drawn on previous laws in other jurisdictions, sharing key 
concepts and terminology, as well as drawing upon common sources of 
inspiration or principle, such as international charters or influential domestic 
documents, such as the Hope Report50 and the Burra Charter. What this also 
means is that flawed premises can be passed from Act to Act, as will be 
shown through the detailed legislative analysis in Chapters 5 to 7. By 
examining the origins and foundations of the Acts, the aim is not to chronicle 
the development of heritage legislation in Australia or around the world; this 
has been well established elsewhere.51 Rather, the aim is to track the change 
in thinking about what aspects of archaeological heritage should or need to be 
protected and why. This is linked to changing visions of protections for the 
environment and heritage more generally. 
 
Philosophical discussion 
 
This thesis is a work of heritage management and it falls broadly within the 
realm of postprocessualist archaeological discourse.52 It is postprocessualist 
insofar as it rejects the “rigid scientism” of processual archaeology,53 which as 
will be shown, underpins much of Australian archaeological heritage law. But 
it does not attempt to situate the discussion more broadly within post-modern 
theory or discourse, rather choosing to rely upon environmental philosophy, 
and takes the view that, for the purposes of its discussion in a legal context, 
archaeology is an environmental matter. Environmental law is generally 
concerned with controlling impacts to “the environment” in the broadest sense, 
or driving environmental conservation or improvement. From a protective and 
conservation perspective, environmental law provides the basis for preventing 
what may be termed “unacceptable” impacts to archaeological resources in 
the form of unauthorised, deliberate or accidental destruction as well as 
providing a framework for active conservation54. This allows archaeology to be 
discussed comfortably within the context of environmental law more generally. 
Analysis in this thesis is carried out using principles of environmental 
philosophy from key texts and draws inferences and connections with the 
archaeological and heritage management principles drawn out in the historical 
analysis. This concludes with the establishment of the framework for ‘public 
good conservation’, which forms the basis against which existing frameworks 
are tested. 
 
Textual analysis 
 
The primary source materials used for this thesis are domestic and 
international charters, treaties and documents of principle (which indicate 
what should be protected and why), the laws which protect archaeological 
                                            
50  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service.  
51  For example, see O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and 
Excavation. Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd.  or Davison, G. (1984). A brief history of the Australian heritage 
movement. A Heritage Handbook. G. Davison and C. McConville. North Sydney, Allen & Unwin: 14-27.  
52  Although perhaps not precisely in the manner in which Smith refers to postprocessualism. 
 Smith, L. (1994). "Heritage management as postprocessual archaeology?" Antiquity 68: 300-309. , Smith, L. 
(2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 6-15 & 33-57. 
53  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 43-47. 
54  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 12-15. 
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heritage, policy and guidelines which flow from those laws (which set out how 
archaeological heritage is to be protected) and the judgments of the courts 
regarding archaeological issues or related principles (where the protections 
are tested). These documents all act as the ‘texts’ which require analysis and 
build the total framework for archaeological heritage management in Australia. 
This is supported by literature review of key texts in the areas of archaeology, 
cultural resource management and law, which provide a framework for 
analysing the primary source documents. Each of these types of text is 
examined to determine what position, if any, is taken on archaeological 
heritage protection and what the primary goals or intent was with respect to 
archaeological heritage protection. The steps of this analysis allow the 
existing legal frameworks for archaeological heritage protection to be related 
back to and tested against the notion of public good conservation.  
 
1.6 Key issues in the legal protection of the archaeological heritage  
 
In a broad sense, the “archaeological heritage” consists of those largely 
hidden traces of past activities and societies which can be uncovered through 
archaeological techniques. In Australia, this heritage falls into two general 
categories: historical archaeological heritage and indigenous archaeological 
heritage. 
 
Historical archaeology 
 
Historical archaeology is defined here as the study of the material evidence of 
the recent past through the use of archaeological techniques.55 In Australia, it 
refers to the archaeology of the colonial and post-colonial period. It is typically 
a text-aided method, allowing analysis of both documentary and 
archaeological evidence, which Anders described as the “interplay between 
artefact and text”.56 This implies that the archaeological record should be able 
to add depth and meaning to the historical record through the analysis of 
material culture. Too great an emphasis on artefacts or documents alone can 
belie the influence of individuals, society and the environment in the 
motivations behind past activities.57 To achieve a balanced understanding 
involves the interpretation and re-interpretation of the past, through 
archaeological materials, documentary records and human memory, or as 
Orser puts it “the creation and constant re-creation of the modern world”58, a 
sentiment echoed by Little.59 Through this process, the past remains 
                                            
55  For various perspectives see, for example: 
 Walker, I. C. (1978). Historic archaeology - methods and principles. Historical archaeology: a guide to substantive 
and theoretical contributions. R. L. Schuyler. Farmingdale, Baywood Publishing Company: 208-215.  
 Connah, G. (1988). The Archaeology of Australia's History. Melbourne, Cambridge University Press.  
 Trigger, B. (1989). A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
 Orser, C. E. and B. M. Fagan (1995). Historical archaeology. New York, HarperCollins College Publishers.  
 Orser, C. E. (1996). A historical archaeology of the modern world. New York, Plenum Press.  
 Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin.  
56  Anders, A. (1998). Between artefacts and texts: historical archaeology in global perspective. New York, Plenum 
Press. Pp 179-183. 
57  Jones, A. (2002). Archaeological theory and scientific practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  Pp 170-
171. 
58  Orser, C. E. (1996). A historical archaeology of the modern world. New York, Plenum Press.  Pg 183. 
59  Little, B. J. (2004). Is the medium the message? The art of interpreting archaeology in US National Parks. 
Marketing Heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. Y. Rowan and U. Baran. Walnut Creek, CA, 
AltaMira Press: 269-286.  
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changeable in order to remain relevant to contemporary society, even though 
the objects in the archaeological record themselves are static.60  
 
The ‘historical’ period varies from place to place but in general the starting 
point for historical archaeology is around the end of the medieval period in 
Europe61, or, in Australia, from the arrival of the first European settlers in 
1788. Pascoe notes that European Australia is one of the most heavily 
documented societies in the world, as the First Fleet arrived with a readymade 
bureaucracy and recordkeeping system,62 hence even the earliest days of 
Australian settlement are accompanied by at least some documentary 
material to supplement the archaeological record. The archaeological record 
is however ideally suited to providing information on those undocumented or 
unofficial aspects of Australian life. The few centuries preceding the arrival of 
the First Fleet include isolated instances of landings by Europeans and 
Indonesians on islands or coastal areas particularly on the western and 
northern coasts of Australia and, while these can be considered historical in 
nature, they are anomalies as far as the main body of historical archaeological 
knowledge is concerned in Australia. The end of the historical period is also 
somewhat open to debate and, in law, tends to be arbitrarily defined through a 
specific date or floating date range–e.g. everything before January 1st 190163 
or everything older than 50 years.64 The use of a particular cut-off date for the 
‘historical’ period has its own problems, however, as noted by Orser: 
 
the precise date [when historical archaeology begins] does not much 
matter. Setting an arbitrary starting point says more about its creator 
and what he or she thinks about the past than about the past itself…65 
 
This issue of legally defining the dates or ages for the prehistoric and 
historical archaeological period will be discussed in greater detail later in the 
text. 
 
Historical archaeological sites as a class of site are significantly under threat 
from present day activities, such as urban development and redevelopment, 
agricultural activity, industrial expansion and infrastructure creation, hence the 
need to consider their protection. Colonial and post-colonial66 settlement in 
Australia has been concentrated in a relatively small portion of the Australian 
landmass for the last two hundred years;67 the same areas of land are being 
                                            
60  Jones, A. (2002). Archaeological theory and scientific practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pp15-
16. 
61  Where it is sometimes referred to as ‘early modern’ or ‘post-medieval’ archaeology. 
62  Pascoe, R. (1979). The manufacture of Australian History. Melbourne, Oxford University Press.  Pg 163. 
63  NSW Heritage Act 1977, Section 4 (repealed). Prior to 1987, an archaeological ‘relic’ was defined as “any object 
deposit or material evidence, of or related to the settlement of New South Wales, not being Aboriginal settlement, 
and created before 1 January 1901.”  
64  NSW Heritage Act 1977, Section 4. Following substantial amendments to the NSW Heritage Act in 1987, the 
definition of a ‘relic’ was amended to “any deposit, object or material evidence…which is 50 or more years old.” 
This ‘floating’ date is generally referred to as the “50-year rule” and is the definition which is still in use at present 
in NSW. 
65  Orser, C. E. (1996). A historical archaeology of the modern world. New York, Plenum Press. Pg 87. 
66  The Australian continent constituted series of British colonies under military governance until the 1850s. 
Following the introduction of civilian authority, the various colonies on the continent were self-governing, until 
Federation in 1901. Docherty, J. C. (1993). Historical Dictionary of Australia. Sydney, Franklin Watts Australia. Pg 
66. 
67  Approximately 64% of the Australian population lives in the capital cities of the States and Territories, with up to 
85% of the population living in urban centres. Australian Bureau of Statistics (2006). 4102.0 - Australian Social 
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affected again and again by human activity, which has the potential to impact 
on sites of past activities in urban locations. Similarly, the increase in scale 
and intensity of agricultural and industrial activities in the rural areas are 
seeing larger and larger areas being affected by farming, forestry or mining, 
which are often overlaid on the earlier remains of such activities.68 Finally, the 
increased construction of infrastructure to support, service and connect the 
growing urban centres has seen greater impacts through the construction of 
roads, water infrastructure, power and telecommunications lines, than ever 
before. Given the prevalence, broad potential significance and substantial 
threats facing historical archaeological sites, they form a central focus of this 
thesis.  
 
Indigenous archaeology 
 
Non-indigenous conceptions of the nature of indigenous69 archaeology and 
heritage have changed substantially over the last thirty years, and continue to 
evolve. Initially, the indigenous past was typically viewed by non-indigenous 
people as of interest to academics studying the ‘stones and bones’ of a 
culture which was perceived as dead or dying.70 The social and political 
stature of indigenous people has grown over past decades, characterised by 
an increasing push for cultural self-determination and recognition of the 
contemporary links to past cultural practices.71 This has led to a general 
recognition that the archaeological materials of past indigenous activities are 
part of a continuum of activity extending from circa 60,000 years ago into the 
present day,72 but this has not necessarily translated into legal recognition of 
cultural continuity for indigenous people.73 Similarly, the value of these 
remains is perceived as no longer the sole preserve of academics, but rather 
something which should largely be under the control of indigenous people, 
                                                                                                                             
Trends, 2006. Australian Bureau of Statistics, Australian Government. Pp 179-180. Similar statistics are noted in 
the 1974 Hope Report as a major impact factor on Australia’s heritage places. Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the 
Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. Pg 21. 
68  For the purposes of this thesis “industrial archaeology”, which is focused on conserving the material remains of 
past industrial activities, will not be included within the larger notion of “historical archaeology”. While the 
methodologies for investigating industrial and historical archaeology have some overlap, in general, within 
Australia industrial, sites have been managed within the frameworks associated with built heritage. Thus the legal 
issues associated with Australian industrial sites can be significantly different from those with historical 
archaeological sites.  
69  Indigenous is used here in the generic sense, for pre-European Australian peoples and their descendents. This 
includes mainland and Tasmanian Australian Aborigines as well as Torres Strait Islanders, who consider 
themselves separate cultural groups. 
70  See, for example discussion in Mulvaney, D. J. (1968). Field research in Australia. Archaeology: A Guide to Field 
and Laboratory Techniques. D. J. Mulvaney. Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies. ; Allen, J. 
(1970). Early colonial archaeology. Aboriginal Antiquities in Australia. F. D. McCarthy. Canberra, Australian 
Institute of Aboriginal Studies.  Pg 99ff. 
71  For example, Brown discusses this in terms of the relationship between traditional stories and art and the realities 
of copyright and the contemporary art market: Brown, M. F. (2003). Who owns native culture? Cambridge, Mass., 
Harvard University Press. Pp 43-68. See also Janke, T. (1998). Our Culture Our Future : a Report on Australian 
Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property Rights. Sydney, Michael Frankel & Co for the Australian Institute of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. Pp 80-82. 
72  Sullivan, S. (1985). The Custodianship of Aboriginal Sites in Southeastern Australia. Who Owns the Past? I. 
McBryde. Melbourne, Oxford University Press: 139-156.  
 Horton, D. (1991). Recovering the tracks : the story of Australian archaeology. Canberra, Aboriginal Studies 
Press.  
 Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin.  Pp 71-75. 
73  Perhaps the most famous example of this being the denial of the Yorta Yorta land claim in Victoria, under the 
Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). Members of the Yorta Yorta Aboriginal Community v Victoria [2002] HCA 58 (12 
December 2002, unreported). For commentary, see Lilley, I. (2005). Archaeology and the politics of change in a 
decolonizing Australia. Object lessons: archaeology & heritage in Australia. J. Lydon and T. Ireland. Melbourne, 
Australian Scholarly Publishing: 89-106. Pp 90-92. 
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who have used this newfound authority in some instances to control who 
should have access to what aspects of indigenous culture and cultural 
material.74 Other aspects of indigenous heritage, particularly places of 
contemporary significance, are being progressively recognised75 and in some 
cases are the subject of statutory protection. 
 
The conflict between conceptualisations of the past is no starker than with 
respect to indigenous archaeology. At present, there remains considerable 
divergence between what indigenous people perceive as important remains of 
their past and what archaeologists consider important.76 The material culture 
of the indigenous past, in the form of archaeological remains, may not 
necessarily have the same value to archaeologists as for indigenous people.77 
Originally, legislation designed to project the indigenous past was created at 
the behest of non-indigenous archaeologists, including the 1955 Native and 
Historic Objects Heritage Protection Ordinance (Northern Territory), the 1965 
Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act (South Australia) and the 1972 
Aboriginal and Archaeological Relics Preservation Act (Victoria). However the 
balance has been shifting over the last thirty years and, at present, very little 
work can be done on remains of the indigenous past without, at a minimum, 
consultation with the indigenous community and often their direct input and/or 
explicit permission. This has principally been through changes in government 
policy rather than through specific enfranchisement of the indigenous 
community through legislation.  
 
Debate has ranged widely as to what constitutes the “indigenous past” and 
this has reflected other social changes within indigenous communities, the 
archaeological profession and wider society.78 For much of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries, the view was that it was critical to protect the physical 
remains of the past. The cultural and spiritual aspects of indigenous culture 
were seen as either absent, already lost or very soon to be lost. This was 
underlaid by a perception that indigenous people as a group would cease to 
exist, either having died out or having been fully assimilated into white culture. 
The protections posed in early heritage legislation reflect this view, as did 
comments made by parliamentarians during the debate on these early acts, 
as will be seen in Chapters 5 to 7. This attitude has largely shifted however, 
with recognition that while the physical remains of the past have value, they 
                                            
74  Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pp 59-91. 
75  Hinkson, M. (2001). Aboriginal Sydney: a guide to important places of the past and present. Canberra, Aboriginal 
Studies Press. As an example, Hinkson identifies a range of significant places to Aboriginal people in the greater 
Sydney area, some of which would be considered archaeological in the usual sense, as well as others which 
would not traditionally be viewed as Aboriginal heritage places. Notable amongst these is Australia Hall, an 
otherwise unremarkable late 19th century commercial building in Sydney, but which is highly significant to 
Aboriginal people as the birthplace of the Australian land rights movement in 1938. Now listed on the NSW State 
Heritage Register, the site was purchased by the Metropolitan Local Aboriginal Land Council and is used as that 
organisation’s head office. See Hinkson Pp 22-24 for further details, as well as the NSW State Heritage Register 
listing for the site: http://www.heritage.nsw.gov.au/07_subnav_02_2.cfm?itemid=5045005. Accessed 15 June 
2006. 
76  McIntosh, R. J., S. K. McIntosh, et al. (1996). People without history. Archaeological Ethics. K. Vitelli. Walnut 
Creek, CA, AltaMira Press: 185-197.  
 Mulvaney, D. J. and J. Kamminga (1999). Prehistory of Australia. St Leonards, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 6-10. 
 Du Cros, H. (2002). Much more than stones and bones: Australian archaeology in the late twentieth century. 
Carlton, Vic., Melbourne University Press. Pp 117-141. 
77  Langford, R. F. (1983). "Our heritage - your playground." Australian Archaeology 16: 1-6.  
78  Sullivan, S. (1985). The Custodianship of Aboriginal Sites in Southeastern Australia. Who Owns the Past? I. 
McBryde. Melbourne, Oxford University Press: 139-156.  
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do not represent the sum total of the indigenous past. This is slowly being 
reflected in the bulk of heritage legislation and there remain certain difficulties 
as to the practical implementation of protection for spiritual or intangible 
values of places. This problem is not however confined to indigenous sites 
and the importance and protection of intangible values is only just starting to 
be understood and discussed by heritage professionals, the community and 
governments.79  
 
The complexities over ‘ownership’ of the indigenous past aside, indigenous 
sites continue to be impacted by many of the same forces as historical sites 
and it is becoming clear that more of the archaeological remains of the 
indigenous past survive in the urban centres than previously suspected.80 The 
principal difference here is that indigenous sites are becoming more difficult to 
deal with, given competing values and perceptions of their ‘value’. With 
complex and overlapping legal regimes for both historical and indigenous 
archaeology it is necessary to consider them in conjunction. 
 
1.8 Related issues considered by this thesis 
 
Legal issues for movable heritage protection 
 
Movable heritage refers to anything of heritage significance which can be 
relocated.81 At various times, it has been used to describe artworks, 
machinery, vehicles, portable buildings, parts of buildings, personal effects, 
papers, human remains and collections of objects, including archaeological 
collections. Protections for movable heritage have existed for some time at the 
Commonwealth level, through the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 
1986 and have been progressively filtering down to the State and Territory 
level.82 The Commonwealth Act is principally concerned with the restriction of 
the export of certain types of objects where their removal from Australia is 
seen as potentially diminishing the cultural heritage of the Australian nation. 
This typically relates to classes of objects or collections of objects which may 
be offered for sale and thus may permanently leave Australia.83 
 
Movable heritage and archaeology generally intersect in Australia once an 
archaeological object has been removed from its original location or context, 
typically through excavation. Such objects tend to take the form of collections 
                                            
79  For example, Article 24 of the 1999 Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter, which includes consideration of “spiritual 
values” or the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. See also 
Truscott, M. (2000). "'Intangible values' as heritage in Australia." Historic Environment 14 (5): 22-30.  
80  E.g. developments in Angel Place in the Sydney CBD, or the Quadrant site in Ultimo near central Sydney 
contained physical remains of pre-European Aboriginal activities in highly urbanised contexts. See Godden 
Mackay (1996). Angel Place Archaeological Investigations Report. Sydney.  and Mider, D. (2002). Quadrant Site 
Archaeological Report, Broadway Ultimo.  
 Attenbrow, V. (2002). Sydney's Aboriginal Past. Sydney, UNSW Press.  
81  Winkworth, K. (1997). Movable heritage in NSW:  A report commissioned by the NSW Heritage Office. Sydney, 
NSW Heritage Office.  
 NSW Heritage Office (1999). Moveable Heritage Principles. Parramatta, NSW Government.  
 Russ, R. and K. Winkworth (2001). Significance : a guide to assessing the significance of cultural heritage objects 
and collections  Heritage Collections Council. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia.  
82  For example, NSW incorporated protections for movable heritage into the 1998 amendments to the NSW 
Heritage Act (section 4). Similarly, the Victorian Heritage Act provides some mechanisms for controlling the sale 
and movement of registered objects and archaeological relics (Sections 52-53 and 134). 
83  See the Schedule to the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Regulations 1987 (Cth) for the National Cultural 
Heritage Control List, which sets out the protected classes of movable heritage. 
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of archaeological artefacts from a specific site or location or individual 
artefacts of particular note which may be separated from a collection. 
Scholars such as Renfrew assert that looting of movable artefacts is “the 
primary threat to the archaeological heritage”84, however there is no evidence 
this is the case in Australia. In general, the philosophical underpinnings of 
movable heritage protection in Australia are focused on a belief that movable 
heritage should, wherever possible, remain in its original location, as it is the 
context provided by the original location which provides some, if not all, of the 
object’s significance.85 That said, this is rarely possible with archaeological 
materials as the process of discovery through excavation destroys the original 
location of the objects. This is further exacerbated where the land is 
excavated in a development context. The process of systematic relocation of 
archaeological material is generally required for in-depth research and study, 
and may also be a management decision based on the inability to protect 
archaeological materials in their original location. In certain instances relating 
to indigenous archaeological materials, ‘keeping places’86 have been 
established at or near the site of excavation (e.g. at Lake Mungo in NSW87) 
however this is not always practical, appropriate or necessary. 
 
In Australia, major state-run museums typically have their own enabling 
legislation which broadly defines their brief and powers, as well as 
establishing a governance structure for the institution. Examples of this 
include the Australian Museum Trust Act 1975 (NSW), the National Museum 
of Australia Act 1980 (Cth) or the Museum Act 1969 (WA). The focus of 
museum-enabling legislation is generally to establish the museum as a place 
of collection and display of materials, with an expectation that these 
collections will be used for research and public education.88 Australian 
museums have been quite active in conducting research-based 
archaeological programs in the past, however these are considerably 
outnumbered by commercially-driven archaeological works.89 Even within the 
context of these research excavations, museum archaeologists are still 
required to comply with the requirements of heritage legislation; museum 
affiliation gives no special exemption from these requirements. As repositories 
for ‘movable heritage’ in the broadest sense, Australian museums have been 
responsible for the collection and, in some circumstances, the discovery of 
aspects of Australia’s archaeological heritage. That said, they rarely serve as 
an integral part of the heritage management process, save as repositories for 
                                            
84  Renfrew, C. (2000). Loot, legitimacy, and ownership : the ethical crisis in archaeology. London, Duckworth. Pg 21 
85  NSW Heritage Office (1999). Moveable Heritage Principles. Parramatta, NSW Government. Pg 3. 
 Russ, R. and K. Winkworth (2001). Significance : a guide to assessing the significance of cultural heritage objects 
and collections  Heritage Collections Council. Canberra, Commonwealth of Australia.  
86  A ‘keeping place’ is a repository where archaeological materials which have been transferred back to the 
Aboriginal community can be kept in the custodianship of Aboriginal people. Legitimate researchers can, 
notionally, negotiate with the Aboriginal community for access to that material for study, however the facility is not 
a museum and stored material is not generally open to the public. 
87  NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (1997). Mungo National Park Guidebook. Yarralumla, Beaten Track 
Press.  
88  See for example Section 9 of the Museum Act 1969 (WA), Section 6 of the National Museum of Australia Act 
1980 (Cth) or Sections 7 and 8 of the Australian Museum Trust Act 1975 (NSW), which each set out the focus 
and key functions of the institutions they enable. In some cases, such as the Museum Act (WA), the brief 
explicitly includes archaeology, whereas the focus of other institutions, such as the Australian Museum (NSW) is 
on the ‘natural sciences’. 
89  It should be noted that some museums have set up their own commercial consulting businesses in response to 
the demand for archaeological compliance services, e.g. Australian Museum Business Services 
(http://www.ambs.com.au/). 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 1–Issues in the legal protection of Australian archaeological heritage 18 
excavated archaeological material. The specific issues arising from the 
management of archaeological heritage within museums are however beyond 
the scope of this thesis to investigate. 
 
The frameworks for movable heritage may provide mechanisms for managing 
archaeological objects once they are divorced from their original context, or 
may allow control over their import or export, however these are not perceived 
as the same issues as those relating to the protection of archaeological sites 
‘on the ground’ or which are as yet undiscovered. Australian archaeological 
objects have not attracted the same level of attention on the international 
market for antiquities and thus an illicit trade in such objects does not seem to 
exist at the same scale as the trade in, for example, Greek, Mayan or Asian 
antiquities.90 Similarly Australia lacks the pressures of acute poverty which 
drive the poor to loot archaeological sites in developing countries in order to 
survive.91 As these issues are only tangentially related to the underlying 
concerns of this thesis, legal controls for movable heritage will not be 
substantially considered here. 
 
Related areas of ‘hidden heritage’ 
 
Archaeological heritage in Australia differs from other types of heritage, such 
as buildings or artwork, as it is often not visible nor inherently understandable 
without some level of translation or interpretation by those with specialised 
skills. It requires the application of specific, in some cases scientific, 
techniques of archaeological investigation to assign meaning. In these 
respects it is ‘hidden heritage’–it is not readily observable when one walks 
around a city or a landscape, nor is it inherently comprehensible without 
assistance. Those more observable manifestations of the archaeological 
record–rock art sites, middens or ruins–are still likely to be overlooked, or not 
valued, by those who do not have some specific knowledge of their 
significance. Furthermore, being ‘hidden’, archaeological heritage is more 
subject to threat, damage or destruction, particularly through accidental 
disturbance. Such threats may themselves be difficult to perceive or anticipate 
until an archaeological place has been at least partially disturbed. 
 
Australia lacks the grand ruins of Europe or Asia, as indigenous peoples did 
not typically build lasting structures. Those that were built, such as fish traps 
or modified cultural landscapes,92 were often overlooked by later settlers as 
they were not perceived as representing construction and settlement in a 
traditional European sense. The romantic “ruin” of European experience never 
existed within Australia yet was a strong influence on the development of the 
                                            
90  However a substantial domestic trade in Aboriginal objects, particularly stone tools, existed in the late 19th and 
early 20th centuries. See Griffiths, T. (1996). Hunters and Collectors: The antiquarian imagination in Australia. 
Melbourne, Cambridge University Press.  
91  O'Keefe, P. J. (1997). Trade in antiquities : reducing destruction and theft. Paris, UNESCO Pub.  
 Renfrew, C. (2000). Loot, legitimacy, and ownership : the ethical crisis in archaeology. London, Duckworth.  
 Renfrew, C., N. Brodie, et al. (2001). Trade in illicit antiquities : the destruction of the world's archaeological 
heritage. Cambridge, McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research.  
 Beech, H. (2003). Spirited Away. Time: 52-60.  
92  Mulvaney, D. J. and J. Kamminga (1999). Prehistory of Australia. St Leonards, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 34-35; 
59-62.  
 Attenbrow, V. (2002). Sydney's Aboriginal Past. Sydney, UNSW Press. Pp 85-88. 
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discipline of archaeology,93 from the antiquarian tradition. Initially, therefore, 
Australia was not perceived as an archaeologically rich nation. Similarly, most 
early Colonial era structures have been replaced and subsumed by later 
changes to cities and landscapes, meaning that much of Australia’s earliest 
and most significant heritage is archaeological in nature. Substantial work has 
been undertaken in Australia about the “archaeological” natures of entire 
landscapes,94 on the basis that the patterns within the landscape can be 
uncovered using archaeological techniques and can reveal considerable 
information regarding the past use of the landscape. Cultural landscapes are 
as likely to in urban areas as rural areas,95 but will have different management 
issues requiring different responses. Overseas, some heritage sites straddle 
the border between ‘built’ and ‘archaeological’ heritage–the Pyramids in Egypt 
or Angkor Wat in Cambodia, for example. Part of this is certainly perception; 
as these sites were first investigated by archaeologists, they are perceived as 
‘archaeological’ and archaeological techniques do play a substantial role in 
investigating the history and significance of such sites. From a heritage 
management point of view however, such sites are substantially managed as 
built heritage and many of the immediate threats to such sites (e.g. pollution, 
development, visitation) are as likely to impinge on the built fabric of the site 
as upon their archaeological resources.  
 
Related areas–intangible cultural heritage 
 
The newest emerging area in heritage conservation internationally is the 
protection of intangible cultural heritage. Like many cultural heritage 
revolutions before it, this is being driven through the establishment of the 2003 
UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural 
Heritage.96 The main aims of this Convention are to safeguard intangible 
cultural heritage, through the fostering of respect, awareness and cooperation 
for its protection.97 The Convention sees intangible cultural heritage as 
important in the maintaining of “cultural diversity and a guarantee of 
sustainable development”.98 The intangible heritage has been defined by the 
Convention to include oral tradition, language, performing arts, social 
practices, knowledge and traditional craftsmanship,99 though it is unclear how 
the Convention will facilitate the retention or restrict trade in intangible cultural 
heritage.100 Furthermore, it has been noted that if an aspect of intangible 
cultural heritage is maintained (through, say, recorded media) but the people 
and culture which produced that intangible practice are gone, then the 
conservation exercise has been a failed one.101  
                                            
93  Sweet, R. (2004). Antiquaries: The discovery of the past in eighteenth-century Britain. London, Hambledon and 
London. Pp 285-286. 
94  Lennon, J. (2001). Identifying and assessing cultural landscapes: Australian practice in a global context. Heritage 
landscapes: understanding place and communities. M. Cotter, B. Boyd and J. Gardiner. Lismore, NSW, Southern 
Cross University Press: 11-24.  
95  Hayden, D. (1995). The power of place: urban landscapes as public history. Cambridge, MIT Press. Pp 44-81. 
96  UNESCO (2003). Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage. Hereafter Intangible 
Convention. Adopted by the UNESCO General Conference on 17 October 2003. 
97  Intangible Convention, Article 1. 
98  Intangible Convention, Preamble. 
99  Intangible Convention, Article 2. 
100  Merryman, J. H. (2005). "Cultural heritage internationalism." International Journal of Cultural Property 12: 11-39. 
Pp 25-26. 
101  Brown, M. F. (2005). "Heritage trouble: recent work on the protection of intangible cultural property." International 
Journal of Cultural Property 12: 40-61. Pp 53-54.  
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The Intangible Convention makes no specific mention of archaeology or 
archaeological issues, although it is possible to see how archaeological 
places could be relevant to certain cultural practices which fall within the 
Convention’s definitions. Some work has been undertaken in Australia on the 
protection of indigenous intangible heritage,102 although these issues are by 
no means resolved.103 Intangible values have formed part of the basis for the 
listing of places on the World Heritage List, but this does not presently apply 
to any Australian places.104 Australia is not a signatory to this Convention, nor 
has the Convention received significant attention domestically.105 As of mid-
2006, the Convention has only just received sufficient signatories to be ratified 
and thus it is too early to observe its application.106 Amendments to the 
Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter in 1999 started to address the conservation 
of non fabric-based heritage values,107 through the addition of ‘spiritual’ 
significance as a consideration for the Charter. Despite this, limited work has 
been undertaken in the protection of intangible cultural heritage generally in 
Australia, although there are some commonalities with work undertaken on 
the social value of heritage places.108 
 
The most relevant efforts have been those in the areas of indigenous heritage 
and social policy, which recognise that part of societal wellbeing for 
indigenous people is the ability to practice their culture and see it passed on to 
future generations. Internationally, the cultural value of biodiversity to 
indigenous people is receiving greater recognition,109 but the same recognition 
lags behind for archaeological heritage. One of the limitations which 
indigenous people have encountered in Australia has been that heritage 
legislation, or other environmental legislation such as that which establishes 
parks and reserves, can exclude indigenous people from access to and use of 
culturally significant places due to the environmental and heritage protection 
regimes which have been put in place. Even in cases where significant places 
have been returned to the ownership of indigenous Australians, they have 
often been denied the ability to manage those places.110 This raises 
challenging questions as to whom that heritage belongs and for whom is it 
being protected. In New South Wales, the government has recognised this 
                                            
102  Janke, T. (1998). Our Culture Our Future : a Report on Australian Indigenous Cultural and Intellectual Property 
Rights. Sydney, Michael Frankel & Co for the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies. 
Brown’s article cited above provides a more general commentary on the issue of appropriation of cultural 
knowledge from indigenous communities internationally. 
103  Diver, A. (2004). "A just war: protecting indigenous cultural property." Indigenous Law Bulletin 6 (4): 7-10.  
104  Beazley, O. (2005). "'Five feet from heaven': the World Heritage Convention, 'mountains of meaning' and 
inspirational landscapes. Identifying and protecting mountains' intangible heritage values." Historic Environment 
18 (2): 3-10.  
105  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 22-23. 
106  The Convention entered into force on 20 April 2006. As of that date there were 47 States Parties to the 
Convention. 
107  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Article 24. See also comments in Allen, C. (2004). "The road from Burra: thoughts on 
using the Charter in the future." Historic Environment 18 (1): 50-53.  
108  Byrne, D., H. Brayshaw, et al. (2001). Social Significance: A discussion paper. Hurstville, NSW National Parks 
and Wildlife Service: 161.  
 Johnston, C. (1992). What is social value? A discussion paper. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service.  
109  Birnie, P. W. and A. E. Boyle (2002). International Law and the Environment (2nd edition). Oxford, Clarendon 
Press. Pp 579-580. See also NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service (1999). NSW Biodiversity Strategy. NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Service. Pp 8-9. 
110  Cordell, J. (1993). Who owns the land? Indigenous involvement in Australian protected areas. The law of mother: 
protecting indigenous peoples in protected areas. E. Kemf. San Francisco, Sierra Club Books: 104-113.  
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and is working to develop frameworks which allow access to significant places 
for cultural purposes.111 While in some cases these significant places may 
have archaeological values, consideration of the full scope of intangible 
cultural heritage issues with respect to archaeological heritage is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
 
1.9  Issues excluded from consideration by this thesis 
 
A full discussion of other types of ‘hidden heritage’ which may have some 
relationship to archaeology falls outside the scope of this thesis. These areas 
are identified below along with reasons noted for their exclusion from this 
discussion. 
 
Excluded issues–Maritime archaeology 
 
Maritime archaeology in Australia refers generally to sites under water112 
(which may include oceans, lakes or rivers), although more often than not it 
refers specifically to shipwrecks. Literally thousands of shipwrecks dot the 
Australian coasts, riverine and territorial waters.113 In addition, other sites of 
formerly land-based activities can be considered maritime in nature,114 such 
as sites of indigenous activities in areas now below sea level, but in practice 
such sites are rarely encountered. Terrestrial sites which are associated with 
maritime activities, such as whaling or shipbuilding, are often also considered 
“maritime” archaeological sites, however for the context of this thesis, 
“maritime” sites are considered to be those under water. 
 
This thesis does not intend to engage with the issue of historic shipwrecks or 
of other types of maritime sites, except at the most general level, for a number 
of reasons. From a legal perspective, there are a range of additional 
complexities relating to such issues as insurance law (many shipwrecks are in 
fact owned by insurance companies which have paid out on the wreck), 
salvage law (in certain instances the salvage of cargo is permissible, which is 
quite different from land-based sites) and other general issues of admiralty 
law (the general term for the ‘law of the sea’, which deals with how ships and 
nations are to behave in international waters). Other complexities include war 
graves legislation for ships sunk in conflicts. The broad legal framework for 
maritime archaeological heritage is thus substantially different from that of 
land-based archaeological heritage. 
 
The other major reason for excluding such heritage from this discussion is 
that, in comparison with land-based archaeological heritage, maritime heritage 
is under little threat from anything save the actions of the environment. While 
                                            
111  NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs (2005). Two Ways Together: the NSW Aboriginal Affairs Plan 2003 - 2012. 
NSW Department of Aboriginal Affairs. Pg 81. http://www.daa.nsw.gov.au/policies/twtreport.html. Accessed 
March 25 2006. Significantly, it should be noted that these frameworks do not seek to restrict indigenous people 
to “traditional” uses of significant places, but rather recognise that indigenous culture and tradition does evolve. 
For a general discussion of this issue see Bomford, M. and J. Caughley, Eds. (1996). Sustainable Use of Wildlife 
by Aboriginal Peoples and Torres Strait Islanders. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
112  UNESCO (2002). Convention for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage. Article 1. 
113  See for example the National Shipwreck Database (http://eied.deh.gov.au/nsd/public/welcome.cfm) which lists 
more that 6000 wrecks around Australia. See also NSW Heritage Office (1996). Shipwreck Atlas of New South 
Wales. Sydney, NSW Government.  
114  UNESCO (2002). Convention for the Protection of Underwater Cultural Heritage. Article 1. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 1–Issues in the legal protection of Australian archaeological heritage 22 
there are impacts from divers seeking souvenirs, active ‘treasure hunters’, 
salvage companies or commercial activities (e.g. sea bed mineral exploration, 
drag-net fishing) these are less intense and less immediate than the impacts 
occurring daily upon land-based heritage. No doubt some maritime 
archaeologists would dispute this statement and certainly the recent release 
of a UNESCO Convention for Underwater Heritage115 and changes to the 
NSW Heritage Act116 with respect to maritime heritage would suggest that 
problems do exist. But for the reasons cited above, maritime archaeological 
heritage will not be specifically considered in this thesis. 
 
Excluded issues–Palaentological remains and fossils 
 
Palaentological remains include fossils and associated deposits as well as 
evidence of very early land forms and the actions of early forms of life (such 
as fossilised footprints, river beds or animal tracks).117 Palaentological 
remains were, for many years, primarily the preserve of the academic 
palaeontologist but in more recent years have attracted the attention of the 
serious collector. To some extent, this may be because such collecting runs in 
cycles of fashion; as noted above, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, indigenous stone tools were actively sought by private collectors.118 
Fossils have certainly recently captured the public interest, generally in the 
form of dinosaurs and, to a lesser extent, ancient mammals, and enormous 
markets have opened up for such material locally and internationally.119 
Virtually no legislation has been put in place for their protection domestically in 
Australia; however their export from Australia is controlled.120 Two Australia 
fossil sites are listed on the World Heritage List and protected by the 
Commonwealth Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999.121 
 
Palaentological specimens differ from archaeological remains in that, 
generally, they are infinitely more ancient than the archaeological remains of 
indigenous and non-indigenous human activities and are therefore not readily 
associated with any particular culture or group. In some instances, indigenous 
people have asserted a spiritual connection with palaeontological specimens, 
                                            
115  Ibid.  
 As of June 2006, only eight countries, and not including Australia, had ratified the Convention. The Convention 
requires twenty States Parties in order to come into force.  
 http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13520&language=E&order=alpha. Accessed June 25 2006. 
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Heritage Act in 2002. See Sections 47-50 of that Act.  
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discovered in Australia. See for example Webb, S., M. L. Cupper, et al. (2005). "Pleistocene human footprints 
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119  Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers (TV documentary), SBS.  Documentary screened on SBS television, 
November 2002. See also the book of the same name: Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, 
N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. See also the South Australian Heritage Places Act 1993, which does have specific 
protections for palaeontological heritage (under section 25). 
120  See Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act (1986) Commonwealth. Certain types of palaeontological 
material appear on the National Cultural Heritage Control List. 
121  Australian Fossil Mammal Sites, Naracoorte, SA and Riversleigh via Gregory Downs, QLD. World Heritage List 
Item # 698, declared 1994. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/698. Accessed 22 March 2006. 
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such as dinosaur footprints.122 Most fossilised remains are hundreds of 
thousands if not many millions of years old, and thus seem to be viewed by 
collectors or commercial fossil hunters more as a natural resource like ore or 
gemstones to be won from the earth, rather than important historical material 
to be protected. Fossilised remains have many of the same qualities as 
archaeological remains and therefore also share many of the same problems–
they are generally below ground, are often ‘invisible’ to the casual observer, 
are fragile and readily destroyed and rely on systematic excavation and an 
understanding of their wider context of discovery to fully appreciate their 
value.  
 
Due to their status or perception as more a natural resource than a cultural 
artefact, they lack the same level of protection. No ‘culture of compliance’ has 
been created for palaeontology which would drive its commercialisation as a 
discipline, in the way that historical and indigenous archaeology have been 
driven in response to legislative regimes and the emergence of a market for 
archaeological compliance services. This is unlike many other natural 
resources, such as flora and fauna, which are often very strongly protected. 
Again it may largely be a matter of the lack of visibility of the fossil record and 
the lack of a strong advocate. Fossils are associated with no living culture, 
they lack an inherent advocate other that academic palaeontologists, in most 
instances, and are less directly relevant to contemporary Australians for 
anything save as curiosities or collectibles. In certain instances, areas of high 
palaeontological significance have been placed on heritage registers and 
protected through the process of heritage listing, but there are no blanket 
protections as tend to exist for archaeological materials.123 Emerging regimes 
for protecting natural heritage may provide the key to that protection, or some 
of the ideas espoused within this thesis may suggest appropriate mechanisms 
for palaeontological heritage, but in the absence of any specific legal regime 
for their protection, they will not be further explicitly discussed in this thesis.124 
 
Excluded issues–Geological heritage 
 
As with palaeontological remains, items of geological significance or rarity 
tend to be hidden from view and again require the intervention of a specialist 
to interpret their significance, save perhaps in instances where such 
formations are objects of natural beauty (for example the Walls of China at 
Lake Mungo in New South Wales125). In some instances, geological features 
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are protected through a heritage listing process,126 but again no blanket 
protections exist for areas of geological significance even though such places 
suffer from the same lack of visibility as other nonliving aspects of the natural 
environment. Geological areas are however highly significant for both 
scientific study127 and recreational enjoyment.128 Both prehistorically and 
historically geological sites, particularly caves, have been important places for 
people to live, work or exploit resources.129 The other area of conflict which 
arises is that places of geological significance may also be the locations of 
significant mineral deposits which are exploitable for industrial and 
commercial purposes. Thus a rare geological feature may have a dollar value 
which is easily perceived as mineral wealth, but which may not be perceived 
in terms of research value to geologists or as an item of natural beauty. This 
can place the same pressure on geological heritage as on other sorts of 
hidden heritage, to exploit the site at the expense of other values. Thus for 
their protection, known geological sites have been protected through heritage 
listing processes. 
 
The exploitation of mineral wealth is commonly controlled at the State and 
Territory level through specific legislation relating to mining and extractive 
industries. It is worth noting that, unlike archaeological remains and 
palaeontological materials, mineral resources are in general owned by the 
government, not by the landowner.130 Thus the government makes 
considerable revenue through extraction of mineral resources in a way it does 
not from archaeological or palaeontological materials. This may explain, in 
part, why strict regimes protecting geological heritage have not been 
established. Geological heritage also lacks a strong advocate, particularly in 
comparison to the interests of the resource extraction industries, although 
professional organisations such as the Geological Society of Australia have 
made representations in the past, seeking the protection of geological 
heritage.131 These issues are not however directly relevant to the issues 
investigated by this thesis and will not be further explored here. 
 
On the bases outlined above, the main concerns of this thesis will be with the 
legal regimes for managing and protecting historical and indigenous 
archaeological heritage and not the totality of the ‘hidden heritage’ of 
Australia.  
                                            
126  The Australian Heritage Places Inventory lists 173 places as “geological sites” across Australia. These places 
appear on one or more heritage registers at local, State/Territory or Commonwealth level. See 
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undertaken 17 June 2006.  
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1.10 Influences–Archaeology and its place in environmental law 
 
As a legal issue, archaeology is appropriately situated within the context of 
environmental law, as one of a range of important considerations about the 
environment we inhabit and the environment we wish to pass on. The place of 
archaeology within environmental considerations is dealt with in Chapter 4, 
through reference to environmental philosophy. It is more important however 
to observe at this stage how archaeology has been managed in a practical 
sense within the realm of the Australian regulatory framework, as well as by 
making a pragmatic examination as to the state of the discipline. Where an 
archaeologist requires no new access to the physical remains of the 
archaeological past, particularly no new excavation, opportunities remain for 
‘pure’ research-driven archaeology to be undertaken without any legal 
restraint. Many archaeological issues are fully dealt with through a process of 
analysing ancient texts, or by making maps and formulating hypotheses about 
this or that spatial patterning, or by observing above-ground features such as 
rock art and formulating and testing hypotheses on their relationship to myth 
cycles or cultural practices. This has, in some instances, led to debate over 
the ownership of the intellectual property arising from the study of indigenous 
cultures.132 Such activities do not need to be regulated as, while they are 
important in their own right, they are intellectual exercises only. These 
activities do not of themselves have a direct impact on the physical remains of 
the archaeological past, and can be undertaken equally by academic, 
professional or amateur archaeologists or the general public. Hodder notes 
however that, at least in terms of perception, archaeology is generally viewed 
as synonymous with excavation.133  
 
As archaeological remains are affected by more than just intellectual 
processes they require a management framework which can adequately 
manage impacts when they do occur. It is the physical interaction with 
archaeological heritage which requires regulation. Environmental law provides 
that regulatory framework. Australian law essentially recognises heritage 
protection, and thereby archaeology, as an environmental protection issue.134 
This is not necessarily a widely accepted position among archaeologists, 
however the ‘environmental’ nature of Australia’s heritage was recognised as 
early as 1974.135 Some legislation refers to ‘environmental heritage’136 and 
includes archaeology in its definition. Within indigenous cultural heritage, the 
separation of the “natural” and “cultural” is similarly viewed as an artificial 
distinction.137 Heritage management more generally, particularly at the 
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134  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 8-9. 
135  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 20-31. 
136  E.g. the NSW Heritage Act, Section 4.  
137  Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pp 71-75. 
 Godden, L. (2002). "Indigenous heritage and the environment : "Legal categories are only one way of imagining 
the real"." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 19 (4): 258-266.  
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Commonwealth level, has been treated as part of the same processes as 
managing that natural environment. In other cases, we see archaeology taken 
into consideration as a factor in planning approvals, or environmental impact 
assessment, as is done with other environmental concerns including 
threatened species issues, noise, contamination, traffic or building density. 
 
The increased commercialisation of archaeological practice in Australia has 
also drawn Australian archaeology into the realm of environmental law. Due to 
the legal frameworks which exist for heritage management, heritage and 
archaeology tend to be considered in the course of almost any development 
or project of even moderate scale, through the environmental impact 
assessment process. This is particularly important as archaeology tends to be 
concerned with place and the significance of place. Thus impacts to 
archaeological places often have a direct bearing on their archaeological 
values. 
 
1.11  Influences–Archaeology, law and politics 
 
The influence of politics on the enactment of heritage legislation cannot be 
ignored. The creation of legislation is a political act and one in which certain 
viewpoints or issues may prevail over others for reasons other than merit. 
Where this has been most obvious in Australia and where archaeologists 
have paid the most heed has been in the conflicts between indigenous people 
and the archaeological community over access to the physical remains of the 
indigenous past. Decisions have been made, often on political grounds, as to 
what level of consultation is required with indigenous people, what level of 
involvement they must have ‘on the ground’, and what level of access or 
control indigenous people can exert over the physical remains of their past. 
This involvement of non-archaeologists has been troubling for the discipline at 
different times, with some archaeologists adopting a hardline position of 
claiming a “right of access” to the physical remains of the past,138 although 
this position has largely moderated in recent years.139 
 
Political considerations have seen decisions made to repatriate indigenous 
skeletal material, over the vocal protestations of those academic 
archaeologists who wish to study the remains,140 as well as the return of other 
classes of objects. Substantial quantities of indigenous objects in Australian 
museums were collected by amateurs, antiquarians, anthropologists and 
                                            
138  Ward, G. K. (1983). Archaeology and legislation in Australia. Australian Field Archaeology: A Guide to 
Techniques. G. Connah. Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies: 18-42.  Pg 18. 
139  Australian Archaeological Association (2004). Code of Ethics. Section 3–Principles relating to indigenous 
archaeology. See http://www.australianarchaeologicalassociation.com.au/codeofethics.php. Accessed 25 
February 2006. 
140  See Sainty v Allen (Unreported, No. VG 643/1995). For commentary on the archaeological perspective see, for 
example: Allen, J. (1995). "A short history of the Tasmanian affair." Australian Archaeology 41: 43-48.  
 Murray, T. and J. Allen (1995). "The forced repatriation of cultural properties to Tasmania." Antiquity 69 (266): 
871-877.  
 Murray, T. (1996). "Aborigines, Archaeology and Australian heritage." Meanjin 55 (4): 725-735.  
 Murray, T. (1996). Archaeologists, Heritage Bureaucrats, Aboriginal organisations and the Conduct of Tasmanian 
Archaeology. Australian Archaeology '95: Proceedings of the 1995 Australian Archaeological Association 
Conference, St Lucia, University of Queensland.  
 For an indigenous legal perspective on the case see for example: 
 Auty, K. (1995). "Aboriginal Cultural Heritage: Tasmania & La Trobe University." Aboriginal Law Bulletin 54 
(3(76)): 20.  
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ethnographers well before the commencement of heritage legislation. In some 
cases collections date to the 19th century and may have had little or no 
material added to the collection in decades. These complexities however are 
often not fully explored when conflicts arise and the issues are grouped 
together. In some instances, partnerships have been reached between 
indigenous people and archaeologists, although often with the wishes of the 
archaeologists given secondary consideration.141 This is somewhat ironic as 
in many instances archaeologists were initially responsible for the discovery 
and protection of indigenous archaeological remains, before indigenous 
people had sufficient political influence to exert direct control over their past. 
But, as this is in the realm of the political process, by swings and roundabouts 
the balance may shift to a different arrangement of shared knowledge and 
control in the future.142 
 
Political considerations are not confined to indigenous heritage. With non-
indigenous archaeological heritage, decisions have been made in the past to 
expedite matters when it was in the interests of the government, or other 
parties with substantial influence. Examples of this in NSW include the 
redevelopment of Darling Harbour in Sydney for the Bicentenary Celebrations 
in 1988, or the establishment of the Redfern-Waterloo Authority, which has 
broad powers to revitalise this area of Sydney but which is exempted from the 
control of the NSW Heritage Act.143 Darling Harbour had been an important 
industrial area and shipping precinct for much of Sydney’s history and, prior to 
redevelopment, reflected that industrial and maritime heritage. In order to 
facilitate the redevelopment, the government of the day passed special 
legislation which exempted that area of the city from normal planning control, 
including exempting it from the control of the NSW Heritage Act.144 This 
resulted in most of the historical remains of past industry being removed, with 
little concern for the conservation of the area’s maritime heritage145 in either 
its built or archaeological forms. In other examples, governments have poured 
resources into projects seemingly beyond all reasonable sense, in order to 
make good on political promises, rather than modifying proposals which might 
                                            
141  Murray, T. (1996). "Aborigines, Archaeology and Australian heritage." Meanjin 55 (4): 725-735.  
 Murray, T. (1993). Communication and the importance of disciplinary communities: who owns the past? 
Archaeological theory - who sets the agenda? N. Yoffee and A. Sherratt. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 105-116.   
142  While some archaeologists, such as Ward (1983), have taken a strong “right of access” stance towards 
archaeologists and archaeological heritage, this position has largely been done away with in contemporary 
archaeological practice. Section 3 of the current Australian Archaeological Association Code of Ethics explicitly 
repudiates positions of this nature. See detailed discussion on this issue in the following chapters. 
143  Section 29 of the Redfern-Waterloo Authority Act 2004 (NSW) exempts the Authority from the control of the NSW 
Heritage Act within its defined operational area under section 5 and Schedule 1. See also Redfern-Waterloo 
Authority (2004). Redfern-Waterloo Plan #2. Sydney. More recently, amendments in 2005 to the Environmental 
Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW), Section 3A, allow certain major projects (including critical 
infrastructure and projects worth more than $50million) to be determined under this new section of the EP&A Act. 
Section 3A removes the requirement for approvals under the Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) or the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) for non-indigenous and indigenous heritage respectively, though the impact of a project 
on these matters must still be assessed by the proponent. The heritage authorities are allowed to comment on 
the project and suggest conditions of consent but it is not mandatory for the Department of Planning to place 
these conditions on the final project approval. 
144  The Darling Harbour Act 1987. This was repealed in 2000 when the Darling Harbour Authority was amalgamated 
with the Sydney Harbour Foreshore Authority. Darling Harbour is once again subject to regulation under the 
Heritage Act. 
145  Fitzgerald, S. (1992). Sydney 1842-1992. Sydney, Hale & Iremonger. Pg 239. 
 Ashton, P. (1993). The Accidental City: planning Sydney since 1788. Sydney, Hale & Iremonger. Pp 112-116.  
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 1–Issues in the legal protection of Australian archaeological heritage 28 
adversely impact upon archaeological heritage.146 This type of action is not 
restricted to any one jurisdiction. 
 
Politics can make or unmake laws, or can influence the rigour with which laws 
are administered. Heritage and archaeology are no different in this regard 
from other potentially controversial, politically sensitive environmental issues 
such as land clearing, infrastructure construction or mining. Conserving the 
archaeological heritage becomes part of the political balancing act, along with 
job creation, provision of service or keeping promises to the electorate. The 
other side of this equation is that, in instances where laws become perceived 
as too burdensome upon the community,147 or not producing effective or 
valuable outcomes, such laws can be substantially modified or repealed. 
There are areas of archaeological heritage protection which are arguably 
burdensome, as they are based on outdated conceptions of archaeological 
values. Ensuring archaeological heritage law reflects contemporary 
community values (such as ‘public good conservation’) is necessary if the 
legislation is to continue to be effective and valued by the public and 
government. 
 
1.12 Structure of the thesis 
 
This thesis investigates the original basis for and intent behind the 
establishment of archaeological protective legislation in Australia. Through 
this investigation, it is possible to observe a disjunction between that original 
intent and the evolution of disciplinary practice over the last thirty years. 
Consideration of changes in social values and needs, with respect to heritage 
conservation, generally suggests a direction for legislative reforms which will 
achieve outcomes closer to the original purposes envisaged in the 
establishment of protective legislation. This thesis represents the first such 
comprehensive analysis of archaeological heritage legislation in Australia. It 
considers the law in all Australian jurisdictions, relevant case law and links this 
to archaeological practice in a way which is aimed at producing better real-
world outcomes.  
 
In this investigation, the thesis is structured as follows: 
 
Chapter 2 contains a review of archaeological literature relevant to 
archaeological heritage management and the influence of the ‘scientific’ 
paradigm of archaeological practice on Australian heritage law. It considers 
the ramifications of bringing archaeology within the legal realm and what this 
means for both the discipline and its relationship to wider society. This allows 
consideration of the value of archaeological heritage protection to Australian 
                                            
146  Burgmann, M. and V. Burgmann (1998). Green bans, red union : environmental activism and the New South 
Wales Builders Labourers' Federation. Sydney, UNSW Press.  
 Goddard, J. (2004). We can't build the future without properly knowing the past. Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney: 
15.  
 Goddard, J. (2004). "Protection? What protection?" reflections: The National Trust Quarterly (August-October): 6-
8.  
  Casey, M. (2005). The road to controversy. Object lessons: archaeology & heritage in Australia. J. Lydon and T. 
Ireland. Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing: 148-166.  
147  Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government.  
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society and establishes the notion of ‘public good conservation’ and its validity 
for future management of Australian archaeological heritage. 
 
Chapter 3 uses aspects of environmental philosophy to situate archaeological 
heritage protection within the larger framework for environmental protection in 
Australia. It examines the issue of ‘scientific significance’ with respect to 
Australian archaeological heritage, and draws conclusions about the value 
and utility of existing significance frameworks and their relationship to heritage 
legislation. Several moral and philosophical positions relating to environmental 
protection and the ‘public good’ are explored, to lay the ground for a broader 
consideration of ‘public good conservation’ later in the thesis. 
 
Chapter 4 examines the past and present philosophical frameworks for 
managing archaeological heritage both generally and in Australia, through a 
process of literature review of academic, legal and policy works. It then 
examines the various frameworks for archaeological heritage management 
such as the UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles for 
Archaeological Excavations148, the World Heritage Convention149 and the 
ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and Management of the Archaeological 
Heritage150 as well as domestic instruments such as the Burra Charter.151 
From this, high-level principles for archaeological heritage protection are 
apparent, and their treatment and application are considered in subsequent 
chapters. 
 
Chapter 5 undertakes a general examination of the Australian legal 
framework and then specifically considers the Commonwealth legislation 
relating to archaeological heritage protection. Chapter 6 reviews and 
analyses the state of archaeological heritage legislation in six States and 
Territories. In both chapters, heritage legislation forms the material for 
analysis, which is considered in terms of the way archaeology is defined and 
protected. This analysis focuses on the main pieces of heritage legislation for 
each jurisdiction and, where relevant, looks at the differing treatments of 
indigenous and historical archaeological heritage. The intent of such 
legislation is examined, through the analysis of the Second Reading 
Speeches and Parliamentary Debates delivered when the Bills were 
considered by legislators, as well as the implementation of these Acts through 
major government heritage policies and guidelines. It also considers the 
impact that the method of enforcement of the legislation has had in different 
Australian jurisdictions. This analysis identifies the key areas of disjuncture 
between archaeological protection legislation and archaeological practice and 
considers whether the existing regimes facilitate the public good conservation 
model. 
 
                                            
148  UNESCO (1956). Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations. New 
Delhi Recommendation.  
149  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention.  
150  International Council on Monuments and Sites (1990). Charter for the Protection and Management of the 
Archaeological Heritage. ICOMOS Archaeological Charter.  
151  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter.  
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Chapter 7 expands upon the analysis undertaken in Chapters 5 and 6, by 
looking in greater detail at the jurisdictions of NSW and Victoria. These States 
have been chosen as case studies for several reasons, including their long 
history of having consistently applied archaeological heritage legislation (from 
1972 in Victoria and 1977 in NSW) and the longest traditions of archaeologists 
working within government to manage the States’ archaeological heritage. 
Due to this long tradition, it has been possible to undertake a degree of 
quantitative analysis of the operation of the legislation in both States, which 
reveals the shift in the nature of archaeological work in these States as well as 
the dramatic increase in the number of sites investigated under the provisions 
of the legislation. This facilitates discussion as to how these strongly 
implemented regulatory frameworks have driven ‘public good conservation’ 
considerations for the States’ archaeological heritage. 
 
Chapter 8 examines the judicial treatment of archaeological heritage, in 
several jurisdictions, through an analysis of the case law relating to 
archaeological issues. Archaeology and archaeological heritage management 
have rarely made an appearance before Australian courts in any jurisdiction, 
and the archaeological provisions of most pieces of Australian heritage 
legislation have not been rigorously tested by the courts. Where appropriate, 
this chapter draws on relevant cases from related areas, including 
palaeontological remains and property issues. Each case is analysed to 
determine what effect the court’s view has on the protection of archaeological 
heritage and whether these views support the ‘public good conservation’ 
model argued for here. 
 
Chapter 9 concludes the thesis, drawing together the work of the previous 
chapters, to identify and discuss areas where reform to the legislation, 
administrative procedures, policy and archaeological practices will result in 
improved outcomes. The thesis develops an initial framework for building 
‘public good’ considerations into conservation decisions or negotiated trade-
offs, for the conservation of places of different degrees of significance. 
Principles for public good conservation are set out, which can help achieve 
meaningful protection, conservation, enjoyment and study of the Australian 
archaeological heritage into the future. 
 
As legislation and policy are constantly evolving and changing, it has been 
necessary to establish a cut-off date for the consideration of legislation and 
this thesis does not deal with any changes to law after June 2006. 
 
1.13 Conclusion 
 
The problems which exist with current Australian regimes for the protection of 
archaeological heritage are twofold: existing legal frameworks do not 
effectively protect archaeological heritage as they contain inappropriate or 
outmoded conceptions of what should be protected and, secondly, the legal 
frameworks themselves work counter to achieving ‘public good’ conservation 
outcomes. The shift in Australian archaeological practice from a ‘culture of 
research’ to a ‘culture of compliance’ has had a significant and not entirely 
positive impact on the discipline of archaeology and Australia’s archaeological 
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heritage. A further shift is required, to a ‘culture of public good conservation’. 
This requires changes in both archaeological practice and in heritage 
protection regimes. Such a shift may allow the consideration of broader issues 
which come to light when addressing an archaeological issue, and may help 
obviate the need for special legislation which sets aside heritage legislation in 
future. 
 
All of these issues can be traced back to the nature of archaeological heritage 
legislation in the various States and Territories. Most archaeologists working 
in Australia today would have to concede that, in the absence of heritage 
protection legislation, little if any archaeological work would be done outside of 
grant-funded academic work, or the occasional project on government-owned 
sites.152 If there is a need to protect archaeological heritage in a legal sense, 
the present systems are not working effectively. As Australian archaeology 
has moved into a predominantly client-focused consulting mode, most clients 
will expect to undertake the minimum level of archaeological intervention 
legally required, with the occasional client perhaps willing to go beyond that 
minimum level. Thus, by its very nature, the legal requirements for 
archaeological heritage will determine what a client is required to undertake 
and pay for, and will define the level of involvement of the archaeologist with 
the archaeological resource. Changing how this involvement is defined in law 
is necessary to achieve public good conservation outcomes, which provide 
more than a minimum compliance approach to managing Australia’s 
archaeological heritage. 
 
                                            
152  This is of course excluding illicit excavation by private collectors seeking to add objects to their collections. 
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Chapter 2–Expressing the importance of the archaeological past: 
Science vs social significance 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter examines the changing philosophical frameworks for managing 
archaeological heritage both generally and with specific reference to Australia, 
through a process of literature review of academic, legal and policy works. 
This review reveals that the paradigm of archaeology as objective science 
was dominant at the time Australia was developing legal frameworks for 
managing archaeological heritage. During the 1960s and 1970s the protection 
of archaeological heritage was in its nascence and the primary focus of 
archaeological theory was on archaeology as “science”.1 The strength of this 
scientific conception of archaeology ensured that the legal protections for the 
physical remains of the archaeological past were principally developed to 
facilitate the research interests of archaeologists, rather than for the protection 
of any other values. In the intervening three decades the perception as to why 
and for whom heritage should be protected has changed. Now the 
consideration of the public value of heritage has taken a more central position 
over the “elite” conception of heritage as being only the preserve of 
professionals, scientists and connoisseurs. This thesis suggests that while 
archaeological research can be of value to the public, heritage legislation 
should focus on a broader ‘public good’ conception of archaeological heritage 
conservation. Australian heritage legislation has however not substantially 
advanced the public value position with respect to archaeological heritage 
management. This chapter analyses the consequences of this static position 
in Australian heritage law, coupled with the legalistic approach which is often 
taken to archaeological heritage management. From this analysis, Chapter 3 
investigates a moral and legal framework for managing archaeological 
heritage from a ‘public good’ perspective.  
 
The notion of the research or scientific values of archaeological heritage is a 
concept which entered into the Australian regulatory framework during the 
debates which were occurring in the early and mid 1970s, particularly around 
the Hope Inquiry into the National Estate2 and the development of the 
Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter,3 both of which are discussed more fully in 
Chapter 4. At that time, the discipline of archaeology was still in the throes of 
the ‘New Archaeology’, a phase driven by largely American theoretical 
positions which held that archaeology could be made an objective, testable 
science, from which laws of human behaviour could be derived.4 In theoretical 
terms, this manifested itself in the school of processualism. This period was 
characterised by a positivist view that cultures were observable systems 
where empirical study of the archaeological record (or in some cases, extant 
                                            
1 Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pg 39. See also 
comments by prominent Australian archaeologist John Mulvaney, reflecting on his personal motivations for 
lobbying for archaeological protective legislation in the 1960s. Mulvaney, D. J. (2004). "The road to Burra: 
memories of an ancient traveller." Historic Environment 18 (1): 9-13.  
2  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service.  
3  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter.  
4  Trigger, B. (1989). A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  Pp 293-295.  
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‘primitive’ culture) could reduce cultural behaviours to ‘processes’, from which 
generalised laws about cultural behaviours could be developed. 
Processualism drew upon the natural sciences as the basis for developing 
theoretical and testing methodologies,5 as a deliberate move away from the 
inferential methods of previous “culture history” approaches to archaeology. 
Whitley, reflecting on the development of processualism noted that, at the 
time, processualism was itself drawing on theoretical views on the nature of 
science which the natural sciences had developed in the 1950s and 1960s.6 
Thus even at the time of the development of processual archaeology, aspects 
of its theoretical underpinning were already dated. Smith observes that while 
processualist theory was principally American and few Australia 
archaeologists explicitly adopted it, the almost complete absence of Australian 
archaeological theoretical development during this period led to 
processualism being highly influential in Australia.7 
 
What intervened to challenge processualism was post-modernist theory, 
which Whitley notes led to a “challenge of science as our pre-eminent means 
of obtaining knowledge.”8 Post-modernism as a movement sought to 
challenge the dominant paradigms of any number of disciplines and, in 
archaeology, led to the primacy of science being replaced with more human-
focussed notions of the past, theoretically expressed as postprocessualism 
and cognitive archaeology.9 Key amongst these movements has been 
pluralistic interpretations of the archaeological record and recognition of the 
perspectives which researchers brought to archaeological questions.10 
Concepts we now consider commonplace within archaeology, such as the 
notion that indigenous people may value different aspects of the past from 
archaeologists,11 as significant to understanding of past and present culture, 
or the idea that indigenous people should be able to make decisions about the 
disposition of the remains of their ancestors, largely come out of this broader 
movement.12 This evolution in the discipline is part of a valuable self-reflective 
exercise, which helps to situate the discipline in a contemporary and relevant 
social context,13 something that Fritz and Plog remarked as being critical 
decades earlier.14 Despite this, the view continues to persist that archaeology 
is principally a “scientific” discipline, although Stiebing quite rightly notes that 
“the application of scientific techniques to archaeological problems has 
                                            
5  Whitley, D. S. (1998). New approaches to old problems: archaeology in search of an ever elusive past. Reader in 
Archaeological Theory: post-processual and cognitive approaches. D. S. Whitley. London, Routledge: 1-28.  
6  Ibid.  Pg 3. 
7  Smith, L. (1995). "What is this thing called postprocessual archaeology and is it relevant for Australian 
archaeology?" Australian Archaeology 40: 28-32. , Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of 
cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 39-40. 
8  Whitley, D. S. (1998). New approaches to old problems: archaeology in search of an ever elusive past. Reader in 
Archaeological Theory: post-processual and cognitive approaches. D. S. Whitley. London, Routledge: 1-28.  Pg 
18. 
9  Whitley, D. S., Ed. (1998). Reader in Archaeological Theory: post-processual and cognitive approaches. London, 
Routledge.  
10  Dark, K. R. (1995). Theoretical archaeology. London, Duckworth.  Pp 21-24. 
11  Smith, L. (1995). "What is this thing called postprocessual archaeology and is it relevant for Australian 
archaeology?" Australian Archaeology 40: 28-32. , Smith, L. (1996). Archaeological knowledge and the 
governance of indigenous material culture in south-eastern Australia. Prehistorical and Historical Archaeology. 
Sydney, University of Sydney. Unpublished PhD thesis.  
12  For a comprehensive survey of the influence of post-modern theory in the development of postprocessualism, 
see Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 45-50. 
13  Orser, C. E. (1996). A historical archaeology of the modern world. New York, Plenum Press.  Pp 199-200 
14  Fritz, J. M. and F. Plog (1970). "The nature of archaeological explanation." American Antiquity 35: 405-412. 
quoted in Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pg 35. 
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already produced results that not only were unknown, but in some cases were 
considered unknowable”.15 A natural science approach to some 
archaeological questions remains useful, however, it is suggested here, not as 
the dominant approach for archaeological heritage management. Given that a 
strong scientific perception persists within archaeology, it is unsurprising these 
concepts have not changed substantially in Australian heritage law.  
 
2.2  The background to the legal management of archaeological 
heritage 
 
In Europe, the practice of managing archaeological heritage16 dates to the 
seventeenth century, through a combination of edicts issued by the Vatican 
requiring the reporting of discovered objects and, slightly later, to a Swedish 
law from 1666 which specified that objects of gold and silver which were 
excavated anywhere within the country belonged first and foremost to the 
king.17 This early law established the basis for what is now known as the 
concept of “treasure trove”, where a government can take title to discovered 
objects should it wish and pay compensation to the discoverer.18 It also 
represents the first step in the legal “management” of archaeological heritage 
in the Western world. Wiltshire noted that the fundamental differences 
between the European and English/American/Australian models of heritage 
management were a belief in Europe that heritage represents a common 
patrimony, which the State protects for the benefit of all, whereas the English, 
American and Australian models are based on a strong notion of individual 
property rights and an often automatic assumption that compensation is 
warranted whenever the government intercedes in those rights, such as 
through heritage protection legislation.19 The principle that governments can 
regulate and control the physical remains of the past through law remains 
fundamentally in place however, to differing effect around the world. Most 
countries have laws in place to protect the physical remains of their pasts, and 
the scope of such legislation internationally has been examined in some detail 
by O’Keefe and Prott20 and, more recently in Australia by Boer and Wiffen.21 
                                            
15  Stiebing Jr, W. H. (1993). Uncovering the past: a history of archaeology. New York, Oxford University Press.  Pp 
265-280. 
16  Here I have chosen to refer to any site or object that, from a contemporary perspective, could be considered a 
part of the archaeological heritage, despite the fact that “archaeology” as we know it now was only formulated in 
the mid-nineteenth century. 
17  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. , Carman, J. (1996). Valuing ancient things : archaeology and law. New York, 
Leicester University Press. pp34-35 Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, 
Oxford University Press.  
18  See for example Bonyhady, T. (1987). The law of the countryside the rights 
of the public. Abingdon, Professional Books.  Pp 268-285 for a general 
discussion of the law of treasure trove in England. 
19  Wiltshire, K. (1985). Heritage. Federalism and the Environment. R. L. Matthews. Canberra, Centre for Research 
on Federal Financial Relations, Australian National University: 47-63.  Pg 48.  
This attitude has recently been reinforced in Australia during the course of the Commonwealth Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into Historic Heritage. See for example the Commission’s draft and final reports, as well as 
the range of anti-heritage public submissions held on the Commission’s website (http://www.pc.gov.au). 
Accessed 1 April 2006. Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - 
draft report. Melbourne, Australian Government. , Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's 
historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, Australian Government.  
20  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. This book is now two decades out of date, however it provides a useful 
overview and analysis of the development of archaeological protection legislation worldwide.  
21  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press.  
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The content and mechanisms of those laws vary, but the underlying concept, 
that the physical remains of the past warrant protection, is similar.22  
 
2.3 World practice 
 
World practice in the legal protection of archaeological heritage varies 
substantially, and this thesis concentrates on the practices of Australia, which 
derived its legal principles initially from the United Kingdom. In England, the 
principle of “treasure trove” was established in the early nineteenth century,23 
and continues today albeit in a modified application. While the early focus of 
English law was on the securing of rare items of gold and silver for the Crown, 
this moved to the protection of “ancient monuments” more generally by the 
mid- to late-nineteenth century, through the actions of individuals such as 
John Ruskin and William Morris, and the Society for the Protection of Ancient 
Buildings,24 to general protections for archaeological heritage across the 
country. Some have questioned whether the narrowness with which the British 
courts have interpreted issues of treasure trove has limited its effectiveness 
as a protective mechanism for archaeological heritage, particularly due to its 
limitations that items much be “substantially” of gold or silver and must have 
been originally concealed “for security.”25 Items lost or abandoned, or not of 
gold or silver, do not fall within the purview of treasure trove.26 The history of 
the development of English law in this area has been traced by a range of 
authors.27 
 
International developments in archaeological heritage management legislation 
were largely spurred by post-World War II actions of international bodies, 
principally the United Nations (UN) and its subsidiary body, the United Nations 
Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO).28 The UN and 
UNESCO negotiated a number of recommendations and international treaties 
which had direct bearing on the protection and management of archaeological 
heritage around the world, including the 1954 Convention for the Protection of 
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27  Carman, J. (1996). Valuing ancient things : archaeology and law. New York, Leicester University Press. , Murray, 
T. (1989). The history, philosophy and sociology of archaeology: the case of the Ancient Monuments Protection 
Act (1882). Critical Traditions in Contemporary Archaeology. V. Pinsky and A. Wylie. Cambridge, Cambridge 
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28  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
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Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict,29 the 1956 Recommendation 
on International Principles for Archaeological Excavations,30 the 1970 
UNESCO Convention,31 the 1972 World Heritage Convention,32 and the 1995 
Unidroit Convention.33 The UNESCO and World Heritage Conventions have 
been particularly significant in that they require signatory nations to enact 
domestic heritage protection legislation for a range of types of heritage items, 
including archaeological heritage.34 These conventions and instruments are 
critically discussed in terms of the thesis in Chapter 4. 
 
In Australia, codified legal protection for archaeological heritage first 
appeared, in rudimentary form, in 1955 in the Northern Territory,35 although 
the discipline of archaeology did not develop in Australia in an institutional and 
professional sense until the 1960s. Connah attributes this to a “cultural 
cringe”, that Australia viewed itself as not old enough to have an archaeology 
worthy of study.36 At least one author traces the notion of heritage protection 
legislation back to the Tasmanian Scenery Preservation Act 191537 however 
this Act did not include archaeological heritage in its scope. Lobbying by 
interest groups, particularly academic archaeologists, as well as a growth in 
environmental consciousness amongst the general public, saw additional 
heritage protective legislation implemented in the 1960s and early 1970s,38 
but the majority of domestic Australian legislation which protected 
archaeological heritage did not appear until the mid-1970s, following 
Australia’s signing of the World Heritage Convention and the Commission of 
Inquiry into the National Estate in 1974 (the Hope Inquiry).39 Since that period, 
heritage legislation has been established in all States and Territories and at 
Commonwealth level, which provides some level of protection for 
archaeological heritage. Detailed consideration of domestic legislation is dealt 
with in Chapters 5 to 7.  
 
2.4 Genesis of archaeological thought in Australia 
 
Archaeology as a discipline has its origins firstly in collecting and secondly in 
the natural sciences of the nineteenth century, particularly geology. The 
collecting of antiquities as art or treasure has occurred throughout the world 
                                            
29  United Nations (1954). Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. Hague 
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33  Unidroit (1995). Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects. Unidroit Convention.  
34  World Heritage Convention Article 5(d); UNESCO Convention Article 5(a). 
35  Native and Historic Objects Heritage Protection Ordinance (1955) Northern Territory.  
36  Connah, G. (1997). "The purpose of archaeology." Australian Archaeology 45: 48-53.  
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Government Publishing Service.  
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for thousands of years. The fashion for ‘cabinets of curiosities’ amongst the 
upper classes in Europe in the Renaissance and Enlightenment, followed by 
the establishment of private and public museums throughout the post-
Enlightenment period allowed for the collecting to become systematised and 
helped create a wider audience for the relics of the past. Discoveries of 
geologists in the early nineteenth century related to the nature of stratigraphic 
soil layers and the bearing this had on the age of the earth assisted the birth 
of a discipline recognisable as archaeology.40 The idea of the deep antiquity 
of the earth and the desire to learn more about the full range of past activities 
helped drive what had been a mere mania for collecting attractive or valuable 
objects under the banner of connoisseurship to an evolving antiquarianism. 
Over the course of the nineteenth century this was assisted in part through the 
notions of cultural evolution, based on the ideas of Charles Darwin.41 By the 
late nineteenth century, this had further transformed into a systematised study 
of sites through excavation which could recognisably be called archaeology. 
Private collections were progressively replaced by professional museums, 
which viewed themselves as the educators of the public and the stewards of 
the past.42 
 
Byrne records calls for protection for Aboriginal sites as early as 188943 and 
research into the physical remains of the Australian indigenous past had 
become established as an offshoot of museum-based anthropology in the 
1930s.44 Prominent Australian curator and anthropologist F D McCarthy led 
the call for general legal protection for archaeological ‘relics’ as early as 1938: 
 
the public has shown that it cannot be trusted to regard such relics with 
due respect and no more important step forward for the science of 
anthropology could be made than the enactment of…legislation 
throughout Australia.45  
 
This was due to concerns over the widespread practice of collecting 
Aboriginal objects,46 although some limited power to declare reserves due to 
the presence of Aboriginal sites existed as early as 1913 in NSW.47 At that 
stage, archaeology did not exist as a discipline per se in Australia, but was 
practiced as one of a range of techniques used by museum staff and 
anthropologists to study Aboriginal culture. Other proto-archaeologists 
operating in this period include Norman Tindale, working out of the South 
Australian Museum, who is credited with driving the establishment of South 
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Australia’s archaeological protective legislation in 1965.48 The study of the 
archaeology of the Australian continent did not become established as a 
distinct academic discipline until the 1950s, and it was well into the 1960s 
before serious effort was being directed towards the analysis of the 
archaeological remains of both the Aboriginal and colonial pasts.49 Australian 
archaeologists began to publish articles50 and lobby government for the 
establishment of laws to protect archaeological heritage.51 Megaw, speaking 
in 1973, anticipated the development of archaeological heritage management 
and called for a greater dialogue between developers and archaeologists. 
Nevertheless he viewed archaeological practice as something belonging 
within the university, with academic archaeologists undertaking “rescue” 
archaeology as a form of public service.52 Ellis echoes this sentiment, 
describing the protection of archaeological material culture as akin to the “civic 
duty” of archaeologists of this period.53  
 
The general thrust of discussion by archaeologists during this period was that 
the archaeological heritage required protection to allow it to be researched by 
archaeologists, and there was little or no consideration of community 
involvement in the process54 beyond (frowned-upon) amateur collecting and 
the use of public volunteers in fieldwork. Similarly, little regard was given to 
the views of Aboriginal people when protective regimes were established in 
the 1960s and 1970s.55 Even now the ability of either an interested member of 
the public or an Aboriginal person to interact with the remains of the past is 
constrained by protective legislation which continues to favour 
“professionalised” understandings of the archaeological past with the 
archaeologists acting as interpreters or gate-keepers.56 There are however 
limited examples of this process working in reverse, with indigenous people 
restricting the access of archaeologists to the remains of the past.57 
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The 1960s saw rapid development in Australian academic archaeology. 
Distinct programs were established in Aboriginal archaeology at a number of 
Australian universities58, bodies such as the Australian Institute of Aboriginal 
Studies59 were established and the number of academic staff increased. 
Academic interest began to be generated in Australian historical archaeology 
by the late 1960s, with the Australian Society for Historical Archaeology being 
established in 197060 and the Australian Archaeological Association in 1974.61 
Academics working in these areas lobbied colleagues and governments for 
the establishment of laws to protect archaeological heritage, generally under 
the principle that these remains required protection to allow future academic 
study, to build and pass on a better understanding of the past. Such efforts led 
to the establishment of the first generation of early archaeological protection 
legislation, in 1965 in South Australia62, 1969 in NSW63 and 1972 in Victoria64 
and Western Australia65.  
 
2.5 The growth from collecting to academic analysis 
 
In Australia, the transformation from antiquarianism to archaeology took much 
longer to occur than in the United Kingdom and Europe, where a systematised 
archaeology had developed by the late nineteenth century.66 This occurred at 
a similar date in the United States.67 By contrast, collecting of Aboriginal 
archaeological objects began in the nineteenth century in Australia and 
continued well into the middle of the twentieth century, where such collecting 
began to overlap and conflict with the nascent Australian archaeology. 
Griffiths traces the history of this collecting phenomenon in Australia and 
noted that “collectors are driven by urgency, by the need to collect ‘before it is 
too late’.”68 Similar arguments have been advanced for the rationale for 
protecting or excavating archaeological heritage, that it is precious and about 
to be lost. However what should be protected (or collected) and why is never 
fully articulated, except as “research potential”. This artefact- and data-
collection oriented practice in Australian historical archaeology has been 
criticised by some as “stamp collecting”.69 Yet Prentis noted that the initial 
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study of Australian origins was not “motiveless curiosity”, but part of a mid-
nineteenth century drive to probe the origins of humankind.70 McCarthy was 
undertaking some problem-driven archaeological excavation in Australia as 
early as the 1930s, which brought him into direct conflict with the collectors, 
as did Tindale, operating in South Australia at the same time.71  
 
Despite these identified problems, McCarthy had no success in his lobbying 
efforts to see Aboriginal archaeological materials legally protected. His view, 
at that early stage of the debate, was clearly fixed in a notion that archaeology 
was a science (albeit an emerging one) based within anthropology, that relics 
required protection for study and their proper place was in a museum; he 
made no concession or acknowledgement that relics could be of value to the 
general public, let alone the Aboriginal community.72 Byrne’s views on the 
establishment of legislation are somewhat counter to this position, and he 
considers that the establishment of legislation had significantly to do with the 
State asserting control and ownership of the Aboriginal past, as a part of its 
incorporation into the Australian national identity. In his view, the role of 
protective legislation was not about protecting the “scientific” value of sites but 
about asserting control over a national asset, in terms of the remains of the 
past.73 This is reminiscent of Orser’s view that the material remains of the past 
are value-neutral, until transformed by archaeologists into a “created space”. 
This space is referred to as the “archaeological record” and is founded in a 
particular archaeological world view, which may not relate to any other world 
view,74 such as those of indigenous people, or the public.  
 
Moreland is suspicious that archaeology can ever uncover an “objective and 
unconscious” version of the past, as everything, including the act of 
archaeological excavation, reflects a conscious act,75 with the accompanying 
inherent bias. He cautions against the adoption of a “presentist” view of the 
past, where contemporary motivations are ascribed to past societies,76 an 
interesting point when considering the question of who “speaks” for the past 
when dealing with contemporary indigenous communities. This is not to say 
that archaeology cannot be used to represent these world views, just that 
traditionally it has not been so used. But in undertaking this “creation” or re-
creation of the past, there should be acknowledgements of the interaction 
between places which shape that creation. Nevertheless, the language used 
in the protection of material culture, whether expressed in the peak extralegal 
documents such as the Burra Charter, or within the language of most 
Australian heritage legislation, is the language of science, research and 
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archaeology, not of national identity or social attachment. Tightly defined 
boundaries around the “archaeological” militate against a consideration of 
wider relationships and interactions between archaeological places in the 
landscape. Despite the views of McCarthy and Byrne, the perception that 
archaeology is principally the domain of science remains strong and was 
influential in the discipline receiving legal protection in Australia.  
 
2.6  Australian archaeology as a ‘scientific’ discipline 
 
Since the mid-1980s, archaeological debate has explored and largely rejected 
the notion of archaeology as a strictly scientific discipline77 in the highly 
positivist way it is now expressed in legislation. Positivism in this context 
refers to the practice within archaeology of basing conclusions solely on the 
observation of the archaeological record,78 in the belief that such analysis can 
bring forth an objective truth about the past.79 It is this positivist basis that 
underlay the processualist New Archaeology of the 1960s and 1970s,80 where 
the sanctity of the material remains in the ground was paramount, as it was 
the archaeological data contained in those remains which was required for 
rigorous testing under the scientific method. The legal expression of what 
aspects of the Australian archaeological record are protected reflects the 
scientific positivism of this period in archaeological thought. This is further 
examined below, as well as in the detailed analysis of Australian legislation in 
Chapters 5 to 7. 
 
The fostering of the notion of archaeology as a “science”, in the objective 
sense of the physical and natural sciences, was strongly assisted by the 
development of radiocarbon dating in the 1950s.81 Radiocarbon dating was 
influential in a move away from the “culture history” approach of previous 
archaeological practice, through the ability to date materials with a scientific 
precision.82 Prior to radiocarbon dating, archaeologists largely relied on 
elaborately-constructed typologies of ceramics, stone tools and other artefacts 
to provide a chronology and dating for sites.83 These typologies were always 
tinged with a degree of subjectivity, and open to interpretation. Radiocarbon, 
and other scientific forms of dating provided a level of precision, cloaked in the 
authority of laboratory science, that no previous archaeological technique had 
provided. In Dark’s view, this scientific presentation added a degree of 
prestige to the discipline, thus elevating archaeology to the same status of the 
natural sciences and rendering it a “serious” discipline84, based on an 
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“institution of authority”.85 But, worryingly, Jones observed that such scientific 
techniques are often accepted uncritically by those outside of the profession86, 
creating an impression that a “correct” answer can be arrived at about the 
past through application of scientific techniques. But the use of scientific 
techniques in analysis is not the same as undertaking science in the pure 
sense.87 This is what Kohl described as an “ingrained belief in the 
omnipotence of science” to adequately address all facts of archaeology88, with 
archaeological techniques becoming a ‘black box’ which presents non-
observable archaeological phenomena, such as dating, in a manner which is 
difficult to verify or refute.89 Through this association with science, 
archaeology seemed to gain a new objectivity, legitimising its use as a tool of 
government and its translation into legislation.90 
 
Hodder traces the development of the notion of a positivist, objective and 
(notionally) ‘scientific’ archaeology, as driven by key figures such as Binford 
and Schiffer in the 1960s and 1970s.91 This was bedded in the ‘New 
Archaeology’ and a belief that a rigorous application of a scientific 
methodology would lead to an objective discovery of a ‘truth’ about the past or 
at least generalised rules of human behaviour.92 The archaeological record 
was viewed as system, from which clear rules of behaviour could be 
discerned and against which hypotheses could be tested. Such a “scientific” 
approach allowed access to the past through the present93 and, implicitly, a 
perspective into the future. MacNeish noted that the application of an explicitly 
scientific methodology was a shift from earlier approaches to scientific 
analysis, where archaeologists would send non-artefactual archaeological 
material, such as soil samples, to specialist ‘scientists’ for analysis, then 
would make use of the results,94 much as McCarthy earlier used archaeology 
as a ‘technique’ for doing anthropological research. Archaeology, in 
MacNeish’s view, was “trying to become the science of past cultures.”95 This 
notion of scientific objectiveness was supported by the use of statistical and 
mathematical models and the use of computers for analysis, all lending an air 
of scientific objectivity to the work of the archaeologist, although some 
prominent archaeologists were sceptical of archaeology’s ability to perform in 
this manner even at the height of processualist ideology.96 Carr noted a 
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similar perspective existed about the study of history in the nineteenth 
century, when concern was only for “the facts”,97 rather than their 
interpretation, or their context, although Carr viewed archaeology (writing from 
the perspective of the 1960s) as primarily being about providing the “raw 
materials” (i.e. “the facts”) for historians. In point of fact, neither history nor 
archaeology and the heritage disciplines can provide the tool for unearthing 
the “true past”, as none are truly objective, neutral or unbiased.98 
 
Hodder sees this focus on scientific objectivism as stemming initially from the 
Analytic Philosophy school of thought and, later, from further developments in 
logical positivism, that is, a belief that by restricting analysis to observable 
phenomena and using the scientific method, the researcher can isolate the 
analysis of observed data from personal bias, reaching an objective truth.99 
This process was fundamentally acultural, as these types of scientific 
analyses denied the differentiation and effect of specific cultures.100 Dark 
noted that “the archaeological data…can be taken to represent the past but do 
not present us with that past in an unmodified state.”101 The essence of this is 
that the archaeological data cannot be viewed as value-neutral conduits for 
developing an understanding of the past. However, as will be seen later in this 
thesis, the way the archaeological past has been objectified and legalistically 
interpreted within a regulatory context has developed to a position where 
there is an inherent assumption in archaeological regulation that 
archaeological data are all equivalent. Under this assumption, archaeologists 
are supposed to be able to capture the totality of data about the past within a 
statutory context, and using this captured data, which is assumed to be value-
neutral, develop any range of interpretations about the past. This tension 
exists most clearly in compliance-driven archaeological work undertaken by 
consultants, where it is debatable whether the archaeological work is 
furthering a “research” agenda or whether it is essentially a data-gathering 
exercise. Neuman and Sanford, writing about American compliance-driven 
archaeology are more honest in their description of how most compliance-
driven archaeology works in practice, referring to “data recovery plans”102 in 
place of the more grandly conceived “research designs” which are required as 
a matter of policy in Australian compliance archaeology,103 but whose 
research promise is rarely achieved.104 The value-neutral view of the 
archaeological past embedded in much legislation belies both the limitations 
and biases inherent in archaeological field and research processes,105 and 
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excludes any non-data based interpretation or value for the archaeological 
past. 
 
Hodder reaches the conclusion that positivist notions of a scientifically unified 
archaeology are in fact a myth and that, while scientific and experimental 
techniques certainly play a part in archaeological practice, they cannot lay 
claim to being the essence of the discipline.106 Similarly, Trigger notes that an 
objective understanding of the past, based in ‘positivist optimism’ is generally 
unachievable, given the biases that must inherently influence the thinking and 
decision-making processes when considering the archaeological record.107 
MacNeish couched his conception of archaeology as “science?” with a 
question mark, noting that while archaeology was good at the precise 
collection and organisation of data, its ability to test those data in controlled, 
repeatable conditions was limited.108 He also noted that the requirements of 
archaeologists, as opposed to these other specialists, were quite different and 
it was impossible to assume that information or material collected in the field 
to suit one purpose would necessarily suit the purpose of another discipline.109 
 
While the debate regarding the scientific nature of archaeology has ranged 
back and forth across the discipline, as outlined above, one clear outcome of 
the argument for a scientific basis for archaeology was the regulation enacted 
to protect archaeological remains. Watson and others were prime advocates 
of a strong ‘scientific’ conception of archaeology, observing that “the data with 
which archaeologists work derives from objects of ‘material culture’”,110 which 
is exactly what existing legally-precise definitions of the archaeological record 
in heritage legislation currently protect. Colley noted that pressure from the 
archaeological community for the establishment of protective legislation was 
based on a perception that “the scientific value of these archaeological sites 
was under threat from amateur researchers, artefact collectors and 
development pressures”.111 Murray viewed the establishment of Aboriginal 
heritage legislation as a part of a process of separating a ‘scientific’ past from 
living Aboriginal culture and putting the interests of that living culture first, to 
the detriment of scientific study of the past.112 This is consistent with Murray’s 
views fifteen years earlier, where he argued that in order to move from 
meaningless conceptual relativism in the study of the past, a “science of 
archaeology” was required, which put archaeology into a strictly rationalist 
framework.113 Murray viewed legislation itself as problematic where it lacked 
or did not adequately articulate a conservation philosophy: 
 
legislation is obviously important but it is insufficient if it is imposed on 
an unwilling and essentially mystified public. A conservation philosophy 
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thus has to express the values and meanings of past items and 
contexts and communicate them114 
 
The ‘conservation philosophy’ to which Murray alludes need not be one which 
is solely, or primarily based on ‘scientific’ archaeological value. 
 
The shift in conservation philosophy from one based in archaeological value 
to one based in indigenous value was part of the process of Australian 
archaeology becoming a post-colonial discipline, which Byrne referred to as 
the “de-colonising” of the physical remains of the Aboriginal past as things 
restricted to the domain of archaeology.115 But a strong scientific position116 
denies such views, by establishing the sanctity of archaeological “data” as the 
primary focus of archaeological practice. Murray took a less strict view, 
indicating that not everything in the archaeological record need be viewed as 
“data” by the archaeologist.117 But when the definition of those data types 
becomes the basis for legal protective mechanisms, the legislation does not 
discriminate between useful and useless potential data for the archaeologist. 
It may be unreasonable to expect legislation to provide for such distinctions, 
but it is equally unreasonable that legal restrictions should be placed on 
society as a whole where there is no clear agreement on what aspects of the 
archaeological past are important to protect. In this context, Jones observed 
that:  
 
while we have retained a notion of standardised or objective recording, 
many of the principles guiding what we deem worthy of record and 
publication have themselves been reproduced from an earlier vision of 
archaeological objectivity.118 
 
This essentially means that observations made by archaeologists, while 
detailed, may not be making a useful or relevant contribution to archaeological 
questions. Furthermore, in the context of compliance-driven archaeology, 
these may be the questions the archaeologist is required to ask, due to the 
model of archaeological practice enshrined within the law. The scope to 
consider other archaeological, or non-archaeological, questions about the 
material remains of the past may be constrained by the legislation which is 
designed to protect that past. The flaw in such a model occurs when 
archaeological data are treated as equally significant, in a belief that this will 
protect the “research significance” of archaeological places, without a qualified 
understanding of what that research significance, if any, the place may 
possess. Murray noted that cultural resource management-style archaeology, 
undertaken in a legislative context, tended to freeze conceptual models of 
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archaeology in time,119 and reflect what heritage bureaucrats and the public 
thought was archaeology, based on the conceptual model which was in 
fashion at the time, in this instance, the scientific paradigm. 
 
By contrast, Ritter asserts, with respect to indigenous heritage, that the 
definition of Aboriginal heritage in archaeological terms was just another stage 
in the colonisation of the Aboriginal people. The defining of Aboriginal heritage 
in objective, scientific language disempowered indigenous people from 
expressing the values of sites and objects in indigenous terms.120 The 
downside of such rigid legislative definition is that it effectively mandates the 
one, legally correct, manner for dealing with the archaeological record. This is 
precisely Ritter’s point–that, through legislating in scientific terms, the ‘correct’ 
manner for dealing with indigenous archaeological heritage becomes a 
scientific process, rather than a process which acknowledges ongoing 
significance to a living community. Hodder notes, in his discussion of the 
various methodological schools of thought for considering the archaeological 
record that:  
 
we need to move towards the recognition that there is not only one right 
way to do archaeology. There are many right ways. This statement does 
not deny that there are also many wrong ways. It is the focus on 
singularity which is dangerous.121 
 
The language of the legislation and of major Australian policy documents all 
supports this notion of a scientific archaeology: legislation generally protects 
‘objects’ or ‘relics’ (data) which have ‘research’, ‘technical’ or ‘scientific’ 
significance. Archaeology can however also be a tool for uncovering other 
types of significance, which may outweigh the “scientific” value of a given 
site.122 That said, the earliest heritage legislation, in the Northern Territory in 
1955, was not based in a scientific perspective, but rather viewed Aboriginal 
sites as monuments within the natural environment, which were worthy of 
protection.123 Effective heritage legislation, then, needs to accommodate such 
a plurality of approaches. This accords with Renfrew’s view that even 
“scientific” archaeology can render wrong answers124 and is echoed by Jones’ 
view that, given the nature of cultural practices and structures, archaeology 
cannot guarantee reproducible results, in the truly scientific sense.125 The 
challenge is to recognise the utility of science as a tool for doing archaeology, 
alongside other traditional methods, rather than elevating science as the only 
way to undertake archaeology. 
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2.7 The seductive certainty of ‘science’ 
 
Based on the primacy of the ‘scientific’ paradigm outlined above, this thesis 
suggests that establishment of archaeology as a ‘science’ in Australia was 
part of the preconditions necessary for the establishment of legal protection 
mechanisms. The act of defining the past gave lawmakers a sense of 
certainty as to what aspects of the past required protection. One of the things 
which this objective scientific school of archaeological thought brought to the 
law was the belief that the study of archaeology was no longer just inference 
and opinion, but that it was now scientific fact, as backed up by techniques 
like radiocarbon dating. This perception of archaeology gave the law 
boundaries which it could build into a conceptual framework and protective 
mechanisms, which would have been more difficult in a framework which 
lacked the perceived objective rigour of a scientific process. Australian 
lawmakers continue to struggle in circumstances where they must deal with 
more subjective values, such as indigenous cultural value.126 This relates to 
Kohl’s point discussed earlier, that the layperson is likely to uncritically accept 
archaeological facts presented in a scientific form, due to the appearance of 
rigour and neutrality believed to be inherent in science generally.127 Yet while 
the field of archaeology has advance from such a position and now 
recognises other values for archaeological heritage, the legislation retains this 
scientific focus. 
 
Related to this is the expectation amongst the lay public that there are aspects 
of archaeological heritage which require the intercession of archaeologists in 
order to be understandable. While the majority of laypeople could puzzle out 
the use and meaning of a historic building without substantial guidance, given 
their familiarity with the nature of buildings generally, the key aspects of an 
archaeological site are less readily apparent to the casual observer. The role 
of the archaeologist is to interpret this unformed mass of information into a 
form comprehensible to the non-archaeologist, although doubtless many 
indigenous people would question the need for an archaeologist to interpret 
their heritage for them.128 This interpretive role of the archaeologist parallels 
the role of the scientist in the physical or natural sciences; the interaction of 
subatomic particles, or chemical reactions, are not inherently comprehensible 
to the non-scientist, so the role of the scientist is to translate this information 
into a comprehensible form. Given that the scientific conception of 
archaeology was pre-eminent in the formative period of Australian 
archaeology, it is unsurprising that the legal interpretation of the 
“archaeological past” was based on what was of greatest interest to 
archaeologists–sites and artefacts. The implication being that, if these aspects 
of the archaeological past were made available for scientific study, they would 
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provide insights into the past for the benefit of the public, yet there is no way 
protective legislation can ensure this occurs.  
 
The Australian legal framework relies on definition and boundary to protect the 
concrete, the physical aspects of the past. And while a heritage building or 
monument has easily observable physical features which could be protected, 
such as the form of its roof, or ornamental detail, an archaeological site 
generally lacks such readily observable characteristics. Through defining the 
physical aspects of the archaeological past in scientific terms, legislators were 
provided with something to protect. Even the notion of protecting “research 
value”, the primary focus of most archaeological protection regimes in 
Australia, is somewhat nebulous. Without this physical dimension of artefacts 
and sites which can be legally defined, trying to conceptualise what it is about 
the archaeological past which requires protection, such as spatial 
relationships, context or stratigraphy becomes more difficult, as the concepts 
are more abstract. This protection of abstract heritage concepts is an ongoing 
problem, given the current difficulties and debates within the heritage 
discipline regarding the protection of intangible or spiritual values.129 As a 
science, the objects of study–the sites, relics, objects–seem more concrete 
and can be enumerated, defined and protected by statute. 
 
Jones considers that the “archaeological record” and the “archaeological past” 
are themselves artificial constructions of archaeologists, to provide a 
framework to describe and explain the past,130 which non-archaeologists have 
been socially conditioned to accept. Not all archaeological sites can or need to 
be analysed with the same scientific techniques, nor will a scientific approach 
always produce the best outcomes or understanding of the past. Scientific 
enquiry will not necessarily be compatible with community values, particularly 
for indigenous archaeological heritage. But legislative practice around 
protecting “scientific” archaeology has acted as a form of social conditioning, 
as to what should be valued about the past. This has driven a rationalist view 
of the world as it presupposes the archaeological world can be ordered and 
described through law-like statements. Slowly this view is shifting, as greater 
reliance is now placed on the documentary record, oral traditions or cultural 
practices and contemporary social values, with scientific techniques forming 
one of many tools used in understanding the past through the archaeological 
record. It has been noted by Aboriginal people that site management practices 
have existed for thousands of years, but have not been accepted as legitimate 
as they were not scientifically based.131 But the Australian law to protect 
archaeological heritage seems to be founded on a notion of archaeology as 
science and, while practice has changed, this notion remains enshrined within 
the legal framework.  
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2.8 Considering archaeological heritage management in Australia 
 
Since the 1970s, the framework for archaeological heritage management has 
been underpinned by one or more pieces of legislation in most Australian 
jurisdictions. The issue of what constitutes “heritage management” generally 
and “archaeological heritage management” specifically have been debated at 
some length and need not be recanvassed here.132 For the purposes of this 
thesis, “archaeological heritage management” is considered to be any 
conscious action taken in accordance with an external frame of reference to 
understand the value of and decide the fate of elements of the archaeological 
heritage. This does not include mere wanton destruction, but does leave open 
the possibility that site destruction can be a management option, in the right 
circumstances. The external frame of reference used to manage an 
archaeological resource may be a piece of legislation, an environmental 
impact assessment report, government-issued guidelines, a code of practice, 
a set of research questions, existing traditional or cultural practices or other 
process which allows for the consideration of archaeological values and the 
weighing up of courses of action. 
 
To be imbued with authority, a management framework must be underpinned 
by processes which validate the outcomes and provide for consequences for 
invalid outcomes. Ideally, these processes should be transparent and open to 
review or challenge. This is the case for not just the management of 
archaeological heritage, but for managing any sort of environmental issue. 
While there are a number of ways this can be done including peer review (for 
an academic framework), binding professional codes of practice (for 
accredited professions,133 which does not include archaeology in Australia) or 
licences to undertake an activity (for many industries and activities, although 
again excluding Australian archaeology), the most broadly-based method for 
ensuring the implementation of a management framework is via legislation. In 
general, this process currently involves a requirement for a permit or approval 
to be obtained in advance of work affecting archaeological heritage, with 
conditions attached to that permit. Legislation provides a mechanism for 
enforcement of codes of behaviour and practice, as well as a mechanism for 
punishing non-complying actions or behaviours. O’Keefe and Prott note that, 
despite a notion that the inherent value of items of cultural heritage should 
itself be a bar to preventing harm to that heritage, the realities and dangers 
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facing cultural heritage in general do require some level of governmental 
intervention, generally through legislation.134 
 
In Australia, the focus in law has been on the management of the physical 
remains of the archaeological past, by protecting either specific types of 
objects (termed relics, objects or artefacts, depending on jurisdiction) or 
specific areas of land. This drive for protection has been underpinned by both 
the international heritage treaties to which Australia is a signatory,135 as well 
as by domestic documents containing statements of principles, such as the 
Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter.136 Underlying all of this is the fundamental 
proposition that the remains of the past must be protected, as they will allow 
us to better understand contemporary society. In Australia, there is also a 
belief that archaeology is a discipline principally based on a research agenda, 
and that archaeological material must be protected to allow it to be 
researched. This is due to the influences of the positivist archaeological 
traditions discussed above. Australian archaeological work has also, until 
quite recently, been seen primarily as a process of excavation of material 
remains in the archaeological record and the subsequent study of that 
material. This view of the primacy of excavation and of the archaeological 
object137 is reinforced through the general public perception of archaeological 
work as synonymous with excavation. Hodder notes that archaeological 
practice in some areas is beginning to “move away from the centrality of 
digging within archaeological practice”.138 However this is by no means a 
universal shift in practice and, given current legal structures, excavation 
retains its primacy within the canon of archaeological techniques.139  
 
Moser noted in 1995 that no extensive analysis had been undertaken of the 
history, development and underlying philosophy of the Australian 
archaeological discipline.140 While her research was primarily focussed on the 
development of a professional culture within Australian prehistoric 
archaeology, she observed a progression within the discipline from a 
museum- and collector-based culture, to an academic culture starting in the 
1960s to the current “public sector” culture.141 Moser’s tracing of the evolution 
of Australian archaeological heritage management to a public sector culture 
aligns neatly with the analysis by Byrne and others of “social significance” and 
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the public sector aspects of archaeological heritage management.142 While 
Byrne and colleagues were writing principally about Aboriginal heritage 
management, the phases they have identified ring true for non-Aboriginal 
heritage management as well, particularly historical archaeology. The initial 
phase was derived from the establishment of legislation to protect 
archaeological relics and that heritage management at that time was 
principally dominated by the field of archaeology.143 The following phase saw 
a large increase in the amount of archaeological work undertaken, in 
response to environmental impact assessment and abatement; however the 
consequence of this was the “virtual exclusion of community heritage 
values”.144 This mirrors the rise in compliance-driven archaeology observed in 
America over the same period.145 The authors suggest a future goal of 
developing a “holistic approach” towards heritage management, where the 
conception of heritage moves away from the merely material aspects to a 
wider conception of heritage as a form of social action.146 Nevertheless, these 
authors do not deny the need for heritage protection legislation, but rather call 
for reform within it, to cater for the acknowledgement of changing 
contemporary values and the intangible values of places.147 Thus even within 
the case for broad reform in Australian heritage management, there is 
consensus that regulation through legislation is required, as opposed to 
voluntary measures, and archaeological heritage management will remain 
within the public sector realm.148 
 
Following on from this analysis, it is observable that the discipline of 
archaeology is currently split into three distinct yet related strands–university 
or museum-based research archaeology, archaeological heritage 
management and archaeological consulting. Each of these three strands 
overlaps with the others yet all have separate goals and responsibilities. 
Ideally, each strives for the appropriate treatment of the archaeological 
resource, but the end results can and should be quite different. Academic or 
research archaeologists have the luxury of being able to pursue their own 
research agendas, and may not ever need to become involved with the public 
sector culture of archaeological heritage management. Researching using 
textual sources, or existing archaeological collections, or pursuing theoretical 
issues, can leave the academic archaeologist outside the legal realm. It is 
only when they seek to interact with the physical aspects of the archaeological 
past that legal requirements are triggered. In some jurisdictions, this may be 
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limited to when physical excavation is actually proposed, however in others 
this may include surveys or studies of the archaeological resource. 
 
Heritage managers are concerned with managing archaeological places and 
administering heritage legislation. They may be responsible for enforcing 
compliance or setting policy which may direct the manner in which the 
archaeological past is managed, impacted upon or used. In some instances, 
this has included restricting access to the archaeological resource, even from 
legitimate researchers, where there have been significant community 
issues.149 The heritage managers are largely responsible for maintaining the 
“public sector” culture to which Byrne, Moser and Smith150 allude and which 
Carman has described as the bureaucracy of archaeology.151 This may have 
little to do with the research-oriented goals of the academic archaeologist and 
more to do with legislation, policy and politics. But as the keeper of the public 
sector culture, it is incumbent upon the heritage manager to seek the best 
public outcomes, to demonstrate the importance of archaeology to the public 
or to specific communities.152 The archaeological heritage manager’s role is 
one of enabling engagement and creating value for the community from the 
archaeological record. 
 
Archaeological consultants represent the private sector involvement with 
archaeology and are principally concerned with compliance issues. The 
archaeological consulting culture is a direct outgrowth of the establishment of 
heritage legislation and compliance requirements upon non-archaeologists. In 
the absence of legislation, it is unlikely that such a branch of archaeology 
would have arisen. It is also unlikely that archaeology would be practiced on 
the scale that it currently is, in the absence of legislation. The archaeological 
consultant must be focussed on the site at hand and may rarely have the 
opportunity to consider the bigger picture issues, or indeed follow any 
significant research agenda, other than that dictated from the public sector 
heritage managers. Writing from the perspective of the early period of contract 
historical archaeology in Australia, Higginbotham noted ambiguities inherent 
in the archaeological protective legal regime, such as the provision of funding, 
or the degree of excavation required for a site to adequately reveal the 
“meaning” for which it has ostensibly protected.153 These questions remain 
pertinent in the current practice of compliance-driven archaeology. Ultimately, 
the archaeological consultant is present to ensure their non-archaeological 
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client complies with heritage legislation.154 If a public or research outcome can 
be delivered along the way, this is an added benefit. The consultant 
archaeologist must work closely with the archaeological heritage manager but 
may have limited interaction with research archaeologists. It remains open to 
debate as to whether the primary archaeological function of consulting 
archaeologists is to gather data for analysis by university or museum-based 
research archaeologists, as it must be acknowledge that the actual activities 
undertaken by archaeological consultants are driven by legislative compliance 
issues rather than by any substantial research framework. 
 
The public sector culture which manages all Australian archaeological 
heritage is a direct product of the legislation which underpins it, forcing a 
culture of compliance upon archaeology, backed up with potentially serious 
consequences for both archaeologists and their clients should they choose to 
operate outside of the legislative framework. Coutts remarked that “if the 
community (through the State agencies) grants an archaeologist the privilege 
of carrying out an [archaeological] investigation…then it has the right to 
demand certain things in return.”155 This may include access to archaeological 
places, influence on their management or simply to be entertained. The 
presence of archaeological heritage legislation in and of itself elevates the 
status of the archaeological record in a privileged manner and while Coutts 
asserted that archaeologists have a right of access to the archaeological 
record, this is tempered with a need to act responsibly and to engage with the 
community.156 McGowan however observed that this hardline “right of access” 
stance has significantly shifted through the 1980s and 1990s, to recognise the 
need for indigenous community involvement in heritage management.157 Now 
professional codes of ethics in Australia, such as those of the Australian 
Association of Consulting Archaeologists Incorporated (AACAI)158 or the 
Australian Archaeological Association (AAA)159 explicitly acknowledge both 
the public160 and specific groups161 such as indigenous peoples as having a 
legitimate claim upon the archaeological resource. 
 
Many archaeologists have written about the value of “community” or “public” 
archaeology, for both the general public and the indigenous community.162 
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This has often arisen out of a desire to educate or present the results of 
archaeological work to the public, to invite public participation in the 
archaeological fieldwork or analysis process or to provide a lasting tangible 
reminder of the archaeological past through on-site interpretation or in situ 
conservation. Less frequently this desire for public or community interaction 
includes the necessity for the public to participate in or drive the direction of 
archaeological work, or to make management decisions about archaeological 
places. This last is perhaps the most difficult, as it requires the professional 
archaeologist to relinquish their last role as arbiter and protector of the 
archaeological past. Much interesting work is being done in this area in terms 
of archaeology as a tool of ‘community’ or ‘civic engagement’, particularly in 
the United States.163 This work leads towards what this thesis argues should 
be the goal of legislative protection of archaeological heritage–delivering a net 
‘public good’ to the community, discussed in detail in the following chapter. 
Current legislation however continues to mandate a compliance regime which 
often lacks community-focussed outcomes. 
 
Given that shift, the next logical progression is the consideration of wider 
community values when undertaking archaeological works and assessing the 
‘value’ of archaeological sites and objects. Ideally archaeologists operating 
within this culture of compliance should be striving to meet those community 
expectations, recognising their privileged position within society to both 
access and interpret archaeological materials.164 Archaeological work or 
outcomes should be commensurate with the privilege of access to 
archaeological materials. Inflexibility within legislative regimes, coupled with 
the commercial realities of much compliance-driven archaeological work, has 
often meant that the end product of an archaeological investigation is more 
focussed on a compliance-based result,165 rather than work which recognises 
that a privilege, that of disturbing a limited resource, has been granted. To 
achieve more than a mere “culture of compliance”, heritage legislation must 
be suitably flexible in its form and administration to allow the achievement of 
what Byrne and colleagues termed a “holistic approach” or the ‘public good’ 
considerations which are argued for in this thesis. 
 
2.9 The birth of a common environmental and heritage consciousness 
 
Internationally, environmental consciousness began to grow in the 1960s, 
spurred on by a rapidly changing world, broad social upheaval and a general 
questioning of society’s mores. In Australia, this did not take concrete form 
until the first public heritage battle, to save the site of Kelly’s Bush, a small 
area of untouched bushland in suburban Sydney, in 1971.166 At about this 
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same time, the first “green” political party was established in Tasmania167 and 
the Australian Council of National Trusts began to investigate and lobby for 
the introduction of heritage legislation across Australia.168 Internationally, the 
field of environmental law was undergoing significant development, driven by 
the efforts of the United Nations.169 Public fights about large-scale 
developments and related environmental and heritage issues brought the 
matter into the broader public forum, particularly the fights over the proposed 
damming of the Franklin River in Tasmania, which led directly to the passing 
of the Commonwealth World Heritage Properties Conservation Act (1983) and 
ensuing battle in the High Court regarding the validity of that legislation.170 
This particular battle also saw the intertwining of cultural and natural heritage 
issues as the presence of archaeological sites and subsequent Native Title 
claim were as important factors as the natural heritage values in the 
conservation of the Franklin Valley.171 A similar environmental and heritage 
battle arose in the late 1990s, over the establishment of the Jabiluka uranium 
mine within the boundaries of the Kakadu World Heritage Area.172 
 
While the initial phases of the Australian heritage movement concentrated on 
the conservation of the built environment and, to a lesser extent concerns 
such as archaeological sites, throughout the 1990s a broader focus on the 
notion of ‘heritage’ began to prevail, one which included cultural/spiritual (or 
intangible) values as well as natural heritage values. This is expressed most 
fully through the establishment of such documents as the Australian Natural 
Heritage Charter173 and amendments to the Australia ICOMOS Charter for 
Places of Cultural Significance174 (the Burra Charter) and various pieces of 
heritage legislation at State, Territory and Commonwealth levels to include 
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natural and cultural heritage values.175 This drawing together of natural and 
cultural concerns 
In part reflects that indigenous Australians do not separate natural and cultural 
concerns. In the non-indigenous community this has been expressed as the 
concept of ‘sustainability’ or ecologically sustainable development, a process 
of considering and balancing environmental, social and economic factors. The 
utility of the sustainability concept within the legal management of 
archaeological heritage is considered later in this thesis. Given the growing 
social concern over such environmental and heritage issues, it would be 
hoped that conservation efforts could be progressed in the absence of 
legislation. The following section considers the necessity of a legislative 
approach to heritage conservation. 
 
2.10 Legislative protection of archaeological heritage as a reflection of 
social value 
 
There are many different potential “purposes” for archaeology,176 the most 
broad-ranging being that analysis of the archaeological record provides a 
deeper understanding of the past which assists in the understanding of the 
present. Yet other disciplines provide insight into the past–history, classics, 
philosophy–however they have not generally required legislative responses. 
What is it about archaeology which has required a response in a way other 
academically-derived disciplines have not? Certainly one aspect must be that 
the “doing” of archaeology requires the access to the physical remains of the 
past. We see similar issues in history with respect to historic documents, 
where legislation exists to protect archival materials.177 The legislation is not in 
place solely because the public or government of the day wanted to facilitate 
the “doing” of history; rather there was a recognition that the source material 
of history, the documentary record, was fragile and needed protective 
legislative assistance to ensure its protection. The end result was not merely 
to ensure that historians had many old documents to pore over, but to allow 
the possibility that knowledge and understanding of the past could be derived 
from those preserved documents. They, as with the archaeological record, 
represent ‘potential history’. 
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Lowenthal cites the strong nostalgic value of the physical remains of the past 
for those in the present, particularly if the present contains unpleasant or 
uncertain aspects178 which, through the veil of nostalgia, appear to be absent 
from the past. This nostalgia may account for some of the public drive to see 
aspects of the past preserved, but does not account for the professional-
objective interest in the past as generally espoused by archaeologists. Both 
serve to influence the protective mechanisms which may be applied through 
law. Emerging groups within societies may themselves see different values for 
the remains of the past, which were perhaps not valued or protected under 
previous regimes. In Australia, indigenous heritage is the primary example of 
this, where the vast majority of statutory protection focussed on places of 
archaeological value, but a gradual shift is being seen towards protecting 
places of significance to the indigenous community. These places may have 
little or no scientific value, but may serve a social, spiritual or perhaps even a 
nostalgic function in the politics of contemporary identity. Nostalgia in this 
context can however be a distinct negative, particularly for indigenous 
cultures, where a common perception of “traditional” society can limit an 
indigenous culture’s ability to establish a contemporary identity, without being 
seen to be rejecting their own past.179  
 
British academic John Carman succinctly summarised a key rationale behind 
archaeological heritage legislation: “Laws...act primarily as symbols of the 
importance of archaeology.”180 In Carman’s view, the main purpose of 
archaeological heritage legislation was to indicate to the general body of the 
populace that archaeological heritage had a value. What should not be 
overlooked in this process however is that the community may attach 
symbolic values of its own to archaeological sites or objects,181 which may not 
align with the “professional” archaeological values the law generally seeks to 
protect. Lowenthal has argued that this drive to protect in a statutory sense is 
inextricably linked to the focus in Western conservation movements on fabric 
over value and a fear of losing something valuable due to a lack of 
understanding about what is in fact important about the past.182 But 
establishing legislative protection is also part of the process of moving 
conservation and appreciation of the past from the private to the public 
sphere.183 In addition to these positive regulatory aspects, Smith notes that 
laws function to regulate areas of conflict,184 as well as areas of value. Those 
things which a society values are generally protected through legislation, 
elevating their status and placing obligations upon society and its members to 
see that the protected things are dealt with in accordance with society’s 
wishes. Evans indicates that a key function of heritage legislation is to provide 
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contemporary relevance to the past, with law being the mechanism for 
supporting the process of determining what to keep of that past, but not 
necessarily defining why an element of the past is important.  
 
He states that: 
 
whilst environmental planning law looks to the future, heritage 
conservation law, as a component of environmental planning law, does 
not merely revisit the past, but more importantly, provides its present 
and future cultural, natural and contextual basis, and raison d’être.185 
 
The law therefore is the primary mechanism for ascribing appropriate 
behaviour with respect to a protected class of thing, practice or concept and 
acts to make the thing protected relevant to wider society. The moral 
implications arising from this are examined in Chapter 3. James and Mora 
indicate however that legislation should play a minor part in the conservation 
of a nation’s heritage.186 The law, in their view, acts as a cautionary 
mechanism but the actual desire to conserve heritage is one which should be 
driven by inherent societal valuing of that heritage rather than due to 
legislative dictate. The mere act of legislating does not necessarily mean that 
the protections enshrined in law are appropriate, enforceable or well thought 
through. The presence of a law exerts a degree of moral force upon members 
of society, backed up with the notion of penalty, which may be more 
persuasive than a moral argument alone. To quote one Victorian 
parliamentarian during the 1972 debates over the Aboriginal and 
Archaeological Relics Preservation Bill “it is not enough to leave it to chance 
or individuals to protect our heritage”, legislation was required.187 Similar 
sentiments about the difficulty of protecting remote sites affected by 
increasing industrial exploration and tourism in remote areas were echoed in 
Western Australia in the same period.188 These sentiments had not changed 
more than 20 years later when another Victorian parliamentarian remarked, 
during debate on the Heritage (Amendment) Bill 2003 (Vic):  
 
Not all Victorians are absolutely passionate about their heritage 
because that is why the bill has been introduced–it prescribes tougher 
penalties for those who breach heritage permits. Not everybody shares 
the same level of passion for our heritage.189  
 
Similarly, in NSW it was noted that the introduction of legislation may obviate 
the need for “wearying and unsatisfactory” fights to protect heritage items.190 
The presence of legislation increases the certainty of outcome in many 
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instances, by clarifying the requirements for the behaviour of citizens, for the 
benefit for the community at large: 
 
For instance, somebody fossicking on what is actually an archaeological 
site may be an innocent mistake but the fossicking can do untold 
damage to that site, particularly if the fossicking becomes something that 
large numbers in the community are doing. It is extremely important to 
explain to people that the site is significant for a particular reason and to 
make it clear to them what is and is not acceptable in terms of this 
heritage legislation.191 
 
In addition, it is necessary for such protective systems to accommodate 
changing views and conceptions of what comprises the “heritage” of a society. 
Social change, better information and deeper understandings of the past will 
influence the perceptions of what is valued and why, influencing in turn what is 
legally protected. Nevertheless, legislation will not act as an absolute 
deterrent to damaging archaeological heritage deliberately or through 
ignorance, but should provide guidance as to why certain places are 
important. 
 
2.11 The limits of legislation 
 
Legislation can exist unamended for a considerable period of time and thus it 
is important to achieve the appropriate balance within it, to prevent undue 
burdens being placed on society.192 E. H. Carr, writing more generally about 
history, noted that history is always being rewritten and reinterpreted, and it 
should be accepted that “old” histories can look foolish or outdated from the 
perspective of the present,193 and there is no reason that this observation 
should not hold for interpretations of the archaeological record or for heritage 
legislation. As archaeological theory changes, in response to fashion, politics 
or evolution of intellectual debate, we should expect the same evolution in 
heritage protection legislation. Considered in the historical context of the 
archaeological literature of 1960s and 1970s, which viewed archaeology as 
“science”, regulation became about creating the opportunity for archaeologists 
to prove or disprove perceptions of the past. While such a positivist notion is 
now generally unfashionable within the archaeological world,194 as discussed 
earlier in the chapter, during the Australian debates regarding heritage 
protection it was inevitable that this perspective would have coloured the 
views of lawmakers at the time. Viewed in the historical retrospect to which 
Carr alludes, this “scientific” emphasis may be seen as a simplistic or 
outmoded view of archaeology, but one which remains embedded in 
Australian law.195 
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Fundamentally, the testing of legislation occurs before the courts, however in 
the case of the archaeological heritage legislation in Australia, there have 
been relatively few instances where this has occurred. This has led to 
inconsistency in the definition of the nature of heritage to be protected 
between Australian jurisdictions, and even within jurisdictions often the 
definitions of indigenous and non-indigenous heritage are inconsistent. This 
same situation applies to the heritage significance assessment criteria used at 
Commonwealth, State and Territory level.196 The scale of penalties for 
offences are highly variable and often inconsistent with broader criminal 
legislation, leading one member of the Victorian Parliament to note it would be 
preferable to be convicted under the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) for removing an 
object from an archaeological site without permission, as the penalties under 
the Heritage Act were considerably more severe, although non-criminal in 
nature.197 Circumstances where such issues have been tested by the courts 
are minimal, but there are however numerous examples of, generally small, 
changes to the various archaeological protections through amendment. Given 
this lack of judicial testing, it is difficult to know with any certainty whether the 
laws are truly acting as an effective moral force. It remains possible legislation 
is merely under-enforced, with verification of compliance difficult or that 
government heritage agencies have chosen to seek negotiated outcomes 
rather than to institute legal proceedings. Chapter 8 contains analysis of that 
case law which does exist, and examines the courts’ consideration of the 
value of archaeological heritage and the protections within the legislation. 
Despite the lack of substantial case law, the legislation can still be said to be 
performing a function, but to what end? Is that legislation still acting, as 
Carmen suggested, as a relevant symbol of the societal value of 
archaeological heritage? And, as a symbol, is the legislation still relevant to 
the public of the twenty-first century, as opposed to the public of the 1960s 
and 1970s, when much of the legislation was established?198 If archaeological 
heritage law does in fact primarily act as a symbol of the importance of 
archaeology, as Carman asserts, why, at a deeper level, should the wider 
society of non-archaeologists consider this practice important? 
 
Archaeological theorist Ken Dark cautions that the public perceptions of the 
purpose of archaeology may not coincide with the motivations of 
archaeologists. However, the views of archaeologists can influence those of 
the public, thus a professional position that archaeology is scientific 
endeavour which can “prove” the past will colour this public perspective.199 
Significantly then, it is arguable that those laypeople involved in the creation of 
archaeological regulation (that is, the lawyers and legislators) were steeped in 
this “scientific” perspective. This perspective would then imply that, if the 
archaeological remains of the past were not protected, there would be an 
inevitable loss of scientific data, which would prevent archaeology from 
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“proving” new “truths” about the past. Kohl, while suspicious of the positivist, 
infallible view of archaeological science, is more cautious about endorsing a 
multivocal interpretation of the archaeological record, feeling that too many 
perspectives may lead to a failure to grapple with significant issues thrown up 
by the archaeological record.200 Jones advocates a position which embraces 
the methodological rigour of scientific archaeology, while using an interpretive 
theoretical framework, which can account for factors outside of the “facts” of 
the archaeological record.201 In terms of a legal heritage management 
framework, the challenge becomes to create an opportunity where study or 
use of the archaeological record can recognise a range of interests and 
questions, without necessarily privileging one perspective, as has happened 
with the legal privileging of the “scientific” paradigm in Australian 
archaeological heritage law. But even so, heritage legislation cannot 
guarantee absolute protection or correct interpretation of the archaeological 
past. 
 
2.12  The public value of Australian archaeology 
 
The Australian archaeological tradition has tended to privilege technical, 
professional significance for archaeological heritage over other values.202 
Implicit in the practice of archaeology is a belief that a better understanding of 
the past assists our understanding of our place in the present and future. Yet 
even this can be the source of tensions between the heritage professional and 
the community, particularly with indigenous communities,203 due to values for 
the archaeological heritage. Renfrew put the position that archaeology 
“permits the reconstruction of the past of humankind” through the study of the 
information and context of materials in the archaeological record.204 He calls 
for “strong laws” to protect the archaeological record, but does not elaborate 
on how those laws should function.205 Significantly, however, he does express 
a view that “archaeology is no longer simply an interesting and perhaps 
romantic academic discipline. It is now an area of considerable public 
concern.”206 This sentiment is echoed by Hodder,207 amongst others.208 Dobb 
noted that a focus on protecting the rights of a small group, at the expense of 
the wider community, is rarely viewed with great acceptance; rather, a 
balance of interests must be sought.209 As a public concern, there must be a 
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reconciliation between the concerns of the discipline of archaeology and the 
concerns of the public, which is reflected in heritage protection legislation. 
 
Murray noted that one of the key values of archaeology was as a tool for non-
archaeologists to discover aspects of their pasts which would otherwise have 
gone unrevealed. He particularly notes the manner in which archaeology has 
helped Aboriginal people discover their past.210 This position is somewhat 
problematic, as it assumes that whatever aspects of the Aboriginal past 
Murray was referring to were either lost or unknown to Aboriginal people. At 
one level, this harks back to earlier conceptions of archaeology which 
assumed Aboriginal people were unknowing about themselves. At the same 
time it must be acknowledged that archaeological knowledge has been of 
practical value to Aboriginal people in certain circumstances, particularly 
around issues such as land rights,211 through demonstrating an ongoing 
connection to lands through archaeological investigation. This highlights some 
of the problems with multivocality which Kohl alludes to, however there should 
be sufficient space within the archaeological record to accommodate such 
views. The constraints on this space come particularly from the legislative 
frameworks which define what is archaeological and limit the ability to 
consider the non-scientific values of archaeological heritage. 
 
Connah laments that fundamental archaeological research is being neglected 
in Australia, due to the prevalence of what he terms “commercial 
archaeology”. He considers that archaeology’s main value is that “[it] can offer 
something history cannot: it can extract unique information from physical 
evidence, provided it asks archaeological questions…and uses appropriate 
processes”212 and does not acknowledge it as a broad public concern. Implicit 
in his argument is a suggestion that “commercial archaeology”, which is driven 
by the need for legislative compliance, is distracting archaeologists from 
archaeological research, which should be the main concern of the discipline. 
Much earlier in his career, Connah had critically observed that, from a public 
perspective, archaeology equals excavation,213 and this public perception 
would certainly influence the way in which the public expects Australian 
governments to protect archaeological heritage through legislation. In a 
related article, Connah expresses the view that “archaeology [is] basically a 
scholarly discipline”. And while he recognises the support the “tax-paying 
public” indirectly provides to archaeology and therefore a need to provide 
archaeological information to the public, he views archaeology’s proper place 
as being situated in Australian universities, with a research focus.214 
Universities are no longer however solely about research and are more and 
more in a position of participating in or actively pursuing commercially 
focussed projects with teaching and public education roles, including 
                                            
210  Murray, T. (1993). Communication and the importance of disciplinary communities: who owns the past? 
Archaeological theory - who sets the agenda? N. Yoffee and A. Sherratt. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 105-116.  
211  Sheehan, J. (2000). "Linking cultural heritage and native title." Land Rights Queensland June 2000: 12.  
212  Connah, G. (2003). "Problem orientation in Australian historical archaeology." Historical Archaeology 37 (1): 146-
158.  
213  Connah, G. (1997). "The purpose of archaeology." Australian Archaeology 45: 48-53.  This is the republished text 
of a lecture originally delivered on 13 October 1986, on the opening of the University of New England’s 
archaeology program. 
214  Connah, G. (1998). "Pattern and purpose in historical archaeology." Australasian Historical Archaeology 16: 3-7. 
Pg 4 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 2–Expressing the importance of the archaeological past: science vs social significance 63 
archaeological projects. Kennedy views the unwillingness amongst some 
archaeologists to engage with the public as problematic, and notes that public 
engagement will be essential for the long-term future of the archaeological 
discipline and the protection of the physical remains of the past.215  
 
Mackay and Karskens explicitly refuted Connah’s position and felt that the 
consulting aspects of (historical) archaeological practice were both delivering 
value to the public and building links with academia.216 They cite, at some 
length, the “public” aspects of a large archaeological project in Sydney’s 
Rocks area, which included public tours, volunteer community excavators, 
publications, film and print media and an education kit. This was however in 
the context of a project which was not compliance-driven, but rather based on 
the desire of a public authority with a cultural heritage management 
responsibility to exploit one of its archaeological sites to produce exactly this 
type of public engagement.217 Yet it has taken ten years from the time the 
excavation works were completed to develop a proposed use for the site, 
which will interpret its archaeological values within a new development.218 
Mackay and Karskens’ response to Connah’s argument is somewhat glib, as 
their tone implies that the public should be pleased to receive whatever 
consulting archaeology may choose to offer, with no consideration of public 
input or lasting community benefit. The public may be entertained, amused or 
enlightened by the types of public interactions Mackay and Karskens 
describe, but are these interactions in fact relevant when dealing with a largely 
self-selected group of “interested” members of the public? This is a 
particularly important consideration when dealing with a typical compliance-
driven archaeological project, such as one undertaken in advance of a 
commercial redevelopment, rather than a specifically-conceived “public 
archaeology” project such as Mackay and Karskens describe.  
 
As cited briefly in Chapter 1, others Australian authors have explicitly 
focussed on the “social value” of archaeology and heritage219 and there is a 
well-established field of “public archaeology”. Mackay and Karskens describe 
consulting archaeology as a “conduit between academia and the 
community.”220 It remains unclear what elements of the community or the 
public may be on the receiving end of this conduit. As Carman noted, while 
archaeological heritage management may be based on a notion that the past 
belongs to everyone, not everyone is interested in its preservation.221 The 
community is, by its nature, a construct of diverse parts, thus the challenge in 
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any publicly focussed archaeological project is to make findings relevant 
beyond self-selected interested persons. Lilley sees that archaeologists have 
an ethical duty to clearly communicate their goals and findings, but see those 
messages as tailored to specific audiences, rather than striving for a general 
public engagement.222 The public value of archaeological heritage has also 
been noted by lawmakers.223 During the Parliamentary debates on the 
Tasmanian Historic Cultural Heritage Bill in 1995, for example, one 
parliamentarian noted that while heritage (in a general sense) has educative 
value and therefore should be protected, its greater value was how “[people’s] 
association with the built heritage and the experiences that have informed 
them over their lifetimes have built this sense of place and this sense of self-
worth…”224 For this reason, heritage protection legislation was viewed as 
something critical to the maintenance of the identity of the Tasmanian people 
into the future.  
 
Ireland has explored in depth the notion of archaeology as a tool for the 
construction of national identity.225 To building on what Carman said, this 
further emphasises the symbolic value of archaeology, just as the listing of a 
place on a heritage register may be as much a protective as a symbolic act. 
Marsh noted that archaeological collections provide symbols which assist in 
the search for identity, while recognising that most archaeological work 
adopted a “utilitarian” approach to the collections, seeking only to extract 
meaning from the collection with respect to the specific site from which it was 
excavated.226 Trigger, however, notes that archaeology has traditionally been 
a middle-class pursuit, bringing with it the potential biases and preconceptions 
which stem from this middle-class basis.227 These will influence the nature of 
the identity being developed, as well as influencing the nature of legislation 
enacted to protect archaeological heritage. Baran and Rowan see 
globalisation and increased affluence as causing the commodification of 
archaeological heritage, one which can create a tension between the 
interpretation of that heritage to support local/regional/national identities and 
those seeking to experience a “common human heritage” through tourism.228 
When undertaken within a public context, either when legislatively mandated 
or for explicit presentation to the public, archaeological work should strive to 
serve public purposes and deliver broad benefits to the community. These 
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may be symbolic, educative or economic in nature, and will be driven by both 
the nature of the site and the needs and aspirations of the community. What 
those purposes may be will need to be determined through a process of 
involvement with the community. 
 
2.13  Conclusion 
 
It remains open as to whether a legislative approach has achieved appropriate 
protection of Australian archaeological heritage. To generalise Carman’s point 
noted above, legislation symbolises the importance of something to society. 
That thing may be a class of object (archaeological sites or protected 
species), a cultural value (racial or gender equality) or a common law principle 
(the right to own property).229 Where laws exist to protect such things on 
paper, each thing is noted as having a value to society. In the instance of 
archaeological heritage law, the laws also symbolise Australia’s commitment 
to international initiatives to protect cultural heritage more generally, as the 
domestic laws support Australia’s obligations under international agreements. 
In the absence of these laws, it is unlikely that moral force alone would 
prevent transgressions (deliberate or accidental) against the archaeological 
heritage. In fact, in the absence of legislation, the situation may be that 
archaeological heritage would be specifically viewed as not being valued, and 
thereby be potentially more subject to threat. In the absence of legislation, it is 
likely that the path of least resistance or least economic cost would be sought, 
which may be in opposition to societal values. Archaeological heritage 
legislation therefore serves a useful purpose, as it reinforces society’s value 
for the physical remains of its past and ensures that past is protected.  
 
However, having entered into the legislative realm, archaeological heritage is 
no longer the concern solely of archaeologists, and therefore needs to be 
relevant to a wider set of values. By explicitly considering wider values, it is 
possible for archaeological heritage management frameworks to overcome 
some of this legislative solipsism. Chapter 3 examines how other 
considerations are being brought into the realm of environmental 
conservation, through the use of the sustainability principles. Developing a 
wider frame of reference, which takes into consideration environmental, social 
and economic factors ensures that heritage conservation is not merely 
measured against itself, but in relation to other things which are valued by the 
community. This may sit uneasily with traditional approaches to heritage 
conservation, particularly those which place the highest value on the 
conservation of the fabric of places, over the conservation of other values. But 
to what end is that past protected? Does the legal protection of the past serve 
the ‘public good’? Chapter 3 situates Australian heritage protection more 
broadly within the area of environmental protection and examines how the 
concept of ‘public good conservation’ can be used to protect archaeological 
heritage. 
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Chapter 3–Establishing a basis for ‘public good conservation’ 
 
Chapter 2 examined the underlying paradigm for the legal protection of 
archaeological heritage in Australia, a paradigm primarily bedded in a 
processual, scientific view of the value of archaeological heritage. That 
chapter introduced ‘public good conservation’, an emerging view within 
environmental conservation and law, as an alternate basis for archaeological 
heritage protection. Using environmental philosophy as a tool, Chapter 3 
analyses the underlying social and moral duties which exist in relation to 
environmental protection generally and examines how those positions may be 
extended to archaeological heritage protection. The thesis then considers how 
these positions within environmental moral philosophy may be transferred into 
protective legislation for the environment and archaeological heritage. By 
forming philosophical links between environmental conservation and 
archaeological heritage conservation, it is possible to demonstrate the 
applicability of the ‘public good conservation’ concept to archaeological 
heritage protection. Having established archaeology as an environmental 
issue for the purposes of legal analysis, this chapter applies emerging legal 
and policy tools for environmental conservation and the transmission of 
environmental benefit to the public to the area of archaeological conservation. 
Such concepts provide a useful method for managing archaeological heritage 
within a ‘public good’ environmental context. This model is of assistance given 
the very limited jurisprudence regarding heritage and archaeological matters 
in Australia.1  
 
Following on from that discussion, the Chapter turns to an analysis of the 
concept of ‘heritage significance’ with respect to Australian archaeological 
heritage, and draws conclusions about the value and utility of existing 
significance frameworks and their relationship to heritage legislation. 
Significance frameworks underlie heritage legislation, forming the criteria 
which are designed to put a degree of objective rigour and transparency of 
process behind the identification and classification of a place or object as 
having heritage value. The classification of a heritage place within a 
significance framework will largely determine what, if any, legal protection will 
be assigned. Good in theory, the practical application is often not altogether 
rigorous and the frameworks remain, perhaps inevitably, subjective. This 
thesis contends that these significance frameworks, as with the legislation, 
prioritise the concept of the ‘research’ or ‘scientific’ significance of 
archaeological heritage over other values, yet at the same time fail to 
effectively underpin the legal frameworks in such a way that this research 
value can be realised. Current legislation and significance frameworks do not 
generally reflect more recent evolutions in archaeological thought, which has 
largely moved beyond the centrality of the scientific paradigm. This has led to 
a focus on the legal or compliance process rather than the outcomes of the 
protective legislation. The analysis then moves to a discussion of broadening 
the conception of the significance of archaeological heritage, to consider its 
place in and contribution to broader public interests. The chapter concludes 
with an argument in favour of ‘public good conservation’ as the appropriate 
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basis for contemporary archaeological heritage management and sets the 
stage for the reconsideration of the existing Australian legal frameworks.  
 
3.1 What is the ‘public good’ as a basis for conservation? 
 
The notion of the ‘public good’ is a generalised moral concept which holds that 
an activity which is in the ‘public good’2 must have a broad positive reach 
beyond a localised outcome, which flows directly or indirectly to wider society 
over a long period of time. This activity may be undertaken by government, 
private sector groups or individuals. The benefits should flow to the 
community generally, rather than principally to an individual, group, business 
or government. It should account for both the present needs of society, as well 
as the potential needs of future generations and seeks the “harmonization of 
the public and private spheres”.3 As an environmental conservation 
philosophy, conservation “in the public good” should present environmental 
conservation as relevant and useful to society broadly and facilitate culture 
change favouring conservation through embedding this philosophy within 
social norms. Protection of environmental values is likely to require collective 
action with the support of an institution such as a government agency. In this 
circumstance, one of the contributions government can make is the 
establishment of appropriate regulation.4 ‘Public good conservation’ is not, 
however, conservation for its own sake, where the beneficiary is principally 
the environment itself, and human implications of lesser, or no, consideration. 
Many activities have been described as public good activities, including pro 
bono legal services5, public services and utilities,6 public health programs7, 
biodiversity conservation8 and scientific research.9 Indeed, archaeological 
                                            
2  Here the term ‘public good’ is used as an expression of positive moral force which supports community well-
being, as opposed to the economic definition of a ‘public good’, which is a physical good (i.e. thing or service) 
which is universally available, provided without profit and unable to be readily restricted. For a range of economic 
definitions of ‘public good’ see for example: 
Definition of public good (collective goods) at Special Investor.com Financial Dictionary: 
http://www.specialinvestor.com/terms/2658.html (accessed 25/10/05);  
Entry for Public Good at Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public_good (accessed 25/10/05);  
 Discussion of Public Goods and Externalities at the Concise Encyclopaedia of Economics: 
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/PublicGoodsandExternalities.html (accessed 25/10/05). 
 See also Ver Eecke, W. (1999). "Public goods: an ideal concept. ." The Journal of Socio-Economics 28 (2): 139-
156. Ver Eecke conceives of a ‘public good’ as something which allows, in economic terms, the realisation of a 
collective gain. For environmental and heritage conservation examples of this sense of a ‘public good’, see 
Bennett, J. (1995). "Protecting nature - privately." Policy: 11-15. and Kling, R. W., C. F. Revier, et al. (2004). 
"Estimating the Public Good Value of Preserving a Local Historic Landmark: The Role of Non-substitutability and 
Citizen Information." Urban Studies 41 (10): 2025-2041. Bennett discusses environmental ‘public goods’ in terms 
of the economics of private sector nature conservation while Kling et al. apply economic modelling to determine 
what the financial costs and values are in the conservation of a ‘public good’ in the form of a heritage building. 
3  Grange, J. (1996). "The disappearance of the public good: Confucius, Dewey, Rorty." Philosophy East and West 
46 (3): 351-366.  
4  Blamey, R. (1998). "The activation of environmental norms: extending Schwartz's model." Environment and 
Behavior 30 (5): 676-708. While here Blamey is using “public good” in the economic sense he it discussing the 
factors which influence the public’s choice in choosing to protect those “goods” as parts of the environment. 
5  Pro bono is shorthand for “pro bono publico”, Latin for “in the public good”. See for example Di Cesare, E. and J. 
Pride (2000). Public good for goodness' sake. Bulletin: 24-25.  
Anderson, J. and G. Renouf (2003). "Legal services 'for the public good'." Alternative Law Journal 28 (1): 13-17.  
6  Hayward, D. (2002). "The public good and the public services." Dissent Autumn/Winter: 8-12. , Wilkenfeld, 
G. and P. Spearritt (2004). Electrifying Sydney. Sydney, EnergyAustralia. Pp 4. 
7  Das, V. "Public good, ethics and everyday life: beyond the boundaries of bioethics." 99-133.   
8  Ishwaran, N. (2004). "International conservation diplomacy and the World Heritage Convention." Journal of 
International Wildlife Law & Policy 7 (1-2): 43-56. Pp 55-56. 
9  Dalrymple, D. G. (2005). "Scientific knowledge as a public good." The Scientist (June 20 2005): 10.  
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heritage management has itself has been described as a ‘public good’.10 One 
moral philosopher has characterised the ‘public good’ as simply “acting 
consistently for the sake of the people”11 while another has noted that there is 
no unitary public good and concepts of what is in the public good will change 
as society changes.12  
 
‘Public good conservation’ is related to the notion of the ‘public trust’ as 
espoused by Bonyhady, which holds that actions affecting public resources–
air, water, land, for example–should be done within a context of stewardship 
and sustainability,13 rather than in an exploitative manner for short-term or 
one-off gain. Bates notes that this concept is quite ancient and is expressed in 
modern form through the principle of right of public access to places like 
foreshore lands or the establishment of parks and reserves, although the 
concept is not universally embedded in Australian law at present.14 Knetsch 
observed that pollution control legislation, for example, while an imposition 
upon the rights of the polluter, is generally perceived by the public as “fair”,15 
as a ‘public good’ activity which benefits the community rather than a select 
group,16 through protecting public and environmental health and promoting 
responsibility for polluting actions. Similarly, Blamey cautions that this 
perception as to whether environmental regulation is “fair” in the eyes of the 
public can be strongly influenced by the credibility of the scientists or scientific 
institution advocating for the issue.17 Thus while it can be argued by 
specialists (e.g. environmental scientists or archaeologists) that an aspect of 
environmental protection is “in the public good” this does not necessarily 
guarantee recognition or support by the public. As Blamey put it “notions of 
fairness and responsibility thus need to be balanced against freedom from 
coercion” when the public is assessing its participation in environmental 
protection initiatives.18 Environmental protection and, this thesis argues, 
heritage protection, fall within the realm of ‘public good’ concepts, which need 
to be appropriately underpinned through legislation and public support.  
 
‘Public good’ is a distinct concept from ‘public benefit’, which is a more 
specific form of public good, focussed on a specific observable public 
outcome stemming from a particular action, but which may have no long-term 
or far-reaching positive moral consequences.19 The majority of projects 
referred to as “public archaeology” projects would classify as public benefit 
                                            
10  Fowler, D. D. (1984). Ethics in contract archaeology. Ethics and Values in Archaeology. E. L. Green. New York, 
The Free Press: 108-116. Although Carmen has challenged this assertion. See: Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology 
and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. Pp 96-100. 
11  Grange, J. (1996). "The disappearance of the public good: Confucius, Dewey, Rorty." Philosophy East and West 
46 (3): 351-366.  
12  Kingwell (1999). "Mirror stage: infinite reflections on the public good." Queen's Quarterly 106 (1): 50-61.  
13  Bonyhady, T. (1995). "A useable past: the public trust doctrine in Australia." Environmental and Planning Law 
Journal 12: 329. In the economic sense, air, water and land can all be classed as public goods as per the 
definitions at Note 2, above.  
14  Bates, G. M. (2002). Environmental law in Australia. Sydney, LexisNexis Butterworths. Pp 23-24 
15  Knetsch, J. L. (1990). Property and environmental values. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer 
and D. James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 1-15. Pp 11-12. 
16  Boer, B. (1990). Some legal and ethical issues. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer and D. 
James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 43-56. Pp 52. 
17  Blamey, R. (1998). "The activation of environmental norms: extending Schwartz's model." Environment and 
Behavior 30 (5): 676-708.  
18  Ibid.  
19  For a general discussion of varying perceptions of ‘public benefit’ archaeology, see Little, B. J., Ed. (2002). Public 
Benefits of Archaeology. Gainsville, University Press of Florida.  
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projects, as they produce a locally focussed, ostensibly positive, public 
outcome, including on-site tours, educative material and publicly-oriented 
publications.20 By their very nature these projects tend to be limited in duration 
and scope, due to financial or other pressures.21 However in the absence of a 
wider impact, they would not classify as works embodying the ‘public good 
conservation’ principle. The distinctions between these two concepts are not 
necessarily readily apparent: Boer observed, for example, that the Victorian 
courts had considered that the purpose of the Victorian Archaeological and 
Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 was to preserve relics for the “public 
benefit”22 but in this context perhaps this can be taken to mean preserved for 
the public good, as something which envisaged long-term, permanent 
conservation efforts rather than short-term archaeological projects. 
Archaeological projects with a ‘public benefit’ focus may lead in time to a 
general force for long-term ‘public good’ conservation outcomes, as a part of 
the process of culture change. But one-off public efforts which are not part of 
a wider ‘public good’ framework are liable to become lost or forgotten over 
time or in the press of other initiatives. If archaeological heritage conservation 
is to act as a form of ‘public good conservation’ it needs to be supported by 
appropriate protective legislation. 
 
3.2 Public perceptions and the urge to protect 
 
The step of legislating to protect archaeological heritage has taken place at 
different times in different societies23 and, until the establishment of 
international heritage treaties24 was largely an internal domestic matter. It was 
up to the individual society to determine when it was appropriate or necessary 
to legislate to protect its heritage, a readiness which may have stemmed from 
practical necessity or moral evolution. But judging the level of social concern 
for such an issue is difficult. The Society for American Archaeology in the 
United States undertook a telephone survey into the public’s attitudes towards 
archaeology.25 This survey indicated a broad public support and value for 
archaeological heritage, including the need for legislation.26 No such study 
has been undertaken in Australia.27 If heritage conservation were not relevant 
                                            
20  Mackay, R. (2003). Whose archaeology is it, anyway? Exploring the modern city. T. Murray. Sydney, Historic 
Houses Trust of NSW and La Trobe University: 169-173.  
21  Colley, S. (1996). "Caught in the web: Cultural policy, cultural places and Australian archaeology." Culture and 
Policy 7 (2): 141-154. Pp 149-150. 
22  Boer, B. (1985). "Aboriginal heritage in Victoria." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2: 94-97.  Pg 94. Boer 
was commenting on the case of Walker v. Shire of Flinders and Ors ([1984] V.R. 409). 
23  See, for example Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. 
Pp 73-76. 
 Carman, J. (1996). Valuing ancient things : archaeology and law. New York, Leicester University Press. Pp 97-
102. 
 Pugh-Smith, J., J. Samuels, et al. (1996). Archaeology in law. London, Sweet & Maxwell. Pp 3-7. 
These three references principally chart the development of United Kingdom legislation. For a more 
comprehensive, if dated, outline of archaeological legislation internationally, see O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott 
(1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. 
Pp 31-70. 
24  Discussed in Chapter 4. 
25  Pokotylo, D. and N. Guppy (1999). "Public opinion and archaeological heritage: views from outside the 
profession." American Antiquity 64 (3): 400-16.  
26  Ramos, M and D. Duganne (2000) Exploring Public Perceptions and Attitudes about Archaeology cited in Little, 
B. J. (2002). Archaeology as a Shared Vision. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, University 
Press of Florida: 3-19.  Pg 4. 
27  But see Balme, J. and M. Wilson (2004). "Perceptions of archaeology in Australia amongst educated young 
Australians." Australian Archaeology 58: 19-24. Balme and Wilson’s survey was restricted to a relatively small 
sample of university students and this thus not directly comparable with the Society for American Archaeology 
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it would be reasonable to expect social indifference to legislative protection. 
Analysis of the survey28 suggests that American society is prepared to place 
upon themselves what Boer described as an additional “moral duty” to protect 
an aspect of the environment.29 The existence of protective legislation alone 
should not itself be seen as a ‘public good’, given the potential for poorly 
framed, mis-used or mal-administered legislation to cause harm. Knetsch 
suggests that, regardless of how “right” a piece of environmental regulation 
may be in a technical sense, it is unlikely to be publicly supported if perceived 
to be unfair,30 in that it unreasonably disadvantages one or more parties. This 
holds true for heritage protection as for any other environmental issue.31 
Despite forthright statements from authors such as Lowenthal, who asserted 
“that heritage must be a general good is now a general faith”,32 protective 
legislation must be appropriately framed to ensure the conservation of the 
collective heritage is seen as both relevant and fair to the general populace. 
The legal processes surrounding archaeological heritage protection therefore 
need to be established carefully and with sufficient transparency to allow the 
general public to understand the process and assumptions upon which 
decisions are based.33  
 
Many other societal values–property rights, criminal codes, human rights–
have been enshrined in legislation before thought was given to protecting 
cultural heritage. Environmental and heritage conservation are not as 
fundamentally embedded in common law principles and cannot automatically 
be assumed to be part of the general legal principles to which a society 
subscribes.34 It requires societal recognition of a common cultural property, 
which it is in the common interest to value and protect.35 One West Australian 
Parliamentarian observed during debate on the Heritage of Western Australia 
Bill 1990 that “…we, as responsible members of society, all have a 
responsibility to contribute to its betterment”, referring not only to the societal 
advantages of conserving heritage, but of participating in the general 
“betterment” of society, without the need for compensation.36 However, this 
                                                                                                                             
survey. See also Lilley, I. (2005). Archaeology and the politics of change in a decolonizing Australia. Object 
lessons: archaeology & heritage in Australia. J. Lydon and T. Ireland. Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing: 
89-106.  The Heritage Chairs and Officials of Australia and New Zealand have recently commissioned some 
research into public attitudes towards heritage generally: Allen Consulting Group (2005). Valuing the Priceless: 
The Value of Historic Heritage in Australia (Research Report 2). Sydney, Heritage Chairs and Officials of 
Australia and New Zealand.  
28  Little, B. J. (2002). Archaeology as a Shared Vision. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, 
University Press of Florida: 3-19.  Pg 10. 
29  Boer, B. (1990). Some legal and ethical issues. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer and D. 
James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 43-56. Pg 49. 
30  Knetsch, J. L. (1990). Property and environmental values. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer 
and D. James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 1-15. Pp 11-12. 
31  See for example the comments of the Commonwealth Government Productivity Commission on the fairness of 
economic impacts on owners of heritage properties. Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's 
historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, Australian Government.  
32  Lowenthal, D. (1998). The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Pg 67. 
33  Deeben, J. (1999). "Proposals for a practical system of significance evaluation in archaeological heritage 
management." European Journal of Archaeology 2 (2). Pg 178. 
34  Stone, C. (1987). Earth and other ethics: the case for moral pluralism. New York, Harper & Row. Pp 73-75. 
35  Boer, B. (1990). Some legal and ethical issues. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer and D. 
James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 43-56. Pg 43. 
36  Parliament of Western Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament Second Session. Speech by Mr McGinty (Member for Freemantle) 23 August 
1990, Pg 4119. Similar points raised again, including a reference to heritage legislation being for the “collective 
good” on 28 August 1990, Pg 4289. For a stark contrast, consider a recent op ed piece in the Sydney Morning 
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view was not universally held during the debates, with another member of 
Parliament contending that heritage legislation “compelled [a person] to 
become a philanthropist…”,37 a sentiment which has been echoed more 
recently.38 Despite the naysayers, there is clear legislative intent for public 
participation in and benefit from heritage conservation. Cultural enrichment 
and public participation is part of the concept of the ‘public good’ and is 
inherent in the overarching concept of ‘heritage’, which enjoins people to 
understand, appreciate and celebrate their past, to provide insight into their 
present lives. Contingent with that is a clear message that the protection of 
the past is for general societal benefit, rather than for that of a small 
professional elite. Heritage legislation should therefore be reflective of this 
desire to see heritage protected for the public good. 
 
While initial archaeological heritage legislation can been seen as primarily 
protecting the interests of archaeologists, properly framed and applied, 
legislation can have a broader application which can serve the public good. 
Poorly considered or administered legislation is more likely to undermine its 
intent through requirements which are widely perceived to be unfair, onerous, 
overly technical, inequitable or difficult to enforce.39 Current legal regimes for 
archaeological heritage tend to provide for one-off public benefit situations 
rather than public good outcomes. Key amongst current legal limitations is a 
lack of mechanisms to consider a range of factors beyond scientific value. 
This is particularly driven by the way in which the value of archaeological 
heritage has been framed in influential documents, such as the Hope Report 
and the Burra Charter, discussed later in this chapter. These documents, and 
their underlying conceptions, have been instrumental in the development of 
Australian heritage conservation philosophy and the legal protective 
responses. 
  
3.3 The protective response in Australia 
 
In Australia, post-Contact Australian society existed for more that 160 years 
before even rudimentary heritage protection legislation was introduced (in 
1955 in the Northern Territory40). Britain and the United States had introduced 
legislation in the nineteenth century, due to both lobbying by interested parties 
and a perceived need to protect aspects of the past.41 By contrast, Australia’s 
                                                                                                                             
Herald, drafted by a lawyer, who described heritage listing as “theft”. Anderson, A. (2005). Historical overkill as 
the urge to preserve leaves us with the same old story. Sydney Morning Herald. Sydney: 11.  
37  Parliament of Western Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament Second Session. Comments by Mr Weise (Member for Wagin) 28 August 
1990, Pg 4275. 
38  Anderson, A. (2005). Historical overkill as the urge to preserve leaves us with the same old story. Sydney 
Morning Herald. Sydney: 11.  
Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government. A range of public submissions to the Inquiry advanced the view that an individual’s 
property rights should not in any way be encumbered by heritage restrictions, without financial compensation 
from one or more levels of government. Several of such submissions are extensively quoted by the Commission 
in its report, as the Commissioners evidently found the argument to be a compelling one. 
39  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. Pp 109-110. 
40  Native and Historic Objects Heritage Protection Ordinance (1955) Northern Territory.  
41  For an account of the development of the first US legislation, see McLaughlin, R. H. (1998). "The Antiquities Act 
of 1906: politics and the framing of an American anthropology & archaeology." Oklahoma City Law Review 23 (1-
2): 61-91. For an account of the development of early UK legislation see Pugh-Smith, J., J. Samuels, et al. 
(1996). Archaeology in law. London, Sweet & Maxwell. Pp 3-7; Hunter, J., I. Ralston, et al. (1993). The structure 
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first environmental regulation, designed to protect the early colony of Sydney’s 
water supply and the public health, was passed in the 1790s, less than ten 
years after European settlement.42 Necessity, rather than morality or lobbying, 
was the key factor in obtaining a legislative response. Certainly the relatively 
late date for Australian heritage protection was due in part to the fact that 
there was no “Australian archaeology” as such until the latter half of the 
twentieth century.43 As noted in Chapter 2, the agitation for protective 
legislation had started significantly before the first legislative response. By the 
same token, Australian indigenous societies already valued their own sites in 
ways which were not appreciated by wider society until comparatively 
recently, and had their own traditional methods of “protecting” those sites, 
based around cultural practices.44  
 
Carment noted that, until the 1970s, there was little strong interest in 
protecting archaeological or other types of heritage, and preservation was 
often through accident rather than by design.45 During that early period, 
Megaw observed it was easier to gain support in the form of government 
research funding for archaeological projects overseas than domestically.46 At 
that time, Australian archaeology was still very much in its early stages of 
development, and had yet to develop to the point where archaeological 
conservation was perceived as a public issue. Lowenthal remarked that the 
rationale to preserve the past is often taken to be self-evident,47 but Australian 
society had to reach a certain level of social and moral maturity and 
complexity before something as seemingly discretionary and abstract, as 
protecting the remains of the past became a viable consideration: “a hallmark 
of a community’s maturity is its sense of history and its commitment to protect 
its cultural heritage” one Australian Parliamentarian remarked during 
Parliamentary debate regarding West Australian heritage legislation.48 Yet 
even after thirty years of formalised heritage protection, there is still no 
definitive view as to which past and whose past should be protected. Boer and 
Wiffen indicate there is a broad conception within law as to what may be 
termed “heritage”49 and commentators such as Little and Ireland have argued 
                                                                                                                             
of British archaeology. Archaeological Resource Management in the UK: An Introduction. J. Hunter and I. 
Ralston. Phoenix Mill, Alan Sutton: 30-43.  
42  By 1795, at least two proclamations had been made by colonial Governors Philip and Hunter to protect the Tank 
Stream, the water supply for the early colony of Sydney. This order forbade the dumping of waste into the Tank 
Stream as well as the grazing of stock or construction of buildings within 50 feet of either side of the watercourse. 
Beasley, M. (1988). Sweat of their Brows: 100 years of the Sydney Water Board 1888-1988. Sydney, Sydney 
Water Board. Pp 1-3; Kennedy, B. and B. Kennedy (1993). Sydney Tunnels. Kenthurst, NSW, Kangaroo Press. 
Pp 14-15. 
43  Although Mulvaney and Kamminga note that “antiquarian excavation” of Aboriginal sites dates to the period of 
Governor Phillip and the First Fleet. Mulvaney, D. J. and J. Kamminga (1999). Prehistory of Australia. St 
Leonards, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 11-12. See also Griffiths, T. (1996). In search of Australian antiquity. 
Prehistory to politics: John Mulvaney, the humanities and the public intellectual. T. Bonyhady and T. Griffiths. 
Carlton South, Vic., Melbourne University Press: 42-62.  
44  Maddock, K. (1984). Aboriginal customary law. Aborigines & the law. P. Hanks and B. Keon-Cohen. Sydney, 
George Allen & Unwin: 212-237.  
Howden, K. (2001). "Indigenous traditional knowledge and native title." UNSW Law Journal 24 (1): 60-84.  
 Sullivan, S. (2004). "Aboriginal sites and the Burra Charter." Historic Environment 18 (1): 37-39.  
45  Carment, D. (1991). Heritage legislation in the Territory. Packaging the past? Public histories. J. Rickard and P. 
Spearritt. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press: 70-77.  Pg 70. 
46  Megaw, J. V. S. (1973). Archaeology from Down Under - A Personal View. An inaugural lecture delivered in the 
University of Leicester 24 February 1973. Leicester, Leicester University Press.  Pg 6. 
47  Lowenthal, D. (1985). The past is a foreign country. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pp 36-40. 
48  Parliament of Western Australia (1989). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament First Session. Second Reading Speech for the Heritage of Western Australia 
Bill. Speech by Mrs Beggs (Member for Whitford, Minister for Planning), 21 November 1989, Pg 4856. 
49  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 7-8. 
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that there is no single, correct view in this regard.50 Blake notes this 
broadness can cause difficulties in interpreting cultural heritage protective 
principles in a legal context.51 
 
Australian governments, at all levels, have opted to take on additional 
obligations to protect evidence of the collective Australian past, in the belief 
that this is beneficial to Australian society. This decision grew out of the social 
changes and green zeitgeist of the 1960s and 1970s and what Lowenthal 
described as Australians developing “a positive sense of the past”.52 During 
the 1977 debates in New South Wales for the NSW Heritage Act, one 
parliamentarian noted that “matters affecting the environmental heritage vitally 
affect all citizens…and therefore should be treated as matters where public 
involvement and interest in decisions thereon should be encouraged and 
facilitated.”53 More broadly, the concept of “common cultural property” has 
developed, with an implication of a wide societal mandate to see such 
property protected for the common good.54 Blake notes the term ‘cultural 
property’ itself is problematic, due to what she terms the “underlying baggage” 
of legal concepts of property rights generally, which can be at odds with 
conservation objectives.55 Nevertheless, “cultural property” carries with it a 
notion of a stewardship role for the present to ensure such common property 
is transmitted to the future.56 The regulation to protect such cultural property 
must have a moral basis and function within wider society. These moral 
positions are discussed in the following sections. 
 
3.4 Establishing a moral basis for the function of heritage law 
 
Legislation is not established in a moral or social vacuum and it is possible to 
derive some understanding of that underlying moral position through 
legislative analysis. Establishing legislation to protect something (archaeology, 
threatened species, property rights, etc.) is a process of making a value 
judgement about what is important enough to protect.57 Ethicist Charles L 
Stevenson is of the view that value judgements, by their very nature, urge a 
wider acceptance of the point of view or value.58 Thus the act of legislating to 
protect archaeological heritage draws archaeology into the public realm59 and 
raises archaeology as a moral concern for society at large. It requires all 
members of society to, at some level, value that heritage, even if that process 
                                            
50  Little, B. J. (2002). Archaeology as a Shared Vision. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, 
University Press of Florida: 3-19. Pg 7; Ireland, T. (2002). "Giving value to the Australian historic past: historical 
archaeology, heritage and nationalism." Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 15-25.   
51  Blake, J. (2000). "On defining the cultural heritage." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (1): 61-85. 
Pp 62-65 
52  Lowenthal, D. (1976). Perceiving the Australian environment. Man and landscape in Australia: towards an 
ecological vision. G. Seddon and M. Davis. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service: 357-365. Pg 
360 
53  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament.  Speech by Mr 
Haigh, Member for Maroubra, 16 November 1977. Pg 9793. 
54  Vernon, M. C. (1994). "Common Cultural Property: The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention." Case 
Western Reserve Journal of International Law 26: 435-479.  
55  Blake, J. (2000). "On defining the cultural heritage." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (1): 61-85. 
Pp 65-66. 
56  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing.  
57  Carman, J. (1995). The importance of things: archaeology and the law. Managing Archaeology. Cooper. London, 
Routledge: 19-32.  
58  Stevenson, C. L. (1983). Value Judgements: Their implicit generality. Ethical Theory in the Last Quarter of the 
Twentieth Century. N. Bowie. Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company: 12-36. Pg 14 
59  Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. Pp 101-102. 
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of valuing is principally to avoid sanctions or public shame at having 
contravened the law. This supports a utilitarian view of the function of law as 
set out by Hart,60 that the law provides an opportunity for people to follow a 
particular moral path, but furthermore, obligates adherence to that path. The 
law can also act in part as a coercive mechanism to direct what has been 
judged to be socially-appropriate behaviour,61 in this case the protection of 
archaeological heritage. Heritage protective legislation requires all members 
of society to act to protect that heritage, or to be subject to the consequences 
of non-compliance, and to endeavour to develop outcomes which respect the 
values which are protected. James and Mora adopt such a position with 
respect to Australian heritage law, noting that its coercive power should not be 
the main reason for conservation of heritage, but should direct members of 
society along that moral path.62 Smith63 and Knetsch64 view legislation as 
useful in managing conflict and resolving competing claims of interest, 
providing a basis for discussion and negotiation of outcomes which might not 
have existed in the absence of legislation. Therefore a less coercive reading 
of the function of law in such circumstances indicates laws should encourage 
compliance with the moral code they espouse, without necessarily forcing or 
dictating particular actions.  
 
Hart notes that the moral environment changes and evolves, containing 
multiple views, thus by implication the legislation that underpins a particular 
moral or ethical stance will evolve as society changes.65 The establishment of 
the initial archaeological heritage protection regimes in Australia was based 
on the values and moral positions of those who lobbied for the legislation to 
be established, of which the early Australian archaeologist practitioners were 
a central force.66 Thus heritage legislation represents the adoption of a 
particular “moral duty” by society, in addition to other moral duties already in 
existence.67 In Hart’s view, laws function to enforce a central morality to 
prevent societal disintegration.68 In the case of the body of law for heritage 
protection, it can also be viewed as an act designed to integrate a new value 
(heritage conservation) into society and in this regard, legislation has been 
generally successful. Thus the law can act as an agent of social change, 
however, as noted by Hart, such efforts will inevitably bear mixed results, due 
to the moral evolution of society. 
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Changes in social values have, to some extent, been incorporated into 
heritage policy and legislation, perhaps the most significant in Australian 
heritage policy being the addition of spiritual values to the Burra Charter.69 
Spiritual values (and other intangible values) are not as yet integrated into the 
bulk of Australian heritage legislation. However the incorporation of such 
values into influential documents of principle, such as the Burra Charter, 
creates the social space in which a new protective value can potentially be 
integrated into society (and thereby into legislation). Again, it is a value which, 
most likely, will require the force of legislation behind it to assist its integration 
into social mores. This is because heritage, and particularly its more abstract 
aspects such as intangible or archaeological heritage, remain somewhat 
marginalised as social concerns. Therefore linking future changes in moral 
and thereby legal frameworks to more widely recognised and accepted 
environmental protective frameworks may provide a greater opportunity for 
driving future social change in this area.  
 
3.5 Expressing the moral duty to protect the environment  
 
The development of environmental consciousness over the course of the 
twentieth century has been concerned with the present and future relationship 
between humans and their environment. When applied to the remains of the 
past, archaeology forms part of the historic environment and can therefore be 
considered an environmental matter in broad terms.70 Positions on the 
relationship between humans and the environment have ranged from the very 
utilitarian notion that nature should be conserved so it can be exploited (the 
notion of husbandry), to the notion that nature should be used sustainably and 
passed on to future generations (the notion of stewardship) to more radical 
notions as to what aspects of the natural world do and do not have ‘rights’71 or 
whether humans should have any impact upon the natural world beyond that 
minimally required to support human life.72 Lockwood separates these 
environmental value frameworks into two broad categories: anthropocentric 
and ecocentric values. Anthropocentric values are those which are assigned 
to the environment for the value it has to humans, whereas ecocentric values 
ascribe value to nature in its own right, irrespective of human perception.73 
While Lockwood indicates these values are not mutually exclusive, it is difficult 
to see cultural heritage as having anything other than an anthropocentric 
value, even in terms of indigenous value systems which do not separate 
nature and culture. The existence of a social moral position on a particular 
environmental issue does not necessarily translate into legal protection, 
particularly where that moral position may be at odds with more widely held 
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moral positions.74 The first step in establishing a new moral position within law 
is to persuade, through lobbying or other action, a portion of society to support 
that position.  
 
A moral position in favour of protecting the environment is not socially 
inherent, it is a position which must be consciously adopted.75 Nash views the 
development of moral and ethical positions for environmental value as lying at 
the far end of a moral/ethical continuum, or what he terms the “ethical 
circle”.76 He sees this ethical circle as progressively widening, beginning with 
ethical concerns for the self, before extending those concerns to family and 
humans generally.77 Eventually the ethical circle may widen to value 
protection or conservation of the living environment78 before reaching ethical 
consideration of the nonliving environment and the wider universe. He notes 
that expansion of this circle is not necessarily direct, or automatic, nor do all 
people or societies necessarily reach the same point in terms of what aspects 
of the environment they value.79 These ethical positions underlie attitudes 
towards conservation and therefore not all individuals or societies will have 
the same level of moral and ethical concern for conservation issues. Nor will 
they necessarily agree on the appropriate course of protective action.80 Thus 
conservation values are not universal in nature across societies, nor are they 
necessarily always enshrined in legislation. Hart noted that bodies of law are 
generally influenced by both general moral concerns and by what he termed 
the “enlightened moral criticism” of those in the minority81 and that, 
furthermore, the law generally lags behind morality. In the development of 
Australian archaeological protective legislation, it was the role of 
archaeologists to provide the enlightened moral criticism in the critical early 
phase of heritage protection, just as it was the role of the environmentalists to 
advocate for environmental protection.  
 
If legislation is accepted as a method for the expression of the ethical and 
moral positions of society, as Hart suggests, then the development of an 
Australian heritage consciousness and attendant legislation in close proximity 
to the development of an environmental consciousness reinforced with 
legislation should come as no surprise. Australian society’s ethical circle, in 
Nash’s terms, had expanded to the point where it began to capture 
environmental values. This can be seen in an initial concern for the living 
aspects of the natural environment,82 progressing to concern for the nonliving 
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environment, including cultural heritage.83 Nash’s moral continuum would 
indicate that within each of his categories of moral concern, there are a 
spectrum of values and concerns. Using Lockwood’s terminology, a range of 
anthropocentric and ecocentric values can be expected to be ascribed to 
different aspects of the environment. Lockwood argues these require 
consideration in an integrated manner if a rational framework for 
environmental valuation and decision-making is to be developed.84 A rational 
consideration of the social relevance of an environmental issue will determine 
the level of legal response as an expression of societal ethics and moral duty. 
Within heritage conservation that moral value is typically expressed through 
reference to the ‘significance’ of places. 
 
3.6 Establishing the concept of ‘significance’ 
 
In Australian heritage management, the concept of ‘significance’ is 
paramount. Significance criteria are meant to establish an objective 
framework for measuring the “heritage value” of a place, which in turn 
determines how that significance may be appropriately protected. This 
concept flows largely from the Burra Charter85, which establishes the basic 
criteria for cultural significance which still are in wide usage: aesthetic, social, 
historical or technical/scientific significance. The Burra Charter, in turn, drew 
on the significance classifications in the Australian Heritage Commission Act 
1975 (Cth) (repealed) which are in turn derived from the 1974 Hope Inquiry 
into the National Estate.86 Significance, particularly when applied to the 
‘social’ criterion can suffer from vagueness as a concept,87 and therefore is 
particularly difficult to define legally which can in turn lead to weaknesses in 
protective legislation.88 In 1999, the Burra Charter was amended to include 
‘spiritual’ significance, in response to a desire for the Charter to be more 
inclusive, particularly in relation to indigenous values.89 The Burra Charter 
defines cultural significance as: 
 
aesthetic, historic, scientific, social, or spiritual value for past, present or 
future generations90 
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and recognises that a place may have multiple values.91 But values are 
mutable and reflect principles and standards which are not necessarily fixed, 
making definitive assessments challenging. Although some authors have 
noted the mutable nature of archaeological significance,92 this is not reflected 
in the rigid approach to its protection enshrined in legislation. Others have 
cautioned that scientific archaeological significance should not be ignored in 
favour of other community interests or values.93  
 
While archaeology exists alongside heritage conservation generally, as a 
discipline it has had different practices and goals from mainstream 
conservation. Heritage conservation in Australia, particularly with respect to 
historic buildings, concentrates on the retention of the historic fabric of the 
place above all else, whereas archaeology tends to focus on the conservation 
of ‘research’ significance or potential. The credo of fabric conservation is 
embedded within the Burra Charter, which argues that change to a heritage 
place should be “as much as necessary…but…as little as possible,”94 a 
phrase with little resonance for archaeological heritage. This statement 
embodies an attitude within Australian conservation philosophy that the 
significance of a place is derived most fundamentally from its fabric, rather 
than its use or social attachment.95 This has led to a circumstance where the 
conservation of fabric may be an end in itself, rather than a means by which 
heritage significance is retained. Nevertheless, this retention of conserved 
historic fabric is often seen as being “in the public good”. Yet it is a common 
maxim that archaeology is a destructive enterprise, which in this respect is at 
odds with this aspect of western conservation philosophy. The act of 
excavation destroys or transforms the archaeological site, disassembling it 
into components for further study, although it has been argued that this 
destruction-through-excavation is in fact an act of archaeological “creation” 
which is necessary to instil meaning in an archaeological place.96  
 
This systematised approach to heritage significance criteria however seems to 
exist outside a notion of changing value systems, and provides that all 
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potential past, present and future values are equal and equally important. In 
addition, the criteria do not reflect an understanding that professional views of 
significance are likely to be divergent from those held by the public,97 
particularly in areas such as research significance, which is almost entirely a 
“professional” value. This is why authors such as Little98 have argued that 
archaeologists need to improve their interactions with the public, to ensure 
that these professionalised values are seen as relevant to the public.99 
Similarly, when dealing with indigenous peoples and the archaeological 
remains of their pasts, ascription of a scientific value can be perceived as a 
colonising or dispossessing act,100 or merely antithetical to the values which 
are relevant to the indigenous culture.101 Essential in the management of 
significance is the need to strike a balance between competing or overlapping 
interests. 
 
3.7 Problems with archaeological significance frameworks 
 
Byrne, Brayshaw and Ireland have strongly criticised the four-part significance 
classification system (with categories of aesthetic, historical, social and 
scientific significance) in their discussion of social significance.102 They see 
this system as overly focussed on the concept of preserving heritage fabric, 
over the realisation of wider values for a site.103 They view the four-part 
system as having established a set of professional-objective criteria which 
largely ignore or sideline community values and call for a more balanced 
approach which takes into account, among other things, economic104 and 
spiritual values of archaeological sites.105 Since that writing, push for 
consideration of the wider implications of heritage conservation, particularly 
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the economic values,106 is being strongly felt from outside of the heritage 
movement. Their discussion focuses mainly on these issues with respect to 
Aboriginal heritage management which, they note, has been overwhelmingly 
dominated by the discipline of archaeology since the early 1970s.107 Due to 
this, a perception arose, and to a degree still persists, that Aboriginal heritage 
is solely archaeology, causing one author to remark on the perceptions of 
Aboriginal heritage, that “…your [Aboriginal] culture is now an archaeological 
resource.”108 The indigenous past ceased to be associated with a living 
community and became “science”.109 
 
Particularly with respect to ‘social’ significance, the professional-objective 
approach to archaeological heritage can fail, as it is based in a conception 
that social value is logical and systematic. Indigenous cultures may ascribe 
social or spiritual values to a site based on status in mythology or oral tradition 
which by its very nature can never be reconciled with a demonstrable 
relationship to significance criteria. This is the essence of ‘spiritual’ 
significance, as it relies on the faith of the members of the culture who are 
ascribing the value. From a secular perspective, such non-rational, non-
objective elevation of a site’s status in community eyes can be termed 
‘community attachment’ and in a legal sense has variously been defined as 
“sacredness” or “special value”.110 This by its very nature may be a value or 
value system which is irrelevant or illogical by the standards of the external 
and, to date, generally non-indigenous, professional-objective researcher. In 
the normal course of events such professionals are responsible for assessing 
a site against the heritage significance criteria. The weakness in the 
professional-objective approach will be no starker than when comparing or 
attempting to reconcile community attachment with the ‘scientific’ or ‘research’ 
values usually ascribed to archaeological sites.  
 
3.8 Considering scientific significance in compliance-driven 
archaeology 
 
Within archaeological heritage management, analysis of the cultural 
significance of archaeological places has generally been restricted to its 
‘scientific’ significance (also referred to as research or technical significance). 
This has been reinforced by the nature of Australian heritage legislation, 
resulting in the management of archaeological heritage as being 
disproportionately focussed on managing scientific value expressed in terms 
of data collection and analysis, while largely ignoring the other potential 
values of archaeological sites and the issues associated with their 
management. In order to facilitate the management of the different values of 
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archaeological heritage, Bickford and Sullivan111 proposed in the mid-1980s a 
series of additional “archaeological significance” criteria. Their view was that 
“archaeological significance” meant one of two things–either that archaeology 
could be used as a technique to investigate the significance of a place, or 
secondly that the site had research potential to contribute to understanding 
current archaeological problems. This suggests that the “science” within 
archaeology was as the method of investigation, rather than the product of 
that investigation. Smith takes the view that the intent of these criteria was not 
to imply that these research values were inherent in the archaeological site 
itself, but were values which could be ascribed through the application of the 
criteria.112 These criteria were designed to supplement and refine the concept 
of scientific significance for historical archaeological sites, although their 
application could be made to any other type of archaeological heritage: 
 
 Can the site contribute knowledge that no other resource can? 
 Can the site contribute knowledge that no other site can? 
 Is the knowledge relevant: 
 to general questions about human history? 
 to other substantive questions relating to Australian history? 
 to other major research questions? 
 
These criteria were designed to allow a research archaeologist to ask the 
question, ‘is this site worth excavating?’ or ‘is this site interesting 
archaeologically?’ Significantly, the article these criteria are derived from 
includes discussion of the public value of an archaeological site; however the 
criteria themselves are focussed on research significance only. Furthermore, 
in practice there has been little difference in terms of the way ‘scientific’, 
‘research’ and ‘technical’ significance have been used. Coutts, in his 
discussion of the future of historical archaeology written in the early 1980s, 
indicated that the discipline required “a solid theoretical context and 
interpretive models” in order to establish a rigorous approach to assessing the 
significance of historical archaeological sites, particularly in the context of 
legislatively-driven compliance archaeology,113 but in general such an 
approach has not developed. Bickford and Sullivan’s approach assumed there 
was a robust, widely-accepted and active research framework existing more 
broadly in Australian archaeology, which had an ongoing approach to 
investigating archaeological questions about the past. Murray noted that 
archaeology undertaken in this type of management context “rarely [rose] 
above the level of potential usefulness of many [archaeological] resources.”114 
Compliance-driven archaeological heritage management has tended to adopt 
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112  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pg 116. 
113  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221.  Pg 217. 
See also Murray, T. (1987). Remembrance of things present : appeals to authority in the history and philosophy 
of archaeology. , Murray, T. (2002). "But that was long ago: theory in Australian historical archaeology 2002." 
Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 8-14.   
114  Murray, T. (1984). Relativism, conservation philosophy and historical archaeology. Historical archaeology and 
conservation philosophy. Papers from the Historical Archaeology Session of the ANZAAS Conference, Sydney 
1982. M. Pearson and H. Temple. Sydney, Heritage Council of NSW: 2-17. Pg 7 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 3–Establishing a basis for ‘public good’ conservation 82 
a very loose approach to determining the ‘research’ or ‘scientific’ significance 
of archaeological sites, treating all sites as if they were equal in potential.  
 
The Bickford and Sullivan criteria, while well known in Australian historical 
archaeology, have not been widely used in heritage management frameworks. 
In New South Wales, where the Bickford and Sullivan criteria have been 
incorporated into government-produced archaeological assessment 
guidelines,115 these criteria are treated as desirable rather than mandatory to 
address,116 and assessments tend to fall back on the legislative definitions of 
archaeological heritage,117 where these criteria have had little effect. Even 
where adopted and used, the criteria are meant merely as a guide to 
determining if the site under assessment can contribute meaningfully to 
research efforts, but the criteria do not represent a research framework itself. 
Additionally, from a ‘public good’ conservation point of view, these criteria are 
still very ‘research’ focussed, not taking the step of asking what the public may 
find interesting or valuable about a site.118 They allow archaeologists to ask 
themselves, ‘Do I find this site interesting enough to investigate?’ but do not 
allow the next question to be asked, ‘Is this site valued by the wider 
community?’ 
 
3.8 Moral value and heritage significance 
 
If, as noted above, environmental moral value is not absolute or inherent, but 
variable and socially determined, there should be limits ascribed to protection 
of the environment (such as archaeological heritage) which reflect the relative 
moral value of that environmental aspect. Archaeological heritage may not 
necessarily be owed the same moral (and by implication, legal) duty as all 
other aspects of the environment, due to these value limits. Heritage 
significance frameworks need to be reconciled with these societal moral limits, 
as it is not necessarily clear that archaeological heritage may have the same 
‘right of existence’ as other aspects of the environment. Nash’s view is that 
rights do not extend beyond sentience,119 thereby excluding consideration of 
something such as archaeological heritage, however this does not necessarily 
mean moral concerns cease at the level of sentience as well. By contrast, 
Stone argues that non-human aspects of the environment120 should be 
accorded with moral rights of existence where protection of those rights will be 
beneficial to humans, regardless as to whether that benefit is for commercial 
exploitation or simple enjoyment.121 This can, but does not necessarily, lead to 
these aspects of the environment being accorded some level of legal 
protection or status. Belshaw takes these moral obligations further, and sees 
moral concerns extending into the realm of the non-sentient and the 
inanimate, insofar as they are reflective of a human action.122 He argues that 
                                            
115  NSW Heritage Office and Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (1996). Archaeological Assessments. 
Sydney, NSW Government.  
116  Ibid. Pg 27. 
117  In this case ‘relics’ more than 50 years old. See the discussion of the NSW Heritage Act in Chapter 5. 
118  Mackay, R. (2003). Whose archaeology is it, anyway? Exploring the modern city. T. Murray. Sydney, Historic 
Houses Trust of NSW and La Trobe University: 169-173.  
119  Nash, R. (1990). The rights of nature: a history of environmental ethics. Leichhardt, Primavera Press. Pp 60-65. 
120  Stone, C. (1987). Earth and other ethics: the case for moral pluralism. New York, Harper & Row. Pp 74-75. Stone 
terms these as “Nonpersons”. 
121 Ibid.  
122  Belshaw, C. (2001). Environmental philosophy. Chesham, Acumen Publishing. Pp 147-150. 
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an act can be objectively positive or negative for a non-sentient, non-living 
part of the environment, such as a natural geological feature or, by extension, 
an archaeological place. A negative act, in Belshaw’s terminology is one 
which “diminishes” the value of the thing in question. Such act therefore falls 
within the realm of human morality to consider whether or not an objectively 
negative act should take place, if it is an act stemming from human action or 
inaction. This is an interesting consideration, given that archaeological places 
are usually composed of lost, abandoned or forgotten cultural objects, which 
are ascribed with new, archaeological, values through the process of 
identification or investigation. 
 
Under this view, the progressive loss of a natural feature through weathering, 
such as the Three Sisters in the Blue Mountains, NSW (Figure 3.1, second 
overleaf), is an objectively negative impact upon that natural feature. But there 
is no moral consideration at play, until the place is valued by humans, who 
may decide to act or not act to mitigate that negative impact. The Three 
Sisters does not “want” to exist but we can argue under an ecocentric 
perspective that it would be “bad” for it not to exist as existence is a preferable 
state to non-existence. In the example of the Three Sisters, given the 
indigenous, scenic, social and economic values of the place,123 it is likely to be 
considered morally wrong to allow the place to be destroyed through natural 
action, just as it would be considered morally wrong to deliberately destroy the 
place. This is due to the place’s anthropocentric value. A more dramatic 
example of this was the loss in 2005 of one of the Twelve Apostles, a group of 
scenic stone formations along the Great Ocean Road in Victoria (Figure 3.2, 
second overleaf). This loss (through wave action) was documented at the 
exact moment of its collapse.124 Reports of the loss cast no moral judgement–
there was no sense that the formation could or should have been saved–but 
the loss can be seen as a negative consequence for Australia, due to the 
community attachment and tourism value which had developed around these 
natural features.125 Thus despite the more ecocentric moral position of those 
such as Belshaw, it is still primarily the anthropocentric value that determines 
the perception of loss and the necessity for moral action, particularly when 
dealing with the inanimate aspects of the environment.  
 
Moral consideration is most relevant when there is a question about what 
action to take: should a natural or cultural feature be destroyed by human 
action, for example. This intention to act, and a preference for outcome, is a 
                                            
123  Thomas, M. (2003). The Artificial Horizon: Imagining the Blue Mountains. Carlton, Vic., Melbourne University 
Press. Pp 150-167. Note Thomas disputes the basis for the Aboriginal legend surrounding the place, citing 
conflicting and dubious historical sources for the story. See also Illert, C. R. (2003). "Three Sisters dreaming, or, 
did Katoomba get its legend from Kangaroo Valley?" Shoalhaven Chronograph (Special supplement) 23 (9). and 
Smith, J. (1992). Aboriginal legends of the Blue Mountains. Wentworth Falls, N.S.W., J. Smith.  
124  See for example: La Canna, X. and M. Murphy (2005). Ninth Apostle crumbles. The Age. Melbourne. 
http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2005/07/03/1120329326001.html 
 BBC News Website. (2005). "Sea claims Australian 'apostle'."   Retrieved 4 July 2005, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4647857.stm.  
 CNN News International website. (2005, 4 July 2005). "Apostles lose one of their own." from 
http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/australia.apostles/.  
125  La Canna, X. and M. Murphy (2005). Ninth Apostle crumbles. The Age. Melbourne.  
 Although the Victorian Government did claim that the international coverage generated by the collapse had 
actually increased international tourism to the area. See Tourism Victoria (2005). Twelve Apostles collapse 
sparks visitor interest - Corporate newsletter July 2005. Tourism Victoria, Victorian Government.  
http://www.tourismvictoria.com.au/newsletter/july_2005/index.php?page=05. Accessed 15 February 2006. Note 
the report did not quote any figures to back up this claim. 
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strictly human characteristic126 which requires an application of moral 
decision-making. This does not mean that all objectively negative 
environmental impacts need be prevented; morally ‘bad’ acts should however 
be prevented, where they conflict with societal values. In some instances, the 
arresting of loss or decay through the conservation of fabric may itself be an 
immoral act.127 The challenge is to frame significance frameworks and 
protective legislation which prevent the morally bad impacts, mitigate the 
‘diminishing’ acts where social value has attached, while allowing other 
aspects of the environment to be affected. Social moral concern does not 
automatically extend to all elements of the environment; certain elements are 
valued more highly than others. This selective valuation should then be 
reflected in heritage significance frameworks and environmental protective 
legislation. 
                                            
126  Stone, C. (1987). Earth and other ethics: the case for moral pluralism. New York, Harper & Row. Pp 75-78. 
127  See for example Whiting, D. (1995). "Conservation of marae structures." Historic Environment 11 (2&3): 47-49. 
which discusses the different approach required to conserve Maori structures in New Zealand, where decay is a 
part of the life of the structure. In a more western construction, conservation of the patina of wear or use is 
generally seen as desirable, rather than restoration to a pristine state. Similarly, when dealing with human 
remains there is generally an acceptance of decay or loss, with some cultures or religions having a prohibition on 
embalming, or a requirement for burial shortly after death (e.g. Islam and Judaism). 
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Figure 3.1: The Three Sisters rock formation in Katoomba, NSW, Australia.128 
  
 
 
Figure 3.2: Collapse of one of the Twelve Apostles on 3 July 2005, Victoria, 
Australia.129 
 
 
                                            
128  Image credit: Wikipedia. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Blue_mountains_-_three_sisters.jpg 
129  Parks Victoria website, photographer uncredited.  
http://www.parkweb.vic.gov.au/1park_display.cfm?park=175. Accessed 12 February 2006. 
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3.9 A moral purpose for archaeological protection 
 
This reasoning can be applied to the protection of archaeological sites as well 
as any other part of the non-sentient environment. An archaeological site is 
created in a moral-neutral state; its creation was incidental to its existence, as 
no party sets out to deliberately create an archaeological site (time capsules 
and archaeological experiments which simulate depositional processes 
aside). Note that by referring to an archaeological site as being created in a 
moral-neutral state this is not the same as a value-neutral state (as 
processual archaeology would contend). As the creation of an archaeological 
site is not a deliberate act, there is no moral consideration in its creation. It is 
neither right nor wrong that an archaeological site has been created. 
However, those sites, whether during or following their creation, may have a 
social or moral value that exists independent of the circumstances of their 
physical creation. Similarly, moral considerations may come into play when 
deciding whether the place should be subject to disturbance, through 
archaeological excavation or development. 
 
An example of this would be a battlefield. While the battle was occurring, the 
participants were not considering whether it was right or wrong that the 
battlefield was being changed into an archaeological site which reflected the 
activity which was taking place. Participants may have been caught up in 
moral considerations as to whether the battle and their actions during it were 
morally right or wrong, but those considerations do not form part of the 
archaeological record and cannot be extracted from it. Subsequently however, 
a great deal of social value may be attributed to the place by the survivors and 
their descendents. The post hoc social value attributed to the place may draw 
on the morality of past actions at the place and influence the morality and 
values of subsequent generations: it may be viewed as a site of sacrifice, 
celebration or shame, or a combination of values. In such circumstances, the 
archaeological place may become a symbol of values or morals expressed 
socially, but those values or morals are not manifest in the archaeological 
record itself. 
 
Once the site is ascribed the character of ‘archaeological’ the moral processes 
of those interacting with it begin to come into play, and individual and societal 
values begin to be applied with regard to how the site should be managed. 
Clearly archaeologists have a high moral and ethical duty to protect 
archaeological heritage, essentially due to enlightened self-interest. This is 
expressed in the Codes of Ethics for various archaeological societies.130 But 
as discussed earlier in this chapter regarding the moral duty for environmental 
protection, the moral duty for archaeological heritage protection is not 
inherent. A society must adopt a position of value and protection for that 
heritage and, thereby, the obligations which flow from such a moral position. 
Heritage legislation provides one of the tools for effecting this, by providing the 
moral filter to determine what impacts or changes to the archaeological 
                                            
130  E.g. Australian Archaeological Association (2004). Code of Ethics. Clause 2. 
Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists Inc (2004). Code of Ethics. Clause 2. 
Archaeological Institute of America (1997). Code of Ethics.   
 http://www.archaeological.org/pdfs/AIA_Code_of_EthicsA5S.pdf (Accessed 17 May 2005). 
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environment are socially acceptable. But the primary ‘moral filter’ which has 
been applied to archaeological heritage protection has been the potential 
‘research significance’ and loss of scientific information. Yet the moral value of 
‘archaeological research significance’ is inherently relevant only to the 
archaeologist or heritage professional or those with a strong interest in their 
work, in the absence of a demonstrable flow-on social benefit.131 
 
The destruction of archaeological places can be considered a diminution of 
the environment such as Belshaw describes. But if the purpose of 
archaeology is, in part, to generate an improved understanding of the past, 
what of the knowledge or social values embedded within the archaeological 
site? Is the moral duty to preserve the archaeological fabric or to preserve 
those other, intangible values from negative consequences? This highlights 
the fundamental dichotomy of archaeology, that the investigation of an 
important resource results in its destruction. Ideally, this results in the creation 
of new knowledge about the past, through the transformation of 
archaeological fabric into data for analysis. That said, not all that is contained 
within the archaeological record is of interest or importance to archaeologists, 
the understanding of the past or the wider community. Hence the need to 
consider the question of significance and value in the widest possible 
construction. If what is contained within the site is not significant or of value, 
then while the destruction of the site may be a negative act, as Belshaw 
describes it, it is not an immoral act and by extension, should not 
automatically be an illegal act. The moral discretion is exercised in the 
consideration of the significance and value of the site. Thus there is no moral 
onus upon society to protect all aspects of the archaeological environment, 
but rather those which have the greatest moral relevance.  
 
3.10 The exercise of moral decision-making 
 
To pick up Prentis’s point raised in Chapter 2, the initial impetus to study the 
Australian past was not based on “motiveless curiosity” but by a desire to 
explore scientific as well as social concerns.132 Scientific debate and public 
interest, rather than legislative directive, underpinned the need for study. 
Where there is public concern about the outcome of such research, it can 
serve the public good.133 This is however not a typical phenomenon in 
archaeological heritage management. Archaeology has a role in influencing 
the mind of the public, which relies on experts to provide information about the 
past.134 There is a danger that, particularly with highly legalistic interpretations 
of heritage protection, the law can itself force a “motiveless” approach to the 
                                            
131  See for example comments on archaeology as principally a middle class pursuit:  
McGuire, R. H. and M. Walker (1999). "Class Confrontations in Archaeology." Historical Archaeology 33 (1): 159-
183.  
Trigger, B. (1989). A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pp 14-15.  
 Similarly, Pokotylo and Guppy’s survey of public attitudes towards archaeology tended to be more extensive or 
positive based on level of education. Pokotylo, D. and N. Guppy (1999). "Public opinion and archaeological 
heritage: views from outside the profession." American Antiquity 64 (3): 400-16. Pp 412-415. 
132  Prentis, M. D. (1995). "From Lemuria to Kow Swamp: The rise and fall of tri-hybrid theories of Aboriginal origins." 
Journal of Australian Studies (45): 79-91.  Pp 80-81.  
133  Although it is certainly debatable that such study was at all advantageous to indigenous people themselves. 
134  Head, L. (1992). Australian Aborigines and a changing environment - views of the past and implications for the 
future. Aboriginal Involvement in Parks and Protected Areas. J. Birckhead, T. De Lacy and L. Smith. Canberra, 
Aboriginal Studies Press: 47-56. Pg 48. 
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study of archaeological heritage. Much legislation, rather naïvely, purports to 
allow archaeological “data” to be gathered for future consideration within 
‘potential’ research frameworks. These research frameworks may never, in 
fact, be developed, making the data-gathering exercise essentially fruitless. 
Frankel has rightly pointed out the problematic nature of this assumption.135 
By widening the legal considerations for archaeological heritage protection 
beyond that of ‘research significance’ it becomes possible to consider what 
other values should be identified, investigated and conserved for 
archaeological places. Under Belshaw’s theory of diminution, the implication is 
that the loss of any value is a negative consequence, a sentiment echoed in 
the World Heritage Convention.136 Yet legislative regimes for archaeological 
heritage provide the illusion of capturing all value by protecting archaeological 
heritage as data for research, but in a practical and epistemological sense, it 
is impossible to ensure that all information (data, research value, moral value) 
for a site is captured. This issue aside, there is the additional issue of ensuring 
that the data captured is in fact utilised effectively to generate a deeper 
understanding of the archaeological past. 
 
Belshaw notes that nonliving entities have whatever value is assigned to them 
by humans. In the absence of sentience; these natural features have no 
inherent value.137 Yet consider the recent loss of a cultural feature which 
shares characteristics of the natural environment. The Giant Buddas of 
Bamiyan, in Afghanistan, were a cause celebre in the international heritage 
movement in the late 1990s.138 These giant stone carvings, cut into the 
cliffside at Bamiyan and enshrined on the World Heritage List,139 were 
threatened and then ultimately destroyed by the Taliban during its rule in 
Afghanistan (Figures 3.3a and 3.3b, second overleaf). The Taliban considered 
the images blasphemous and contrary to their fundamentalist moral view of 
Islam. Despite international lobbying at the time, the statues were destroyed, 
leaving only the niches in the cliff where the statues once stood.140 Under 
Belshaw’s theory of diminution, it is clearly possible to say that this act was 
objectively negative as well as morally “bad” for both the statues themselves 
(insofar as they have ceased to exist) and for the common heritage of the 
world. Their destruction was as much a political act as a moral one, designed 
to demonstrate the military power and authority of the Taliban as much as to 
remove something perceived as a religious affront. 
 
Here we have a clear example of the exercise of moral considerations in 
decision-making by humans, highlighting an occasion where differing morality 
and social values can come into conflict. It is in such circumstances that Stone 
                                            
135  Frankel, D. (1993). "The excavator: creator or destroyer?" Antiquity 67 (257): 875-878.  
136  Molesworth, S. R. (1999). "Barbarians at the gates of the Garden of Eden - revisited". Heritage protection 
foundation for the new millennium. Environmental Outlook No 3: Law and Policy. P. Leadbeter, N. Gunningham 
and B. Boer. Annandale, NSW, The Federation Press: 222-247. Pp 233-234. Also see the World Heritage 
Convention (1972) Preamble. 
137  Taylor, P. W. (1986). Respect for nature: A theory of environmental ethics. Princeton, Princeton University Press.   
138  The discussion of the Bamiyan Buddhas is based in part on a paper entitled “The thinking beneath–archaeology 
and the law” delivered to the Society for Historical Archaeology conference in York, England in January 2005. 
139  World Heritage List Item # 208. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/208. Accessed 17 March 2005. 
140  For a general discussion of the issues surrounding this case and its aftermath, see: 
 O'Keefe, R. (2004). "World cultural heritage: obligations to the international community as a whole?" International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (1): 189-209.  
 Ishwaran, N. (2004). "International conservation diplomacy and the World Heritage Convention." Journal of 
International Wildlife Law & Policy 7 (1-2): 43-56.  
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believes it is necessary to assign moral values to nonliving things, to explicitly 
inject moral considerations into the decision-making process where they might 
otherwise be absent, because the decision is about an object rather than a 
person.141 It is fair to say that at an international level there is a genuine regret 
of the loss of these features, but it is because they were cultural constructs. If 
the Taliban had just destroyed a featureless cliff, perhaps there would have 
been some discussion as to whether it was a responsible act, but it would not 
have garnered the same attention and criticism as the destruction of these 
cultural artefacts. Again to use Belshaw’s language, it may have been 
objectively negative for the cliff to be destroyed, but it would not necessarily 
have been morally wrong. The cultural value came not from the rock from 
which the statues were made, but from the artistry, effort and spiritual 
association with the statues themselves.  
 
Once those natural futures had been imbued with a social value, moral 
considerations attached to their future disposition and management by 
society. On a less dramatic scale, archaeological heritage legislation requires 
such social and moral decision-making, ideally within a rational framework. 
From Belshaw’s perspective, destruction, while a negative act, is not a moral 
absolute and may have neutral or positive consequences elsewhere which 
should be taken into consideration.142 With the Bamiyan Buddas example, we 
can however ascribe a moral value to the actions of the Taliban, just as we 
could ascribe a moral value to societal inaction which caused damage to any 
significant cultural artefact. If a stone is just a stone, its destruction is of little 
moral consequence. But if a stone is a symbol, its protection should be 
directly related to the social value ascribed to it.  
 
                                            
141  Stone, C. (1987). Earth and other ethics: the case for moral pluralism. New York, Harper & Row. Pp 75-77. 
142  Belshaw, C. (2001). Environmental philosophy. Chesham, Acumen Publishing. Pp 151. 
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Figure 3.3a: One of the Bamiyan Buddhas prior to its destruction in 2001.143 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3b: The empty niche following the destruction of one of the 
statues.144 
                                            
143  http://www.unesco.org/bpi/eng/unescopress/2001/afghanistan.shtml 
144  http://www.talesofasia.com/ afghanistan-bamiyan.htm 
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Writing specifically of archaeological resources, Little emphasises that public 
support and maintenance of public relevance is critical for the survival of those 
resources.145 To this end, Belshaw notes that “human centred ethics involves 
a compromise between the individual and the community”.146 This need for 
compromise is as relevant between archaeologists and the community, with 
‘sustainability’ the emerging framework for balancing the aspects of such 
compromise. If a legislative response is indeed appropriate or desirable to 
advance archaeological heritage protection, as a reflection of an adopted 
social moral duty, it is clear that this legislation must reflect the social 
relevance of the thing being protected. While heritage legislation can act as 
the symbol of integration of a new social value, based in the “enlightened 
moral criticism” of the heritage conservation movement, a legislative response 
cannot ride roughshod over all other social concerns. The establishment of 
protective legislation and the integration of a new social value should not be 
seen as a carte blanche which obligates society to do something it perceives 
as irrelevant or not in the wider interest.  
 
3.12 Frameworks for balancing interests and expectations 
 
Within environmental protection, the concept of ‘sustainability’,147 involves a 
consideration of issues which weigh up environmental, economic and social 
factors of any given situation. Sustainability is a process of balance and 
compromise which, ideally, achieves an outcome which sits squarely within 
the nexus of all three factors. When applied to cultural heritage, this concept is 
often referred to as “cultural sustainability”148 and points the way towards 
integrating public good conservation into archaeological heritage protection. 
Evans has applied these principles to the general notion of heritage 
conservation in Australia.149 He posits a rational view of heritage conservation, 
based around a right of the present and future community to access the past 
and an obligation thereby arising to preserve elements of our various pasts. 
Part of this process involves people ascribing broad ‘cultural values’ to objects 
and, by extension, significance to heritage items. Evans asserts that 
sustainable conservation essentially involves an ethic of stewardship150 for the 
past and advocates using nonbinding documents of principle rather than 
legislation to implement this ethic,151 with the ‘soft law’ sustainability principles 
as the tool.  
 
                                            
145  Little, B. J. (2004). Is the medium the message? The art of interpreting archaeology in US National Parks. 
Marketing Heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. Y. Rowan and U. Baran. Walnut Creek, CA, 
AltaMira Press: 269-286.  
146  Belshaw, C. (2001). Environmental philosophy. Chesham, Acumen Publishing. Pg 174. 
147  Also referred to as ‘sustainable development’, ‘ecologically sustainable development’ or ESD. 
148  Gerus, M. (1993). "The Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 and culturally sustainable development." 
Australian Environmental Law News 3: 31-39. Pp 31-32. 
149  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing.  
150  Within the context of Aboriginal heritage management, Murphy has advocated a similar concept of Aboriginal 
‘guardianship’ of cultural heritage, where a Native Title connection with the land has been established. Although 
the ‘guardianship’ Murphy describes implies an ongoing spiritual as well as physical connection to the land, which 
is a different type of relationship to Evans’ ‘stewardship’. The latter implies more of an ongoing connection to 
present and future generations, expressed through the conservation of heritage, rather than a deep spiritual 
connection to the physical expressions of that heritage per se. Murphy, L. (1996). "The political application of 
cultural heritage management: indigenous participation or indigenous control?" Tempus 6: 141-146.  Pp 141-142. 
151  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing. Pg 62-66. 
Evans refers to these instruments as “soft law” instruments, in that they are guiding, rather than binding, 
documents. 
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The sustainability principles, as implemented in Australia are largely focussed 
on the natural, living environment. They have been conceived as the 
principles of “ecologically sustainable development” (or ESD) and, due to that 
focus, are not directly adaptable to the cultural environment. The ESD 
principles, as implemented in Australian legislation are set out as follows: 
 
(a) decision-making processes should effectively integrate both long-term and 
short-term economic, environmental, social and equitable considerations; 
(b) if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage, lack of 
full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing 
measures to prevent environmental degradation; 
(c) the principle of inter-generational equity—that the present generation should 
ensure that the health, diversity and productivity of the environment is 
maintained or enhanced for the benefit of future generations; 
(d) the conservation of biological diversity and ecological integrity should be a 
fundamental consideration in decision-making; 
(e) improved valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms should be 
promoted.152 
 
Boer and Wiffen have noted the difficulty in translating the concerns of the 
ESD principles, with their natural environment focus, to the cultural 
environment.153 Similarly, other authors have noted that there are multiple 
conceptions of what “sustainability” may mean, and the concerns of 
developed nations may be very different from those of developing nations.154 
But the underlying principle behind ESD, that environmental, social and 
economic considerations should be taken into account in decision-making, is 
also an underlying principle of ‘public good conservation’. In essence, the 
‘public good conservation’ considerations should be to the cultural 
environment what the ESD principles have become to the natural 
environment. This relationship is shown in the diagram overleaf (Figure 3.4). 
The conclusion of this thesis, in Chapter 9, begins to point to what some of 
those ‘public good conservation’ principles may be. 
                                            
152  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) Commonwealth. Section 3A. These principles 
are themselves derived from Section 3 of the 1992 Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. Australian 
Commonwealth Government (1992). Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. Canberra.  
http://www.deh.gov.au/esd/national/igae/index.html. See also the discussion of the development of the ESD 
principles in Hutton, D. and L. Connors (1999). A History of the Australian environmental movement. Melbourne, 
Cambridge University Press. Pp 245-260. 
153  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 15-16. 
154  Schnaiberg, A. and K. A. Gould (2000). Environment and society: the enduring conflict (2nd edition). Caldwell 
New Jersey, Blackburn Press. Pp 211-216. 
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Environmental 
considerations 
 
Social considerations 
 
Economic 
considerations 
Derived ESD principles 
in relation to the natural 
environment 
 
(a) decision-making processes should 
effectively integrate both long-term 
and short-term economic, 
environmental, social and 
equitable considerations;  
(b) if there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental 
damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing measures 
to prevent environmental 
degradation;  
(c) the principle of inter-generational 
equity—that the present 
generation should ensure that the 
health, diversity and productivity of 
the environment is maintained or 
enhanced for the benefit of future 
generations;  
(d) the conservation of biological 
diversity and ecological integrity 
should be a fundamental 
consideration in decision-making; 
(e) improved valuation, pricing and 
incentive mechanisms should be 
promoted 
 
 
Derived ‘public good 
conservation’ principles 
in relation to the cultural 
environment 
 
Chapter 9 begins to suggest 
what some of these principles 
may be. 
 
Figure 3.4: Relationship between the sustainability 
principles, ESD and ‘public good conservation’ 
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The rationality inherent in Evans’ view of heritage and environmental 
conservation is an essential criterion for applying the balance which the 
sustainability framework brings to the consideration of any given 
environmental concern. Writing somewhat earlier, Mayer-Oakes had explicitly 
advocated for a stewardship ethic within American archaeological heritage 
management, and considered that a part of that stewardship process was 
ensuring that archaeological work should serve the public interest.155 While 
writing prior to the concept of ‘sustainability’ in the sense Evans uses it, 
Mayer-Oakes’ conception of archaeological stewardship within a public 
interest context fits neatly within the sustainability framework. These 
conceptions of stewardship are also reinforced through the Codes of Ethics of 
various archaeological professional and interest groups, including the 
Australian Archaeological Association156 and the Australian Association of 
Consulting Archaeologists Incorporated.157 Smith, for one, remains sceptical 
of the archaeological stewardship concept, viewing it as an intellectual ruse to 
justify the role of archaeologists as the stewards of the archaeological 
record.158 Where stewardship is used by archaeologists or the heritage 
profession generally, as a justification for the exercise of an unequal power or 
control relationship with other parties with a claim to the remains of the past, 
this is a justified criticism. But where stewardship can be used to bring about 
an inclusive or collaborative relationship in accessing or interpreting the past, 
it is a useful concept.  
 
The concept of sustainability, as a process for balancing the impacts and 
outcomes of actions, has value and moral force. It reinforces the notion that 
“heritage” is a collective construction and therefore a collective concern.159 As 
a concept, it has been developed in the international arena through an 
extensive process of consultation and negotiation, and is enshrined in 
international treaties and charters, much as with the underlying principles of 
archaeological heritage conservation, which are discussed in Chapter 4. From 
a domestic perspective, this gives the sustainability principles an overarching 
imprimatur. This authority assists in driving the principles into domestic 
legislation at all levels of government, which Boer notes is essential for 
achieving the goals of sustainability.160 Viewed broadly, the principles of 
sustainability when considered for heritage conservation assist in the 
establishment of a ‘public good’ framework for archaeological heritage 
conservation in law. 
 
3.13 The need for ‘public good conservation’ 
 
There is no unitary ‘public’ for whom good can necessarily always be done. 
But drawing on examples cited earlier, initiatives taken ‘in the public good’ are 
those which are aimed at improving quality of life or disseminating a positive 
                                            
155  Mayer-Oakes, W. J. (1989). Science, Service and Stewardship - a Basis for the Ideal Archaeology of the Future. 
Archaeological Heritage Management in the Modern World. H. F. Cleere. London, Unwin Hyman: 52-58.  
156  Australian Archaeological Association (2004). Code of Ethics.  
157  Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists Inc (2004). Code of Ethics.  
158  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge.  Pp 82-83. 
159  Lowenthal, D. (1998). The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Pp 55-56. 
160  Boer, B. (1995). "Institutionalising ecologically sustainable development: the roles of national, state, and local 
governments in translating grand strategy into action." Willamette Law Review 31 (2): 307-358.  
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outcome to the broadest possible spectrum of the population. ‘Public good 
conservation’ shares these aims by seeking to make conservation beneficial 
and relevant to society more broadly. This is particularly the case as these 
disciplines are fairly mature, having been established for more than thirty 
years.161 Such a period of time potentially allows complacency to develop in 
both the interest groups and the general public, who may consider such 
issues resolved in their minds. More worryingly, the public may view 
achievements in these areas to be inadequate or inappropriate. This may be 
particularly true for sectors of society who feel aggrieved or philosophically 
opposed to conservation efforts. This leaves open the possibility of a winding-
back of protective mechanisms which have evolved over time.162 When 
considered within the context of sustainability, ‘public good’ outcomes will be 
those which adequately balance competing interests and provide equal or 
greater benefits to the wider community than to the party or individual which 
might undertake a particular action. As the sustainability principles become 
more and more enshrined in bodies of domestic legislation, those practices 
which do not appear to be providing this level of balance will become 
increasingly pressured to review and reform. Environmental and heritage 
conservation activities are, by their very nature, prime candidates for this type 
of conservation, as there is an inherent implication that these activities are 
about providing a wide community benefit. 
 
An Australian Government Parliamentary Committee has examined, to a 
limited extent, the issue of ‘public good conservation’ for environmental 
conservation.163 While this work was primarily focussed on assessing the 
impacts of ‘public good conservation’ environmental efforts on the livelihoods 
of farmers and landowners, the analysis represents a significant policy 
document which explores the various facets of ‘public good conservation’ in 
some detail. The Committee took the view that, while every landowner had a 
duty of care to manage their land and the environment in a sustainable 
manner, those activities which are beyond their immediate personal benefit 
are ‘public good conservation’ initiatives. Those initiatives, the Committee 
argued, are a real (predominantly economic) concern for landowners and 
require balance to be brought into the process.164 This goes back to the ethic 
of stewardship, which Evans discusses, but with an added dimension which 
explores the inputs to the ‘public good conservation’ process. An essential 
element of the Committee’s findings was that public good conservation is a 
shared responsibility.165  
 
Undertaking a ‘public good conservation’ activity was viewed therefore not 
merely another obligation upon the undertaker; the activity should have a 
‘public good’ outcome beyond a benefit for the undertaker. To this end, 
                                            
161  Hutton, D. and L. Connors (1999). A History of the Australian environmental movement. Melbourne, Cambridge 
University Press.  
 Lowenthal, D. (1998). The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.  
162  Examples of such winding-back of heritage protective legislation are discussed in Chapters 5 to 7. 
163  Standing Committee on Environment and Heritage House of Representatives. Parliament. Australia (2001). 
Public Good Conservation: Our Challenge for the 21st Century: Interim report of the inquiry into the Effects upon 
Landholders and Farmers of Public Good Conservation Measures Imposed by Australian Governments. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
164  Ibid. Pp 53-56. 
165  Ibid. Pp 135-136. 
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government and the community should be assisting the party which 
undertakes the activity as much as possible. This sentiment is echoed in the 
more recent examination of “historic heritage”166 conservation by the 
Commonwealth Productivity Commission.167 A key element of this when 
considered in legislation, is the question as to whether the legal provisions 
requiring a conservation activity are themselves balanced and designed to 
produce, rather than thwart, a ‘public good’ outcome.  
 
3.14 The scientific paradigm, the ‘public good’ and archaeological 
heritage legislation 
 
Naive positivism about the value of the archaeological record is a legislative 
artefact, albeit a powerful one, from the influence of the processualist New 
Archaeology of the 1960s and 70s.168 It is one which denies any moral 
consideration of the value of particular sites and thereby supports a blanket 
approach to their legal protection. The strong legislative focus on scientific 
value provides very little opportunity for communities, particularly indigenous 
communities, to input into the development of broad-based research 
frameworks.169 The outputs of compliance-driven “research” are therefore 
unlikely to reflect public interests or perceptions of the archaeological 
heritage. Similarly, most professional archaeologists lack the opportunity to 
contribute to such research frameworks, as they are concerned either with 
their own personal research agendas (if academics) or with assisting clients 
with archaeological compliance (if consultants). Here it must be recognised 
that the archaeological heritage manager (i.e. the administrator of heritage 
legislation) is in an advantageous position to facilitate, if not necessarily 
develop, broad research frameworks. Smith argues that this focus on regional 
research frameworks is still mired in processualist modes of thinking.170 She 
views regional research frameworks as inherently driven by the scientific 
mode of thought, as necessary to legitimate archaeological data. But provided 
such frameworks are guiding documents only and do not unduly limit the 
consideration of other research themes or community agendas, regional 
research frameworks have the potential to provide a coherence to what is 
otherwise a disconnected series of archaeological projects across the 
landscape. New South Wales has attempted this with respect to historical 
research, through the development of ‘historic themes’ and ‘regional histories’ 
which are intended to provide a shared basis for historical research within that 
state.171 
 
                                            
166  I.e. non-indigenous. In practice, while the brief of the Productivity Commission was wider, their analysis focussed 
almost exclusively on the economic issues associated with the conservation of heritage-listed buildings by private 
individuals. See Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - issues 
paper. Melbourne, Australian Government. For the initial, broader Terms of Reference for this enquiry. 
167  Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government.  
168  Kohl, P. L. (1993). Limits to a post-processual archaeology (or, the dangers of a new scholasticism). 
Archaeological theory - who sets the agenda? N. Yoffee and A. Sherratt. Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press: 13-19.  
169  Greer, S., R. Harrison, et al. (2002). "Community-based archaeology in Australia." World Archaeology 34 (2): 
265-287. Pg 267. See the detailed analysis of Australia heritage legislation in Chapters 5 to 7 of this thesis. 
170  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 117-120. 
171  NSW Heritage Office and Department of Urban Affairs and Planning (1996). Regional Histories. Sydney, NSW 
Government.  
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From a professional perspective, public views of archaeological significance 
may be seen as irrational or misinformed, concerned with aliens, dinosaurs, 
religious happenings or the exploits of fictional archaeologists.172 A narrowly- 
focussed interpretation of ‘research’ significance as the primary heritage value 
allows such community views to be excluded, on the basis that they do not 
support a scientific understanding of the value of a site.173 The public’s 
perception of a site is an opportunity for the construction of community identity 
and social value.174 In such an instance, the public view may reflect the 
ambitions a society has for itself, or for the past or future it wishes to construct 
for itself. Archaeological research should be able to contribute to community 
identity, but if it is to do so, that requires the cooperation and participation of 
the community. Similarly, the use of archaeological heritage in a non-research 
oriented way should not necessarily be precluded. If the public attaches a 
social value to a site there should at least be sufficient flexibility within a 
heritage management framework to consider this value alongside research 
values, yet many of the legal regimes for archaeological heritage 
management discount or exclude such views. The public use of 
archaeological heritage in this way may seem at odds in some instances with 
the professional/research/scientific values of a site, particularly in instances 
where the public may want a site preserved, even though from a ‘purely’ 
research-oriented point of view, the site may not warrant such action. But an 
archaeological site may become symbolic of other non-archaeological or non-
heritage values which the community is attempting to articulate about itself,175 
whether this is demonstrating appreciation for its own past, valuing open 
space or educative facilitates or not allowing a site to be overdeveloped.176 
 
In its current form, Australian heritage legislation does not promote the use of 
the archaeological heritage, even for research purposes, but merely its 
preservation as data, data which may never be analysed. Community values 
are rarely directly catered for in the legislation and can only be dealt with 
administratively within the context of conditions placed on an approval to 
impact archaeological material or places. Some of this is due to the manner in 
which archaeological heritage legislation has been administered. In other 
cases heritage managers have been constrained by the legislation itself. 
Detailed analysis of these issues is contained in Chapters 5 to 7. Furthermore, 
those non-archaeologists who are bound to comply with archaeological 
legislation have no obligation, nor necessarily any desire, to undertake the 
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 Balme, J. and M. Wilson (2004). "Perceptions of archaeology in Australia amongst educated young Australians." 
Australian Archaeology 58: 19-24.  
173  Greer, S., R. Harrison, et al. (2002). "Community-based archaeology in Australia." World Archaeology 34 (2): 
265-287. Pp 278-280. 
174  Lowenthal, D. (1998). The heritage crusade and the spoils of history. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Pp 55-87. 
 Ireland, T. (2002). "Giving value to the Australian historic past: historical archaeology, heritage and nationalism." 
Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 15-25.   
175  Kohl, P. L. and C. Fawcett, Eds. (1995). Nationalism, politics and the practice of archaeology. Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press.  
 Baran, U. and Y. Rowan (2004). Archaeology after nationalism: globalisation and the consumption of the past. 
Marketing Heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. U. Baran and Y. Rowan. Walnut Creek, CA, 
AltaMira Press: 3-23.  
176  Hall, C. M. and S. McArthur (1996). Managing community values: Identity-place relations: An introduction. 
Heritage Management in Australia and New Zealand: The Human Dimension. C. M. Hall and S. McArthur. 
Melbourne, Oxford University Press: 180-184.  
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 3–Establishing a basis for ‘public good’ conservation 98 
types of community-oriented archaeological work which might be 
recommended in policy or guidelines. A formal, legalistic approach to treating 
archaeological heritage solely as research data to be analysed can enshrine 
little more than a data-collecting antiquarianism.177 The Codes of Ethics of 
archaeological organisations such as the Australian Archaeological 
Association and the Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists 
Incorporated may seek to push archaeological work in the direction of 
community-based outcomes, but again there is no compliance requirement 
which can ensure this will happen. What requires protection, then, is not so 
much the “research value” of archaeological heritage, but a method of 
ensuring that research is actually undertaken, which can support wider 
benefits to the community,178 as well as ensuring the public values of the site 
are adequately conserved and presented to the community. 
 
3.15 Conclusion–Building a framework for ‘public good’ archaeology 
 
For ‘public good conservation’ to work, the legislative frameworks for 
conservation must support ‘public good’ outcomes. The establishment of 
broad frames of reference are a part of providing the opportunity within the 
legal framework for ‘public good’ outcomes. Broad frameworks such as the 
sustainability principles can support public good outcomes in environmental 
conservation, due to their level of acceptance at international and national 
levels.179 The effectiveness of the principles relies directly upon their being 
driven down to the subordinate legal frameworks at state and local level.180 
Similarly, a suitably broad-based understanding of an environmental ‘duty of 
care’ can, if implemented throughout the levels of government and across 
jurisdictions, achieve a ‘public good conservation’ outcome.181 Research 
significance, however, is a narrow frame of reference, primarily designed to 
suit the needs of archaeologists and, as discussed earlier, those needs are 
primarily derived from a now-outdated framework for academic research.  
 
For archaeological heritage legislation to achieve a ‘public good’ status, it 
must move away from the current focus on research significance and consider 
a wider frame of reference. The move away from the primacy of scientific 
significance should acknowledge the fact that little research is in fact being 
produced and the research significance of many sites itself is going 
unrealised. This indicates the need to seek out other valid outcomes for 
archaeological heritage management. Fundamental changes are required to 
the mechanics of the existing archaeological heritage legislation, which is 
largely designed to protect archaeological objects, archaeological sites and 
                                            
177  Lipe, W. D. (2002). Public Benefits of Archaeological Research. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. 
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their underlying or assumed research significance first and foremost. These 
will in turn require resources, infrastructure, education or standards which 
support the implementation of a new framework. As will be discussed later in 
the thesis, even in circumstances where legislation gives some protection to, 
the indigenous cultural values of archaeological heritage, the actual 
implementation of protective mechanisms can be difficult. The focus on these 
narrowly defined protections has limited the ability of archaeology to provide a 
“useable past” to the public, as is called for by Little.182 The development of a 
‘public good’ test for archaeological heritage protection which is implemented 
in law will, by broadening the frame of reference, lead to a conservation of 
Australia’s archaeological heritage which is more in keeping with the 
underlying principles of archaeological conservation, sustainability and current 
societal values. This need not negate the value of research significance, but 
will rather require consideration of research significance as one of a number 
of equally significant criteria, rather than the determining factor for 
conservation or the driving force behind archaeological heritage protection 
legislation. 
 
As an expression of societal values, legislation must evolve and change in 
response to the changes within society. Archaeological practice in Australia 
has also evolved, largely driven in a particular direction by heritage legislation. 
This has had unintended consequences, which has left existing legislation and 
practice out of step with contemporary values. The development of a broad 
environmental consciousness in Australia and internationally over this period 
has come to an ethical position based on the balancing of competing interests 
rather than the primacy of any one interest. Heritage conservation generally 
has started to grapple with these issues but archaeological heritage 
conservation has remained mired in a focus on research significance which 
largely ignores wider values. The development of legal regimes which protect 
archaeological heritage within a ‘public good conservation’ framework is 
necessary for archaeological heritage to be considered relevant to the wider 
community. Sustainability, which includes notions of stewardship and duty of 
care, is focussed on providing these wider outcomes for the community.  
 
Building on the philosophical position set out in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 explores 
in greater detail the underlying principles of archaeological heritage protection, 
as expressed in charters, treaties and other “soft law” documents of principle 
which have helped shape the Australian legal landscape. These are 
considered in light of the broad goals of heritage conservation and how they 
can support a notion of ‘public good conservation’. This analysis of the 
underlying principles of archaeological heritage conservation is followed by an 
assessment of their application in current Australian legal regimes in Chapters 
5 to 7. Through this detailed analysis of existing legal regimes it will be 
possible to see where the gaps lie between the existing legal frameworks and 
the goal of ‘public good conservation’.  
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Chapter 4–Identifying underlying principles of archaeological heritage 
protection 
 
4.1 Establishing principles of protection 
 
Chapter 4 analyses the international and domestic instruments which provide 
the underlying basis for protecting heritage generally and considers how these 
relate to both the scientific and ‘public good’ protective paradigms discussed 
in previous chapters. Most are applicable in Australia and have been ratified 
or adopted by many countries. Each of these instruments, while in most cases 
not principally concerned with archaeological heritage, establishes key 
principles for its protection. This chapter identifies three main underlying 
principles of archaeological heritage protection in these instruments, setting 
the scene for analysing their implementation in Australian heritage law in 
Chapters 5 to 7. These three key principles of archaeological heritage 
protection, protection of the archaeological object, protection of the 
archaeological site and transmission of knowledge gleaned from the 
archaeological record to present and future generations, underlie all 
archaeological heritage protection legislation to a greater or lesser degree. 
 
International and domestic treaties, charters and codes of practice have all 
had a bearing on the framing of heritage legislation in Australia. Select other 
key documents are also considered where they relate to archaeological 
heritage protection although they may not be specifically implemented in 
Australia. The majority of these documents are concerned with heritage 
protection more generally, but all make reference to archaeological heritage. 
As the underlying documents of legal heritage protection regimes in Australia, 
analysis of these documents allows the fundamental principles of 
archaeological heritage protection to be distilled. Existing legal regimes for 
archaeological heritage protection in Australia are then evaluated against 
these protective principles, as well as against the concept of ‘public good 
conservation’. 
 
4.2 Key heritage instruments 
 
This section considers the key extralegal instruments which have helped 
shape the legal landscape for archaeological heritage management in 
Australia. These documents are influential “soft law” documents–documents 
of policy and principle, but without the force of statute–which Evans argues 
are key in implementing heritage protection legislation.1 These instruments 
take three forms: international Conventions, UNESCO Recommendations and 
Charters. Conventions place binding obligations on those countries which 
become signatories2 to the Conventions, generally including a requirement 
that the signatory nations enact appropriate national legislation to ensure the 
Convention can be implemented within the signatory nation, although such 
arrangements vary.3 UNESCO Recommendations are non-binding statements 
                                            
1  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing. Pp 62-66. 
2  Also referred to as “States Parties” 
3  O'Keefe, P. J. (2000). Commentary on the UNESCO 1970 convention on illicit traffic. Leicester, Institute of Art 
and Law.  Pg 102. 
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of recommended regulatory principle which UNESCO has endorsed.4 Member 
states of the UN are not required to implement the principles. 
Recommendations are voluntary, but have a degree of moral force and can 
help establish the basis for a formal, binding instrument such as a Convention 
at a later date. The Constitution of UNESCO itself prevents the organisation’s 
intervention in domestic matters,5 thus the voluntary adoption of these guiding 
documents and their implementation in domestic law is a key element in their 
effectiveness. Charters are again statements of principle, however those 
discussed in this chapter are issued by nongovernmental agencies, and thus 
have no legal force. Adoption of the Charters is voluntary and, as with the 
Recommendations, they act as moral forces which establish sets of guiding 
principles.  
 
Australia is a signatory to two of the three main international heritage 
conventions: the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and 
Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural 
Property6 and the 1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural 
and Natural Heritage.7 Australia has not, as yet, chosen to participate in the 
1995 Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects.8 By 
becoming a signatory to these Conventions, specific legal obligations9 have 
been placed on Australia to implement the key elements of the Conventions in 
domestic legislation and to cooperate with the international community to see 
that the Conventions are implemented. The UNESCO and Unidroit 
conventions are primarily concerned with preventing the illegal transfer of 
cultural property out of the home country and placing restrictions on the public 
(UNESCO) and private (Unidroit) spheres to prevent this practice. The World 
Heritage Convention is concerned with the protection of places entered on the 
World Heritage List and unlisted places which may be under consideration for 
World Heritage status. Each of these Conventions has had some bearing on 
the protection of archaeological heritage under Australian law, as domestic 
legislation is required to reinforce the broad principles set out in the 
                                            
4  United Nations (2004). Rules of Procedure concerning recommendations to Member States and international 
conventions covered by the terms of Article IV, paragraph 4, of the Constitution. Article 1(b) states that 
“Recommendations…[contain]…principles and norms for the international regulation of any particular 
question…Member States [may] take whatever legislative or other steps may be required…to apply the principles 
and norms aforesaid within their respective territories.” Thus the application of the Recommendations to domestic 
law is entirely at the direction of a particular State. 
See also Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 
34-35. 
5  Merryman, J. H. (2005). "Cultural heritage internationalism." International Journal of Cultural Property 12: 11-39. 
Pp 20-21. The limitations on UNESCO’s actions are contained in Article 1 of its Constitution. 
6  Accepted by Australia on 30/10/1989. Hereafter UNESCO Convention. 
7  Ratified by Australia on 22/08/1974. Hereafter World Heritage Convention. 
8  The Convention entered into force internationally on 24/06/1995 but Australia is not, as yet, a party to this 
Convention. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/implement/i-95.pdf. Accessed 20 April 2006. Hereafter Unidroit 
Convention.  
 Note unlike the United Nations, which is a quasi-governmental organisation in its own right, with membership of 
essentially all nations on the planet, Unidroit is an intergovernmental cooperative organisation which seeks to 
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members, states must accede to the Unidroit (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) Statute 
1993. Australia is one of 60 member States in Unidroit and is represented within Unidroit by the Commonwealth 
Attorney-General’s Department. See http://www.unidroit.org/english/presentation/main.htm. Accessed 20 April 
2006. 
9  UNESCO Convention Articles 5(a), 6(b), 7(b), 8 and 13. 
 World Heritage Convention Articles 5(d) and 11(1). 
 Unidroit Convention Articles 5(1), 5(3). 
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Conventions.10 Such legislation must be tailored to suit local circumstances in 
individual jurisdictions.11 
 
There are also several nonbinding extralegal documents which set standards 
relevant to the protection of archaeological heritage. The Australia ICOMOS 
Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance12 (Burra 
Charter) is the principal document in Australia and has substantial influence in 
the framing of Australian heritage legislation. It was itself heavily influenced by 
the 1966 Venice Charter13 and the findings of the Hope Inquiry into the 
National Estate;14 the latter is discussed later in this chapter. In addition, there 
are two specifically archaeological extralegal documents which need to be 
considered in the analysis of the principles for protecting archaeological 
heritage: the 1956 UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles 
Applicable to Archaeological Excavations15 and the 1990 ICOMOS Charter for 
the Protection and Management of the Archaeological Heritage.16 Neither of 
these latter two documents has been implemented in Australia nor adopted by 
Australian governments or Australian archaeological professional bodies. 
Nevertheless, as specifically archaeological international documents they 
provide a basis for the discussion of the principles of archaeological heritage 
protection developed in this chapter. These conventions and extralegal 
guiding documents provide the basis for the conservation of archaeological 
sites in Australia, and each will be examined in turn. The chapter concludes 
with an examination of several archaeological Codes of Ethics, including the 
Codes for the Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists 
Incorporated (AACAI) and the Australian Archaeological Association (AAA) 
and the New South Wales Government’s archaeological Code of Practice.17 
This will analyse how the profession has responded to the challenges and 
issues raised in the treaties and charters. 
 
4.3  International Legal Instruments–Conventions 
 
Australia has implemented the two key UNESCO heritage conventions, the 
1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the 
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12  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Hereafter Burra Charter, as revised 1999. 
13  (1966). International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites. Venice Charter. The 
Venice Charter was never adopted by Australia. As the Venice Charter is primarily concerned with built heritage, 
it will not be considered by this thesis. Furthermore, the establishment of the Burra Charter in Australia in 1979 
essentially rendered the Venice Charter redundant in the Australian context. See also Truscott, M. and D. Young 
(2000). "Revising the Burra Charter: Australia ICOMOS updates its guidelines for conservation practice." 
Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 4: 101-116.  
14  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service.  
15  UNESCO (1956). Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations. New 
Delhi Recommendation. The New Delhi Recommendations were never adopted in Australia. 
16  International Council on Monuments and Sites (1990). Charter for the Protection and Management of the 
Archaeological Heritage. ICOMOS Archaeological Charter. The ICOMOS Archaeological Charter has not been 
adopted in Australia, although it remains in effect internationally. 
17  NSW Department of Planning and Heritage Council of NSW (1993). Code of Practice: Historical Archaeological 
Excavations. Sydney, NSW Government. As of mid-2006, this document was undergoing revision prior to 
reissue.  
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Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and the 
1972 Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. 
These Conventions, as well as other charters and documents have been of 
considerable influence internationally, particularly in encouraging cooperative 
efforts to protect cultural heritage.18 While these Conventions are not 
specifically concerned with archaeological matters, they have been 
enormously influential in the shaping of domestic heritage legislation and 
policy.19 The Conventions are analysed in the order in which they were 
adopted by Australia, rather than in chronological order. 
 
4.3.1 The World Heritage Convention 1972 
 
The World Heritage Convention was drafted in 1972 in response to a 
perception that rapid social changes around the world threatened to 
conservation of highly significant heritage places. The impetus for the 
Convention was, in part, an outgrowth of the international cooperative efforts 
of the 1960s to save the Abu Simbel temples in Egypt, which were to be 
flooded by the construction of the Aswan Dam.20 Historically, it is the most 
important of the heritage Conventions for Australia, as it represents the first 
adoption of a document of heritage conservation principles by an Australian 
Government. Australia was amongst the first nations to ratify the Convention 
and now almost all UN member nations are parties to it.21 The Convention 
was highly influential in Australia in the early days of the heritage conservation 
movement and debate on its ratification occurred simultaneously with the 
establishment in 1973 of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate,22 
from which much Australian heritage legislation and philosophy flows. 
Domestically, the protection of World Heritage Places is effected through the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth)23 
though that legislation has been criticised for focusing protective efforts on the 
listed World Heritage values rather than protecting the totality of the place and 
any as-yet-unidentified values.24 The Convention is concerned with protecting 
cultural and natural places of “outstanding universal value”25 and the 
Preamble states that “deterioration or disappearance of any item of the 
cultural or natural heritage26 constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the 
                                            
18  Merryman, J. H. (2005). "Cultural heritage internationalism." International Journal of Cultural Property 12: 11-39. 
Pp 22-24. 
19  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing. Pp 38. 
20  Brief History of the World Heritage Convention. http://whc.unseco.org/en/169/. Accessed 20 April 2006. See also 
(1990). "The World Heritage Convention: a new idea takes shape." UNESCO Courier (October 1990): 42--45. 
and (1997). "What is the World Heritage?" UNESCO Courier (September 1997): 6-9.  
21  The Convention was passed by the UN General Conference on 16 November 1972 and Australia was the 7th 
nation to become a party to the Convention on 22/08/1974. The convention came into force internationally on 17 
December 1975. As of 2006, there are 182 States Parties to the Convention. 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13055&language=E. The United Nations has 191 Member 
Countries as of 2006. http://www.un.org/geninfo/faq/faq/faq.html. Accessed 20 April 2006. 
22  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Established 17 May 1973 with findings delivered in 1974. See discussion later in 
this Chapter. 
23  Protections for World heritage places were added to this legislation in 1999 when the World Heritage Properties 
Conservation Act 1983 (Cth) was repealed by the Environmental Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 1999 
(Cth)–Schedule 6, Section 1. 
24  Nichols, W. (2001). World Heritage at the crossroads. Habitat Australia. August 2001: 12-15.  
25  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention. Preamble. 
26  Ishwaran observes that the notion of “natural heritage” considered by the Convention is focussed more on 
aesthetic or scenic values and predated the broader concept of biodiversity conservation usually associated with 
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heritage of all nations of the world” and that “parts of the cultural or natural 
heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as a 
part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole.”27 The purpose of the 
Convention is to establish both the protective framework and cooperative 
mechanisms necessary for this to happen at an international level. And while 
the language of the Convention may imply the need for a universal protection 
for cultural heritage places, its focus is only on those places of “outstanding 
universal value”. 
 
The Convention conceives of archaeological heritage as one of the potential 
forms of heritage of outstanding universal value. Article 1 of the Convention 
defines the nature of different categories of cultural heritage places and 
specifically mentions monuments, which include “elements or structures of an 
archaeological nature” of outstanding value for history, art or science, as well 
as sites, defined as “works of man or the combined works of nature and of 
man and areas including archaeological sites which are of outstanding 
universal value from the historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological 
points of view.” In the Operational Guidelines to the Convention, 
archaeological heritage is identified as one of the key components of the 
heritage values of urban centres and abandoned places such as uninhabited 
cities and towns.28 The language of Article 1, while couched in terms of 
“outstanding universal value” makes significant use of the technical and 
scientific language typical of the period in which it was drafted, which can lead 
to conflict between listing places on the basis of technical, professional-
objective criteria and social significance. This has led to a tendency to list 
“monumental” sites with perceived self-evident values over sites with perhaps 
greater social significance but fewer obvious visible characteristics.29 That 
said Article 5 provides direction that the “cultural and natural heritage [has] a 
function in the life of the community”30 as a rationale for its conservation rather 
than conservation on primarily on technical values. It is thus possible to read 
“outstanding universal value” as a form of ‘public good’ conservation.  
 
The Convention requires States Parties to identify places within their territory 
which may meet the criterion of “outstanding universal value” and places the 
obligation for the conservation of such places on individual member states, 
with international assistance if required.31 Signatories are encouraged to 
establish domestic conservation services32 as well to take appropriate legal 
measures33 to ensure conservation measures are effective. Fundamentally, 
                                                                                                                             
natural heritage conservation more recently. Ishwaran, N. (2004). "International conservation diplomacy and the 
World Heritage Convention." Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy 7 (1-2): 43-56. Pp 45-46. 
27  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention.  
28 UNESCO World Heritage Centre (2005). Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention. Paris, UNESCO World Heritage Centre.  Pg 85. 
29  Zouain, G. (1997). "Words and deeds: ambiguities in the World Heritage Convention criteria for choosing cultural 
sites." UNESCO Courier (September 1997): 26-29.  
30  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention. Article 5(a) provides significant support for this objective. A number of “living places” have been 
designated as World Heritage sites, particularly urban centres, including the Historic Centre of Macao, China 
(World Heritage List Item # 1110, 2005), the Historic Centre of Brugge (World Heritage List Item # 996, 2000) and 
the Historic Town of Zabid in Yemen (World Heritage List Item # 611, 1993).  
31  Ibid. Article 4. 
32  World Heritage Convention Article 5(b). 
33  World Heritage Convention Article 5(d). 
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the Convention establishes heritage conservation as an international 
cooperative duty,34 rather than something undertaken solely in the national 
interest. In this regard it can be considered highly successful, as an almost 
universally adopted instrument which has facilitated international 
cooperation,35 although concerns have been raised that lack of follow-up 
commitment and increased tourism at World Heritage sites can cause more 
harm than good.36 The Convention establishes the World Heritage Committee 
as the international administrative and oversight body,37 with its main tools 
being the World Heritage List38 and the List of World Heritage in Danger.39 
Other major objectives of the Convention are the encouragement of private 
conservation efforts40 and the education of the public.41 
 
It is interesting to consider the value and position the World Heritage 
Convention, and indeed ‘soft law’ heritage instruments more generally in 
circumstances where a signatory government may itself decline to ensure the 
conservation of (indeed participate in the destruction of) a World Heritage 
place. Undoubtedly the most dramatic recent example of this was the 
destruction of the giant Buddas in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, discussed in the 
previous chapter, which despite being inscribed on the World Heritage list and 
international protestations, were destroyed by the ruling government of the 
time.42 In Australia, related questions arose when the Federal Government 
considered and then ultimately approved the recommencement of uranium 
mining in Kakadu World Heritage Area in the Northern Territory.43 Only 
through political machinations did Australia prevent the inscription of Kakadu 
on the List of World Heritage in Danger.44 In circumstances where the 
responsible State Party chooses to act in a manner which is contrary to the 
conservation of a World Heritage Place, there is little the international 
community can do in a legal sense;45 the List of World Heritage in Danger is 
the major tool of moral suasion to persuade governments to take appropriate 
action to limit harm, but there is no mechanism to compel action. Sanctions, if 
any, are a matter left to domestic legislation. 
 
In terms of archaeological heritage conservation, the Convention can be a 
significant tool but one which has been used to only limited effect in this 
                                            
34  World Heritage Convention Articles 6 and 7. Articles 19 to 26 set out the conditions and procedures for the 
rendering of cooperative assistance. 
35  von Droste, B. (1997). "The World Heritage Convention: 25 years on." UNESCO Courier (September 1997): 8-9.  
 Ishwaran, N. (2004). "International conservation diplomacy and the World Heritage Convention." Journal of 
International Wildlife Law & Policy 7 (1-2): 43-56.  
36  (2006). "The curse of approval: if UNESCO designates it, they will come. Does identifying World Heritage sites do 
more harm than good?" Newsweek International (April 10 2006).  
37  UNESCO (1972). Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage. World Heritage 
Convention. Articles 8-10. 
38  World Heritage Convention Article 11(2). 
39  World Heritage Convention Article 11(4). 
40  World Heritage Convention Article 17. 
41  World Heritage Convention Article 27. 
42  O'Keefe, R. (2004). "World cultural heritage: obligations to the international community as a whole?" International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (1): 189-209. Pp 195-196. 
43  Mulvaney, J. (2002). "Uranium and cultural heritage values." Dissent 7 (Summer 2001-2002): 47-50.  
 O'Brien, J. (2003). "Canberra yellowcake: the politics of uranium and how Aboriginal land rights failed the Mirrar 
people." Journal of Northern Territory History 14: 79-91.  
44  Maswood, S. J. (2000). "Kakadu and the politics of World Heritage Listing." Australian Journal of International 
Affairs 54 (3): 357-372.  
45  O'Keefe, R. (2004). "World cultural heritage: obligations to the international community as a whole?" International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (1): 189-209. Pp 207-208. 
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regard in Australia. Many archaeological places internationally have been 
inscribed upon the World Heritage list, including well-known archaeological 
sites such as Troy,46 Delphi47 and Moenjodaro,48 although places nominated 
principally on archaeological values represent a relatively small proportion of 
all listed sites.49 In Australia, efforts were initially focussed on the listing of 
places of natural heritage value, such as the Great Barrier Reef,50 however 
more recent efforts have focussed on built heritage, including the listing of the 
Melbourne Royal Exhibition Building51 and the nomination of the Sydney 
Opera House.52 Two places nominated initially only for natural values, 
Kakadu53 and Uluru National Parks 54 in the Northern Territory, were 
subsequently renominated for indigenous cultural values which did include 
archaeological heritage, but the primary cultural impetus was the ongoing 
cultural connection indigenous people had with these places, rather than 
specific archaeological values.  
 
At a conceptual level, the World Heritage Convention is concerned with the 
preservation of the heritage values of a place as a whole, rather than just 
individual elements within a place. The place may be principally considered 
archaeological in nature, or archaeology may form a major or minor 
component of the overall values of place. In this regard, the Operational 
Guidelines to the Convention state that: 
 
It is important for urban archaeological sites to be listed as integral 
units. A cluster of monuments or a small group of buildings is not 
adequate to suggest the multiple and complex functions of a city which 
has disappeared; remains of such a city should be preserved in their 
entirety together with their natural surroundings whenever possible.55 
 
The Convention offers little other specific protection for archaeological 
heritage, but is highly important for establishing heritage conservation as a 
‘public good’ issue, for both the responsible State Party and the international 
community. Perhaps the greatest value of the Convention is the establishment 
of the “common heritage of mankind” and “outstanding universal value” as 
very compelling notions which enjoin a consideration of conservation beyond 
                                            
46  In Turkey–World Heritage List Item # 849. Inscribed in 1998. 
 All of the following World Heritage List details were taken from the online World Heritage database: 
http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=31, accessed 28 April 2006. 
In Turkey–World Heritage List Item # 849. Inscribed in 1998. 
47  In Greece–World Heritage List Item # 393. Inscribed in 1987. 
48  In Pakistan–World Heritage List Item # 138. Inscribed in 1980. 
49  34 sites on the World Heritage list are identified principally as “archaeological sites” out of 812 places presently 
on the list. Based on a search of the online World Heritage database on 28 April 2006. 
http://whc.unesco.org/pg.cfm?cid=31 
50  World Heritage List Item # 154. Inscribed in 1981. 
51  World Heritage List Item # 1131. Inscribed in 2004. 
52  Nominated for World Heritage Status by the Australian Government in 2005 for consideration in 2006. 
53  World Heritage List Item # 147. Originally inscribed for natural values only in 1981, the site was subsequently 
expanded in size and relisted on a mix of cultural and natural values in 1992. See Report of the 18th Session of 
the World Heritage Committee 31 January 1995, WHC-94/CONF.003/16. 
 http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom94.htm#447. Accessed 28 April 2006. 
54  World Heritage List Item # 447. Originally inscribed for natural values only in 1987, the site was subsequently 
relisted on a mix of cultural and natural values in 1994. See Report of the 16th Session of the World Heritage 
Committee 14 December 1992, WHC-92/CONF.002/12. http://whc.unesco.org/archive/repcom92.htm#147. 
Accessed 28 April 2006. 
55  UNESCO World Heritage Centre (2005). Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage 
Convention. Paris, UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Pg 85. Clearly the Convention sees heritage places as 
being greater than the sum of their parts. 
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the immediate needs and values of local concerns or political considerations. 
That said, World Heritage is of course highly politicised and, as noted above, 
no level of international concern can necessarily stop a government bent on 
international bad acts. The destruction of the giant Buddas of Bamiyan in 
Afghanistan, as the first deliberate act of that sort by a national government, 
did serve to galvanise the international community in condemning the 
destruction, which was described by the General Conference of UNESCO as 
a “crime against the common heritage of humanity.”56 O’Keefe noted that, at 
the time, the universal international condemnation was not expressed in terms 
of Afghanistan’s obligations under the Convention and was described in 
suitably vague terms to render the condemnation to be more of a rhetorical 
than legal nature.57 While clearly not as robust as legally-enforceable 
domestic statute, the World Heritage Convention, as an almost universally 
adopted ‘soft law’ heritage instrument has been enormously significant in 
Australia and internationally in establishing heritage conservation generally, if 
not archaeological heritage specifically, as a universally applicable ‘public 
good’ value. 
 
4.3.2 The UNESCO Convention 1970 
 
The 1970 UNESCO Convention provides the basis for the protection of 
cultural property (here principally referring to moveable cultural property) at 
the international level and is supported by many later documents and 
domestic legislation. Although it was the first of the major international 
heritage conventions, it was not adopted by Australia until 1989.58 The 
essential purpose of the Convention is to provide a framework to prevent the 
international trade in illicitly-removed or stolen cultural property. It establishes 
a basis for assessing claims of illegal removal while providing a mechanism 
for the return of illegally-removed cultural property, though it has been 
criticised as a mechanism for legitimating the hoarding of cultural property.59 
The Convention is however restricted to cultural property within government 
control (such as that located in museums and state institutions) and does not 
deal with cultural property which is privately held. While the effectiveness and 
relevance of the UNESCO Convention has been the subject of debate,60 as a 
                                            
56  UNESCO Doc 31C/Res 26, 2 November 2001, cited in O'Keefe, R. (2004). "World cultural heritage: obligations to 
the international community as a whole?" International and Comparative Law Quarterly 53 (1): 189-209. Pg 196. 
57  Ibid. Pp 202-204. 
58  The UNESCO Convention was passed by the UN General Conference on 14 November 1970 and came into 
force internationally on 24 April 1972. Australia was the 64th nation to become a party to it on 30/10/1989 and it 
entered into force in Australia on 30/01/1990. As of 2006, there are 109 States Parties to the Convention. 
http://portal.unesco.org/la/convention.asp?KO=13039&language=E. Accessed 20 April 2006. 
 Australia did not accede to the Convention until after the implementation of the Protection of Moveable Cultural 
Heritage Act 1986 (Cth). See Second Reading Speech for the Protection of Moveable Cultural Heritage Bill, 27 
November 1985. Speech by The Hon B Cohen, member for Robertson, Minister for Heritage and the 
Environment. Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1985). Official Reports of the Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard). Pg 3739, as well as the Question on Notice No 2672 by Mr C Hollis, Member for Throsby, on 
29 November 1985. Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1985). Official Reports of the 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Pg 4271. 
59  Merryman, J. H. (2005). "Cultural heritage internationalism." International Journal of Cultural Property 12: 11-39. 
Pg 22.  
60  O'Keefe, P. J. (1996). "Developments in cultural heritage law: what is Australia's role?" Australian International 
Law Journal (1996): 36-59.  
 O'Keefe, P. J. (2000). Commentary on the UNESCO 1970 convention on illicit traffic. Leicester, Institute of Art 
and Law.  
 O'Keefe, P. J. (2000). "International cultural property: Traditional culture and folklore: Droit de suite." Media and 
Arts Law Review 5 (2): 121-125.  
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document of principle it remains influential in the formation of domestic 
heritage legislation, including in Australia. The preamble to the Convention 
provides its raison d’être, namely that the international community must take 
steps to protect the cultural property within its borders, to work cooperatively 
to return stolen cultural property and to ensure that cultural institutions within 
its borders accumulate items of cultural property in an ethical way. Jowers 
notes, however, that this ethical restriction on the accumulation of cultural 
property is effectively limited to those cultural institutions under governmental 
control–it has moral suasive force only upon private collecting institutions.61 
This gap later led to the establishment of the Unidroit Convention, which deals 
specifically with cultural property in private ownership. A fundamental element 
of the Convention is that, through cooperation, individual nations can ensure 
that their respective cultures are not diminished through the loss of cultural 
property.62 
 
Article 1 of the convention identifies the types of “cultural property” protected 
by the Convention and sets out the characteristics of archaeological relics 
protected by the convention including: 
 
(c) products of archaeological excavations (including regular and 
clandestine) or of archaeological discoveries; 
(d) elements of artistic or historical monuments or archaeological 
sites which have been dismembered; 
(e) antiquities more than one hundred years old, such as 
inscriptions, coins and engraved seals; 
 
The convention specifically protects archaeological relics legitimately 
excavated by archaeologists as well as those excavated by looters, 
monuments removed from sites and “antiquities” over 100 years in age. This 
appears to principally designate those classes of items which are collected by 
enthusiasts or museums and actively traded internationally. While prohibiting 
the practice of illicit excavation of archaeological sites is not specifically 
mentioned, it falls into the terms of Article 2(2), as one of the causes or 
practices by which cultural property is illicitly transferred. In theory, this should 
preclude the collusion of the national authorities at an official or unofficial level 
from allowing the illegal excavation of archaeological sites within their 
jurisdiction. It should also prevent agents acting on behalf of government in a 
foreign country, such as archaeological researchers or museums, illicitly 
acquiring cultural property and bringing in back into their home country. 
 
Article 5 enjoins signatory nations to create national agencies to care for 
cultural heritage. In Australia, this initially took the form of the Australian 
Heritage Commission,63 later followed by State level heritage agencies in all 
                                                                                                                             
 Leiboff, M. (1999). "The embodiment of culture: the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth)." 
Australian Feminist Law Journal (12): 3-19.  
 Forrest, C. (2004). "Australia's Protection of foreign states' cultural heritage." UNSW Law Journal 27 (3): 605-630.  
61  Jowers, K. F. (2003). "International and National Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the United States, and Mexico." Texas International Law Journal 38: 145. Pg 152 
62  Ibid. Pg 150 
63  Although the creation of this agency occurred some considerable time prior to Australia becoming a party to the 
Convention. The Australian Heritage Commission was dissolved on 1 January 2004 and replaced by the 
Australian Heritage Council as a result of amendments to the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
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States and Territories. Among the duties of protection of these agencies is 
subclause 5(d), which requires national agencies to: 
 
[organise] the supervision of archaeological excavations, [ensure] the 
preservation in situ of certain cultural property, and [protect] certain 
areas reserved for future archaeological research. 
 
This clause is perhaps the most important for the archaeological heritage 
within Australia. By requiring States Parties to manage the process of 
archaeological investigation within their borders, it puts archaeology into a 
class of discipline to be regulated, much as any other. It moves archaeology 
out of a remote, academic framework into the essential business of 
government.64 And as a part of the business of government, it inevitably 
touches on the lives of the citizens of signatory nations, making the protection 
of cultural property a general societal concern. The latter half of the clause 
identifies the importance of archaeological sites remaining in situ, that is, in 
their original location. This statement therefore acknowledges archaeological 
sites as drawing at least some of their inherent worth from their original 
location; relocating archaeological relics and monuments to museums and 
other cultural institutions is therefore not always appropriate. Lastly, by 
requiring areas be set aside for future research and excavation, this is an 
attempt to provide future access to what is a finite and non-renewable 
resource, and privileges the “research culture” discussed in Chapter 2. 
 
While the majority of the remainder of the Convention does not specifically 
mention archaeological sites or relics, the duty to prevent the illicit transfer of 
a range of cultural objects is clearly spelled out by the Convention. The last 
Article requiring specific mention in relation to archaeology is Article 10, which 
in part requires antique dealers to establish a register of provenance for all 
cultural property in which they deal. Australia has acceded to this Convention 
subject to a reservation for Article 10, citing an inability to enforce the keeping 
of a register of cultural property by antique dealers. Clause 10 (b) however, 
relates specifically to the States Parties’ responsibility with respect to the 
education of the public, to “create and develop in the public mind a realisation 
of the value of cultural property and the threat to the cultural heritage created 
by theft, clandestine excavations and illicit exports.” As the reservation by 
Australia only specifically mentions the keeping of a register, there is an 
implication that clause 10 (b) should still apply, thereby making public 
education one of Australia’s responsibilities under the Convention. 
 
The UNESCO Convention, much like the World Heritage Convention, is 
enormously influential as a document of principle and drove the establishment 
of the Commonwealth Protection of Moveable Cultural Heritage Act 1986. Like 
                                                                                                                             
Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). The new Council is enabled under the Australian Heritage Council Act (2003) 
Commonwealth. Note that the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act is in fact administered by the 
Commonwealth Department of Environment and Heritage on behalf of the Minister. See 
http://www.deh.gov.au/heritage/movable/index.html. Accessed 28 April 2006. 
64  Differing levels of government involvement in the undertaking or regulation of archaeology exist around the world. 
See for example Hunter, J., I. Ralston, et al. (1993). The structure of British archaeology. Archaeological 
Resource Management in the UK: An Introduction. J. Hunter and I. Ralston. Phoenix Mill, Alan Sutton: 30-43. for 
a discussion of the UK situation, or for a brief review of the US situation see Advisory Council on Historic 
Preservation (2001). Protecting Historic Properties: A Citizen's Guide to Section 106 Review.  
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the World Heritage Convention, it seeks to establish a notion that the 
protection of cultural heritage is a collective responsibility, one which requires 
international cooperation. It establishes archaeological objects as items 
worthy of protection, but acknowledges the value of the context of those 
items, rather than focusing solely on the object. While principally focussed on 
museums and collecting bodies, it does support the notion of conservation in 
the ‘public good’, rather than for the benefit of those countries with the power 
or resources to claim cultural objects as their own. 
 
4.3.3 Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural 
Objects 1995 
 
The Unidroit Convention was established in 1995, to complement the 1970 
UNESCO Convention, by placing international responsibilities for protection of 
cultural property on the individual as well as on governments. It complements 
the UNESCO Convention by providing processes which individuals as well as 
governments can use in the recovery of stolen cultural property, in addition to 
the State-to-State mechanisms established under the UNESCO Convention.65 
As yet, Australia has not ratified this Convention and to do so would require 
some amendment to the Protection of Moveable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 
(Cth).66 The Unidroit Convention establishes a basis to prevent the private 
trade in illicit cultural property and to establish frameworks by which claims of 
illicit removal can be assessed and property returned to the rightful owners.67 
The preamble to the Convention specifically mentions archaeological sites as 
items to be protected and the Convention being: 
 
...deeply concerned with the illicit trade in cultural objects...in particular 
by the pillage of archaeological sites and the loss of irreplaceable 
archaeological, historical and scientific information. 
 
The preamble goes on to state specific objectives in the preservation and 
protection of cultural heritage and specifically the “physical protection of 
archaeological sites” and is couched in the professional-objective language of 
archaeology. Despite this cultural heritage is perceived as significant to local 
and national communities, as well as to humanity generally.68 The choice of 
language in this Convention is significantly different from the UNESCO 
Convention in this regard, as the goals of the Unidroit Convention now 
explicitly acknowledge the need to protect not only the intrinsically valuable 
                                            
65  Prott, L. V. (1997). Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
1995. Leicester, Institute of Art and Law. Pg 15. 
 UNESCO and Unidroit (2005). UNESCO and Unidroit - cooperation in the fight against illicit traffic in cultural 
property (UNESCO Information Note CLT-2005/Conf/803/2). Paris, UNESCO.  
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generally no more than 50 years after the act of theft itself, however the Act provides for no time limits). 
 Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 42-44.  
67  O'Keefe, P. J. (1996). "Developments in cultural heritage law: what is Australia's role?" Australian International 
Law Journal (1996): 36-59. Pp 41-42. 
Prott, L. V. (1997). Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 
1995. Leicester, Institute of Art and Law.  
68  Ibid. Pp 18-19 
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cultural object, but also the “irreplaceable...information” associated with it, or 
in other words, the object’s context. The Unidroit Convention also provides for 
a somewhat broader understanding of the significance of archaeological sites, 
by seeking to protect both “historical and scientific” information. While this 
clause seems, as with the UNESCO Convention, to be concerned mainly with 
scientific research, there is an acknowledgement of historical value of sites, 
which may extend beyond their scientific value. 
 
The Convention makes some specific provisions for archaeological materials, 
in recognition of the different circumstances which can surround the discovery 
of such items, as opposed to issues arising from the theft of works of art, for 
example. Article 3(2) states 
 
a cultural object which has been unlawfully excavated or lawfully 
excavated but unlawfully retained shall be considered stolen, when 
consistent with the law of the State where the excavation took place. 
 
This Article establishes the concept that an unexcavated archaeological object 
is not ownerless. In general such objects will belong to the State or the 
landowner, thus either party should have an opportunity to commence legal 
proceedings for their return. It has been noted, however, that proof of origin in 
such cases can be extremely difficult.69 This clause places a particular onus 
on archaeologists, indicating that even where an object has been legally 
excavated, this does not indicate an entitlement of ownership or the right to 
remove objects without appropriate permission. Thus an archaeologist 
working in a signatory nation cannot presume a right to take excavated 
cultural material out of the country without having appropriate approval. The 
clause also places an onus on the signatory nation, to have appropriate 
controlling legislation in place to make the unauthorised excavation of sites an 
offence. 
 
The matter of context is explored in Article 5, which provides for States to 
claim against one another for stolen cultural property in their territories. This 
Article identifies the preservation of context,70 the maintenance of the integrity 
of a larger whole71 and the “traditional or ritual use”72 of cultural objects as key 
reasons why courts should order the return of cultural objects. O’Keefe notes 
here that this clause is drafted in such a way as to not necessarily apply to all 
types of stolen cultural property, but only those which meet the criteria set out 
in the clause. However the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 
(Cth) provides for a broader range of controlled cultural property in Australia.73 
The Convention also recognises the potential social harm which can come 
from the loss of important objects by indigenous communities.74 This is most 
relevant in Australia with respect to Aboriginal archaeological objects which 
                                            
69  Ibid. Pp 32-33. 
70  Unidroit Convention Article 5(1)(a) 
71  Unidroit Convention Article 5(1)(b) 
72  Unidroit Convention Article 5(1)(d). Note this clause applies only to indigenous communities. 
73  O'Keefe, P. J. (1996). "Developments in cultural heritage law: what is Australia's role?" Australian International 
Law Journal (1996): 36-59. Pp42-43. 
See also comments by Prott on this issue in Prott, L. V. (1997). Commentary on the Unidroit Convention on 
Stolen and Illegally Exported Cultural Objects 1995. Leicester, Institute of Art and Law. Pp 58-59. 
74  Unidroit Convention Article 5(1)(d) 
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may have been illegally excavated, as it recognises the continuity of cultural 
context of an object, despite its physical disposition or antiquity. This is 
consistent with the procedures for the return of cultural significant objects to 
indigenous people under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 (Cth).75  
 
The Unidroit Convention fills a significant legal and policy gap in international 
heritage law by providing a framework to address the actions of individuals, as 
well as government entities, in the loss of cultural property. For archaeological 
heritage, the Convention recognises the importance of not just individual 
objects, but the significance of their context, the information associated with 
them and their social value. While the question of social value is most strongly 
expressed for indigenous communities, who are likely to be the least 
empowered to reclaim items of stolen cultural property, the Convention 
stresses that conservation of cultural property is a collective concern. As a 
document focussed on the private sector, however, it is less supportive of a 
‘public good’ conservation notion, as it is principally supportive of the property 
rights of individuals. 
 
4.4 Documents of principle–Charters and ‘soft law’ instruments of 
protection 
 
In addition to the Conventions discussed above, which are important moral 
and legal documents which are substantially supported by domestic 
legislation, there is another category of instruments which have no legal force. 
These are documents of principle which may be generated by quasi-
governmental agencies such as UNESCO or professional and public interest 
groups such as ICOMOS.76 Three such documents are discussed here, the 
1956 UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to 
Archaeological Excavations, the 1990 ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and 
Management of the Archaeological Heritage and the 1999 Australia ICOMOS 
Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance (Burra 
Charter). While the first two of these documents have never been adopted in 
Australia, they remain influential internationally and are specifically concerned 
with archaeological issues. The Burra Charter, while not specifically 
concerned with archaeological heritage, is the fundamental guiding document 
of heritage principle in Australia, which has status with all Australian heritage 
authorities and has assumed a quasi-legal status in Australia. These ‘soft law’ 
documents, while non-binding, give a strong insight into the fundamental 
protective principles for archaeological heritage, which should be expressed in 
protective legislation. 
 
4.4.1 The UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles 
Applicable to Archaeological Excavations 1956 
 
The UNESCO Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to 
Archaeological Excavations77 emanated from a UNESCO General 
                                            
75  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (1984) Commonwealth. Section 12. 
76  The International Council on Monuments and Sites. See http://www.icomos.org/ 
77  Hereafter New Delhi Recommendations. 
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Conference in 1956 in New Delhi, India. As a Recommendation, the document 
has no legal force and is not binding,78 but provides professional and moral 
guidance on the management of archaeological heritage by member states. 
Recommendations do not have to be formally adopted by member states 
following their adoption by UNESCO and the New Delhi Recommendation has 
never been specifically implemented in Australia. The key principles 
established by the Recommendation found their way into subsequent 
UNESCO cultural heritage instruments, particularly the notion that cultural 
heritage is a common concern and international cooperation is required to 
effect its conservation.79 Given the lengthy gap between the issue of the 
Recommendation and the establishment of broad archaeological heritage 
protection regimes in Australia, it does not appear that the Recommendation 
had any significant influence within Australia. As an historical document it is 
nevertheless worth examining the Recommendation for its stance on 
archaeological protective legislation. 
 
The Preamble to the Recommendation notes the ability of archaeological 
heritage to enrich domestic and international cultural values, promote 
international understanding and advance the cause of science. In the interests 
of preserving archaeological heritage, the Recommendation calls for 
protection through the regulation of excavations,80 protection of objects which 
meet certain criteria,81 establishment of standards and the requirement that 
approval be obtained for excavation or surface collection of artefacts.82 The 
Recommendation specifically suggests legally defining the archaeological 
heritage83 and the “archaeological sub-soil” as well as clearly establishing 
ownership of the sub-soil.84 Article 5 recommends specific recognition of State 
ownership of the archaeological sub-soil for relevant member states, as land 
ownership practices vary worldwide. In some instances there is a presumption 
that the owner of the land owns everything below ground. However in other 
instances the below ground resources are reserved for the State.85 
 
The Recommendation explicitly recognises archaeology as a science and 
calls for protection of samples of archaeological resources to be retained 
unexcavated, to allow for future investigation with improved techniques or 
                                            
78  See the ‘General introduction to the standard-setting instruments of UNESCO’ for a brief introduction to the key 
differences between Recommendations and Conventions. 
http://portal.unesco.org/unesco/ev.php?URL_ID=23772&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201&reload=11
01727325# Accessed 5 May 2006. 
79  Blake, J. (2000). "On defining the cultural heritage." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (1): 61-85.  
80  UNESCO (1956). Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations. New 
Delhi Recommendation. Articles 3, 4 and 5. 
81  New Delhi Recommendation  
82  New Delhi Recommendation Articles 5 and 8. 
83  New Delhi Recommendation Article 3(a). 
84  New Delhi Recommendation Article 5(e). 
85  Jowers, K. F. (2003). "International and National Legal Efforts to Protect Cultural Property: The 1970 UNESCO 
Convention, the United States, and Mexico." Texas International Law Journal 38: 145. Pg 163. Jowers cites the 
example of some Latin American countries, which have essentially “nationalised” their archaeological heritage in 
order to protect it. See also Carman’s critique of the issue of private versus state ownership of heritage objects. 
Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. Pp 195-199. 
 Fourmile critiques this practice with respect to Australian indigenous heritage, viewing it as a colonial holdover 
which dispossesses indigenous people of their own heritage. This issue is further examined in Chapters 5 to 7 
with respect to Australia. See Fourmile, H. (1996). "The Queensland Heritage Act 1992 and the Cultural Record 
(Landscapes Queensland and Queensland Estate) Act 1987 (Qld) :legislative discrimination in the protection of 
Indigenous cultural heritage." Australian Indigenous Law Reporter 1 (4): 507-529. , Fourmile, H. (1996). "The law 
of the land : whose law, whose land." Tempus 5 (1996): 9-17.  
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knowledge and the management of collections of objects for future study.86 
This reflects the emergence of scientifically-focussed processual archaeology, 
as discussed in Chapter 2. The Recommendation also calls for prohibition of 
trade in illegally excavated antiquities and penalties for the illicit disturbance of 
archaeological sites.87 While calling for regulation, the Recommendation also 
specifically recognises archaeology as a public concern, referring to the 
discipline in the Preamble as being “in the general interest.” Significantly, the 
Recommendation does not call for the protection of all potential 
archaeological remains, nor does it suggest that all such remains are of equal 
interest. From a legal perspective, this indicates the intent of the 
Recommendation was selective protection of archaeological materials based 
on criteria to be determined by individual states, rather than assuming a 
blanket protection of any material which could conceivably be considered 
“archaeological”. This is consistent with the World Heritage Convention notion 
of “outstanding universal value”, which sets a very high bar for the attributing 
of World Heritage value to places. Similarly, the UNESCO and Unidroit 
Conventions set certain criteria which objects must meet in order to achieve 
protected status.  
 
Article 2 applies a “public interest” criterion to the application of the 
Recommendation, stating that: 
 
[the] Recommendations apply to any remains, whose preservation is in 
the public interest from the point of view of history, art or architecture, 
each Member State being free to adopt the most appropriate criterion 
for assessing the public interest of objects found on its territory.88  
 
Thus while the Recommendation adopts, in places, the language of science, it 
does not give primacy to the scientific perspective. The Recommendation 
clearly conceives of the archaeological heritage as something which should 
be protected, in a selective manner, for the benefit of wider society. So even 
at this early stage in the thinking regarding archaeological heritage protection, 
it is possible to see the germ of ‘public good’ considerations. Article 3 goes on 
to state that the criterion for assessing public interest should be based on the 
object belonging to “a given period or of a minimum age fixed by law.” It does 
not necessarily follow however that protection of all objects of a given period 
or older than a certain age will in fact be in the public interest. The systems in 
place in Australia tend to subscribe to the tests of an object belonging to a 
given period (for example, pre-Contact Aboriginal materials89) or older than a 
given age (for example, 50 years90). Defining indigenous heritage has tended 
to have a broader focus, with definition often based on the value of an object 
to “Aboriginal tradition”.91 The difficulties with these approaches are dealt with 
                                            
86  UNESCO (1956). Recommendation on International Principles Applicable to Archaeological Excavations. New 
Delhi Recommendation. Articles 9 and 10. 
87  New Delhi Recommendation. 
88  New Delhi Recommendation Article 2, emphasis added. 
89  See for example the Aboriginal Relics Act 1975 (Tas), which limits protection to objects created before 1876 
(Section 2(4)). 
90  E.g. the Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) sets the age of archaeological materials at older than 50 years (Section 4), 
while for some classes of object on the Cultural Heritage Control List under the Protection of Movable Cultural 
Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) the age of protection is 30 years (Schedule 2). 
91  E.g. the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), Section 3 or the Aboriginal 
Cultural Heritage Act 2003 (Qld), Section 9 and Schedule 2.  
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in Chapters 6 and 7. The Recommendation articulates the key principles of 
archaeological heritage protection as the protection of the archaeological 
object, the protection of the research potential of archaeological places and 
the transmission of discovered information to the wider public. Significantly, 
the Recommendation recognises that this needs to be undertaken in a “public 
interest” context. This supports the notion of ‘public good’ conservation argued 
for in this thesis. 
 
4.4.2 ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and Management of the 
Archaeological Heritage 1990 
 
The ICOMOS Charter for the Protection and Management of the 
Archaeological Heritage 199092 is an outgrowth of the 1964 Venice Charter on 
the Conservation and Restoration of Monuments and Sites93 and builds 
explicitly upon the principles of the 1956 New Delhi Recommendation. It is 
however designed to be distinct from the more architectural concerns of the 
Venice and Burra Charters and deals specifically with conservation issues for 
archaeological sites. This Charter is not specifically implemented in Australia, 
nor adopted by any Australian heritage professional bodies, which in general 
rely on the Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter, discussed below. In this regard, 
the Archaeological Charter has no formal or informal standing in Australian 
heritage management, however it provides a number of statements on the 
role of legislation to protect archaeological heritage that are relevant to the 
analysis in this thesis. The language and format of the Archaeological Charter 
is considerably less formal than the Venice or Burra Charters. Nevertheless, 
its principles are largely compatible with those documents, while being 
focussed specifically on archaeological heritage. 
 
The Archaeological Charter adopts the position of archaeology as “science” 
and sees that protection of the archaeological heritage is necessary “to enable 
archaeologists and other scholars to study and interpret it on behalf of and for 
the benefit of present and future generations.”94 It does recognise that 
“archaeological heritage constitute[s] part of the living traditions of indigenous 
peoples, and for such sites and monuments the participation of local cultural 
groups is essential for their protection and preservation”.95 Thus while 
recognising that there is a public and community dimension to the discipline of 
archaeology, the protection of the archaeological resource is still strongly 
directed towards archaeological protection for the benefit of archaeologists 
and “science”. The Charter identifies the need for protection for archaeological 
sites to be integrated into legislation and planning policies at all levels of 
government96 and seeks many of the same general outcomes as the New 
Delhi Recommendation, including the establishment of archaeological 
                                            
92  Prepared by the International Committee for the Management of Archaeological Heritage (ICAHM) an approved 
by the 9th General Assembly of ICOMOS in Lausanne in 1990. Hereafter referred to as the Archaeological 
Charter. http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/arch_e.htm 
93  Developed at the IInd International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, Venice, 1964 
and adopted by ICOMOS in 1965. http://www.international.icomos.org/charters/venice_e.htm 
94  Archaeological Charter International Council on Monuments and Sites (1990). Charter for the Protection and 
Management of the Archaeological Heritage. ICOMOS Archaeological Charter. Introduction. 
95  Archaeological Charter. 
96  Archaeological Charter Article 2. 
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reserves, transmission of information to the public and international 
cooperation to protect archaeological heritage. 
 
The Charter shows signs of having been influenced by contemporary 
concerns relating to development, planning and impact assessment and 
highlights development as “one of the greatest threats” to the archaeological 
heritage.97 The Charter recognises legislation as a key protective tool and 
Article 3 sets out an extensive list of key principles for protective legislation. It 
advocates the need for approvals to excavate archaeological material and 
sanctions for unauthorised excavation,98 but notes that excavation should in 
fact be a last resort.99 It further calls for a legislative presumption in favour of 
“full excavation” of archaeological sites which may be subject to authorised 
destruction (for example through development). This is however expressed in 
a somewhat self-serving manner, as the same Article (Article 3) states that it 
is a common duty of people and government to conserve the archaeological 
heritage and to provide “adequate funds” for this purpose. However the 
Introduction to the Charter makes it clear that the main beneficiaries of this 
societal largess are to be archaeologists and “science”. Implicit in this is a 
belief that what is good for science is good for the public, however this is not 
convincingly demonstrated. 
 
Despite its more plain-speaking style, the recommendations inherent in the 
Archaeological Charter are more strongly worded than other charters and 
focussed more on the interests of archaeologists than those of the public. The 
view presented by the Charter is that the archaeological record should be 
protected primarily for its future study by archaeologists versed in a scientific 
conception of archaeology. The Archaeological Charter offers only limited 
support for broad-based notion that protection of the archaeological heritage 
should serve any wider societal needs. Thus while providing some 
acknowledgement of the public aspect of archaeological heritage protection, 
this Charter cannot truly be said to be supporting a ‘public good’ conception of 
heritage protection. 
 
4.4.3 The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of 
Cultural Significance 1999 
 
The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance 1999100 serves as the base document for conservation policy for 
most heritage organisations (government or private) and heritage 
professionals in Australia. In basic form, structure and aim, it was adapted 
                                            
97  Archaeological Charter Articles 2 and 3. 
98  Archaeological Charter. 
99  Archaeological Charter Article 5. 
100  The initial version of the Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural Significance was 
adopted by Australia ICOMOS on 19 August 1979 at Burra, South Australia. Revisions were adopted on 23 
February 1981, 23 April 1988 and 26 November 1999. Hereafter referred to as the Burra Charter. All references 
in this thesis are to the 1999 revision of the Charter. http://www.icomos.org/australia/burra.html Accessed 7 May 
2006. 
 Mulvaney provides a general outline of the political and social factors which motivated those involved in the 
production of the original version of the Burra Charter. See Mulvaney, D. J. (2004). "The road to Burra: memories 
of an ancient traveller." Historic Environment 18 (1): 9-13.  
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from the 1964 Venice Charter,101 for Australian circumstances.102 It describes 
itself as “[setting] a standard of practice for those who provide advice, make 
decisions about, or undertake works to places of cultural significance, 
including owners, managers and custodians”103 and in this regard it has been 
highly effective at creating a consistent national framework of conservation 
principles.104 In and of itself, the Burra Charter does not have any legal power, 
as Australia ICOMOS is a non-government body, albeit one intimately 
involved with UNESCO.105 Nevertheless, the use or adoption of the Burra 
Charter by bodies such as the Commonwealth Department of Environment 
and Heritage106 as well as at State and Territory government level107 and by 
professional organisations like Australia ICOMOS gives the principles 
espoused by the Charter the effect of a de facto legal instrument.108 Many of 
the Charter’s principles have found their way into domestic heritage 
legislation, although few pieces of legislation encompass all areas dealt with 
by the Charter.109 The Burra Charter is not specifically concerned with 
archaeological heritage110 however as the key document of heritage principle 
in Australia it has been highly influential in all areas of heritage protection, 
including the formation of government policy and legislation. 
 
                                            
101 International Council on Monuments and Sites (1964). International Charter for the Conservation and Restoration 
of Monuments and Sites. Venice Charter.  
102  Kerr, J. S. (2004). "The Burra Charter of Australia ICOMOS in 1983 (Reprint)." Historic Environment 18 (1): 22-
24.  
103  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Preamble. 
104  Allom, R. (1997). "Is the conservation industry its own worst enemy?" Historic Environment 12 (3&4): 105-111. Pg 
105. 
105  The International Council on Monuments and Sites was established as a result of a resolution put forward by 
UNESCO calling for the creation of a nongovernmental international heritage organisation, at the 1964 Second 
Congress of Architects and Specialists of Historic Buildings in Venice, Italy. This was the same conference where 
the Venice Charter was adopted. http://www.international.icomos.org/hist_eng.htm Accessed 5 May 2006 
106  The Commonwealth Department of Environment and Heritage specifies the use of the Burra Charter as the basis 
for Commonwealth agencies preparing management plans for Commonwealth heritage places identified in the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth). See 
http://www.deh.gov.au/heritage/publications/guidelines/index.html Accessed 5 May 2006. 
107  The Burra Charter is used in a variety of ways by State heritage authorities, for example: The NSW Heritage 
Office has a requirement to use the Burra Charter for the preparation of conservation management documents 
prepared under the NSW system. See NSW Heritage Office (2004). Conservation Management Documents. 
Parramatta, NSW Heritage Office. Pg 3. http://www.heritage.nsw.gov.au/docs/hm_conservationman2002.pdf 
 Heritage Victoria similarly endorses the Burra Charter as providing “the guiding philosophy for the care of 
important places”. http://www.heritage.vic.gov.au/page.asp?ID=40 Accessed 5 May 2006. 
 The South Australian Department of Environment and Heritage “voluntarily subscribes” to the principles of the 
Burra Charter. Department for Environment and Heritage (South Australia) (2005). Annual Report. Pg 11. 
108  Truscott, M. and D. Young (2000). "Revising the Burra Charter: Australia ICOMOS updates its guidelines for 
conservation practice." Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 4: 101-116.  Pg 102 
 The Burra Charter has also been referred to or considered in a number of court judgements, though none of 
which deal with archaeological heritage. See for example: Alesci Investments Pty Ltd v Kingston CC [2005] 
Unreported, VCAT, 17 October 2005, Member Nicholas Hadjigeorgiou at 19; Engelen Moore P/L v Woollahra MC 
[2005] Unreported NSWLEC, 15 August 2005, Murrell C at 52; V Willis v Hobart City Council and Smartgrowth 
Pty Ltd and P Trowbridge v Hobart City Council and Smartgrowth Pty Ltd and T & P Holmes v Hobart City 
Council and Smartgrowth Pty Ltd [2004] Unreported, TASRMPAT, 5 Oct 2004 B McNeill Member at 12-13; ACT 
Chapter of Royal Australian Institute of Architects and ACT Heritage Council & Anor [2003] Unreported, ACTAAT, 
11 April 2003 Preedom (P), O’Neil and McMichael Members at 51-53; National Trust of Australia (Tasmania) -v- 
Northern Midlands Council and JD Edwards [1997] Unreported TASRMPAT, 18 March 1997, Cannell, 
Cunningham and Cooper Members. 
109  Allen, C. (2004). "The road from Burra: thoughts on using the Charter in the future." Historic Environment 18 (1): 
50-53.  
110 However two notable Australian archaeologists, John Mulvaney from the Australian National University and Judy 
Birmingham from the University of Sydney, were heavily involved in the initial conceptualisation and drafting of 
the Burra Charter. Kerr notes a number of changes were made to the draft text in 1979 to clarify, at Birmingham’s 
request, that the Charter should apply to archaeological sites. Kerr, J. S. (2004). "The Burra Charter of Australia 
ICOMOS in 1983 (Reprint)." Historic Environment 18 (1): 22-24. Pg 23. 
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The primary aim of the Charter is the conservation of cultural significance. 
Cultural significance in this case includes “aesthetic, historic, scientific [and] 
social value for past, present and future generations.”111 The Charter aims to 
be all-encompassing, by providing an extremely broad definition of what a 
culturally significant “place” might be, and includes the contents and setting of 
that place.112 Ideally, the Charter seeks to draw the community into the 
“heritage process” which forms the basis for protective mechanisms.113 While 
much of the language of the Charter seems preoccupied with the built 
environment, it is regularly applied to non-indigenous archaeological sites as a 
document of guiding principles. Quite soon after its adoption, it was being 
hailed in archaeological circles as an important document relevant to 
archaeological conservation.114 In practice its relevance to archaeological 
heritage conservation has been questioned, particularly in relation to 
indigenous sites.115 More recently it has been noted that while the Burra 
Charter was intended by Australia ICOMOS to apply to the conservation of 
Aboriginal sites, the drafting of the Charter did not involve indigenous people 
and was focussed on the scientific, aesthetic and historical values of 
Aboriginal places to the non-indigenous community.116 
 
Sullivan has noted that the Burra Charter was initially primarily concerned with 
the conservation of fabric of historic places, which she describes as a 
particularly Western approach to conservation but one which was a necessary 
step117 in the evolution of contemporary conservation practice. Indeed the 
Charter itself describes conservation in terms of respect for “existing fabric, 
use, associations and meanings”118 but it is clear from the past and current 
application of the Charter in Australia that historic fabric remains the focus. 
Despite efforts to broaden the remit of the Charter to adequately cater for 
social and other non-fabric-based values,119 in conflicts between the 
conservation of fabric and the conservation of intangible or associative use 
values, fabric conservation tends to be the focus.120 Ireland has commented 
that this has allowed historical archaeology to be relegated to the role of an 
analytical technique, “authenticating the material evidence” rather than 
contributing to the interpretation and understanding of a place.121 The terms of 
the Charter are however sufficiently broad that the conservation of a wide 
range of values is possible. The essence of the Charter is “to retain the 
                                            
111  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Definitions Article 1.2 
112  Ibid. Article 1.1 
113  Truscott, M. and D. Young (2000). "Revising the Burra Charter: Australia ICOMOS updates its guidelines for 
conservation practice." Conservation and Management of Archaeological Sites 4: 101-116. Pg 103 
114  Mulvaney, D. J. (1981). "What future for our past? Archaeology and society in the eighties." Australian 
Archaeology 13: 16-27. Pg 22. 
115  See for example, comments in Meehan, B. (1984). "Victoria's Heritage - A Future for the Past." Australian 
Archaeology 19 (December 1984): 143-147. Pg 144 and Truscott, M. (1994). "Indigenous cultural heritage 
protection program." Australian Archaeology 39: 127-129. Pg 127. 
116  Sullivan, S. (2004). "Aboriginal sites and the Burra Charter." Historic Environment 18 (1): 37-39.  
117  Ibid. 
118  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Article 3.1. Emphasis in the original. 
119  Mackay, R. (2004). "Associative value and the revised Burra Charter: a personal perspective." Historic 
Environment 18 (1): 35-36.  
120  Allen, C. (2004). "The road from Burra: thoughts on using the Charter in the future." Historic Environment 18 (1): 
50-53. Pg 51. 
121  Ireland, T. (2004). "The Burra Charter and historical archaeology: reflections on Port Arthur." Historic 
Environment 18 (1): 25-29. Pg 25. 
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cultural significance of a place”.122 Such a broad definition must accommodate 
a range of potential significances for any cultural place, including the scientific 
archaeological values as well as the ‘public good’ values argued for in this 
thesis. The problem, then, has been in the narrow interpretation and 
application of the Charter with respect to archaeological materials to date, as 
noted by a number of the authors cited above. While various heritage 
practitioners in Australia have called for a flexible application of the Charter,123 
it appears any flexibility has been limited. 
 
The Burra Charter, as a type of domestic ‘soft law’ instrument, has enormous 
potential to encourage a public good approach to heritage conservation. The 
language of the Charter is not absolutist: “Places of cultural significance 
should be conserved.”124 Such language invites consideration of what values 
should be conserved and how this may be done. In order to put this into 
effect, the heritage profession, policy- and law-makers and heritage interest 
groups must be prepared to acknowledge a range of potential values for 
archaeological places. The Charter will need to be applied in a manner which 
encourages the identification and conservation of other types of values for 
archaeological heritage, beyond the scientific values traditionally considered 
in past applications of the Charter. As the Charter has been such an 
instrumental document in the formation of heritage policy and law in Australia, 
should future amendments to the Charter explicitly take ‘public good’ into 
consideration, this would significantly improve the chances of such values 
making their way into future Australia heritage legislation. 
 
4.5 Principles of archaeological protection and conservation 
 
The international conventions and extralegal charters discussed above 
provide the international frame of reference for heritage protection in Australia. 
All recognise the value of archaeological heritage to the domestic and 
international communities and most specifically acknowledge archaeological 
sites as a non-renewable resource.125 Each identifies legislation as an 
essential mechanism for heritage preservation and such preservation is 
obligatory under the international conventions.126 Ideally, legal protections for 
archaeology should be integrated into the planning system,127 which is 
generally the case in Australia. Heritage, if not archaeology specifically, forms 
a matter for consideration in all Australian planning legislation.128 These 
                                            
122  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Article 2.2. Emphasis in the original. 
123  For example Allom, R. (1997). "Is the conservation industry its own worst enemy?" Historic Environment 12 
(3&4): 105-111. and more recently Allen, C. (2004). "The road from Burra: thoughts on using the Charter in the 
future." Historic Environment 18 (1): 50-53. And Ireland, T. (2004). "The Burra Charter and historical archaeology: 
reflections on Port Arthur." Historic Environment 18 (1): 25-29.  
124  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Article 2.1. Emphasis added. 
125 UNESCO Convention Article 5; World Heritage Convention Article 5; Unidroit Convention Article 3; ICOMOS 
Archaeological Charter Article 2. 
126  UNESCO Convention Article 5; World Heritage Convention Article 5(d); Unidroit Convention Article 17. 
127  World Heritage Convention Article 5(a); ICOMOS Archaeological Charter Article 3. 
128  Heritage is typically integrated into State and Territory planning legislation as a matter for consideration when 
developing a planning scheme or assessing a development application. See for example: 
Australian Capital Territory–Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991–Sect 231. 
 New South Wales–Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979–Sect 76A. 
 Northern Territory–Planning Act 1999–Sect 51R. 
 Queensland–Integrated Planning Act 1997–Sect 2.1.3A. 
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principles have underpinned the form and evolution of Australian heritage 
legislation. 
 
Archaeological items obtain the majority of their non-monetary values from 
their context (i.e. the archaeological site) rather than from their intrinsic 
qualities as objects. The UNESCO and Unidroit Conventions are primarily 
concerned with protecting objects out of their original context, however they 
do identify illegal excavation of archaeological sites as one of the central 
threats to cultural heritage,129 a sentiment more strongly put in the specific 
archaeological documents. Whenever possible, retention of archaeological 
sites in their original location (in situ)130 and establishing archaeological 
reserves for future generations are highly desirable, as is a policy of minimal 
intervention in archaeological sites when disturbance is necessary.131 The 
international instruments also create an obligation to maintain the collections 
of archaeological material excavated from sites which are destroyed, as they 
provide the sole record of a site once excavated or destroyed. 
 
The principle of retaining heritage values for the broader appreciation of the 
present community132 and future generations133 is central to the international 
conventions and extra-legal heritage documents and is well embedded in 
international law.134 The concept “intergenerational equity”, a fundamental 
tenet of the sustainability principles, holds that present generations should not 
use or treat the environment in such a way as to leave future generations in a 
worse environmental position than the present.135 Evans summarised this as 
the “stewardship ethic” in heritage and environmental conservation.136 
Similarly, it is common conservation philosophy that future generations may 
not necessarily share the same values as present generations with respect to 
heritage and therefore present generations do not have the sole right to 
decide the fate of heritage items.137 Both of these concepts support the notion 
that heritage is a ‘public good’ in the sense that it is not merely a resource to 
be exploited but a valued collective asset which is to be, ideally, passed on to 
the future. Thus the present holds the collective heritage in trust for the future. 
It is perhaps this principle more than any other that sits uneasily with the 
                                                                                                                             
 South Australia–Development Act 1993–Sect 23. 
 Tasmania–Local Government Act 1993–Sect 89. 
 Victoria–Heritage Act 1995–Sect 64. Heritage is not an explicit consideration in the general planning legislation 
(Planning and Environment Act 1987). 
 Western Australia–Town Planning and Development Act 1928–Sect 18C. 
 Note that while the Australian Commonwealth Government is not a planning authority in the strict sense, impacts 
to heritage places which fall within “matters of national environmental significance” may require approval from the 
Commonwealth under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999–Sect 12 (World 
Heritage places), Sect 15B (National heritage places) and 341ZC (Commonwealth heritage places). 
129  New Delhi Recommendations Article 29; UNESCO Convention Articles 1(c), 5(d) and 9; Unidroit Convention 
Preamble and Article 3. 
130  New Delhi Recommendations Article 9; UNESCO Convention Article 5(d); ICOMOS Archaeological Charter 
Article 6 
131  Also see Frankel’s contra viewpoint on this issue: Frankel, D. (1993). "The excavator: creator or destroyer?" 
Antiquity 67 (257): 875-878.  
132  New Delhi Recommendations Preamble; UNESCO Convention Preamble; World Heritage Convention Preamble; 
Burra Charter Preamble; Unidroit Convention Preamble; ICOMOS Archaeological Charter Preamble 
133  World Heritage Convention Article 4; Burra Charter Preamble; ICOMOS Archaeological Charter Preamble 
134  Blake, J. (2000). "On defining the cultural heritage." International and Comparative Law Quarterly 49 (1): 61-85. 
Pp 83-84. 
135  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing. Pg 76. 
136  Ibid. Pp 88-91. 
137  Australian Commonwealth Government (1994). Intergovernmental Agreement on the Environment. Canberra. 
Section 3.5.2 
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Australian legal situation, which is more often concerned with actions in the 
present than the potential views of future generations. 
 
4.6 Australian efforts to establish a broad basis for heritage 
conservation in Australia 
 
The role of the archaeological profession in lobbying for heritage legislation 
has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. This lobbying was successful in 
seeing archaeological heritage protection legislation passed in selected 
jurisdictions by the early 1970s, principally to protect Aboriginal archaeological 
heritage. Broad-based heritage protection legislation across the whole of 
Australia did not attract widespread support until the mid-1970s, following two 
significant events: the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate in 1974 
and the signing of the World Heritage Convention in 1975. The Committee of 
Inquiry into the National Estate (the ‘Hope Inquiry’) was commissioned by the 
then Prime Minister, Gough Whitlam, in 1973, with a report presented to the 
Australian Parliament in 1974. The Committee had a broad ambit to 
investigate the nature of the National Estate in Australia and make 
recommendations for its protection. The Committee sat for over a year, held 
public hearings and accepted over 650 submissions from governmental 
bodies, private sector entities, interest groups and the Australian public.138 
 
4.6.1 The Hope Inquiry into the National Estate 
 
The Hope Inquiry represented the first large-scale effort to canvass the 
opinion of a diverse range of bodies in Australia as to what the national 
heritage was, and how it should be protected. As such, the report represents 
perhaps the earliest formal ‘statement of intent’ with respect to the 
conservation of Australian heritage. Its examination sheds some light into the 
philosophy behind early heritage conservation initiatives at a governmental 
level. The Inquiry examined the full range of potential heritage issues in 
Australia. However the analysis below is principally confined to those issues 
affecting archaeological heritage. While over 30 years old, the fundamental 
principles laid down by the Committee continue to resonate within Australian 
heritage protection thought and practice. 
 
The Hope Inquiry viewed itself as the formalisation of a widespread public 
sentiment in Australia, that action was required to conserve the nation’s 
heritage. This was supported through the public hearing and submission 
process, as well as through statistical analysis in the growing membership of 
‘conservation societies’ with respect to total population. Other important 
factors in the Committee’s view were the diminishing of Australian ‘cultural 
cringe’ with respect to the value of Australian heritage as compared to 
European heritage, and a growing respect and understanding for the place of 
Aboriginal people in contemporary Australian society, as evidenced by the 
overwhelming popular support in the 1967 Referendum which gave Aboriginal 
people recognition as Australian citizens.139 
                                            
138  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 12-13. 
139  Ibid. Pp 24-25. 
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A particular driver, in the Committee’s eyes, for formal government action on 
heritage conservation was the speed of urban growth which was impacting on 
Australian urban areas and the pressure of the high percentage of the 
Australian population living in urban centres was inevitably exerting on the 
national heritage.140 Among the potential values that the national heritage had 
for the Australian people included education and recreation,141 as well as 
general value for “aesthetic, historical, scientific, social, cultural, ecological or 
other special value” at an international, national or local level.142 
Archaeological sites, referred to as “areas of special archaeological interest” 
were specifically considered by the Committee, including Aboriginal sites, 
historic sites, relics and geological sites.143 All types of heritage were viewed 
as requiring ‘conservation’ (active, dynamic management which respected 
heritage values) and ‘presentation’ (a process of providing public access and 
enjoyment as well as contributing to public knowledge).144 Thus, from the very 
inception of national heritage conservation in Australia, Australian heritage 
was constructed as something of public value. The main purpose for its 
conservation was its ability to contribute to public education, understanding, 
enjoyment or knowledge. The Committee did however refer to areas of 
“special” archaeological interest and did not adopt a broad interpretation as to 
the nature of archaeological sites to conserve and present. The Committee 
was also definite in its recommendations that appropriate statutory 
mechanisms were required to protect the National Estate, stating: 
 
We recommend:  
 
that the Australian Government introduce legislation to give uniform 
protection on a national basis to Aboriginal sites of significance 
throughout Australia… 
 
and 
 
that the other States be encouraged to examine the existing South 
Australian legislation for the protection of historic sites with a view to 
introducing similar legislation...145 
 
The Committee strongly felt mere ‘good will’ would not suffice to see 
Australia’s heritage conserved. The principles espoused in the Hope Report 
remain fundamental to present-day heritage management, although in some 
instances they have been substantially reworked in their implementation. 
 
 
 
                                            
140  Hope Report Pg 26. 
141  Hope Report Pg 27. 
142  Hope Report Pg 35. 
143  Hope Report Pp 34-35. 
144  Ibid. 
145  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 340, Recommendations 29 and 34. Recommendations 34 is referring to the 
Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act (1965) South Australia. At the time this was viewed as model 
heritage legislation. See further discussion of this Act is Chapter 5. 
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4.6.2 The Hope Inquiry and archaeological heritage 
 
The Hope Inquiry considered Aboriginal146 and historical (referred to as 
‘historic’, in the Inquiry) archaeological heritage, geological sites and movable 
‘cultural property’.147 The major focus was on Aboriginal sites, with substantial 
recommendations made for that class of site. Historical archaeological sites 
received a far more cursory treatment. The Inquiry observed that the 
ignorance of much of white Australia with respect to the culture of Aboriginal 
people had been a key element for the decline in Aboriginal cultural tradition. 
The Inquiry implied that the need to conserve Aboriginal heritage was strongly 
about assisting Aboriginal people in reclaiming their heritage and determining 
the manner in which they would live in the future (that is, in a traditional, or 
non-traditional manner, with the choice being fully theirs). The Committee 
stated that Australia and the international community could benefit from the 
protection of Aboriginal heritage, but that the protection mechanisms which 
existed at the time were ineffectual.148 
 
The Report made several observations about the role of archaeologists with 
respect to Aboriginal heritage, including the need to identify and record sites 
where traditional owners were no longer present, or to assist traditional 
owners in areas where a strong association with the land continued. White co-
operation in this task was emphasised, but the Committee fell back on the 
devices of ‘crash teams’ of archaeologists to assess sites subject to 
development proposals and the establishment of museums to collect 
Aboriginal cultural artefacts for presentation.149 The Committee did note the 
dichotomy here however, between preserving the physical remains of a past 
culture and the conserving of living traditions into the future. In addition they 
observed that different values were ascribed to Aboriginal sites by those living 
Aboriginal people associated with them, as opposed to those archaeologists 
or tourists who might wish to study or inspect them. Significantly, the 
Committee stated: 
 
[i]nsofar as the Australian Government accepts the right of Aboriginals 
to determine their future, this must have a significant effect on the 
manner and extent of archaeological procedure. It is important however 
that the Aboriginals be made aware of the importance of archaeological 
research in increasing their own awareness, and that of the white 
community, of the great time-depth and complexity of their cultural 
heritage. There is a need for suitably oriented publications to explain 
the past culture.150 
 
                                            
146  Note the term “Aboriginal” is used throughout this section, as at the time the report was drafted, the distinction 
between mainland Aboriginal people and Torres Strait Islanders was not widely recognised. 
147  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Archaeological and geological heritage are dealt with in Chapter 5 and cultural 
property in Chapter 6 of the Hope Report.  
148  Hope Report Pg 166. 
149  Hope Report Pp 166-167, Paragraph 5.9. The suggestion for “crash teams” came from the Australian Institute for 
Aboriginal Studies, as it was then known. 
150  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 169-170, Paragraph 5.20 
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This view is particularly significant in light of the changes which have been 
taking place over the last decade with respect to access to Aboriginal 
archaeological material. The Committee emphasised the value of undertaking 
archaeological research with the aim of benefiting both Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal people, but it also set the stage for Aboriginal self-determination 
with respect to the access of archaeologists to the past remains of that 
culture. That said, the Committee then went on to state that much of the 
Aboriginal archaeological heritage could be viewed as having ”been preserved 
chiefly for the scholarship of European man”151 but made no further attempt to 
grapple with what, at the time, may have been an intractable issue. The 
Committee further noted that, where Aboriginal people had lost all “interest or 
knowledge”, the archaeologists should have access to such archaeological 
heritage on the basis of both the principle that the reclamation of knowledge of 
the Aboriginal past was a noble end in itself, but also in the hope that such 
knowledge could, in some manner, be returned to Aboriginal people in the 
future.152 
 
The Committee examined some of the protection regimes which were in 
existence at the time, including State and Territory legislation. Specific 
criticism was levelled at the Northern Territory Native and Historical Objects 
Preservation Ordinance 1955 due to its requirement that before any site could 
be protected, the owner had to be paid compensation and the site acquired by 
the Territory government; this requirement meant that only six sites were 
protected under the Ordinance between 1955 and 1973.153 The framing of the 
Ordinance meant that sites could be destroyed with impunity while still in 
private ownership, thus demonstrating the weakness of a legislative approach 
which required prior identification, listing and acquisition of archaeological 
sites.154 The Report further noted that all States and Territories had legislation 
to protect Aboriginal sites by 1972 but only South Australia had legislation to 
protect historical sites.155 
 
Interestingly, the Report calls for a uniform approach to the protection or 
prevention of the traffic of ‘portable objects’ or relics from sites across state 
borders, and indicated a need to restrict the ability to on-sell archaeological 
materials.156 While there is anecdotal evidence as to the traffic in 
archaeological materials continuing into the present day, there is still little 
restriction on their sale or transfer; what restrictions do exist mainly prevent 
the traffic in certain classes of listed objects at an international level, without 
an export permit, via the Protection of Movable Cultural Property Act 1986 
(Cth). As of the early twenty-first century, there is still no regime to restrict the 
traffic in archaeological objects domestically, regardless of whether they have 
been excavated legally or illegally.157 Some domestic heritage legislation, 
                                            
151  Hope Report Pg 170, paragraph 5.21. 
152  Hope Report Pp 167-170. 
153  Hope Report Pg 173, paragraph 5.38 
154  Hope Report Pg 173. 
155  Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act (1965) South Australia. 1965 (SA) 
156  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 173. 
157  It is interesting to consider whether the prohibitions on the sale of stolen goods in the criminal code could be used 
for this purpose, particularly in circumstances where the ownership of the cultural heritage item is claimed by the 
state (as in NSW, under the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974, section 83) or is vested in indigenous 
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such as the New South Wales and Victorian Heritage Acts, provide for seizure 
of materials excavated without a consent,158 and the South Australian 
Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 provides that excavated materials cannot be 
removed from the state without permission, although it is difficult to see how 
such measures can be enforced.159 The Hope Report notes the need for 
penalties for illegal acts affecting archaeological heritage to be substantial, in 
order to provide a real deterrence, particularly in isolated areas where 
disturbance or destruction might go unnoticed.160 
 
4.6.3 The Hope Report and historical archaeological sites 
 
The Hope Report drew the distinction between landmark historic sites (for 
example Captain Cook’s landing place161) which have a greater cultural 
significance, and other archaeological remains which may also be of historic 
interest. It further noted the difficulty in protecting many such sites, particularly 
in the second category, due to their potential remoteness.162 At the time the 
Report was written, the authors noted that there was a rising interest in such 
types of heritage. However the Commission devoted scant attention to 
historical archaeological heritage, in comparison to Aboriginal archaeological 
heritage. This focus is reflected in the progress of Australian heritage 
legislation, with early action taken to protect, even at a rudimentary level, 
Aboriginal heritage, but with some delay for legislation to come to grips with 
the protection of historical material. It is worth noting that the then very new 
Australian Society for Historical Archaeology did make a submission to the 
Commission.163 Protections recommended by the Report included the listing 
of historical sites by a proposed Commonwealth heritage authority.164 The 
Report further encouraged the other States and Territories to examine and 
consider adopting protective mechanisms for historical sites based on the 
South Australian Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act 1965, which 
                                                                                                                             
communities (as in the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 (Queensland) and Torres Strait Islander Cultural 
Heritage Act 2003 (Queensland), Section 19). 
158  Heritage Act (1977) New South Wales. Section 146B–the Minister can direct that an illegally excavated relic be 
given to a “museum or conservation body”, regardless as to whether there has been any prosecution over the 
illegal excavation. 
 Heritage Act (1995) Victoria. Section 134–it is an offence to buy, sell or possess a relic for the purposes of sale, 
unless the relic was acquired before 1972, the date the Aboriginal and Archaeological Relics Preservation Act 
1972 (Vic), the predecessor to the Heritage Act 1995 (Vic) came into effect. 
159  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1988) South Australia. Section 29(1)(b)–“(1) A person must not, without the authority of 
the Minister (b) remove an Aboriginal object from the State”. More recent Aboriginal heritage protection 
legislation, such as the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act (2003) Queensland. and the Torres Strait Islander 
Cultural Heritage Act (2003) Queensland. provides for an offence for unauthorised excavation, relocation or 
taking away of Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander heritage items (section 25 of both Acts) but does not explicitly 
deal with the trade in such items. 
160  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 174. 
161 Now Kammay Botany Bay National Park, on the Kurnell Peninsula, in southern Sydney, NSW. This area was 
listed on the National Heritage List under the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 
(Cth) on 28/2/2005, ID # 105812. 
162  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 175-176. 
163  Ibid. Pg 360. The Society was founded at the University of Sydney in 1971 and is now known as the Australasian 
Society for Historical Archaeology. Australian Society for Historical Archaeology (1970). Introductory Newsletter. 
Sydney, Australian Society for Historical Archaeology.  
164  The Hope Report recommended the establishment of a body called the National Estate Committee. In 1975 the 
Australian Heritage Commission was established to serve this function, with control of the Register of the 
National Estate as the national heritage list. The Commission was replaced by the Australian Heritage Council in 
2004 and the Register of the National Estate, while preserved, ceased to serve any statutory function. See 
detailed discussion on these changes in Chapter 5. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 4–Identifying underlying principles of archaeological heritage protection 126 
recognised both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal relics as classes of protected 
objects.165  
 
The Hope Report did not note the inherent similarities in the practicalities of 
protecting Aboriginal archaeological material, historical archaeological 
material, geological and fossil material, and did not make uniform 
recommendations for the protection of all such heritage. This may be due to 
the nature of the submission to the Committee on these matters, which were 
from single-issue interest groups. At that time, there were few broad-based 
heritage interest groups other than the National Trust, which has never had a 
strong focus on archaeological heritage. Nevertheless, in retrospect it seems 
surprising that the Committee did not appreciate the similarity of the 
management issues for archaeological, geological and palaentological 
material when developing its recommendations. This lack of a coordinated 
approach to protections for these issues continues to be reflected in the 
various legal regimes which exist across Australia, which generally have 
separate protective provisions for Aboriginal and historical archaeological 
heritage, and little or no protection for geological or palaentological 
heritage,166 except for sites which appear on a heritage list. These protective 
mechanisms are discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6 
 
4.6.4 The National Estate and the ‘public good’ 
 
The Hope Inquiry took a broad perspective on the types of heritage which may 
be important to Australians and recommended a series of broad-based 
protections at Commonwealth, State and Territory level. The submissions 
received by the Committee were of a mixed nature and included government 
agencies at Federal, state and local level, amateur and professional 
organisations with an interest in heritage, tourism and business groups, 
indigenous organisations, religious groups and individuals from across the 
country.167 The number and diversity of submissions demonstrates the broad 
public interest in heritage as an issue.168 The Committee described the 
conservation of Australia’s cultural and natural heritage as a societal “need”169 
and of broad relevance to all Australians and to the international community. 
With indigenous heritage, the Committee indicated that its conservation had 
the potential to forge closer links between the indigenous and non-indigenous 
populations of Australia. Without expressing it in precisely these terms, the 
Committee clearly viewed heritage conservation as a ‘public good’ exercise. 
The Committee did not conceive of the benefits of heritage conservation as 
accruing or being restricted to any particular interest group.  
 
                                            
165  Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act (1965) South Australia. Section 3. 
166  The South Australian Heritage Places Act 1993 is the exception, in providing protection for palaentological 
heritage. See discussion in Chapter 6. 
167  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Appendix C pp 360-369. It is noted in the Report’s preface that the Committee 
received more than 650 submissions. 
168 The 2005/2006 Commonwealth Productivity Commission Inquiry into Conservation of Historic Heritage attracted a 
similar level of diverse interest, with 417 submissions from across Australia. See 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/heritage/subs/sublist.html Accessed 10 May 2006.  
169  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 26, paragraphs 1.36 and 1.37. 
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The Hope Report was undeniably a significant, even monumental, 
achievement but even nearly 30 years on, many of its key recommendations 
have not been implemented, and the pressures upon Australia’s cultural 
heritage have become even greater. Perhaps the Committee’s key 
achievement was in establishing heritage conservation in Australia as an 
important public activity and one in which government agencies and 
legislation played key roles. In that regard, the Report was enormously 
successful, as all States and Territories have protective legislation and 
heritage agencies within government. Since the drafting of the Hope Report, 
the notion of “what is heritage?” has changed and there is now a temptation to 
see potentially any aspect of the natural or cultural environment as “heritage”. 
At times, too broad a focus on what may be considered heritage has led to 
paralysis in the effective identification, protection and management of that 
which is genuinely significant. Heritage legislation has at times been 
perceived as capricious, vague and inequitable.170 The only subsequent 
national enquiry into heritage conservation in Australia has a substantially 
different tone from the Hope Report, one which reflects these perceived 
problems with the system which has evolved out of the Hope Inquiry. 
 
4.6.5 The Productivity Commission Inquiry into Conservation of 
Historic Heritage Places 
 
The Commonwealth Productivity Commission Inquiry into Conservation of 
Historic Heritage Places,171 which ran over 2005/2006, is considerably less 
sympathetic to the heritage cause. The Productivity Commission, which is a 
government economic policy and research agency, was directed172 to 
examine the costs and benefits of heritage conservation in Australia. The 
terms of reference were limited to “historic heritage” (that is non-indigenous 
heritage). While historical archaeological places fell within the Terms of 
Reference for the Inquiry, the Commission focussed its attention almost 
exclusively on the impacts to private owners of placing buildings on a heritage 
list and the Commissioners addressed archaeological heritage in only a 
cursory manner.173 Nevertheless, the Inquiry received a great deal of public 
attention and represented the first such public inquiry since the Hope 
Commission. The Hope Inquiry sought to build a national heritage 
consciousness and protective system and was, if the significance of a place 
warranted such action, prepared to see conservation over-ride the private 
                                            
170  Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - issues paper. Melbourne, 
Australian Government.   
171  Productivity Commission (2005). Circular No. CAHHP C1 - Conservation of historic heritage places, Australian 
Commonwealth Government.  
 Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - issues paper. Melbourne, 
Australian Government.  
 Note the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference specifically excluded consideration of indigenous cultural heritage. This 
Inquiry made only minimal comment on archaeological issues, although they were included within the Terms of 
Reference. Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - draft report. 
Melbourne, Australian Government. Pg 17. The Inquiry did receive submissions from two archaeological interest 
bodies: the Australasian Institute for Maritime Archaeology (Submission 138) and the Australasian Society for 
Historical Archaeology (Submission DR330). For the text of these submissions see 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/heritage/subs/sublist.html Accessed 10 May 2006. 
172 By the Federal Treasurer. See Productivity Commission (2005). Circular No. CAHHP C1 - Conservation of historic 
heritage places, Australian Commonwealth Government.  
173 Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government. Pp 247-248. 
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property rights of individuals.174 By contrast, the Productivity Commission 
Inquiry largely viewed heritage conservation as a generally unreasonable 
imposition on private property rights. In the draft findings of the 
Commissioners, the key recommendation was for Australia to revert to an 
entirely voluntary heritage protection system:175 
 
Privately-owned properties should be included on a national, State, 
Territory, or local government statutory heritage list only after a 
negotiated conservation agreement has been entered into and should 
remain listed only while an agreement is in force.176 
 
This recommendation, while focussed on privately-owned property, would 
have dismantled much of what the Hope Inquiry set out to establish. Such a 
recommendation would have removed statutory protection from many historic 
places including archaeological sites, supporting a strong private property 
interest rather than a ‘public good’ interest in heritage conservation. Following 
substantial additional public comment and submissions from interest groups 
on both sides of the heritage issue,177 the Commissioners re-examined their 
recommendations, settling on the introduction of a notion of determining the 
effect of “unreasonable costs” upon the owners of heritage places.178 The 
Commissioners’ notion of “reasonableness” accords with the view that 
environmental regulation generally must be perceived as “fair” in order to be 
supported.179 The Commissioners felt that, when considering the provision of 
heritage protection to a place, if the costs of conservation were determined to 
be an unreasonable imposition upon the owner, then heritage protection 
should be voluntary, rather than mandatory. In such circumstances, the 
Commissioners held the view that the government seeking to ascribe heritage 
protection to the place should enter into a binding conservation agreement 
with the owners and the government should fund a share of the costs of 
conservation. Note the Commissioners extended this “reasonableness” test to 
the undertaking of archaeological work, which was perceived as a research 
activity to be undertaken by government.180 
 
The Commissioners have essentially identified the need to build economic 
considerations into the protection of heritage places in a more transparent 
                                            
174  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 167. 
175  Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - draft report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government.  
176  Ibid. Pg XLII, Draft Recommendation 8.1. 
177  There were 192 written submissions to the Commission prior to the Draft report and a further 226 following 
publication of the Draft Report. http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/heritage/subs/sublist.html Accessed 28 July 2006. 
 Additionally, there was an initial round of public hearings in most Australian capital cities during the data-
gathering phase of the Inquiry and a further round in response to the Draft Report (17 days of public hearings in 
total). http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/heritage/trans/tranlist.html Accessed 28 July 2006. This is comparable to the 
Hope Inquiry, which had nearly 800 written submissions and hearing appearances. See Hope, R. M. (1974). 
Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing 
Service. Appendix C. Pp 360-369. 
178  Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government. Pp 234-242. 
179  See discussion of this issue in Chapter 3, as well as Knetsch, J. L. (1990). Property and environmental values. 
Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer and D. James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 1-15. 
and Blamey, R. (1998). "The activation of environmental norms: extending Schwartz's model." Environment and 
Behavior 30 (5): 676-708.  
180  Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government. Pp 247-248. 
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manner. The results of the Inquiry identify the need to take a wider range of 
issues into consideration, given the potential impacts of extending legal 
heritage protection to a place. This leads part of the way towards building a 
‘public good’ framework for heritage conservation, but the principally 
economic focus of both the analysis and the conclusions in the Inquiry comes 
at the expense of other values. While the recommendations of the Productivity 
Commission are not binding on any level of government, and may never be 
implemented, this highly-publicised inquiry has been deeply damaging to 
heritage conservation efforts in Australia. It is too early to say if the results of 
this Inquiry will be accepted and implemented at any level of government.181 
But what this does demonstrate is that the support for heritage conservation is 
not always perceived as a ‘public good’ nor is legislation necessarily 
perceived as desirable. From the perspective of heritage conservation, it is to 
be hoped that the results of the Productivity Commission Inquiry are not 
nearly as far-reaching as that of the Hope Inquiry. 
 
4.7 ‘Public good’ and archaeology as a discipline–Professional Codes 
of Ethics 
 
The archaeological profession in Australia has also endeavoured to engage 
with the protective principles for archaeological heritage and bases itself 
within Codes of Ethics or Codes of Practice. However these still largely 
remain focussed on the duties of archaeologists to the archaeological 
heritage,182 or their clients,183 rather than necessarily considering the 
concerns, costs or benefits for the wider community. Additionally, there is no 
one universally accepted Code of Ethics within Australian archaeology, nor is 
compliance with such a code mandatory. While the Australian Archaeological 
Association (AAA), Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists 
Incorporated (AACAI) and New South Wales Heritage Office all have Codes 
of Practice or Codes of Ethics there are no mechanisms to ensure compliance 
with these Codes. Further, the Codes say little about the role of legislation to 
protect archaeological heritage, and are more concerned with ensuring 
compliance with extant legislation rather than seeking to set standards for 
best practice.  
 
At the time of the establishment of the Australian Archaeological Association 
for example, Crawford stated that “public appreciation of [archaeologists’] 
aims is of fundamental importance” but further noted that “the passing of 
                                            
181  The Final Report of the Productivity Commission Inquiry was presented to the Australian Government in April 
2006 and released to the public in July 2006.  
182  For example, the Australian Association of Consulting Archaeologists Incorporated Code of Ethics Clause 2 
entitled “Duty to the Public” indicates that its members have a duty to ensure the “archaeological resource base 
and…information derived from it, are used…in the best interest of the public” yet this duty is expressed in terms 
of protecting the “archaeological resource” (Clause 2.1), generating good research product (Clauses 2.2 and 2.3) 
and ensuring appropriate storage of excavated material and derived information (Clause 2.4). The Code appears 
to assume that undertaking these acts in and of themselves is in the public interest. See 
http://www.aacai.com.au/codeofethics.html. Accessed 18 April 2006. 
 By contrast, the Code of Ethics for the Australian Archaeological Association makes no reference to a public 
duty. Section 2 of the AAA Code refers to Principles Relating to the Archaeological Record, and is concerned 
with the protection of the archaeological heritage in terms of sites, objects and information. Section 3 does 
recognise that archaeological cultural heritage has importance to indigenous communities, but there is no 
mention of the wider community. See http://www.australianarchaeologicalassociation.com.au/codeofethics.php. 
Accessed 18 April 2006. 
183  AACAI Code of Ethics Clause 6.  
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these Acts [to protect archaeological heritage] was encouraged by 
archaeologists and…they serve archaeologists well”, negating any notion that 
archaeological heritage legislation was established to serve the broader 
community.184 This sentiment is echoed by Dobb, who observed the critical 
role of archaeologists and other heritage professionals in driving the 
enactment of initial Australian heritage legislation.185 Greer and colleagues 
noted that community input into Aboriginal heritage and archaeological 
matters has widely been acknowledged as appropriate, if not necessarily 
embraced by heritage professionals. Historical archaeological matters 
however are still largely considered the preserve of experts, in the form of 
professional archaeologists.186 The essence of these observations remains 
true to the present day, that archaeological heritage codes serve a limited set 
of interests, rather than providing a good framework for the consideration of 
the public value of archaeological heritage. Ideally these Codes of Ethics 
should reflect a broader understanding of the value of archaeological heritage 
to the wider community. 
 
 
4.8 A basis for legislation–underlying principles of archaeological 
heritage protection 
 
The impetus to protect archaeological heritage through legislation has come 
from many directions. The international charters have been particularly 
influential in seeing legislation implemented within Australia. Other non-
statutory “soft law” instruments such as the Burra Charter and other 
documents of principle have been as influential if not more influential and 
have shaped both the legislation as well as the concept of how places are 
valued. The public interest in heritage as an issue of government and of law is 
undeniable, through the response to both the Hope and Productivity 
Commission Inquiries into heritage conservation in Australia. While having 
different foci, these Inquiries sought to engage the public on a wide range of 
heritage issues, to guide the response that Australian governments would 
have in heritage conservation. Several themes in archaeological heritage 
protection have emerged from this analysis, which form underlying protective 
principles which have been worked into Australian heritage legislation. These 
principles can be summarised as: 
 
 
 Protection of the archaeological object; 
 Protection of the archaeological site; 
 Transmission of archaeological heritage to present and future 
generations. 
 
The three points identified in this analysis provide the basis for archaeological 
heritage protection at an international and domestic level. McKinlay had 
                                            
184  Crawford, I. (1975). "The Role of the Australian Archaeological Association." Australian Archaeology 2: 3-4.  
185  Dobb, R. (1995). Legislation for Aboriginal places of significance. Cultural conservation: towards a national 
approach. S. Sullivan. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 9: 39-43. Pg 39. 
186  Greer, S., R. Harrison, et al. (2002). "Community-based archaeology in Australia." World Archaeology 34 (2): 
265-287. Pg 267. 
 Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 120-121. 
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previously identified the first two points explicitly, in his analysis of the New 
Zealand heritage protection regime in the early 1970s. He had, however, only 
touched upon the third principle and any conception of a “public good” aspect 
to archaeological heritage management was confined to a notion that 
archaeological heritage belonged to “the people” rather than to any individual, 
and that this public interest should override any private concerns.187 
McGimsey, in his discussion of the “value of archaeology” provides arguments 
in favour protecting the first two points, as these represent the sum total of the 
“facts” which are available to the archaeologist. What is synthesised out of 
those facts is the third point, and forms the information which is passed on to 
other archaeologists and the wider community.188 Yet Carman has noted the 
difficulty in bringing the public into the conservation of archaeological 
heritage,189 precisely because heritage legislation tends not to provide 
avenues for their involvement. But analysis of this situation from outside the 
heritage discipline, through the Productivity Commission Inquiry, has shown a 
need to draw other factors into the conservation process, as these other 
factors, such as economic issues, are also legitimate areas of public concern. 
It may be necessary, therefore, to move beyond the three principles identified 
above, to establish a basis for ‘public good conservation’. The next three 
chapters consider the existing legal frameworks for archaeological heritage 
management at the Commonwealth, State and Territory levels and their 
support for these existing protective principles. This analysis demonstrates 
some of the flaws with too much a reliance of these principles, as these 
principles, while protecting archaeological heritage in a strict sense, can serve 
to further alienate the public from that heritage.  
 
 
                                            
187  McKinlay, J. R. (1973). Archaeology & legislation : a study of the protection of archaeological sites and material 
by legislative action. Wellington, New Zealand Archaeological Association. Pp 59-60. 
188  McGimsey III, C. R. (1984). The Value of archaeology. Ethics and Values in Archaeology. E. L. Green. New York, 
The Free Press: 171-174.  
189  Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. Pp 108-111. 
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Chapter 5–The Commonwealth heritage regime and archaeological 
heritage protection 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 set out the broad framework for the legal protection of the 
archaeological heritage through an analysis of influential quasi-legal and non-
legal charters, instruments and other policy tools. These have established 
underlying philosophical and legal principles of archaeological heritage 
protection, now expressed in domestic legislation. Building on the analysis in 
Chapter 3, it has been demonstrated that the documents of principle 
examined in Chapter 4 support the conclusion archaeological heritage 
protection was not conceived as principally a scientific exercise. 
Archaeological heritage was conceived as a part of the common cultural 
heritage of humanity, and therefore relevant to all portions of society. This 
lends support to the primary contention of this thesis that archaeological 
heritage protection should be based in ‘public good’ rather than scientific 
discourse. This and the following two chapters will analyse in detail the 
existing Australian legal regimes for archaeological heritage protection and 
their effectiveness in light of both the protective principles identified in chapter 
4 and the ability to support a notion of ‘public good conservation’.  
 
The definitive analysis of legal frameworks for archaeological heritage 
protection was O’Keefe and Prott’s work Law and the Cultural Heritage: 
Volume 1 Discovery and Excavation.1 This work explored the legal issues 
associated with the protection of archaeological heritage around the world. As 
the law moves rapidly, much of the legislative detail in this work is now more 
than two decades out of date, but the underlying issues which the authors 
identified remain relevant to the present discussion. This chapter reconsiders 
a range of the issues raised by O’Keefe and Prott, within the context of the 
current Australian legal regimes and with respect to the question of public 
good conservation. When describing “the ideal relics law”, (while recognising 
that such could not be achieved in reality) O’Keefe and Prott advocated not a 
specific mix of protective mechanisms, but rather that protective legislation: 
 
 Be consistent, within itself and as related to other legislation; 
 Be comprehensive, allowing for no gaps which might be exploited; 
 Have clear guidelines for administration; 
 Be well publicised; 
 Be practical in its methods; and, 
 Be actively enforced.2 
 
These are desirable criteria for any piece of legislation in any area of law. With 
archaeological heritage protection legislation, a major consideration should be 
“what are the problems which must be addressed?” and “how can legislation 
best be drafted to address these issues?” In Australia, the major problem 
faced by legal analysis such as this thesis is the lack of consistency across 
                                            
1  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd.  
2  Ibid. Pg 109. 
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Australian jurisdictions. Australia has nine jurisdictions,3 many of which have 
multiple, overlapping pieces of heritage legislation and typically adopt a 
different approach to protecting historical, indigenous and maritime 
archaeological heritage. Due to this, there are more than 30 individual 
legislative approaches to protecting Australia’s archaeological heritage. The 
quality of legislation examined here and its adherence to the “ideal legislation” 
criteria articulated by O’Keefe and Prott is extremely variable. Much Australian 
legislation has been guided by the 1974 Hope Report into the National Estate4 
as well as the Australia ICOMOS Burra Charter. Often legislators and legal 
draftspeople have looked to other Australian jurisdictions for inspiration and 
guidance, as well as responding to particular local issues. Other legislation, 
particularly that enacted prior to the Hope Report, has taken its cue from 
overseas legislation and issues, in some cases misconstruing the nature of 
the problem and in others setting in place ineffectual and elaborate legal 
mechanisms. This last observation is particularly true with respect to the trade 
in archaeological materials, where there is little evidence of a significant 
problem in Australia. 
 
5.2 The development and approach of Australian heritage legislation 
 
In order to examine the ways in which Australian law protects archaeological 
heritage, it is necessary to understand the past and current practice in the 
area. This section provides a brief discussion of the approaches of the 
Commonwealth, State and Territory governments in protecting Australia’s 
archaeological heritage. This forms the basis of the comparative legal analysis 
of the different approaches to implementing the underlying principles of 
archaeological heritage protection and the extent to which ‘public good’ 
conservation is supported by existing legislation. This analysis demonstrates 
the weaknesses in current, overly legalistic or vague approaches to protecting 
archaeological heritage, particularly where the conception of archaeological 
heritage is based on a paradigm of “scientific” significance as its primary 
value. The primacy of this concept has been to the detriment of achieving the 
goals expressed in the principles of archaeological heritage protection, and 
has created an inability in many cases, under current regimes, to implement 
activities which support ‘public good’ conservation. While the majority of the 
emphasis in Australian heritage legislation has been on “threat removal”, it 
has been recognised by at least some Australian lawmakers that “a threat [to 
a heritage item] might not be capable of being countered by legislation,”5 and 
thus it is important to focus on objectives beyond threat removal or punitive 
remedies. Establishing a concept of ‘public good’ in heritage conservation 
may then also serve as a mechanism for finding ways to combat those threats 
which cannot be thwarted through legislation alone. 
 
                                            
3  The Australian Commonwealth including external territories (e.g. Norfolk Island and the Australian Antarctic 
Territory), 6 States (New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, Victoria and Western Australia) 
and 2 Territories (the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern Territory). 
4  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service.  
5  Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1999). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard). 9 December 1999, Pg 13231. Senator Gareth Evans, Second Reading Speech to the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Bill 1998 (Cth). 
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Australian legislation has relied on a range of mechanisms for the protection 
of archaeological heritage, which can be categorised as follows: 
 
 Protection through definition–where an Act is designed to specifically 
protect archaeological heritage, there are one or more definitions of 
archaeological heritage. These definitions tend to focus on the 
archaeological object6 (or “relic”) or the archaeological place.7  
 
 “Blanket” protection–blanket protection is a subset of definitional 
protection, where all items meeting a certain definition receive 
automatic statutory protection. No additional significance test is 
required, leaving such protection open to highly legalistic interpretation. 
Blanket protection has been used, most notably, in NSW8 and Victoria,9 
for both indigenous and non-indigenous archaeological heritage. Prior 
to the recent reforms in indigenous heritage protection in Queensland, 
indigenous critics had argued that the lack of blanket protection for 
indigenous heritage certain jurisdictions was due to institutional racism 
which devalued indigenous heritage.10 
 
 Protection through listing–every Australian jurisdiction has one or more 
lists of heritage places, which have been assessed as meeting certain 
criteria and are accordingly placed on the list or register.11 Unlisted 
places tend to have no automatic protection, but there is generally a 
power to place an emergency order over a place, if it is under threat, to 
allow time to assess its significance. Some states, such as Victoria, 
have a separate list for archaeological places.12 
 
 Protection through posting of notices–this is a fairly weak form of 
protection which requires the placing of notices or signs at sensitive 
archaeological places, forbidding unauthorised entrance or disturbance 
to the place.13 
 
 Protection through reservation–some legislation allows “archaeological 
areas” to be defined, as a limited form of reservation. Activities within 
these areas may be restricted or subject to administrative control.14 
 
                                            
6  E.g. Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) Section 4–definition of a “relic”. 
7  E.g. Heritage Act 1995 (Vic) Section 3–definition of an “archaeological site”. 
8  Under both the NSW Heritage Act (non-indigenous) and the National Parks and Wildlife Act (indigenous). 
9  Under the Victorian Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (indigenous) and Heritage Act (non-
indigenous). 
10  Jago, M. and N. Hancock (1998). "The case of the missing blanket : indigenous heritage and states' regimes." 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 4 (16): 18-21.  
11  E.g. The WA Register of Heritage Places, established under the Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 (WA), 
Section 46. 
12  The Victorian Heritage Inventory, established under Section 120-121 of the Heritage Act 1995 (Vic). By contrast, 
the NSW Department of Environment and Conservation maintains the Aboriginal Heritage Information 
Management System, which is a non-statutory register of Aboriginal heritage places and objects. 
http://www.nationalparks.nsw.gov.au/npws.nsf/Content/How+to+obtain+AHIMS+data Accessed 15 July 2006. 
13  E.g. the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic), Section 19. 
14  E.g. the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic), Section 15. The National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) allows the declaration of “aboriginal areas” which, while they can contain archaeological 
places, are more designed to protect places of cultural significance to contemporary Aboriginal people. 
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 Protection through ownership–this type of protection may take two 
forms: compulsory acquisition of places to be protected, or a 
presumption of automatic state ownership of archaeological 
materials.15 While many Acts have compulsory acquisition powers, 
these are rarely used and schemes which have relied solely on this 
mechanism for protection have been ineffective. Some Acts do have a 
presumption of automatic state ownership of archaeological materials, 
but this is generally restricted to indigenous materials.16 
 
 Permitting procedures restricting access or impacts to archaeological 
places–this is a common form or protection, which requires a statutory 
application to be made for an activity which will affect an item of 
archaeological heritage.17 Generally such permits are limited to 
archaeologists, but as will be discussed in Chapter 8, this is not always 
the case.18 
 
 Restriction on trade or sale–while there is overarching Commonwealth 
legislation which restricts the international export of certain types of 
archaeological materials;19 some states have restrictions on the sale or 
trade of archaeological materials within the state, or on the removal of 
such materials from the state.20  
 
The details of the implementation of particular mechanisms in different 
jurisdictions are discussed over the next three chapters. All of these 
mechanisms have their utility in certain situations, and none represents a 
perfect mechanism for protection. The three most commonly used are 
definition, listing and permitting which, when used in conjunction, can provide 
an effective administrative regime for archaeological heritage management. 
The other mechanisms, while useful in certain situations, are much more 
difficult to enforce and monitor, limiting their effectiveness.  
 
As a final matter, it should be noted that legislation is an ever-evolving area 
and much debate has been underway across Australia about the need for 
reforms of Commonwealth, State and Territory heritage legislation. In order to 
adequately contain this movable feast, legislation referred to in this chapter 
and subsequently is that which is in force or subject to debate (with respect to 
Bills) at or prior to June 2006.21 The following table provides a timeline for the 
development of key legislation and related documents which have had a 
bearing on the management of archaeological heritage in Australia. It is 
followed by a brief treatise on the Australian legal system and the 
                                            
15  E.g. Native and Historic Objects Heritage Protection Ordinance 1955 (NT), now repealed, relied on this as the 
sole form of heritage protection and only 6 places were ever acquired during the first 20 years of its operation. 
See also the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic), Section 18 which has specific 
powers to compulsorily acquire land containing “irreplaceable relics”. 
16  E.g. National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW), Section 83. 
17  E.g. Heritage Act 1977 (NSW) Section 139, which sets out the procedure for obtaining an “excavation permit”. 
18  A Victorian case involving the grant of a permit to a treasure hunter will be discussed in Chapter 8. See Panama 
Downs P/L v. Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported (Appeal no 1993/18716).  
 Anonymous (1993). "Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe." Environmental Law Reporter 12: 153-
154.  
19  Through the Protection of Moveable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the National cultural Heritage Control List 
defined under Schedule 2 of that Act. 
20  E.g. Heritage Places Act 1993 (SA) Section 28 and Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988 (SA) Section 29. 
21  See limitations to the thesis outlined in Chapter 1. 
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mechanisms by which legislation is made, for the benefit of those readers 
without a legal background. 
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Treaties, Charters and Australian Heritage Legislation, 1950s to Present122 
Jurisdiction/Decade 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000-2006 
Treaties, Charters and other 
Agreements 
 
Note: Documents marked with 
an asterisk (*) have not been 
specifically implemented in 
Australia.  
 UNESCO Recommendation 
on International Principles 
Applicable to Archaeological 
Excavations 1956 * 
 International Charter for the 
Conservation and 
Restoration of Monuments 
and Sites 1964 (Venice 
Charter) * 
 European Convention on the 
Protection of 
the Archaeological Heritage 
1966 * 
 Convention on the Means of 
Prohibiting and Preventing 
the Illicit Import, Export and 
Transfer of Ownership of 
Cultural Property 1970 
(UNESCO Convention) 
 Convention For the 
Protection of the World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage 
1972 (World Heritage 
Convention) 
 Australia ICOMOS Charter 
for Places of Cultural 
Significance 1979 (Burra 
Charter) 
  ICOMOS Charter for the 
Protection and Management 
of the Archaeological Heritage 
1990 * 
 Unidroit Convention on 
Stolen or Illegally Exported 
Cultural Objects 1995 
(Unidroit Convention) * 
 
 Convention on the 
Protection of the 
Underwater Cultural 
Heritage 2001 * 
 Convention for the 
Safeguarding of the 
Intangible Cultural 
Heritage 2003 * 
Commonwealth of Australia    Australian Heritage 
Commission Act 1975 
(Repealed 2003) 
 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1976 
 World Heritage Properties 
Conservation Act 1983 
(Repealed 1999) 
 Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Heritage Protection 
Act 1984 
 Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 
 Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation 
Act 1999 
 Australian Heritage Council 
Act 2003 
Australian Capital Territory     Nature Conservation 
Ordinance 1980 (Converted 
to the Nature Conservation 
Act 1980 when the ACT 
received self-government in 
1988) 
 Heritage Objects Act 1991 
(Repealed 2004) 
 Land (Planning and 
Environment) Act 1991 
 Heritage Act 2004 
New South Wales   National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1967 (Substantially 
revised and redated 1974) 
 National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1974 
 Heritage Act 1977 
   
Northern Territory  Native and Historic Objects 
Heritage Preservation 
Ordinance 1955 (Repealed 
1991) 
 Native and Historic Objects 
and Areas Heritage 
Preservation Ordinance 
1960 (Repealed 1991) 
 Northern Territory Aboriginal 
Sacred Sites Act 1978 
  Heritage Conservation Act 
1991 
 
Queensland   Aboriginal Relics 
Preservation Act 1967 
(Repealed 1987) 
  Cultural Record (Landscapes 
Queensland and 
Queensland Estate) Act 
1987 (Repealed 2003) 
 Queensland Heritage Act 
1992 
 Aboriginal Cultural Heritage 
Act 2003 
 Torres Strait Islander 
Cultural Heritage Act 2003 
South Australia   Aboriginal and Historic 
Relics Preservation Act 1965 
(Repealed 1979) 
 Aboriginal Heritage Act 1979 
(Never formally repealed but 
effectively superseded by the 
1988 Act) 
 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1981 
 Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988  Heritage Act 1993 
(Substantially amended and 
name changed 2005) 
 Heritage Places Act 1993  
Tasmania    National Parks and Wildlife 
Act 1970 
 Aboriginal Relics Act 1975 
  Historic Cultural Heritage Act 
1995 
 
Victoria    Archaeological and 
Aboriginal Relics 
Preservation Act 1972 
(Repealed 2006) 
 Historic Buildings Act 1981 
(Repealed 1995) 
 Historic Shipwrecks Act 1981 
(Repealed 1995) 
 Heritage Act 1995  Aboriginal Heritage Act 
200623 
Western Australia    Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 
 Maritime Archaeology Act 
1973 
  Heritage of Western 
Australia Act 1990 
 
                                            
22  This table outlines the years of establishment of key international charters and treaties as well as enactment of heritage legislation across Australia. The dates of amendment acts are not shown, 
however if an Act was substantially altered by amendment then it is relisted at the new date. Legislation related specifically to historic shipwrecks is listed, however it is not discussed in this thesis. The 
year legislation has been repealed is shown in italics. Current bills are not shown. 
23  While the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 has passed through the Victorian Parliament, the legislation has not been commenced, as of this writing. Once commenced, it will repeal the Archaeological and 
Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic). Commencement relies on Commonwealth-level reformed to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984. While the Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Amendment Bill 2006 has been introduced to the Australian Parliament, it is still subject to debate. 
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5.3 The Australian legal framework
 
This section briefly reviews the structure of the Australian legal system, to 
provide context to the discussion of individual jurisdictions later in the thesis. 
The Australian legal framework is separated into three main jurisdictions: the 
Commonwealth, the States and the Territories. The Commonwealth legal 
framework provides the overarching, Federal-level legal regime for the whole 
of Australia, but is limited in its powers by the Australian Constitution.1 The 
States and Territories have broad powers to regulate within their own borders, 
but in general are subordinate to the Commonwealth and certain activities are 
beyond their authority (for example, entering into international agreements, 
which is an “external affairs” issue reserved for the Commonwealth). 
Territories, while generally sovereign, can have their legislation disallowed by 
the Commonwealth, if the Commonwealth feels there is necessity.2 The 
Commonwealth does not generally have the power to overturn State 
legislation.3  
 
Legislation within all Australian jurisdictions is considered by the parliamentary 
legislature. The general arrangement is for a bicameral system, with a lower 
house of government and an upper house of review. Bills are introduced into 
the lower house either by the sitting Government, the Opposition or by 
individual members (referred to as Private Member’s Bills). When a bill is 
initially presented to the legislature, this is referred to as its First Reading. The 
members are presented with the bill and given time to analyse it prior to 
debate, with usually some gap in time between the First Reading and the 
Second Reading of a bill. The Second Reading is the core period of 
consideration for a bill. It is introduced through an explanatory speech by the 
sponsoring member (generally a minister if a Government bill) called the 
Second Reading Speech. This sets out the rationale behind the bill and 
broadly outlines its background and proposed powers. This is followed by 
debate by the members of the legislature prior to a vote on the bill. Debate 
may give rise to minor amendments, referral to a Parliamentary Committee for 
more detailed examination or withdrawal of the bill. Following completion of 
this process, the bill is sent to the upper house for consideration, where the 
same process of debate and amendment is undertaken. If the upper house 
requires amendment of the bill, it is passed back to the lower house for 
additional consideration. Once a bill has been passed by both houses it has 
its Third Reading and is passed to the Governor for the final making of the bill 
into an Act and it is published in the Government Gazette. There may be a 
delay between the gazettal of an Act and its commencement. All of these 
processes can take considerable time and there is no guarantee of a bill 
completing its passage through any stage. 
                                            
1  Section 51 of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) enumerates the powers reserved for 
the Commonwealth. All other powers are reserved for the States and Territories, except in certain instances, 
such as a referral of powers. 
2  Recent examples of this include the Commonwealth’s overturning of voluntary euthanasia legislation in the 
Northern Territory in 1997 and same-sex marriage in the Australian Capital Territory in 2005. For a general 
discussion of this issue see Australian Law Reform Commission (2000). Discussion Paper 64: The judicial power 
of the Commonwealth - A review of the Judiciary Act 1903 and related legislation. Sydney, Australian Law 
Reform Commission: Ch 7 - Judicial Power in the Territories.  
3  The powers of the Commonwealth are limited to those set out in Section 51 of the Australian Constitution. Where 
there is an inconsistency between Commonwealth and State law, the Commonwealth prevails under Section 109, 
however Section 118 gives a broad recognition of the power of State laws in other circumstances. 
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The following several chapters rely heavily on the record of these 
parliamentary debates (the Hansard).4 Hansard is not necessarily a clear 
window into the legal intention behind a piece of legislation, but does provide 
an insight into the issues which led to the introduction of a particular bill, the 
conceptions the parliamentarians may have had about those issues and the 
broad context in which issues were considered. Analysis of Hansard has been 
used to a limited extent by a few Australian archaeologists, to chart the 
development of Aboriginal heritage legislation.5 Legal scholar Malbon has 
cautioned against too strong a reliance on Hansard for an “originalist” 
approach to analysing legislation, where the researcher attempts to go “back 
in time” in an effort to understand the underlying intentions of those involved in 
the original drafting and debate on a statute.6 Too rigid a use of this approach 
can lead to false conclusions, he argues, as it ignores what has passed since 
the enactment of legislation. In the case of this thesis, however, there is very 
little case law upon which a researcher could normally rely to see the 
evolution in statutory interpretation. While the Hansard cannot be assumed to 
completely reflect the views and motivations of those involved in the drafting 
and debate of heritage legislation, it does provide an important insight into 
legislative intent in the absence of any substantial jurisprudence arising from 
the testing of these statutes in the courts. 
 
Archaeological issues receive some discussion in the parliamentary debates 
and analysis of that discussion indicates the conceptions or misconceptions 
that the members of the legislature have about archaeology as a discipline, its 
relationship and value to the public and its management in a public policy 
context. Despite the acknowledgement of archaeological issues during 
parliamentary debate, it is clear throughout the Hansard from the 1970s to the 
present and across jurisdictions that built heritage and, to a lesser extent, 
natural heritage are the main factors considered by legislatures across 
Australia in debating the merits and forms of heritage protection legislation. 
Archaeological heritage remains more of a misunderstood curiosity than 
something in which the legislatures of Australia have expressed a deep 
interest. In the context of this thesis, it is important to acknowledge that laws 
to protect archaeological heritage were not enacted on a whim, but rather 
because of a perceived need and because archaeological heritage had a 
perceived value. In the absence of either, legislation to protect archaeological 
heritage would not exist. 
 
 
5.4 The Commonwealth heritage framework 
 
Under Australian law, the Commonwealth has no direct power to regulate the 
environment (including the historic environment), as it is not one of the 
                                            
4  The Hansard, which is a transcription of the speeches of parliamentarians. See 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hansard for a detailed history of the term. 
5  Principally McGowan and Murray. See for example their articles McGowan, A. (1996). "A view from the castle: 
administering Aboriginal heritage legislation in a changing policy environment." Tempus 6: 301-309. And Murray, 
T. (1996). "Aborigines, Archaeology and Australian heritage." Meanjin 55 (4): 725-735.  
6  Malbon, J. (2002). "Avoiding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Disaster: Interpreting the Race Power." Flinders 
Journal of Law Reform 6: 41-66. Pp 46-48. Malbon was speaking primarily of the use of this technique by judges 
when interpreting statutes. 
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enumerated powers of the Commonwealth under the Australian Constitution;7 
environmental and heritage regulation has largely been left to the States and 
Territories. This has meant that, in most instances, there has been no 
overarching or consistent approach to the legal protection of archaeological 
heritage in Australia. The Commonwealth does have certain powers with 
respect to the environment, but these are principally restricted to 
Commonwealth-owned land, actions by Commonwealth agencies, dispensing 
of funding and ensuring Australia as a nation meets its obligations under 
international treaties relying on the Constitutional ‘external affairs’ powers. 
This latter issue was decided with respect to the Commonwealth’s power to 
intercede in matters affecting World Heritage Areas in the 1983 Franklin Dam 
Case, which saw the Commonwealth overturn the Tasmanian State 
Government’s decision to construct a hydroelectric dam which would have 
damaged the Franklin River World Heritage Area.8 
 
Commonwealth heritage legislation has been in place since the mid-1970s. 
There are two Commonwealth constitutional powers which are key for an 
understanding of Federal regimes for heritage protection: the power to make 
laws for the benefit of any race and the external affairs power.9 As outlined in 
the discussion of the Hope report in Chapter 3, it is these powers which 
underpin the current and former Commonwealth heritage protection regimes, 
including the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 (Cth),10 the World 
Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 (Cth),11 the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth), the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), the 
Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999 (Cth) and the 
Australian Heritage Council Act 2003 (Cth). While none of these Acts explicitly 
provides mechanisms for the protection of archaeological heritage, each has a 
bearing on the legal approach to managing that heritage.  
 
5.5.1 The Australian Heritage Council Act 2003 
 
The Commonwealth heritage management regime, past and present, has 
never made specific provision for the protection of archaeological heritage. 
While both the general value of archaeological heritage and specific issues 
surrounding scientific or research significance were recognised in the Hope 
Report, the main direct outcome of that Report was the enactment of the 
Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975. The main purpose of the 1975 Act 
has been described as “to prevent, in a constitutionally unobjectionable way, 
the destruction of the national estate.”12 In that Act itself there were no specific 
                                            
7  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (1900) Commonwealth. Section 51. 
 Crawford, J. (1991). "The Constitution and the Environment." Sydney Law Review 13: 1.  
8  See Commonwealth of Australia v. Tasmania (1983) 158 CLR 1. for the full decision. For commentary, see:  
 Bates, G. M. (1984). "The Tasmanian Dam Case and Its Significance in Environmental Law." Environmental 
Planning Law Journal 1: 325-345.  
 Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing. Pp 150-151. 
 Bates, G. M. (2002). Environmental law in Australia. Sydney, LexisNexis Butterworths. Pp 60-65.  
 Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 97-98. 
9  Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900 (Cth) Sections 51(xxvi) and 51(xxix) respectively. 
10  Repealed 2003. 
11  Repealed 1999. 
12  Mossop, D. (1997). "Some observations on the operation of the Australian Heritage Commission Act." Australian 
Environmental Law News (1): 17-20. Pg 17. 
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protections for archaeological heritage. Sites, if they met the relevant criteria, 
could only be listed on the Register of the National Estate13 and actions 
affecting such sites could only be restricted if they involved Commonwealth 
agencies or Commonwealth funds and there was no ‘prudent and feasible 
alternative’.14 The actions of private individuals, state or local governments or 
businesses were, in general, not restricted under such a listing. The Register 
of the National Estate was more significant for its symbolic value15 than for the 
actual power of its protections. As the Register of the National Estate arose 
out of the Hope Inquiry, it was enormously influential in shaping other heritage 
listing processes at State and Territory level. With respect to archaeological 
heritage, however, it was fundamentally limited by the conception of 
archaeological heritage as something with “research” significance, thus 
making consideration of other heritage values difficult. 
 
The Australian Heritage Commission Act was repealed in late 2003 and 
replaced by substantial amendments to the Environment Protection and 
Biodiversity Conservation Act 199916 and the Australian Heritage Council Act 
2003.17 The EPBC Act provides omnibus legislation for the Commonwealth to 
implement its environmental obligations which stem from a range of 
international agreements and implements the sustainability principles, 
discussed in Chapter 3.18 This should, theoretically at least, provide some 
framework for implementing ‘public good’ conservation outcomes at the 
Commonwealth level, in both the environmental and heritage spheres, 
through a balancing of environmental, social and economic factors. The AHC 
Act established the Australian Heritage Council as a body with the power to 
                                            
13  Originally established under section 22 of the Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975. Now kept by the 
Australian Heritage Council under section 21 of the Australian Heritage Council Act 2003. 
14  Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 section 30(1). The discretion in that regard rested solely with the 
Commonwealth Minister for Heritage. Whitrow (Whitrow, D. L. (1985). "The Australian Heritage Commission Act: 
Some Serious Shortcomings." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2: 94-97. ) notes (pg 92) that this is a 
very vague requirement on the Minister, and that no guidance on ‘prudent alternatives’ are provided by the Act. 
James and Mora highlight the fact that this phrase is in fact borrowed from a piece of American legislation–
section 4(f) of the US Federal Department of Transport Act 1966 and that while the phrase has been substantially 
considered by American courts, there has been little judicial interpretation of the phrase in Australia. James, P. C. 
and J. Mora (1996). Australian Mosaic: A handbook for the conservation of the National Estate. Cairns, 
Mukkamanna Holdings. Pp 31-32. See also Boer, B. (1989). "Natural resources and the National Estate." 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 6 (2): 134. and Boer, B. (1995). The legal framework of heritage 
conservation. Special Australian Heritage Publication Series. S. Sullivan. Canberra, Australian Heritage 
Commission. 9.  
15  Despite its primarily symbolic significance outside of the actions of the Commonwealth government, the 
Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975 was viewed with strong suspicion in some quarters and that symbolic 
value did have unintended negative consequences. See for example Pinwell, C. E. (1980). The Heritage Hoax! 
Control of Private Property by Progressive Legislation. Ravensbourne, Queensland, The Institute of Economic 
Democracy. Pinwell views heritage legislation generally and the Australian Heritage Commission Act specifically 
as a part of a socialist plot to dispossess Australians of private property. See also Whitrow (1985, above). 
Whitrow provides a mining industry perspective on the objections to the Australian Heritage Commission Act, 
particularly the “unlimited power [of the Commission] to decide what places should be registered” (p 91), although 
ultimately a Full Federal Court decision curtailed this power in Australian Heritage Commission v. Mount Isa 
Mines (1995) 60 FCR 456. See Mossop 1997, above, for discussion of that decision, which Mossop views as 
incorrect in law. Whitrow also notes (pg 93) that, in the public’s mind, a listing on the Register of the National 
Estate, accorded a place a “quasi-national park status”.  
The spectre of “socialist plots” and heritage was raised again during the debates on the Heritage of Western 
Australia Bill 1990, particularly comments by the Hon Peter Foss, 19 September 1990. Parliament of Western 
Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly. Thirty-Third 
Parliament Second Session. Pg 5354, as well as more recently during submissions to the 2005/06 Productivity 
Commission Inquiry into Management of Australia’s Historic Heritage Places. See for example the submission of 
Mr Gary Green to that inquiry–Submission DR199, pg 6, dated 12/01/2006, 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiry/heritage/subs/subdr199.pdf Accessed 15 May 2006. 
16  Hereafter EPBC Act. 
17  Hereafter AHC Act. 
18  EPBC Act Section 3 
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provide advice to the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment but with no 
significant power of its own. Beyond having the power to make 
recommendations to the Minister regarding archaeological matters, the AHC 
Act provides no direct protection for archaeological heritage.  
 
5.5.2 The Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 
1999 
 
Since 1999 there has been a considerable reorganisation and consolidation of 
the Commonwealth’s environmental and heritage powers in the Environment 
Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act 1999. This Act replaced five 
pieces of earlier legislation dating from the 1970s and 1980s.19 Essentially this 
Act gives the Commonwealth limited powers of intervention where there is a 
matter of “national environmental significance” such as potential for impacts to 
environmentally protected areas under an international treaty (e.g. World 
Heritage Areas, Ramsar wetlands, migratory bird habitat)20 or actions which 
affect “national heritage values” on the newly established National Heritage 
List. The Act also established the Commonwealth Heritage List, for 
Commonwealth-owned heritage items.21 The principles of ecologically 
sustainable development are fundamentally embedded within the Act22 which 
specifically directs the Minister to consider the precautionary principle in 
decision-making,23 as well as any information contained in the Register of the 
National Estate.24 This Act represents a change in approach by the 
Commonwealth to managing natural and environmental heritage, which had 
previously been dealt with under separate legislation. While perhaps an 
administrative convenience, this drawing together of natural and cultural 
heritage issues furthers the notion that cultural heritage is an environmental 
matter, as well as both aspects being part of a common heritage for 
Australia.25  
 
The EPBC Act provides for the management of World Heritage areas, 
replacing the regime established under the World Heritage Properties 
                                            
19  The following Commonwealth Acts were repealed by the Environmental Reform (Consequential Provisions) Act 
1999 and their amended key functions incorporated into the Environment Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 1999:  
 Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974  
 National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975 
 Whale Protection Act 1980 
 World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983 
 Endangered Species Protection Act 1992 
20  EPBC Act Chapter 2 Part 3 enumerates the full range of environmental protection under the Act, including the 
three types cited. 
21  The National Heritage List is established under section 324C of the EPBC Act 1999 and came into existence on 1 
January 2004. The Commonwealth Heritage List is established under section 341C. The Commonwealth Minister 
for Heritage is responsible for the management of this list and is the determining authority for actions which may 
affect the heritage values of listed items. The Minister is advised by the Australian Heritage Council however the 
Council has no power in its own right to list items or make decisions about proposed actions. 
22  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) Commonwealth. Sections 3(1)(b) and 3A. 
23  Ibid. Section 391. The precautionary principle states “that lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a 
reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment where there are threats of serious or 
irreversible environmental damage.” Section 391(2). This has, in general, been applied to natural heritage but the 
Act directs its consideration when dealing with World, National or Commonwealth Heritage listed places. Section 
391(3) Items 11, 11A and 13A.  
24  Ibid. Section 391A. 
25  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 105-106. 
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Conservation Act 1983. Australia presently has 16 World Heritage items26 
and, until quite recently, these were primarily listed for natural rather than 
cultural values. Many of these World Heritage Areas do contain 
archaeological sites, which have been noted as contributory to their 
‘outstanding universal value’. This was particularly noteworthy during the 
Franklin Dam case, as a number of important Aboriginal archaeological sites 
would have been flooded by the dam and this was viewed as unacceptably 
diminishing the World Heritage values of the place,27 contributing to the 
Commonwealth’s decision to intercede and halt the project.  
 
No Australian World Heritage places are identified as significant primarily 
because of the presence of archaeological materials, nor does the EPBC Act 
specifically mention the protection of archaeological heritage. The Act could 
be used to protect archaeological heritage specifically in two instances. The 
first circumstance would be a scenario where works were proposed within a 
World Heritage Area which would affect archaeological materials which 
contribute to the World Heritage values of a place. If the archaeological 
materials were of exceptional significance, proposed works could be declared 
a ‘controlled action’28 and trigger the requirement for an approval under the 
Act. This is not dissimilar to the Franklin Dam situation, which was dealt with 
under the now-repealed World Heritage Properties Conservation Act 1983. 
The second circumstance would be if a new World Heritage Place was 
declared specifically for its archaeological value. One proposed nomination, 
which has not as yet proceeded, includes a number of archaeological places. 
Following the commission in 1996 of a thematic study of convict heritage 
places,29 a “Convict Serial Sites” World Heritage Listing was mooted for 
Australia but has not proceeded to any broad public debate. This listing would 
include a range of sites relating to convict transportation across Australia. 
These places are now principally archaeological sites, and include the Port 
Arthur Historic Site in Tasmania and the Convict Lumberyard site in 
Newcastle, NSW, among others.30 Similar protective processes under the 
EPBC Act would be activated if an archaeological site were listed on the 
National or Commonwealth Heritage Lists. While the EPBC Act offers no 
specific protection to archaeological heritage beyond that accorded by most 
                                            
26  As of 2006. See also discussion in Chapter 4. See http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/ for the current list of World 
Heritage Places. Accessed 15 May 2006. Note the Sydney Opera House was submitted for listing in early 2006, 
but has not been listed as of 30 June 2006. 
27  See the listing for the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heritage Area: http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/181 and 
Commonwealth of Australia (1981). Nomination of Western Tasmania wilderness national parks : for inclusion in 
the World Heritage List.  
28  Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation Act (1999) Commonwealth. Section 67. 
29 Pearson, M. and D. Marshall (1996). Study of world heritage values : convict places Canberra, Department of the 
Environment, Sport and Territories.  
30  The nomination has not proceeded to date, perhaps due to the Commonwealth’s current policy of requiring 
places nominated for World Heritage status to be listed on both the National Heritage list and any relevant State 
or Territory heritage lists prior to World Heritage nomination. While the “Convict Serial Sites” nomination has 
been mentioned by the Australian Government as recently as August 2005, it is not clear precisely which sites 
will be included in the nomination. Sites mentioned at various times have included Port Arthur Historic Site 
(Tasmania), the Ross Female Factory (Tasmania), Fremantle Prison (Western Australia), the Newcastle Convict 
Lumberyard (NSW) and portions of the Old Great North Road (NSW). For recent mentions of the listing, see for 
example press releases by the Commonwealth Minister for the Environment: 
 Federal Minister for the Environment and Heritage (The Hon Dr David Kemp MP) (2004). Port Arthur nomination 
for National Heritage Listing (press conference transcript). 20 April 2004  
http://www.deh.gov.au/minister/env/2004/tr20apr04.html 
 Australian Minister for the Environment and Heritage (Senator the Hon. Ian Campbell) (2005 ). Fremantle Prison 
WA's first National Heritage listing (Media release). 1 August 2005. 
 http://www.deh.gov.au/minister/env/2005/mr01aug305.html  
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heritage listing regimes, its incorporation of the sustainability principles 
indicates a need to consider, and balance, competing environmental, social 
and economic objectives. This goes part of the way towards establishing a 
basis for a ‘public good conservation’ regime. 
 
5.5.3 The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 
1984 
 
Using the “race power” of the Australian Constitution,31 the Commonwealth 
enacted the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act in 
1984.32 This Act was designed to provide protection for indigenous heritage 
(including archaeological materials and in particular human remains) in areas 
where adequate protection did not exist at the State/Territory level and 
perhaps the political support did not exist for the enactment of such 
legislation.33 The Act came into force during a complex debate about 
Aboriginal land rights, property rights, immigration and central versus local 
control of Aboriginal issues.34 Arguably this debate commenced with the 
debate over the extension of citizenship to Australians in the 1960s, and 
continued well into the 1990s, with the Mabo and Wik cases regarding 
indigenous land rights. Aspects of this debate continue today.35 The Act has 
been noted as having created Commonwealth/State tension at certain 
points,36 but it has been further observed that delegation of these powers 
back to the States and Territories can be equally problematic.37 Fulcher38 and 
Malone39 both describe the ATSIHP Act as an Act of “last resort” and Fulcher 
notes that only Victoria has strongly embraced the full extent of the Act.40 This 
view remains despite a significant review of the legislation in 1996 by Justice 
Evatt following the Hindmarsh Island case.41 Perhaps the most widely known 
case brought under this Act, the 1996 Hindmarsh Island dispute42 centred on 
the construction of a bridge between the mainland and Hindmarsh Island in 
South Australia. The essence of that case was whether Aboriginal heritage 
                                            
31  Under section (xxvi) of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (The Constitution) Commonwealth. The 
Parliament may create legislation with respect to “the people of any race , other than the aboriginal race in any 
State, [sic] for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws”. 
32  Hereafter ATSIHP Act. 
33  Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1984). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard). , Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 
(Online version). Summary. 
34  Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1984). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard). Debates for 31 May 1984 Pp 2667-2701. 
35  See, for example, the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) presently passing 
through Parliament, which seeks substantial reform to the Northern Territory land rights system. 
36  Waters, J. F. (1985). "Protection of Aboriginal Sites and Objects under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Heritage (Interim Protection) Act 1984 (Commonwealth)." Aboriginal Law Bulletin (17): 17. Significant aspects of 
the debate on this Bill during its Second Reading focussed on the Commonwealth versus States’ rights issues. 
See generally Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1984). Official Reports of the Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard). Debates for 31 May 1984 Pp 2667-2701. 
37  Finlayson, J. (1998). "Update on proposed changes to the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 (Cth)." Indigenous Law Bulletin 4 (14): 21. See also Jago, M. and N. Hancock (1998). "The 
case of the missing blanket : indigenous heritage and states' regimes." Indigenous Law Bulletin 4 (16): 18-21.  
38  Fulcher, J. (1999). "Changes proposed to the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 and their impact on project developments." Australian Environmental Law News (2): 67-69. 
Pg 67. 
39  Malone, A. (1996). "The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act : how beneficial legislation 
has missed its mark." The Olive Pink Society Bulletin 8 (1): 23-32.  
40  See also Boer, B. (1985). "Aboriginal heritage in Victoria." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2: 94-97.  
 Boer, B. (1986). "Aboriginal cultural heritage - Victoria." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 3 (1): 87.  
41  Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online 
version).  
42  Chapman v Tickner (1995) 133 ALR 74 
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values, referred to by opponents as “secret women’s business” (with a 
disputed archaeological basis, amongst other issues) should preclude the 
construction of a bridge to Hindmarsh Island in South Australia.43 This action 
was ultimately unsuccessful and the bridge was constructed44 following the 
passage of the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth), which exempted the 
bridge project from the ATSIHP Act.  
 
The Act was established to specifically protect sites and objects,45 and made 
no attempt to protect intangible heritage values. Boer and Wiffen note that, 
while there were over 200 applications for protection under the Act, only 8 
objects were protected, 2 places received long-term protection and 5 places 
received short-term emergency protection.46 The Act was viewed by the 
Government of the day47 as separate but complementary to the debate over 
Aboriginal land rights48 and part of a suite of measures necessary to protect 
the rights of Aboriginal Australians. Evatt observed that the protection of 
Aboriginal heritage serves a community purpose in addition to the specific 
benefits to Aboriginal Australians, bringing a public good element into the 
intent and effect of the legislation.49 Evatt further noted that protections for 
archaeological heritage were placed in the Act specifically due to the lobbying 
of the Australian Archaeological Association.50 This implies an attempt to 
balance the legitimate concerns of both the Aboriginal and archaeological 
communities, for the benefit of the wider community, in the drafting of this 
legislation. Despite this, the ATSIHP Act does not recognise archaeological 
“research” or “scientific” significance as a consideration for protection of 
Aboriginal heritage. For critics of the legislation such as Fourmile,51 this is a 
positive step towards official recognition of indigenous heritage as belonging 
first and foremost to the indigenous community. Evatt as well felt that the 
primary definitions of significance under the Act needed to come from 
indigenous people for all types of that heritage, including archaeological sites, 
                                            
43  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 271-273. 
44  Hindmarsh (Kumarangk) Island : Norvill and Milera v Chapman and Ors, Tickner v Chapman and Ors, 
Unreported, Full Federal Court, Black CJ, Burchett and Kiefel JJ, 7 December 1995. For a discussion of this 
case, see for example Flood, E. (1999). "The Hindmarsh Island Case." Polemic 10 (1): 58-63. , Malbon, J. (2002). 
"Avoiding the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Disaster: Interpreting the Race Power." Flinders Journal of Law Reform 6: 
41-66. , Taubman, A. (2002). "Protecting Aboriginal sacred sites : the aftermath of the Hindmarsh Island dispute." 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 19 (2): 140-158.  
45  Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1984). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard). Second Reading speech, 9 May 1984 by Mr. Holding. Pp 2129. See also Evatt, E. (1996). Review of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online version). Chapter 6, Section 6.5. 
46  Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pg 271 note 
43. 
47  The Bill was introduced under the Hawke Labour Government. 
48  Australia. Parliament. House of Representatives. (1984). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard). Second Reading speech, 9 May 1984 by Mr. Holding. Pp 2130. The issue of Aboriginal land rights 
was not more fully resolved at the Commonwealth level until the Mabo High Court decision in 1992 (Mabo v 
Queensland (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1) and the passage of the Native Title Act 1993 (Cth). This issue was again 
substantially reviewed by the High Court in the 1998 Wik decision (Wik Peoples v The State of Queensland & 
Ors; the Thayorre People v The State of Queensland & Ors (1996) 187 CLR 1) which led to significant 
amendments to the Native Title Act.  
49  Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online 
version). Chapter 6, Sections 6.5 and 6.6. Principle 6.6 of the Evatt report states: “The principle and purpose 
which should be reflected in all Aboriginal cultural heritage laws is that those laws are intended to benefit 
Aboriginal people, and in doing this, to benefit the whole society.” (Emphasis added). 
50  Ibid. Chapter 6, Section 6.5, note 5. 
51  Fourmile, H. (1989). "Aboriginal heritage legislation and self-determination." Australian-Canadian Studies 7 (1-2): 
45-61.  
 Fourmile, H. (1996). "The law of the land : whose law, whose land." Tempus 5 (1996): 9-17.  
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rather than from an externally imposed frame of reference, such as 
archaeology.52  
 
This represents an important principle, but one which is only just making its 
way into heritage protective regimes. Recent law reforms in Queensland53 and 
proposed law reform in Victoria,54 discussed later in the thesis, will start to see 
the ability of indigenous communities to influence the management of their 
significant places. This is a clear challenge to the scientific paradigm of 
archaeological heritage management and will redress some of the past 
imbalance in power over the control and access to indigenous heritage 
places. It will remain to be seen how this will be effectively dealt with within 
the planning system, and whether indigenous communities will have 
substantial influence on the outcomes of planning decision which affect their 
heritage places. The recent experience in New South Wales suggests that 
governments, while willing to provide a semblance of greater control to 
indigenous people, will retain significant power within the planning system to 
override community views when deemed necessary.55  
 
The ATSIHP Act focuses on protecting objects and places of significance to 
“Aboriginal tradition”, which is defined as: 
 
…the body of traditions, observances, customs and beliefs of 
Aboriginals generally or of a particular community or group of 
Aboriginals, and includes any such traditions, observances, customs or 
beliefs relating to particular persons, areas, objects or relationships.56 
 
This is quite important as, because of the broad nature of the definition of 
indigenous object and indigenous area, requiring that the thing to be protected 
has “particular significance” for indigenous tradition provides an inherent 
limitation on the breadth of the legal protection. What this implies is that, while 
there may be a vast number of areas or objects which relate to indigenous 
heritage, it is only those with particular importance to indigenous tradition 
which warrant protection. This should mean, therefore, that not all items of 
indigenous origin are inherently significant or protected by the Act. Rather, the 
Act provides a filter which limits protection to some, but not all, items and 
places of indigenous origin or association. Sites and objects are protected 
under the Act where they are deemed to be significant to indigenous tradition. 
Fourmile has criticised the definition of indigenous heritage in this way as too 
restrictive and not appropriately encompassing the breadth of indigenous 
                                            
52  Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online 
version). Chapter 6, section 6.13. 
53  The Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act (2003) Queensland. and the Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act 
(2003) Queensland.  
54  Aboriginal Heritage Act (2006) Victoria. This Act is not yet commenced and will repeal the Archaeological and 
Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 1972 (Vic). Commencement of this Act is dependent on reforms to the 
ATSIHP Act to remove the special clauses relating to Victoria. The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Amendment Bill 2006 is presently subject to debate by the Federal Parliament, but has not yet passed 
beyond the Second Reading stage. 
55  E.g. the 2005 reforms to Part 3A of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) which allows 
the Minister to declare certain areas or types of projects exempt from heritage legislation. This is discussed 
further in Chapter 7. 
56  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (1984) Commonwealth.  
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heritage. She sees the term “traditional” as inherently offensive57, however 
Evatt noted that various definitions of “traditional” existed and favoured the 
use of the term in the sense that “Aboriginal tradition” has evolved, and 
continues to evolve over time.58  
 
Where legislation, other than the ATSIHP Act, uses “tradition” in a sense 
which sees indigenous culture as static, Fourmile has a valid criticism, as this 
reinforces and enshrines in law a notion that indigenous people are 
dispossessed from their past and can have no valid claim to it. It was exactly 
this conception of indigenous heritage which led to the de facto claim to the 
indigenous past by archaeologists for much of the early- and mid-twentieth 
century and led some archaeologists, such as Coutts, to advocate that there 
should be automatic State ownership of indigenous heritage.59 The value of 
the physical remains of the indigenous past is to support the social cohesion 
of contemporary indigenous culture.60 The legislation does, in its current form, 
cover those parts of the indigenous heritage which can be considered 
somehow “archaeological” in nature, but it is clearly not the legislative focus. 
The limited number of places and objects which have received protection 
under this Act are likely to reflect both a high threshold in terms of determining 
heritage significance, but, particularly in light of the Hindmarsh Island dispute 
highlight the high level of politicisation around the issue of indigenous heritage 
and an unwillingness to take a strong role in its protection. 
 
This Act then is set up with a type of ‘public good’ in mind, although it is a 
‘good’ which is limited to a certain subset of the population–indigenous 
people–and in the view of Fourmile and others,61 has not gone far enough 
towards providing appropriate recognition and authority for the role of 
indigenous people in managing the remains of their pasts. Malone particularly 
contends that the onerous procedures of the ATSIHP Act are in fact part of a 
regime which continues to punish and dispossess indigenous people for 
maintaining a difference in their identity from the mainstream Australian 
community.62 Given the politicisation and polarised attitudes between the 
                                            
57  Fourmile, H. (1989). "Aboriginal heritage legislation and self-determination." Australian-Canadian Studies 7 (1-2): 
45-61. Pp 46-50. See also Fourmile, H. (1996). "The law of the land : whose law, whose land." Tempus 5 (1996): 
9-17. For a further discussion of the Aboriginal perspective of fundamental problems with Australian heritage 
legislation more generally, particularly the issue of the legal ownership of the physical remains of the Aboriginal 
past. 
58  Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online 
version). Chapter 6, Section 6.10. 
59  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pp 217-
218. 
 Automatic State ownership of Aboriginal heritage applies in several states, including NSW (National Parks and 
Wildlife Act Section 83) and Victoria (Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act Section 20). Recently 
changes to Queensland legislation however provide default ownership to the relevant indigenous community. 
State ownership only applies in the absence of clear indigenous ties to the place. (Aboriginal Heritage Act 2003 
and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Act 2003, Section 14). See also Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law 
in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pg 222. 
60  Prentis, M. D. (1995). "From Lemuria to Kow Swamp: The rise and fall of tri-hybrid theories of Aboriginal origins." 
Journal of Australian Studies (45): 79-91. Pg 80. 
61  For example, Murphy, L. (1996). "The political application of cultural heritage management: indigenous 
participation or indigenous control?" Tempus 6: 141-146. Murphy enjoins cultural heritage managers to ask 
themselves “‘How does what we do impact upon Australia’s indigenous people?’”, particularly given the scope for 
recognition of Aboriginal customary law in Australia. Murphy argues that, in instances where Native Title has 
been established at least, indigenous land management practices should prevail over mainstream cultural 
heritage management practices. Pp 141-142. 
62  Malone, A. (1996). "The Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act : how beneficial legislation 
has missed its mark." The Olive Pink Society Bulletin 8 (1): 23-32. Pg 24 
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indigenous and archaeological communities noted by Colley with respect to 
access to and management of the physical remains of the indigenous past,63 
it is debatable whether the Act in its current form effectively serves the 
interests of either party, let alone the wider community. While perhaps not 
entirely successful from the perspectives of those interest groups, what the 
legislation has done is laid the groundwork to acknowledge that heritage is a 
community concern and needs to be considered in a broad context, however 
the mechanisms are still in need of refinement. 
 
Key amongst Justice Evatt’s recommendations in her review of the Act was 
that protections for indigenous heritage should be based on a uniform set of 
principles across Australia. She suggested these principles rely on a broad 
definition of significance established by indigenous people and provide 
automatic protection for places that meet those significance criteria.64 As 
discussed in Chapter 4, the de facto national standard for judging heritage 
significance, the Burra Charter, has deficiencies with respect to indigenous 
heritage, yet provides a nationwide assessment framework for heritage places 
generally. Thus the equivalent of an indigenous Burra Charter, which is 
accepted as a national standard, would be a significant advance in the 
protection of indigenous places across Australia. Evatt’s recommendations do 
not go as far as the automatic blanket protection of indigenous places desired 
by some critics of the Act, as they are tied to the significance of the place, 
object or site and not merely to the physical presence of past indigenous 
activities. But returning to the discussion of significance in Chapter 3, not all 
places will be equally deserving of legislative protection. While undoubtedly 
there will be many places with a high degree of significance, for social or 
perhaps scientific value, there will also be many places of lesser or marginal 
significance. Therefore no moral obligation attaches to protect all indigenous 
sites and places as if they were equally significant. It is, of course, open to 
members of the indigenous community to dispute this point of view, however 
in terms of western environmental philosophy, selective protection is a valid 
legal mechanism.  
 
The ATSIHP Act was designed to be a flexible tool for the protection of 
indigenous heritage places throughout Australia. It provides a potential 
mechanism for the protection of archaeological places, although it relies on 
those places having significance to an indigenous community. The Act serves 
to redress the power imbalance which has existed in past protective regimes, 
which have either favoured the scientific significance of a place or which have 
ignored indigenous values all together. As a tool of redress, it is therefore not 
acting strictly as a ‘public good’ conservation mechanism, but the Act does 
contemplate the relevance of indigenous heritage to all Australians, not just 
indigenous people. The reluctance to use the Act and the failure to 
substantially implement the recommendations of the Evatt review have 
however limited its effectiveness as a protective tool for indigenous heritage 
places of both an archaeological and non-archaeological nature. 
                                            
63  Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pp 67-75. 
64  Evatt, E. (1996). Review of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait  Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Online 
version). Recommendations 5.2, 6.1 and 6.2, Pp iii-iv. 
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5.5.4  The Native Title Act 1993 
 
The Native Title Act 1993 provides a system by which indigenous people can 
claim legal title over certain lands in Australia. This is limited to lands where 
native title was not extinguished through an act granting exclusive possession 
of the land, such as the granting of freehold title. The Native Title Act was 
established following the long-running Mabo High Court indigenous land claim 
case,65 decided in 1992. The Act, while not directly concerned with cultural 
heritage, recognises indigenous connection to the land through tradition and 
continuity66 as key to establishing native title. It potentially provides a 
mechanism by which culturally significant areas can be placed into the 
ownership and control of indigenous people. The establishment of the Native 
Title Act served to reinforce the principles of the Mabo case and establish 
native title as an area of Commonwealth responsibility.67 This helped address 
the fact that Australia had lagged behind other nations in recognising the land 
rights of indigenous people.68 Pearson noted the key difference between the 
Mabo decision and earlier land rights legislation was that Mabo recognised an 
underlying right in land which predated white settlement, rather than previous 
land rights systems69 which allowed land to be granted back to indigenous 
people in certain circumstances.70 Murphy viewed the recognition of native 
title under the Mabo decision as a check against “government control 
and…the influence of anthropological perspectives in the development of 
cultural heritage management policy.”71 The native title system, while 
complicated, has established a process by which indigenous people can re-
establish control of important places from which they may have been 
alienated. 
 
The Act is largely irrelevant to the protection or management of archaeological 
heritage, but key for the recognition of native title is the ability of claimants to 
demonstrate an ongoing connection with the land over which a claim was 
asserted.72 This has involved the use of archaeological evidence to support 
the claim in some cases, in addition to evidence based on oral history and 
indigenous tradition and folklore. The use of archaeological evidence to 
demonstrate ongoing connection to the land has, in some instances, led to 
unexpected alliances between archaeologists and indigenous people. While 
the Native Title Act creates scope for archaeological places of significance to 
be vested in indigenous people, the Act itself provides no protection of 
                                            
65  Mabo and Others v. Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1 F.C. 92/014.  The High Court case was the 
culmination of a court action started in 1982 in the Queensland courts. See Bartlett, R. (1993). The Mabo 
decision. Sydney, Butterworths. Pp vi-viii for a brief history of the earlier cases. 
66  Native Title Act (1993) Commonwealth. Section 223. 
Bartlett, R. (1993). The Mabo decision. Sydney, Butterworths. Pp viii-ix, xiv-xv. 
67  Rowse, T. (1993). "How we got a Native Title Act." Australian Quarterly 65 (4): 111-132. Rowse charts the 
development of the Native Title Act from the Mabo case in 1992 to the passage of the Act through Parliament in 
1993.  
68  Kirby, M. (1996). "In defense of Mabo." Australian Quarterly 65 (4): 67-81. Pp 77-78. 
69  E.g. such as the Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth), which provided for claims over 
specific areas of land over a 20 year period, or the Pitjantjatjara Land Rights Act 1981 (South Australia) which 
was restricted to land claims by one particular indigenous group. 
70  Pearson, N. (1996). "From remnant title to social justice." Australian Quarterly 65 (4): 179-184.  
71  Murphy, L. (1996). "The political application of cultural heritage management: indigenous participation or 
indigenous control?" Tempus 6: 141-146. Pg 145. 
72  Bartlett, R. (1993). The Mabo decision. Sydney, Butterworths. Pg xix. 
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archaeological heritage, nor indeed was that its principle purpose. The Act 
therefore has little relevance to the issues considered in this thesis and is not 
further discussed here. 
 
5.5.5 The Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986  
 
The final area of Commonwealth protection for heritage is through the 
Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth) which provides for the 
restriction on trade of certain types of movable heritage items (that is, items 
which can be physically transported), which was previously provided under 
the Customs Act 1901-1987 (Cth).73 This Act enumerates a range of items of 
heritage which can only be exported from Australia with an export permit and 
a smaller, more select range of items which may not be exported under any 
circumstances. The concept of movable heritage, at law, is intimately tied up 
with the notion of property rights, however it implies that, in certain 
circumstances, heritage considerations should outweigh property 
considerations.74 This is a form of ‘public good’ heritage protection, as it 
establishes a basis that in certain instances, the public value of an object 
should override personal or financial considerations for its owner; the public 
value of the object is derived from it remaining within Australia, even if it is 
never part of a public collection.  
 
Archaeological materials75 (primarily indigenous materials) appear in both 
categories of identified movable heritage items within the Act, under the 
National Cultural Heritage Control List. Aboriginal sacred objects and human 
remains are the two categories of archaeological material which may not be 
exported under any circumstance (Category A items). Other types of 
archaeological materials can potentially be exported following an expert 
assessment and determination that the export would not permanently diminish 
Australia’s cultural heritage (Category B items). While there have been 
instances where there has been a refusal to grant an export permit,76 there 
has never been a refusal for the export of archaeological materials and, by 
reference to the Annual Reports of the body which oversees the Act, there 
have been only 20 applications for the export of archaeological materials in 
the period of the Act’s operation, none of which has been refused.77 
 
                                            
73  Wiltshire, A. (1992). "Moveable cultural heritage - part 1." Art and Entertainment Law Review 3: 9.  
74  Leighfield, S. (2000). "Of ships and sealing wax : planning the preservation of movable cultural heritage within 
Australia." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 17 (3): 214-230. Pg 215. 
75  Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act (1986) Commonwealth. Section 3(5)(a). 
76  There have been 47 refusals of export permits between 1986 and 2006. See 
http://www.deh.gov.au/heritage/movable/refused.html for the complete list. Accessed 16 May 2006. For 
discussion of specific instances of refusal, see Ley, J. F. (1991). Australia's protection of movable cultural 
heritage : report on the Ministerial review of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and 
Regulations. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. With respect to the painting “Bath of Diana” 
and Leiboff, M. (1999). "The embodiment of culture: the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth)." 
Australian Feminist Law Journal (12): 3-19. Pg 4. regarding military medals and sporting memorabilia. See also 
Wiltshire, A. (1992). "Moveable cultural heritage - part 2." Art and Entertainment Law Review 4: 1. Theoretically, 
items refused export permission can be purchased through the National Cultural Heritage Fund and fifteen 
objects have been acquired through this mechanism as of 2006. See 
http://www.deh.gov.au/heritage/programs/movableaccount/index.html Accessed 16 May 2006. 
77  Appendix 1 to this chapter outlines all applications of this Act to archaeological objects from 1986 until 2005. The 
2005-06 report on the operation of this Act was not available as of the completion of this thesis. See also Ley, J. 
F. (1991). Australia's protection of movable cultural heritage : report on the Ministerial review of the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and Regulations. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service. 
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Export protection only focuses on an archaeological object once it is divorced 
from its context and thus provides only a limited protective benefit. If the 
object was initially illegally obtained (through unauthorised excavation, for 
example) there is no penalty and the possessor of such an object would need 
to be pursued through State or Territory legislation. As will be discussed in 
Chapter 8, these mechanisms have only been infrequently used, to limited 
effect. Should the export of a prohibited archaeological item be discovered, 
the Act provides Australia with a credible foundation on which a claim can be 
lodged within the terms of the UNESCO Convention, as Australia can be seen 
to have a legislatively defined import/export regime for cultural heritage 
items.78 This type of arrangement is however generally reciprocal, thus if the 
receiving country is not a signatory to the UNESCO Convention (including 
such major collecting countries as the United Kingdom), it is unlikely a return 
of the object would be facilitated. Similarly, Australia is obligated to return 
items if it is determined that they have been illegally exported from their home 
country.79 Thus while providing only minimal protection for Australian 
archaeological heritage, the establishment of the PMCH Act is essential to 
Australia credibly demonstrating its heritage protection commitment at an 
international level. The Act’s primary value is as a deterrent mechanism and 
would be valuable if a significant illicit trade in Australian archaeological 
materials came to light. In the absence of such a trade, the effect of the Act is 
minimal with respect to Australian archaeological heritage. 
 
5.6 The Commonwealth heritage regime–The best of intentions 
 
Commonwealth legislation provides little direct protection for Australian 
archaeological heritage, save for the case of its export, and even then the 
actual effect of the movable heritage legislation has been minimal. This is 
however consistent with Constitutional limitations on the Commonwealth’s 
powers. With respect to indigenous cultural heritage, the Commonwealth has 
shown itself to be reluctant to take a strong position on its protection, an issue 
so closely aligned to contemporary political issues as to be beyond the scope 
of this thesis to analyse in detail. The primary value of the Commonwealth 
legislation has, until quite recently, been largely symbolic, for the protection of 
all types of heritage. This was particularly the case for the now-repealed 
Australian Heritage Commission Act 1975, which was a direct outgrowth of 
the Hope Inquiry. The value of the Commonwealth leadership in heritage 
protection at that time must be acknowledged and the establishment by the 
Commonwealth of heritage protection legislation drove efforts in state 
jurisdictions across the country. While in some cases it has taken several 
decades for the moral force of the early Commonwealth acts to reach all 
states and territories, such regimes are present across the country. The major 
value of Commonwealth legislation is to ensure Australia is recognised 
internationally as fulfilling its obligations under international treaty and 
providing high-level influence for the subsequent enactment of state and 
territory heritage legislation. But the symbolic value of the Commonwealth 
legislation has not extended to the establishment of universal protective 
principles across Australia, as will be seen in the following chapters. 
                                            
78  Wiltshire, A. (1992). "Moveable cultural heritage - part 2." Art and Entertainment Law Review 4: 1. Pp 3-4. 
79  Wiltshire, A. (1992). "Moveable cultural heritage - part 1." Art and Entertainment Law Review 3: 9. Pg 11. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 5–The Commonwealth heritage regime and archaeological heritage protection  152 
 
It is certainly possible to view the early efforts of the Commonwealth, in the 
signing of the World Heritage Convention, the undertaking of the Hope Inquiry 
and the passage of the Australian Heritage Commission Act as those of a 
government which perceived heritage to be fundamentally a ‘public good’ 
issue. The goal of that period was to establish the concept of a collective 
Australian heritage, which could be protected, conserved and enjoyed into the 
future. Archaeological heritage can be seen to be a lesser consideration for 
the Commonwealth in most instances as, aside from the intervention in the 
Tasmanian Dam Case, there has been little need for Commonwealth 
intervention in archaeological issues. Despite this, the Commonwealth legal 
regime has addressed the underlying protective principles identified in 
Chapter 4, through the protection of sites and landscapes under the EPBC Act 
and objects (however weakly) under the ATSIHP Act and Protection of 
Moveable Cultural Heritage Act. The goal of conserving Australia’s heritage 
for the present and seeing it transmitted to future generations remains an 
underlying theme in all Commonwealth legislation. This ideal has however not 
always been borne out in reality, particularly with the highly politicised nature 
of Commonwealth level heritage issues. Archaeological heritage has not so 
much been poorly served by the Commonwealth legislation, as overlooked 
amongst other bigger picture heritage issues. Archaeological heritage 
protection, as a detailed heritage management issue, has been left to the 
primary attention of the states and territories. Chapters 6 and 7 analyse the 
legal regimes at this level, where most of the management decisions are 
made and the greatest potential exists to implement ‘public good’ initiatives in 
archaeological heritage conservation. 
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Appendix 1: Summary of the Operation of the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 with respect 
to archaeological heritage, for the period 1986 to 2005. 
 
Note that as the descriptions in the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act Annual Reports are often vague as to 
the precise details of the items subject to an application for an export permit, a broad definition of “archaeological” 
materials has been used to compile the table. As applications have often been for groups of objects, the totals reflect 
the number of applications for collections, rather than total number of individual objects. 
 
The table specifically exclude items of an identifiably ethnographic or artistic nature which were likely obtained from 
living indigenous people, such as spears, clubs, shields and paintings. 
 
Year Total 
applications 
Number 
Refused 
Applications for 
Archaeological 
items 
Number 
Refused for 
Archaeological 
Items 
Details 
1987-8880 0 0 0 0 No relevant applications 
1988-8981 26 0 2 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 Aboriginal artefacts to New 
Zealand  
1 collection of historical artefacts for 
temporary export: 
 Objects recovered from historic 
shipwrecks to “Mutiny on the 
Bounty” Exhibition, United 
Kingdom  
1989-9082 41 1 3 0 2 collections of Aboriginal artefacts 
for temporary export: 
 Aboriginal artefacts for display 
in Japan (4 items) 
 Aboriginal artefacts for display 
in Japan (7 items)  
1 collection of historical artefacts for 
temporary export: 
 A piece of timber recovered 
from the shipwreck ‘Batavia’  
1990-9183 32 0 0 0 No relevant applications 
1991-9284 43 1 0 0 No relevant applications 
1992-9385 31 0 1 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for temporary export: 
 Collection of Aboriginal stone 
artefacts from Shark Bay 
Western Australia  
1993-9486 124 3 1 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 A collection of Aboriginal 
artefacts  
1994-9587 86 5 1 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
                                            
80  Department of the Arts Sport the Environment Tourism and Territories (1988). Annual report on the working of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Fund 1987-88. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
81  Department of the Arts Sport the Environment Tourism and Territories (1989). Annual report on the working of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Fund 1988-89. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
82  Department of the Arts Sport the Environment Tourism and Territories (1990). Annual report on the working of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Fund 1989-90. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
83  Department of the Arts Sport the Environment Tourism and Territories (1991). Annual report on the working of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Fund 1990-91. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
84  Department of the Arts Sport the Environment and Territories (1992). Annual report on the working of the 
Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 
1991-92. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
85  Department of the Arts and Administrative Services (1993). Annual report on the working of the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1992-93. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
86  Department of Communications and the Arts (1994). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1993-94. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
87  Department of Communications and the Arts (1995). Annual Report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1994-95. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
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 Aboriginal artefacts including 
3 circumcision knives, 2 
quartzite knives, 24 Aboriginal 
implements, 1 ax blade from 
Tambo River, Victoria, 1 
hatchet head from the 
Northern Territory  
1995-9688 81 0 3 0 2 collections of historical artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 Artefacts from the Ross 
Female Factory, Tasmania  
 1 piece of pig iron ballast 
block from HMB Endeavour  
1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 A collection of Aboriginal 
artefacts  
1996-9789 93 0 2 0 2 collections of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export:  
 23 Aboriginal Artefacts  
 Aboriginal Artefacts  
1997-9890 93 3 1 0 1 collection of historical artefacts for 
permanent export: 
 Guilt [sic] Dragon coin approx 
300 years old weighing 26 
grams from a wreck of WA 
1987 [sic]  
1998-9991 108 1 1 0 1 collection of historical artefacts for 
temporary export: 
 Fides Shipwreck Relics (31 
pieces)  
1999-
200092 
211 4 1 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 An 8-inch Churinga stone  
2000-0193 159 4 1 0 1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 44 Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Island artefacts  
                                            
88  Department of Communications and the Arts (1996). Annual Report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1995-96. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
89  Department of Communications and the Arts (1997). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1996-97. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
90  Department of Communications and the Arts (1998). Annual report on the operation of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 1997-1998. Canberra, 
Department of Communications and the Arts.  
91  Department of Communications Information Technology and the Arts (1999). Annual Report on the operation of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Fund 1998–99. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
92  Department of Communications Information Technology and the Arts (2000). Annual Report on the operation of 
the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage 
Account 1999–2000. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
93  Department of the Environment and Heritage (2001). Annual Report on the operation of the Protection of 
Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Account 2000-01. 
Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
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2001-0294 248 8 0 0 No relevant applications 
2002-0395 482 3 2 0 1 collection of historical artefacts for 
permanent export: 
 Antarctic artefacts (5) used by 
Sir Douglas Mawson and 
Carsten Borchgrevinck  
1 collection of Aboriginal artefacts 
for permanent export: 
 Aboriginal paintings and 
artefacts (214), John 
McCaffrey Collection of West 
Kimberley art and artefacts  
2003-0496 185 4 0 0 No relevant applications 
2004-0597 149 5 1 0 1 collection of historical artefacts for 
permanent export: 
 Wooden Fence Railings, Iron 
Hinges, ex Myall Creek  
      
Summary Statistics 
 
Total number of applications for archaeological collections 20 
Total number of applications refused for archaeological collections 0 
Total number of historical archaeological collections exported 5 permanent 
3 temporary 
Total number of Aboriginal archaeological collections exported 9 permanent 
3 temporary 
 
                                            
94  Department of the Environment and Heritage (2002). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 2001-02. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service: 228-241.  
95  Department of the Environment and Heritage (2003). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 2002-03. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
96  Department of the Environment and Heritage (2004). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 2003-04. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
97  Department of the Environment and Heritage (2005). Annual report on the working of the Protection of Movable 
Cultural Heritage Act 1986 and the administration of the National Cultural Heritage Fund 2004-05. Canberra, 
Australian Government Publishing Service.  
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Chapter 6–An overview of State and Territory archaeological heritage 
protection regimes 
 
Chapter 5 examined the basic structure of Australian legislation with respect 
to archaeological heritage protection and then focussed specifically on the 
Commonwealth legislative regime for heritage protection. Aside from some 
little-used protections in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act, the Commonwealth legal regime provides little specific 
protection for archaeological heritage. The exception is for those places 
specifically listed for archaeological heritage values on the World, National or 
Commonwealth Heritage Lists and thus subject to the Environment Protection 
and Biodiversity Conservation Act. Perhaps most significantly for this thesis, 
the Commonwealth regime does not privilege the scientific paradigm for 
archaeological heritage protection, but is structured to treat heritage as a 
broad public concern, even if not expressed explicitly in ‘public good’ terms. 
This is also supported through the integration of the sustainability principles in 
the Commonwealth heritage regime. Yet in practical terms, the bulk of 
archaeological heritage management falls to the States and Territories and is 
controlled through the legislation at that level. 
 
Chapter 6 provides a brief overview of the State and Territory regimes for 
archaeological heritage protection.1 The legislation analysed in this and the 
following chapter is the primary mechanisms used to manage Australia’s 
archaeological heritage. These laws constitute the bureaucracy of 
archaeological heritage management, as Carman termed it,2 and 
fundamentally they are about making decisions regarding appropriate 
managements action for archaeological places. What follows is by no means 
intended as an exhaustive discussion of the legislation in every State and 
Territory, nor a history of Australian heritage legislation. It does, however, 
demonstrate the approaches which have been adopted in different 
jurisdictions, and facilitates the discussion which follows regarding the 
implementation of the underlying principles of archaeological heritage 
protection. Many of these regimes have a focus on the scientific paradigm, 
which is unsurprising given that most of the legislation examined here has its 
origins in the 1960s and 1970s. This focus can hamper the consideration of 
the wider values of archaeological heritage and preclude ‘public good’ 
heritage outcomes, due to the narrow conceptualisation of the value of 
archaeological heritage. Where legal regimes have considered the social 
value of archaeological heritage, it has been confined to indigenous places. 
Chapter 7 undertakes a more detailed analysis of the legislation in New South 
Wales and Victoria. These States were selected as case studies as they have 
the most comprehensive and far-reaching legal regimes for archaeological 
heritage protection.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
1  The state and territory legislative regimes are reviewed in alphabetical order.  
2  Carman, J. (2002). Archaeology and heritage : an introduction. London ; New York, Continuum. Pp 99-101. See 
also Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 154-155. 
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6.1 The administration of archaeological heritage protection  
 
Chapter 4 identified key legal principles for archaeological heritage 
protection–protection of the archaeological site, protection of the 
archaeological object and transmission of knowledge about the archaeological 
past to present and future generations. Protection of archaeological objects, 
divorced from their context, characterised the earliest attempts at 
archaeological heritage protection legislation in the 1950s and 1960s, in the 
Northern Territory, South Australia and Queensland. The roots of this 
approach lie even earlier, in the law of treasure trove, which was more 
concerned with the archaeological object as a valuable commodity than for 
any other values. The form of the early Australian legislation was an 
outgrowth of the contemporary debate between the merits of collecting 
archaeological objects for personal pleasure, as opposed to their scientific 
study.3 Most early legislation came down squarely on the side of protecting 
objects for scientific study, however there have been instances where the 
legislation has been drafted to protect the interests of collectors, as this was 
seen as a legitimate pastime. Leiboff argues that “the law does not protect 
ephemeral pasts”–that is, the cultural practices and beliefs of past peoples 
who have left a material record–but rather specified “fetishised objects”4 which 
are judged as important by an interpreting professional class (including 
archaeologists, art historians, museum curators, bureaucrats). His concern is 
that too much uncritical faith in the power of heritage legislation can lead to an 
erroneous belief in two ways. One is a belief that the collective past has been 
protected or conserved by the legislation and further social action is not 
required. The second is a perception that what the law has chosen to protect 
is in fact the most important aspect or aspects of the collective past.  
 
Leibhoff’s concern is justified, particularly considering that the law cannot 
specify with absolute certainty what aspects of the past are most important to 
protect, nor can the law reclaim lost cultural practices. Legal frameworks 
should provide the latitude for those administering the legislation to consider 
such issues; currently that is not the case with the majority of Australian 
heritage legislation as the frameworks are too rigid. One exception to this is 
that much Australian legislation established to protect Aboriginal cultural 
heritage does have clauses to facilitate the ongoing use of that heritage for 
cultural purposes. As will be seen later in this chapter, the Hansard debates 
surrounding that legislation often highlight a belief that protection of such 
heritage is important for the maintenance of Aboriginal cultural identity. So 
while the protective principles identified in Chapter 4 are important for the 
protection and conservation of archaeological heritage, they have not 
necessary been explicitly considered and incorporated into Australian heritage 
legislation. They are also not the only protective principles which can apply to 
archaeological heritage, if a wider conception is taken of archaeological 
significance. 
 
 
                                            
3  See discussion in Chapter 2. 
4  Leiboff, M. (1999). "The embodiment of culture: the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth)." 
Australian Feminist Law Journal (12): 3-19. Pg 3. 
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6.2 The Australian Capital Territory  
 
Heritage protection in the Australian Capital Territory (hereafter ACT) is 
primarily achieved through the Heritage Act 2004.5 This Act replaced an 
earlier legislative regime, which contained protections for “heritage objects” in 
the Heritage Objects Act 19916 and protection for “heritage places” in the 
Land (Planning and Environment) Act 1991.7 Under the previous regime, 
registration of places and objects was a drawn out process and only 71 places 
were registered in the period 1991-2004.8 The new Act was established to 
bring ACT heritage legislation into line with contemporary heritage practice in 
the other states and territories.9 The Heritage Act protects both heritage 
places and objects10 and, continuing the somewhat atypical arrangements of 
the Heritage Objects Act, combines protection for indigenous and non-
indigenous heritage into the same piece of legislation.11 The main protective 
tool under the Act is the ACT Heritage Register12, which replaced the Heritage 
Objects Register13 and Heritage Places Register14 established under the 
previous scheme. The Act also establishes the ACT Heritage Council15 and 
requires that at least one member has expertise in archaeology.16 
 
The Act makes no direct reference to the protection of archaeological heritage 
and the primary method of protecting any heritage place or object is via listing 
on the Heritage Register. Indeed, the heritage significance criteria stipulated 
under the Act make no reference to scientific significance at all17 although 
research significance is referred to in one criterion.18 This is somewhat 
unusual, particularly as it breaks with the Burra Charter emphasis on scientific 
significance. Heritage significance for scientific value is implied for places of 
natural heritage value.19 The Act provides blanket protection for Aboriginal 
places and objects, which are defined as follows:  
                                            
5  The Heritage Act 2004 came into force on 9 March 2005.  
6  Repealed by the Heritage Act 2004. 
7  Hereafter, the Land Act. 
8  Speech by Mr Wood (Minister for Arts and Heritage) Legislative Assembly for the ACT: Week 5 Hansard (14 May 
2004) Pp 1941. The Minister also noted that there were 250 Aboriginal places subject to an interim registration 
under the old system and a backlog of 2500 Aboriginal places still requiring consideration. 
9  ACT Government (2005) ACT Heritage Legislation–what you need to know. Pg 1. Dated 9 March 2005. 
http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13494/actheritagelegislationwhatyouneedtoknow.pdf  
Accessed 16 March 2006. 
 See also speech by Mr Wood (Minister for Arts and Heritage) Legislative Assembly for the ACT: Week 5 Hansard 
(14 May 2004) Pp 1940-41. The Bill was however criticised by the opposition for introducing “non-standard” 
heritage definitions which departed from definitions used in other jurisdictions. Speech by Mrs Dunne Legislative 
Assembly for the ACT: Week 8 Hansard (5 August 2004) Pp 3542-43. 
10  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 8. 
11  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 9. 
12  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 20. 
13  Heritage Objects Act (1991) Australian Capital Territory. Section 6–Repealed. 
14  Land (Planning and Environment) Act (1991) Australian Capital Territory. Section 54–Repealed. 
15  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 16. 
16  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 17(4)(c). 
17  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 10. 
18  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 10 criterion (j).  
19  E.g. Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 10, Criteria (i) and (j):  
(i)  it is significant for understanding the evolution of natural landscapes, including significant geological features, 
landforms, biota or natural processes;  
(j)  it has provided, or is likely to provide, information that will contribute significantly to a wider understanding of the 
natural or cultural history of the ACT because of its use or potential use as a research site or object, teaching site 
or object, type locality or benchmark site;  
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"Aboriginal place" means a place of particular significance to Aboriginal 
people because of either or both of the following:  
(a) Aboriginal tradition;  
(b) the history, including contemporary history, of Aboriginal 
people.  
"Aboriginal object "means an object of particular significance to 
Aboriginal people because of either or both of the following:  
(a) Aboriginal tradition;  
(b) the history, including contemporary history, of Aboriginal 
people.20 
The Act stipulates that any discovery of an Aboriginal place or object must be 
reported to the ACT Heritage Council.21 This requirement does not apply to 
Aboriginal people with a traditional association with the land,22 recognising 
there may be cultural reasons for not disclosing such information. Aboriginal 
places or objects, once reported, are only heritage listed with the agreement 
of the relevant Aboriginal group.23 Information on Aboriginal heritage places or 
objects on the Heritage Register may be restricted from general public 
access.24 The Act provides that the unauthorised disturbance or removal of a 
discovered Aboriginal place or object is an offence, even if the place or object 
is not specifically listed.25 No such offence applies to historical archaeological 
places or objects, unless they are listed on the Heritage Register.26 
 
Few archaeological places or objects have been registered in the ACT. As of 
early 2006, only one collection of Aboriginal objects has been registered27 and 
37 Aboriginal places are registered.28 Not all of the registered Aboriginal 
places are archaeological in nature, although the bulk of listed Aboriginal 
places have some archaeological component. Ten nominations are pending 
for Aboriginal places, including several scarred trees and the Aboriginal Tent 
                                            
20  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 9. 
21  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 51. 
22  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 52. 
23  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 53. 
24  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 54. While this restriction can apply to any type of heritage place, as drafted the 
provision primarily appears directed towards Aboriginal places and objects. See ACT Heritage Council (2005) 
How is Aboriginal heritage protected? Pg 2. Dated 9 March 2005. 
 http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13443/actheritagelegislationhowisaboriginalheritagepro
tected.pdf Accessed 16 May 2006. 
25  Heritage Act 2004 (ACT) Section 75.  
26  It should be noted that there is a general prohibition against damaging the heritage significance of a place or 
object under section 74 of the Act. There is however an ambiguity as to whether such places must be listed on 
the Heritage Register to be protected by this section as the significance of a place or object is only determined 
under the Heritage Act when it is considered for listing on the Register. By contrast, the definition of “Aboriginal 
place” and “Aboriginal object” under section 9 requires something defined under this section to be of “particular 
significance to Aboriginal people” before it is considered for registration. Thus arguably Aboriginal places and 
objects have protection regardless of registration status. 
27  Aboriginal stone artefact collection from site PH 44 (CMAG Collection) Item # 10008. This listing was transferred 
from the previous Heritage Objects Register.  
See http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13235/heritageregister10008.pdf Accessed 16 May 
2006.  
28  Note these registered Aboriginal places are actually groups of sites in unspecified numbers in each of the 
identified localities. The precise numbers and locations of individual sites are not recorded in the registration 
information, but in early 2004 it was noted that 344 individual Aboriginal sites had been discovered as a result of 
the widespread bushfires in the ACT in 2003. Question on Notice 1408 Ms Tucker to Mr Wood (Minister for Arts 
and Heritage) Legislative Assembly for the ACT: 2004 Week 4 Hansard (1 April) Pg 1696. 
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Embassy at Old Parliament House.29 One place identified as a non-
indigenous archaeological site has been nominated for the Register but is not, 
as of mid-2006, listed.30 In its policy approach to listed Aboriginal places, the 
ACT Heritage Council has attempted to strike a balance between scientific 
and Aboriginal community values. This general policy approach, which is 
applied to all registered Aboriginal places in the ACT, gives strong emphasis 
to the community value of Aboriginal places: 
 
The Heritage Council promotes a general conservation policy for all 
Aboriginal heritage sites. This policy states that Aboriginal sites are to 
be conserved appropriately in accordance with their individual heritage 
significance, taking into account their Aboriginal and archaeological 
heritage values.31  
 
and 
 
The ACT Aboriginal community considers all archaeological evidence 
of the past occupation of the ACT by Aboriginal people to be 
significant. Aboriginal places have the capacity to demonstrate and 
provide information about ways in which Aboriginal people lived in the 
past. 32 
 
Such statements place the significance of Aboriginal sites in the hands of the 
Aboriginal community for determination, but do not provide a robust 
framework for detailed decision-making about the fate of a place which may 
be threatened by disturbance or development. While providing for the 
recognition of indigenous community values, the policy explicitly places all 
sites at an equivalent level of significance, potentially creating management 
difficulties when decisions must be made about impacts to registered 
Aboriginal places. This approach, while one apparently designed to empower 
the Aboriginal community in the management of its heritage, is as problematic 
an approach as one which ascribes an equivalent level of scientific 
significance to all archaeological places or objects. By establishing a policy 
position that all Aboriginal places are equally significant to the Aboriginal 
community, but not explicitly forbidding impact or change to those places, the 
policy leaves open the possibility that all Aboriginal places, with or without an 
archaeological component, are equally able to be impacted upon with 
approval. This creates a circumstance where a place of high social 
significance but limited archaeological value is legally equivalent to a place of 
limited archaeological value and little social value. Such a situation is 
inherently risky to the preservation of places of significance to the Aboriginal 
                                            
29  Based on a search of the ACT Heritage Register Summary List, dated 19 April 2006. 
http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13010/Heritage_Summary_list_19_April_2006.pdf 
Accessed 16 May 2006. 
30  Ibid. Pg 14. Described as “TG 1 archaeological site and adjacent road easement” 
31  Heritage Register Item Report 20132. Aboriginal Places–Urban and Rural Bushfire Containment Lines Pg 4. 
 http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13007/heritageregister20132.pdf 
 Accessed 18 May 2006. 
32  Heritage Register Item Report 20140. Aboriginal Places–Districts of Belconnen, Coree, Cotter River, Gungahlin, 
Paddys River & Stromlo Pg 2.  
 http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13766/heritageregister20140.pdf Accessed 18 May 
2006. 
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community as a policy which judged significance on scientific value alone, as 
it does not clearly establish that some places are more important than others. 
This undermines ‘public good’ considerations by not providing a clear 
framework for the consideration of multiple issues and establishing a basis for 
the balancing of competing interests for an archaeological place. 
 
The ACT Heritage Council goes on to note that archaeological and Aboriginal 
community significance are different value systems which are not equivalent: 
 
[A site’s] significance to Aboriginal people may not necessarily, 
however, relate to or accord with archaeological significance 
assessments. 33 
 
Despite this statement, the policy still provides some level of privilege to the 
research paradigm of archaeological significance: 
 
[A site’s] true informational value, scientific value and significance to 
Aboriginal people can only be realised or determined through further 
research.34  
This implies that the Aboriginal community is unable to recognise or realise 
the significance of its own heritage places without some form of research 
assistance from a third party. This seems to be at odds with what at least one 
parliamentarian imagined, when she stated “…heritage is a social and cultural 
construction and not the preserve of experts”35 during the debates on the 
Heritage Bill. In its current form, the Act provides limited protection for 
archaeological heritage, unless a site or object has been specifically listed on 
the ACT Heritage Register. Aboriginal places and objects have a limited 
degree of automatic protection however the same is not true for non-
indigenous archaeological heritage. While the ACT Heritage Council’s policy 
efforts to build Aboriginal community values into the significance assessment 
and listing process is well-intentioned, in its current structure, the system 
continues to privilege the “research” paradigm of archaeological significance. 
There is also a need to ensure, no matter how legislatively empowered, the 
Aboriginal community has the infrastructure and, in effect, the bureaucracy, to 
exercise such power. The new Act’s failure to grapple with questions of the 
degree of significance of indigenous places potentially places all such sites at 
risk. This limits the ability to consider other social values for archaeological 
places in a manner which hampers opportunities for ‘public good’ 
conservation outcomes. 
 
6.3 The Northern Territory 
 
The Northern Territory was the first jurisdiction in Australia to implement any 
form of heritage legislation, in the form of the Native and Historic Objects 
                                            
33  Heritage Register Item Report 20140. Aboriginal Places–Districts of Belconnen, Coree, Cotter River, Gungahlin, 
Paddys River & Stromlo Pg 3.  
34  Heritage Register Item Report 20124. Aboriginal Places–District of Belconnen Pg 2.  
 http://www.environment.act.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/13052/heritageregister20124.pdf 
 Accessed 18 May 2006. 
35  Speech by Ms Tucker. Legislative Assembly for the ACT: Week 9 Hansard (17 August 2006) Pg 3765. 
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Heritage Protection Ordinance 1955,36 although O’Keefe and Prott note that 
this is still a late date for such legislation by international standards. They 
attribute the slowness of Australian governments to act in this area to a 
colonial “contempt” for Aboriginal culture.37 This Ordinance was passed by the 
Northern Territory Parliament at the same time as the first legislation in the 
Territory to protect natural areas.38 This particular Ordinance is no longer in 
force and was of questionable effectiveness during its period of operation39 as 
in order for a place to be protected, the Territory government was required to 
compulsorily acquire the land.40 Due to the onerous nature of the provisions, 
the Historic Objects Ordinance was only used to protect six places during the 
first twenty years of its operation.41 The Historic Objects Ordinance was 
criticised for its somewhat vague definition of ‘relics’ and the lack of a 
mechanism to ensure Aboriginal people had access to ‘tribal relics’.42  
 
Archaeological heritage in the Northern Territory is now protected through the 
Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 1978 (NT)43 and the Heritage 
Conservation Act 1991 (NT).44 These Acts are administered by the Aboriginal 
Areas Protection Authority45 and the Heritage Advisory Council46 of the 
Northern Territory respectively. The Sacred Sites Act is designed to protect 
“Aboriginal sacred sites” and recognises the potential for traditional 
connection between a portion of land and an Aboriginal person, based on 
Aboriginal tradition. By implication, this includes a spiritual connection as well 
as a physical connection which may have existed through use or occupation 
of land.47 The definition of an Aboriginal sacred site is: 
 
a site that is sacred to Aboriginals or is otherwise of significance 
according to Aboriginal tradition, and includes any land that, under a law 
                                            
36  Hereafter Historic Objects Ordinance. 
37  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. Pg 69-70. 
38  The Northern Territory National Parks and Gardens Ordinance 1955. These Ordinances were debated 
concurrently by the Northern Territory Parliament and passed in the same sitting of Parliament. Northern Territory 
Legislative Council (1955). Legislative Council Debates. Fifth Council, First Session. Sydney, Northern Territory 
of Australia. Debates for 25, 28 and 29 March 1955. Both Ordinances proclaimed by the Governor-General on 28 
November 1955. 
39  Carment, D. (1991). Heritage legislation in the Territory. Packaging the past? Public histories. J. Rickard and P. 
Spearritt. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press: 70-77. Pg 72; Sullivan, M. and D. Carment (1992). Cultural 
heritage conservation in the Northern Territory. Canberra, Australian National University: 27. Pg 2. By 
comparison, Flood describes the legislation as “pioneering”, but notes that it was not kept up to date. Flood, J. 
(1993). Cultural resource management in  Australia: the last three decades. A Community of Culture: The People 
and Prehistory of the Pacific. M. Spriggs, D. E. Yen, W. Ambroseet al. Canberra, Australian National University. 
21: 259-265.  Pg 259. 
40  It is interesting to note that this concept of protection through compulsory acquisition has once again appeared, in 
the draft recommendations of the Productivity Commission Inquiry into Historic Heritage Management. 
Productivity Commission (2005). Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - draft report. Melbourne, 
Australian Government. The Final Report considerably moderated this position, indicating that compulsory 
acquisition should only be used in “exceptional circumstances”. Productivity Commission (2006). Conservation of 
Australia's historic heritage places - final report. Melbourne, Australian Government. Pg 267-268.  
41  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pg 173. 
42  McKinlay, J. R. (1973). Archaeology & legislation : a study of the protection of archaeological sites and material 
by legislative action. Wellington, New Zealand Archaeological Association. Pg 78. 
43  Commenced 1978. Substantially amended 1983, 1989 and 2002. Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act 
(1978) Northern Territory. Hereafter Sacred Sites Act.  
44  Commenced 1 November 1991. Amended 1994 and 1996. Heritage Conservation Act (1991) Northern Territory.  
45  Under section 5(1) of the Northern Territory Aboriginal Sacred Sites Act (1978) Northern Territory.  
46  Under section 12 of the Heritage Conservation Act. 
47  Sacred Sites Act Preamble 
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of the Northern Territory, is declared to be sacred to Aboriginals or of 
significance according to Aboriginal tradition.48 
 
As in the definition of “Aboriginal tradition” under the Commonwealth ATSIHP 
Act, this definition implies a limitation to the breadth of what is protected; it is 
not every site which has some physical trace of the Aboriginal past, but those 
with particular importance according to Aboriginal custom. This is in strong 
contrast to the approach described above, which has been recently adopted in 
the ACT. But such a definition leaves open the possibility of sites having no 
definable physical trace of past Aboriginal activity but which, through tradition, 
have a high degree of cultural significance. In such instances, where the 
assertion of cultural significance is credible and, if necessary, able to be 
backed up through reference to past and current cultural practices among 
Aboriginal people, there represents a good argument for the protection of 
such places. Coutts analysed these issues shortly after the passage of the 
Sacred Sites Act. While supportive of the aims of connecting Aboriginal 
people with the places they held significant, he decried both the politicisation 
of Aboriginal heritage due to the land rights movement, which had created a 
climate of fear amongst landowners, and the limits that this had brought to the 
archaeological study of indigenous places.49 In many ways, Coutts’ analysis 
was prescient, heralding the nationwide concern over indigenous land claims 
following the Mabo High Court decision.50 Coutts was also keen to draw a 
distinction between indigenous heritage places with which the indigenous 
community had a genuine ongoing relationship, and what he referred to as the 
“secular” sites, which were principally of interest to archaeologists.51 This 
distinction remains problematic across Australia, where the political value of 
any archaeological site may well outweigh its community or scientific value. In 
the politics of contemporary indigenous life, heritage places have become one 
more tool in politics or negotiation over issues which may have nothing to do 
with heritage management or social value. This politicisation of heritage is by 
no means unique to indigenous heritage places, and is beyond the scope of 
this thesis to fully analyse, but has the propensity to sideline potential 
conservation outcomes for political outcomes. An interesting example in this is 
Chambers Pillar (Figure 6.1, below), a site with both indigenous and non-
indigenous heritage value. 
 
                                            
48  The Sacred Sites Act uses the definition of a sacred site which is in section 3 of the Aboriginal Land Rights 
(Northern Territory) Act 1976. 
49  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pg 213  
50  See for example Goot’s analysis of the public polls and understanding of the Mabo issue during and shortly after 
the High Court decision. Goot, M. (1993). "Polls as science, polls as spin: Mabo and the miners." Australian 
Quarterly 65 (4): 133-156.  
 See also Ewing’s predictions of the collapse of the Australian resources industry due to the Mabo decision. 
Ewing, G. W. (1993). "Terra Australia post Mabo: for richer or poorer." Australian Quarterly 65 (4): 157-166.  
51  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pp 215-
216. 
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Figure 6.1: Chambers Pillar, a site with both Aboriginal and European cultural 
values.52 
 
 
                                            
52  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Chambers_pillar_email.jpg 
Photo credit Cas Liber 1994. Released into the public domain.  
See also the NT Heritage Register listing information for this site: 
 http://www.nt.gov.au/nreta/heritage/ntregister/declared/display.html?chambersp 
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The Chambers Pillar Historical Reserve is listed on the Northern Territory 
Heritage Register53 due to its unique geological characteristics, historical 
association with early white exploration and its association with an Aboriginal 
morality story. Under Aboriginal tradition, the Pillar, a notable geological 
formation, represents two adulterous lovers, turned to stone for their illicit 
affair. In the Statement of Heritage Value, there is no mention of any physical 
traces of past Aboriginal use of the site; its Aboriginal significance is derived 
from the story association. This is a critical distinction for broadening the 
consideration of what elements of the past warrant conservation. Under a 
more traditional conception of Aboriginal heritage as ‘archaeological’ in 
nature, this site may not have been legally protected in the absence of any 
physical remains. Furthermore, if the site had contained physical remains of 
an archaeological nature, but such remains were considered of low ‘research’ 
or ‘scientific’ value from an archaeological perspective, it remains likely that 
the site would not have received any particularly strong legal protection. The 
low ‘scientific’ value archaeological materials may have been allowed to be 
removed and the intangible, social significance of the site to the Aboriginal 
community may have been ignored and potentially damaged, due to the 
primacy of the archaeological view of significance. The protection of this site 
for its multiple values and irrespective of the physicality of those values is a 
strong illustration of the ability of heritage legislation to protect a place for 
‘public good’ reasons. The site has a strong social value with local indigenous 
and non-indigenous people, as well as being a tourist attraction and 
destination. The recognition and promotion of these multiple values is an 
important step towards conservation ‘in the public good’. 
 
The Heritage Conservation Act provides more generalised heritage protection 
in the Territory and was passed in 1991 as a part of a package of legislation 
designed to demonstrate the Territory’s commitment to sustainable land 
management.54 The Territory government explicitly acknowledged heritage 
conservation as an issue within the sustainability framework at the time.55 The 
Act had a lengthy and fraught drafting process and its successful passage 
was driven primarily by the Northern Territory National Trust and professional 
historians, rather than archaeologists.56 The Heritage Conservation Act 
provides for the establishment of a Register of Heritage Places57 and sets 
guiding principles for the development of ‘heritage assessment criteria’.58 
These guiding principles do not specify ‘archaeological’, ‘scientific’ or 
                                            
53  Listed 5 October 1994. Northern Territory Government Gazette No. G40. For the full heritage listing see 
http://www.lpe.nt.gov.au/heritage/register/chambersp/default.htm. Note this site is not, in fact, a declared ‘sacred 
site’ under the Sacred Sites Act, but is used to illustrate the point that a site can have Aboriginal heritage 
significance warranting legal protection but with no observed physical evidence of past Aboriginal use or 
occupation. 
54  The proposal to enact legislation was first put forward in 1978 when the Northern Territory was granted self-
government, however the impetus for the Heritage Conservation Act did not come about until 1988. Carment, D. 
(1991). Heritage legislation in the Territory. Packaging the past? Public histories. J. Rickard and P. Spearritt. 
Melbourne, Melbourne University Press: 70-77. Pp 70-71. 
55  Sullivan, M. and D. Carment (1992). Cultural heritage conservation in the Northern Territory. Canberra, Australian 
National University: 27. Pg 1-2. 
56  Carment, D. (1991). Heritage legislation in the Territory. Packaging the past? Public histories. J. Rickard and P. 
Spearritt. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press: 70-77. Pp 76-77. 
57  Heritage Conservation Act (1991) Northern Territory. Section 16.  
58  Ibid. Section 18. The full 14 criteria are spelled out in the Heritage Conservation Regulations, Section 5. Again, 
none of the criteria specifically refer to archaeology, scientific significance or research significance (except as 
pertaining to ‘natural history’–Criterion G), however Criterion J is sufficiently broadly worded to encompass these 
values: “by providing information contributing to a broader understanding of the history of human occupation”. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 6–An overview of State and Territory archaeological heritage protection regimes 166 
‘research’ significance to be one of the values underlying a heritage 
significance assessment. Hiscock noted that, during the debates, an 
Aboriginal member of Parliament remarked that “[m]ost certainly I would not 
wish to have a site that is sacred to me protected as if it were an 
archaeological site. I would want people to regard it from an historical 
perspective.”59 Such a forthright position by a member of Parliament may 
have had some influence of the notion of archaeological significance being 
absent from the legislation, in favour of more broadly constructed criteria for 
significance.  
 
Within a few years of enactment, the Act was the subject of criticism by 
archaeologists operating in the Northern Territory, particularly citing the 
attempted comprehensiveness and vague definitions in the legislation as key 
causes of problems.60 In 2003, the Territory government implemented a 
comprehensive review of this Act.61 As of mid-2006, while the Northern 
Territory Cabinet has endorsed the establishment of a new Heritage Act at a 
conceptual level, the draft legislation is not available for comment.62 For 
archaeological heritage, the Act’s purview is limited to protecting 
archaeological sites and objects related to Aboriginal or Macassan 
inhabitation of the Northern Territory;63 historical sites are excluded from the 
definition of archaeological heritage, although they can be listed on the 
Northern Territory Heritage Register.64 “Over 5700” Aboriginal and Macassan 
sites had been identified and protected under the Act,65 and 172 places are 
listed on the Northern Territory Heritage Register.66 Of the sites on the 
                                            
59  Speech by Wesley Lanhupuy, Member for Arnhem, Northern Territory Legislative Assembly Parliamentary 
Record 1991, Pg 1336, cited in Hiscock, P. (1994). "Coming to terms with the Northern Territory Heritage 
Conservation Act 1991." Australian Archaeology 38: 55-60. Pg 57. 
60  Ibid. Pg 57. He cites as a particular failure of the legislation the lack of differentiation between archaeological and 
anthropological principles and terms, which are used interchangeably within the legislation but which do not 
correspond in practice.  
61  Heritage Conservation Services (2003). Review briefing notes - Heritage Conservation Act (1991). Darwin, 
Northern Territory Government Department of Infrastructure Planning and Environment. , Office of Environment 
and Heritage (2003). Discussion paper - Heritage Conservation Act Review 2003. Darwin, Northern Territory 
Government Department of Infrastructure Planning and Environment. , Heritage Advisory Council. (2004, 30 
January 2004). "Review of the Heritage Conservation Act."   Retrieved 13 June, 2004, from 
http://www.lpe.nt.gov.au/heritage/review/default.htm.  
62  http://www.nt.gov.au/nreta/heritage/managing/review/index.html#update Accessed 31 May 2006. 
63  Hiscock notes that this narrow definition excludes protection for the archaeological heritage of a range of other 
ethnic groups significant to the history of the Territory, particularly British, Chinese and Afghans. Hiscock, P. 
(1994). "Coming to terms with the Northern Territory Heritage Conservation Act 1991." Australian Archaeology 
38: 55-60. Pg 56. 
64  Heritage Conservation Act (1991) Northern Territory. Section 4. The protections for archaeological heritage are 
contained in section 39 of the Act. The effect of the protections is the same as if the archaeological place or 
object was the subject of an interim conservation order and the consent of the Minister is required under section 
29 of the Act to do “work” to the place or object. Archaeological places or objects must however meet a series of 
additional criteria under Section 3 of the Heritage Conservation Regulations in order to be considered 
“prescribed” places or objects: 
(1) For the purposes of Part 6 of the Act, the following archaeological places are prescribed archaeological places: 
(a) places containing rock paintings or rock carvings; 
(b) prehistoric or protohistoric occupation places; 
(c) places (not being cemeteries within the meaning of the Cemeteries Act) containing human remains or burial 
artifacts. 
(2) For the purposes of Part 6 of the Act, archaeological objects which are Aboriginal portable cultural objects 
(including but not limited to secret and ceremonial objects, log or bark coffins, human remains, portable rock or 
wood carvings or engravings or stone tools) are prescribed archaeological objects. 
 This limitation is noted as a problem with the current legislation requiring resolution in the Discussion Paper 
(Office of Environment and Heritage (2003). Discussion paper - Heritage Conservation Act Review 2003. Darwin, 
Northern Territory Government Department of Infrastructure Planning and Environment. ) Pp 33-34.  
65  Heritage Advisory Council. (2004, 30 January 2004). "Review of the Heritage Conservation Act."   Retrieved 13 
June, 2004, from http://www.lpe.nt.gov.au/heritage/review/default.htm.  
66  Office of Environment and Heritage (2003). Discussion paper - Heritage Conservation Act Review 2003. Darwin, 
Northern Territory Government Department of Infrastructure Planning and Environment. Pg 9. The online version 
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Northern Territory Heritage Register, perhaps 12 places are principally 
archaeological in nature.67 The Act also contains a power unique in Australian 
heritage legislation, which allows the Minister to declare a specific class of 
sites or objects to be “prescribed objects” under the Regulations,68 and 
therefore protected, although such protection is weak and poorly defined.69 
This power of declaration could be used, potentially, to allow a particular 
locality or group of sites which relate to specific research issues or scientific 
values to be prescribed and protected.70 
 
The Heritage Conservation Act has been characterised as an attempt to 
grapple with heritage conservation squarely within the context of broad land 
management issues, considering heritage sites to be “features within 
landscapes”,71 rather than disconnected, single entities. Efforts striving 
towards this comprehensive management of a range of landscape issues is 
desirable, however the practicalities of such integration continue to elude most 
efforts in land management. Different, overlapping legislation, administered by 
different government agencies with conflicting priorities means that such 
integrated management is rarely achieved. Sullivan and Carment observed a 
specific difficulty with the Heritage Conservation Act, insofar as it attempts to 
manage both natural and cultural heritage in one piece of legislation, yet with 
little recognition of the different skills and requirements needed to manage 
these diverse types of heritage.72 Hiscock highlighted a similar issue with the 
limited archaeological expertise available to the Territory government and the 
concern that this may inhibit the effectiveness of the legislation.73 Both rightly 
note that archaeological sites are often the least recognised features in such 
approaches to land management, due to their largely invisible nature to the 
casual observer and the need, generally, for a degree of specialist 
interpretation to realise their significance. The Northern Territory government 
has recognised the limitations of the existing legislation and, it can be hoped, 
new legislation will better strike a balance between protecting the values of 
different types of heritage places. 
 
In Sullivan and Carment’s commentary on the Northern Territory legislation 
and reform process, they observe that cultural heritage and, more specifically, 
                                                                                                                             
of the NT Heritage Register lists 172 places as of 31 May 2006. 
http://www.nt.gov.au/nreta/heritage/ntregister/index.html 
67  No place listed on the Northern Territory Heritage Register is identified specifically as an archaeological site by 
name. The figure of 12 is ascertained from the published descriptions and statements of significance for items on 
the Register. Other sites may have archaeological components which were not specifically identified in their 
listing details. Heritage Advisory Council. (2003, 14 May 2003). "Northern Territory Heritage Register (Online 
version)."   Retrieved 12 June, 2004, from http://www.lpe.nt.gov.au/heritage/register/default.htm. Reviewed 31 
May 2006. Site now at http://www.nt.gov.au/nreta/heritage/ntregister/index.html 
68  Heritage Conservation Act (1991) Northern Territory. Sections 56(2)(a)-(d). Such prescribed places or objects are 
then listed in Section 3 of the Heritage Conservation Regulations. By contrast, the NSW Heritage Act 1977 
contains a power which allows the Minister to gazette an order declaring certain classes of archaeological ‘relics’ 
to be excluded from protection under the Act. See NSW Heritage Act 1977 Section 139(4). 
69  Hiscock, P. (1994). "Coming to terms with the Northern Territory Heritage Conservation Act 1991." Australian 
Archaeology 38: 55-60. Pg 58. 
70  A further refinement of this process, which could include non-Aboriginal archaeological sites is one of the models 
proposed in the review of the current legislation. Office of Environment and Heritage (2003). Discussion paper - 
Heritage Conservation Act Review 2003. Darwin, Northern Territory Government Department of Infrastructure 
Planning and Environment. Pp 32-33.  
71  Sullivan, M. and D. Carment (1992). Cultural heritage conservation in the Northern Territory. Canberra, Australian 
National University: 27. Pg 3. 
72  Ibid. Pg 13. 
73  Hiscock, P. (1994). "Coming to terms with the Northern Territory Heritage Conservation Act 1991." Australian 
Archaeology 38: 55-60. Pp 58-59. 
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archaeological sites, are not able to be recreated once destroyed, a common 
maxim in archaeological practice.74 Thus heritage protection legislation must 
focus on the retention of those things which make a place significant, as 
opposed to a system of heritage exploitation, which presupposes that the best 
management action for an archaeological site is in fact its excavation. 
Furthermore, they call upon the legislative definition of ‘archaeological’ to be 
widened and made more generic, to apply to any “past human occupation”.75 
This is certainly desirable, considerably more so than any arbitrary distinction 
based on an association with a particular ethnic grouping or date range (for 
example, ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘more than 50 years old’). Such definitions need to be 
further refined if the focus of the legislation is to be more based in a ‘public 
good’ conception of heritage conservation. Certainly the nature of the current 
Northern Territory heritage significance criteria provide scope for 
archaeological heritage to be conceived of as more than just sites and 
objects, to ensure there is a transmission of archaeological knowledge to 
current and future generations. However, achieving this will require different 
mechanisms from those proposed for expanding archaeological heritage 
protection in the Discussion Paper76 and it remains to be seen if such advice 
will be incorporated into the reviewed Heritage Conservation Act. 
 
The Northern Territory has, in many ways, been at the forefront of indigenous 
heritage management, due to a large indigenous population with a greater 
range of enduring cultural associations with specific areas than many 
displaced Aboriginal populations in other States and Territories. The Northern 
Territory was the first Australian jurisdiction to enact a form of heritage 
legislation as well as the first with land rights legislation.77 There has been a 
strong acknowledgement that indigenous heritage is of great relevance to 
contemporary indigenous people, as well as having a strong appeal for 
tourism. While some of the legislative efforts have been less than successful 
in their practical implementation, there has been a definite concern for the 
public values of heritage. This has not always translated into a balanced 
concern for the issues, as politics and pragmatism have weighed heavily on 
conservation efforts, but such concern points the way towards a ‘public good’ 
framework. This would allow the consideration of these wider social issues in 
a more transparent manner, providing for different sorts of conservation or 
community outcomes which can presently be achieved only through political, 
rather than legislative, means.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
74  Sullivan, M. and D. Carment (1992). Cultural heritage conservation in the Northern Territory. Canberra, Australian 
National University: 27. Pp 8-9. 
75  Ibid. Pg 12. This is one of the models proposed in the 2003 Discussion Paper reviewing the Heritage 
Conservation Act. See Office of Environment and Heritage (2003). Discussion paper - Heritage Conservation Act 
Review 2003. Darwin, Northern Territory Government Department of Infrastructure Planning and Environment. 
Pp 33-34. 
76  Ibid.  
77  Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976 (Cth). This was the first legislation that allowed land to be 
granted to Aboriginal people on the basis of traditional association, as opposed to earlier legislation such as the 
Aboriginal Lands Act 1970 (Vic) and the Aboriginal Lands Trust Act 1966 (SA), which allowed Aboriginal reserves 
to be set up, controlled by trusts on behalf of Aboriginal people, rather than directly by them. See also 
http://www.foundingdocs.gov.au/item.asp?dID=57 
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6.4 Queensland 
 
Queensland was a relatively early adopter of cultural heritage legislation for 
indigenous cultural heritage, through the Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act 
1967. During the period of its operation, the Act was described as ineffective78 
and Ellis likened it to an exercise in the social control of Aboriginal people.79 
This Act, now repealed, was replaced by the Cultural Record (Landscapes 
Queensland and Queensland Estate) Act 1987, itself repealed in 2003.80 
While the Cultural Record Act was quite sweeping in its definition of what may 
be considered the “Queensland Estate”, it had principally been used to protect 
Aboriginal cultural and archaeological heritage. This was particularly the case 
following the enactment of the Queensland Heritage Act in 1992, which 
established more generalised heritage protections. The powers with respect to 
historical archaeological heritage were formally folded into the Queensland 
Heritage Act in 2003.81 In 2003, the Queensland legal regime for heritage 
management underwent a comprehensive series of reforms. The Cultural 
Record Act 1987, which managed Aboriginal heritage, was repealed and 
replaced with the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 and the Torres Strait 
Islander Cultural Heritage Act 2003. At the same time, the Queensland 
Heritage Act 1992, which manages non-indigenous heritage, was substantially 
amended to bring it into line with a range of integrated planning reforms.82 The 
two new indigenous heritage management Acts are administered by the 
Department of Natural Resources, Minerals and Energy, while the 
Queensland Heritage Act is administered by the Queensland Heritage 
Council, a part of the Environment Protection Agency. 
 
The Cultural Record Act was considered to be a problematic piece of 
legislation of limited effectiveness,83 prior to its replacement in 2003. One 
parliamentarian noted, in his support for the changes to the legislation: 
 
[u]nder our existing laws, protection is restricted to evidence of human 
occupation of the various areas of Queensland which hold some 
archaeological significance. Any areas that might be significant to 
Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander people but that are not purely 
archaeological cannot be protected. 
 
At the moment the way we deal with Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander culture might be described as ancient Roman or ancient 
Greek. It is an approach based on an assumption that a culture is 
dead. For too long Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people have 
                                            
78  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pg 219 
79  Ellis, B. (1994). "Rethinking the paradigm: cultural heritage management in Queensland." Ngulaig 10. Pp 11-13. 
80  Hereafter the Cultural Record Act. 
81  Parliament of Queensland (2003). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Second Reading 
Speech for the Queensland Heritage and Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003 by Hon. D. M. Wells 
(Murrumba—ALP) (Minister for Environment) Pg 1351. 
82  Environment Protection Agency (2003). Changes to the Queensland Heritage Act. IDAS is established under the 
Integrated Planning Act 1997 (Qld). 
83  Parliament of Queensland (2003). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Second Reading 
Speech for the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Bill 2003 by Hon. S. Robertson (Stretton—ALP) (Minister for Natural 
Resources and Minister for Mines). Pg 3179. See also remarks later in the debates by Mr Seeney (Callide—NPA) 
(Deputy Leader of the Opposition), Pg 4396; Mr Hobbs (Warrego—NPA) Pg 4404; Hon. K. W. Hayward 
(Kallangur—ALP) Pg 4406; Mrs Desley Scott (Woodridge—ALP) Pg 4422. 
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been unable to fully document or record their places of cultural heritage 
significance unless those places are archaeologically significant.84 
 
This is a significant observation on the part of the Parliament, as it recognises 
explicitly the changing conception of indigenous cultural heritage from a purely 
archaeological conception to one which has broader notions of contemporary 
significance and a different focus in terms of protection. For the archaeological 
community, this requires a recognition that arguments about the significance 
of places will need to be based on a concept of significance to the indigenous 
community first, with archaeological research considerations secondary. 
 
A quite different approach has been taken with the recently-enacted 
Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage 
Act. While effectively identical in their provisions, the separation of the Acts 
was at the request of the Torres Strait Islander people, in recognition of their 
distinct culture and different circumstances to mainland Aboriginal people. 
There was a precedent for such action in Queensland, with separate land 
rights legislation passed in 1991 for Aboriginal people and Torres Strait 
Islanders.85 These new Acts provide a broad “blanket” protection for 
indigenous cultural heritage, however they rely on a notion of a “duty of care” 
to prevent harm to indigenous heritage,86 rather than through a rigidly-defined 
approvals process. Declarations may be made through the Government 
Gazette or through the Regulations87 to protect certain items or places and 
require that protected objects or areas not be disturbed without a permit or a 
“reasonable excuse”.88 In the absence of any rigorous definition of 
“reasonable”, it is likely that a defence of ignorance would be able to be used 
in an instance of unauthorised disturbance, provided some level of pre-
disturbance due diligence could be demonstrated. 
 
Permits to affect indigenous cultural heritage have been replaced with binding 
“cultural heritage management plans”.89 Legislators have also attempted to 
resolve elements of the internecine conflicts between indigenous groups by 
giving priority to ‘speak’ on behalf of identified cultural heritage places to the 
registered Native Title claimant(s) for the area in question.90 Importantly, 
however, the Acts recognise that cultural heritage values can exist in the 
absence of a Native Title claim and therefore leave open the ability for 
indigenous cultural heritage values to be interpreted on a wider basis for the 
community. While the primary responsibility for such interpretation will rest 
with an indigenous group, there is a requirement that the assertion of cultural 
heritage value be consistent with advice from other areas of cultural heritage 
                                            
84  Ibid. Speech by Mr MULHERIN (Mackay—ALP) Pg 4400. 
85  Ibid. Second Reading Speech for the Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Bill 2003 by Hon. S. ROBERTSON 
(Stretton—ALP) (Minister for Natural Resources and Minister for Mines). Pp 3180-3181. The Minister is referring 
to the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Qld) and the Torres Strait Islander Land Act 1991 (Qld) which were largely 
identical pieces of legislation but established in a manner which recognised there were cultural differences 
between Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people. 
86  Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act 2003 Section 23 and Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act Section 23. 
87  Only one such place is currently declared in the Heritage Regulations 2003, Section 8(1). 
88  Queensland Heritage Act (1992) Queensland. Sections 47 and 51 respectively. 
89  Ibid. Section 80. 
90  Ibid. Sections 34-37. 
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management, such as archaeology.91 This is clearly an attempt to balance 
indigenous, professional and public values for indigenous heritage, however 
the legislation is still too new to determine if the balance has been struck 
correctly. This provides a significant role for archaeology (and other 
disciplines) within this process, in a way which has been perhaps eroded in 
some jurisdictions over the last 20 years.  
 
During the debates on these bills, the one member of Parliament noted the 
substantial contribution the indigenous past played to the tourism industry for 
her region–more so than the remains of the historical, non-indigenous past:  
 
In Cairns we learnt that lesson some years ago when we became an 
international tourism destination. Many locals had not at that time 
discovered Aboriginal culture or, for that matter, the culture of Torres 
Strait Islander peoples. What then transpired was that the world's 
tourists, in visiting Cairns, found a tremendous fascination not with 
Caucasian Australia but with Aboriginal Australia and with Torres Strait 
Islander culture and customs.92 
 
While this could be viewed as exploitative, such an observation provides a 
substantial motivation for non-indigenous people and governments to take 
notice of heritage issues and put in place appropriate protective legislation. 
But in the case of tourism, and its substantial economic influence, such 
exploitation needs to be sustainable, to allow the presentation of preserved 
heritage to the (paying) public. This is a very different form of exploitation of 
the remains of the past than that derived solely from its treatment as an 
archaeological resource which is excavated and removed. Preservation of 
cultural heritage under such a model becomes more than an exercise in 
placing artefacts in museums or keeping places, undertaking academic 
research or sterilisation of sites for development, but is focussed on 
presenting and preserving the best elements of the past and making them 
available into the future. 
 
Such approaches do not seek to preserve everything, even for the sake of 
tourism. Later in the same speech, the Member for Cairns noted: 
  
One of the things I like particularly about the bills is the flexibility. There 
might be some items, for example, that could be explored as potentially 
of significance in terms of Aboriginal culture, but on the best advice of 
the appropriate Aboriginal people and other experts—archaeologists or 
the like—it may well be that an agreement can be reached between the 
developer or the person involved in the land use and the Aboriginal 
                                            
91  Parliament of Queensland (2003). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Second Reading 
Speech for the Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Bill 2003 by Hon. S. Robertson (Stretton—ALP) (Minister for Natural 
Resources and Minister for Mines). Pp 3179-3180. This provision is held in Section 73 of the two Acts, in the 
requirements for conducting a cultural heritage study. 
92  Ibid. Speech by Ms Boyle, Member for Cairns, during the Third Reading debates for the Aboriginal Cultural 
Heritage Bill and the Torres Straight Islander Cultural Heritage Bill. Pg 4403. Similar sentiments relating to the 
value of non-indigenous heritage to tourism were echoed by Hon. D. M. Wells (Murrumba—ALP) in his Second 
Reading speech for the Queensland Heritage And Other Legislation Amendment Bill 2003, Pg 1349. 
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people not to require the items or the place to be particularly preserved 
in a formal fashion.93 
 
Here the legislature has explicitly stated that the intent of the legislation is not 
to preserve everything, but to preserve the most significant elements of the 
past. By establishing an archaeological protective regime which seeks to 
consider and balance a range of considerations, rather than opting for 
automatic blanket protection for archaeological sites, the Queensland 
legislature has established a good basis for considering archaeological 
heritage in a wider ‘public good’ context than that of a scientific, research-
driven discipline. This implies a negotiated outcome, which balances a range 
of interests–those of indigenous people, archaeologists and other specialist 
professions, developers, landowners and the community generally. A 
community-focussed conservation outcome becomes the goal of the 
legislation, rather than a one-off side benefit. 
 
6.5 South Australia 
 
South Australia was one of the first states to set up a legal heritage 
management regime, with the 1965 Aboriginal and Historic Relics 
Preservation Act.94 This Act, long since repealed, was lauded as an exemplar 
of archaeological heritage legislation in the early days of the Australian 
heritage movement.95 Heritage in South Australia is now managed through 
two main pieces of legislation: the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988, administered 
by the South Australian Department for Aboriginal Affairs and Reconciliation 
and the Heritage Places Act 1993, administered by the Department of the 
Environment and Heritage. The Heritage Places Act is a substantially 
amended and renamed version of the Heritage Act 1993, which occurred in 
2005.96  
 
The existence of separate acts for indigenous and non-indigenous heritage 
demonstrates a legislative commitment to both realms, as well as an 
understanding that the issues faced by these diverse categories of heritage 
are quite different. This legal approach is now the norm in Australian 
jurisdictions, leaving NSW and the ACT the only jurisdictions where Aboriginal 
heritage is incorporated within an Act dealing with other matters. Providing 
separate acts allows the law to cater for different sets of circumstances,97 
issues or types of heritage, while providing, at a symbolic level, a distinct 
recognition of these separate types of heritage as important to the community. 
The enactment of separate legislation for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
                                            
93  Ibid.  
94  The Act was finally assented to in 1967. When the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1979 was passed, repealing the 1965 
Act, similarly there was a delay of three years between ratification by Parliament and assent to the legislation. 
Clearly there was some considerable reluctance to embrace legislation of this type in South Australia. See also 
comments by Ward, G. K. (1983). Archaeology and legislation in Australia. Australian Field Archaeology: A Guide 
to Techniques. G. Connah. Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies: 18-42. Pg 23. 
95  See, for example, contemporary comments in the 1972 Hansard surrounding the debate over the Victorian 
Aboriginal and Archaeological Relics Preservation Act 1972, as well as comments by McKinlay (1973) Pp 66-68 
and in the Hope Report (1974) Pg 176. 
96  The Heritage Act 1993 (SA) was substantially amended and the name changed by the Heritage (Heritage 
Directions) Amendment Act 2005 (SA). 
97  Such an approach was favoured by O’Keefe and Prott when writing about this issue in more general terms. 
O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. Pg 114. 
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heritage has the potential to further empower the Aboriginal community, and 
overcome some of the objections of critics of Aboriginal heritage legislation.98 
 
While South Australia was an early adopter of heritage legislation, passage of 
the legislation was by no means a straightforward process, with the initial 
heritage legislation taking three attempts to successfully pass through the 
South Australian Parliament. The Aboriginal and Historic Objects Preservation 
Bill99 was introduced unsuccessfully in 1964, however the redrafted Aboriginal 
and Historic Relics Preservation Bill100 passed successfully in 1965.101 When 
the Aboriginal and Historic Objects Preservation Bill was under debate in 
1964, its focus was initially quite narrowly conceived: “[the Bill] seeks to 
facilitate the preservation of aboriginal [sic] rock carvings…”; significantly, the 
Bill was viewed as important to both the scientific community and the public, 
although there was no explicit mention of the importance of protecting sites for 
Aboriginal people.102 However, the debates did recognise the importance of 
protecting heritage for present and future generations.103 Much of the debate 
concerned the broad-ranging definition and nature of the protections proposed 
in the Bill, the impacts on landowners and the need to protect important 
Aboriginal heritage items from being sold overseas.  
 
A substantially different Private Member’s Bill was presented late in the 
debate on the Objects Bill and the debate resumed afresh, on the new 
Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Bill.104 The Relics Bill was 
broadened to cover both Aboriginal and historical archaeological remains,105 
and tightened the definitions of what was and was not a protected object. The 
responsibility for administering the Act fell to the Minister of Education, with 
anticipated support from South Australian universities and museums.106 
Parliamentarians expressed a belief that the main purpose of protecting 
                                            
98  E.g. Fourmile, H. (1992). "The need for an independent national inquiry into state collections of Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander cultural heritage." Aboriginal Law Bulletin 2 (56): 3-4. , Fourmile, H. (1996). "The law of the 
land : whose law, whose land." Tempus 5 (1996): 9-17. , Jago, M. and N. Hancock (1998). "The case of the 
missing blanket : indigenous heritage and states' regimes." Indigenous Law Bulletin 4 (16): 18-21.  
99  Hereafter Objects Bill. 
100  Hereafter Relics Bill / Relics Act. 
101  McKinlay, J. R. (1973). Archaeology & legislation : a study of the protection of archaeological sites and material 
by legislative action. Wellington, New Zealand Archaeological Association. Pp 66-67. 
102  Parliament of South Australia (1964). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Session of 1964. 
Third Session of the Thirty-Seventh Parliament. Second Reading Speech for the Aboriginal and Historic Relics 
Preservation Bill by the Hon. C D Rowe (Attorney-General), 1 September 1964, Pg 657. Rowe stated that the 
preservation of rock carvings was desirable for “scientific examination, education and the tourist trade.”  
 It is further worthy of note that a lengthy exchange took place during these debates as to whether “Aboriginal” 
should or should not use a capital ‘A’. See the exchange between the Hon R C DeGaris and the Hon Sir Frank 
Perry, 22 September 1964, Pp 922-923. DeGaris was strongly opposed to the use of the capital ‘A’. 
103  Ibid. Speech by the Hon. R R Wilson (Member for Northern)22 September 1964, Pg 920. 
104  The Hon H K Kemp (Member for Southern) introduced the redrafted Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation 
Bill on 21 October 1964 as a Private Member’s Bill, as an alternative to the Government-sponsored Aboriginal 
and Historic Objects Preservation Bill introduced earlier that year. Ibid. Speech by Kemp, Pp 1532-1534. 
Parliament resolved to suspend discussion of the Objects Bill and hold over debate on the Relics Bill until the 
next year's Parliamentary session, on the basis that the new Bill resolved some of the flaws which had been 
observed in the Objects Bill. Pg 1595. Both Bills lapsed and there was a change of government in the 1964 
election. A somewhat modified version of Kemp’s Relics Bill was reintroduced to Parliament on 4 August 1965, 
with Kemp delivering the Second Reading Speech. Parliament of South Australia (1965). Official Reports of the 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Session of 1965-66. First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament. Pp 800-
801. 
105  Parliament of South Australia (1965). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Session of 1965-
66. First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament. Speech by Kemp, Pp 800-801. Parliamentarians were in 
general favourably disposed to the extension of protection to historical as well as Aboriginal relics. See 
comments by DeGaris on 17 August 1965, Pg 1623; and by the Hon C D Rowe on 31 August 1965, Pg 1335. 
106  Ibid. Kemp, Pg 800. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 6–An overview of State and Territory archaeological heritage protection regimes 174 
“relics” was to educate the public, through an unspecified partnership 
arrangement between archaeologists, museums and educators. This was due 
to the fact that, at that time, Australian archaeology was in its nascence and 
commercialised consulting archaeology, as presently practiced, did not exist. 
In the debate regarding whether to include historic relics, there was a 
significant element of local pride in the history of South Australia, which led to 
these relics being protected. Nevertheless, support for blanket protection for 
relics was mixed and there were statements in favour of allowing the amateur 
collection of relics, as this was seen as assisting in their preservation, as well 
as being a legitimate form of recreational activity.107 Substantial debate 
revolved around how broadly the definition of “relic” should range, with 
concerns it could be too all-encompassing,108 however the Act required the 
location of relics to be gazetted prior to them becoming protected. The 1965 
Act allowed the creation of reserves to protect historic relics,109 with the Crown 
taking ownership of any historic relics within declared protected areas, but 
with a focus on those dating from prior to 1865.110  
 
While the Relics Act was repealed in 1982,111 the legal approaches 
established under it have been passed to subsequent heritage legislation in 
South Australia and, through the influence of the Hope Report,112 to other 
Australian jurisdictions which drafted legislation in its wake. The Aboriginal 
Heritage Act 1979 seemed to be an attempt to negotiate a middle path 
between the interests of archaeologists and Aboriginal people. “Relics” from 
the previous Act were replaced by “items of Aboriginal heritage”, although 
their main criteria for being items worthy of protection was that they were of 
“archaeological, anthropological, ethnological, or historic significance relating 
to the Aboriginal people,”113 so thereby of interest to heritage professionals 
and archaeologists, not because of their significance to contemporary 
Aboriginal people. The Act did recognise that protected items could still be in 
use by Aboriginal people and this use should not be precluded by the 
legislation.114 Otherwise, the protections were typical–the Minister could 
declare “protected areas” containing Aboriginal items115 which were not to be 
                                            
107  Ibid. DeGaris, Pg 1622. There was a feeling that relics would be “lost” without the actions of keen amateur 
collectors. Griffiths reports this as a common attitude amongst non-scientific collectors of archaeological relics in 
Australia. Griffiths, T. (1996). Hunters and Collectors: The antiquarian imagination in Australia. Melbourne, 
Cambridge University Press.  
108  Parliament of South Australia (1965). Official Reports of the Parliamentary Debates (Hansard). Session of 1965-
66. First Session of the Thirty-Eighth Parliament. Speech by the Hon G J Gilfillan (Member for Northern), 18 
August 1965, Pg 1083.  
109  Aboriginal and Historic Relics Preservation Act (1965) South Australia. Sections 16 and 17. 
110  Ibid. Section 21. 1865 was 100 years prior to the passing of the legislation, and was a common age range for 
early Australian heritage protection legislation. South Australia was first settled in 1836 and had reached its 
current boundaries by 1861. Docherty, J. C. (1993). Historical Dictionary of Australia. Sydney, Franklin Watts 
Australia. Pp 129-130. Similarly, NSW initially specified that items must date from before 1900 to be protected. 
This was subsequently changed to a floating date, with protection coming into effect for items more than 50 years 
old. 
111  The Relics Act was replaced by the Aboriginal Heritage Act 1979, however the new Act did not come into effect 
until 1982, demonstrating legislative reluctance to embrace some of the changes in the new legislation. Ward, G. 
K. (1983). Archaeology and legislation in Australia. Australian Field Archaeology: A Guide to Techniques. G. 
Connah. Canberra, Australian Institute of Aboriginal Studies: 18-42. Pg 23.  
112  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 175-176. 
113  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1979) South Australia. Section 5. 
114  Ibid. Section 6. 
115  Ibid. Section 21. 
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disturbed without a permit.116 While the South Australian Heritage Act was 
established in 1978, its protections were limited to places which had been 
registered,117 and made no provision for archaeological heritage specifically. 
With the repeal of the Relics Act a lacuna was left in heritage protection for 
historical archaeological materials, although shipwrecks were protected under 
the 1981 Historic Shipwrecks Act (South Australia). 
 
This gap was filled in part by the Heritage Act 1993 which, in addition to 
establishing the South Australian State Heritage Register,118 established 
provisions to protect geological, palaentological or archaeological places.119 
Those provisions were clearly based in a scientific notion of their heritage 
value, with protections designed to prevent removal of geological or 
palaentological “specimens” or archaeological “artefacts” without a permit. 
The Heritage Act was subject to extensive review and amendment in 2005 
and is now known as the Heritage Places Act 1993. The Heritage Places Act 
has articulated a need for broader goals than conservation alone, adding the 
need for sustainable development to the objects of the Act: 
 
[the Act] encourage[s] the sustainable use and adaptation of heritage 
places in a manner consistent with high standards of conservation 
practice, the retention of their heritage significance, and relevant 
development policies.120 
 
As part of the amendments, the key functions of the Council is to “promote 
public understanding and appreciation of the State's heritage”.121 These 
amendments recognise the need to both provide outreach to the community in 
heritage conservation efforts, as well as to take into account other social 
objectives which may exist alongside conservation. 
 
This scientific conception of archaeological heritage continues virtually 
unchanged in the revised Act, which primarily limits protection to those places 
listed on the State Heritage Register.122 During debate over the Bill, the 
Leader of the Opposition noted that the archaeological provisions of the Act 
were to be strengthened, as the original Act was not designed to deal with 
such matters.123 Later in the same speech, he noted there had never been a 
prosecution under these provisions of the Act and, in effect, the provisions 
provide little additional protection from those of the earlier legislation. 
Sensibly, the Bill was amended to ensure protected archaeological artefacts 
had to have “heritage significance”, with the Minister for Conservation and the 
Environment noting the need for a distinction between such objects and 
                                            
116  Ibid. Section 25. Section 26 in fact allowed the Minister to direct that specific relics be excavated for their 
protection and could empower people to enter land to undertake such excavation, presumably over the 
objections of the landowner. 
117  South Australian Heritage Act (1978) South Australia. Section 11. This Act was repealed by the Heritage Act 
1993 (SA). 
118  Heritage Act (1993) South Australia. Section 13. 
119  Ibid. Sections 25-27. 
120  Heritage Places Act (1993) South Australia. Section 2. 
121  Ibid. Section 5A. 
122  Ibid. Section 26. 
123  Speech by The Hon. I.F. Evans, 7 April 2005. South Australia House of Assembly Hansard. 
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“green bottles hanging in the backyard”.124 This small amendment constrains 
those administering the Act from adopting a legalistic interpretation of what may 
be archaeological, based solely on age, for example. While no specific 
definition is provided for archaeological heritage significance, it is reasonable to 
look upon the heritage significance criteria contained in the Act, specifically: 
 
[an object] may yield information that will contribute to an 
understanding of the State's history, including its natural history.125 
 
Such protection is however limited only to objects divorced from their context, 
rather than addressing archaeological places in a holistic manner. As of mid-
2006, only ten archaeological places are listed on the South Australian State 
Heritage Register,126 providing a very limited protective regime for non-
indigenous archaeological heritage in the State. The Act provides some 
“blanket” protection for unlisted archaeological objects, which requires an 
exercise of due diligence to prevent unauthorised disturbance127 however the 
Heritage Council may develop exemptions from this requirement, for specific 
types of objects, areas of land or types of disturbance. There is a requirement 
for notification in the event of an unexpected archaeological discovery and a 
limited control on the ownership and trade in archaeological objects.128 While 
there was some debate about the need for deterrence in the unauthorised 
disturbance of archaeological places, the Heritage Places Act takes a very 
standard approach to historical archaeological heritage, with an overemphasis 
on individual objects and little consideration of archaeological heritage beyond 
scientific values.  
 
Much greater effort has been placed into the management of indigenous 
heritage in South Australia. The second Aboriginal Heritage Act was passed in 
1988 with overlapping powers to the 1979 Act, which has never been formally 
repealed.129 The 1988 Act changed direction again, with “items” and 
“protected areas” in the 1979 Act becoming “Aboriginal objects” and 
“Aboriginal sites” which can be entered onto the Register of Aboriginal Sites 
and Objects in the 1988 Act.130 These new definitions are interesting for this 
discussion as, in comparison to earlier legislation, the Act moved 
archaeological and scientific values to being a second named consideration to 
the first named Aboriginal cultural values. Aboriginal objects (and sites) are 
defined as being: 
 
(a) of significance according to Aboriginal tradition; or 
(b) of significance to Aboriginal archaeology, anthropology or history.131 
 
                                            
124  Speech by The Hon. J.D. Hill, Minister for Conservation and the Environment, 24 May 2005. South Australia House 
of Assembly Hansard. This amendment relates to the protections for archaeological objects under Section 27(1)(a). 
125  Heritage Places Act (1993) South Australia. Section 16, Criterion C. 
126  Based on a search of the South Australian State Heritage Register, undertaken 23 May 2006. The SA Register is 
searchable through the Australian Heritage Places Inventory: http://www.heritage.gov.au/ahpi/index.html 
127  Heritage Places Act (1993) South Australia. Section 27(1). 
128  Ibid. Sections 27-28. 
129  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1988) South Australia. Notes. While the 1988 Act commenced 1/3/1989, the provision 
which repeals the 1979 Act remains uncommenced. 
130  Ibid. Section 9(2). 
131  Ibid. Section 3. 
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This reordering of the significance criteria, while relatively minor in 
appearance and perhaps in practical effect, does however highlight the 
changing attitude of the South Australian government towards Aboriginal 
heritage. By establishing Aboriginal community significance as the first 
significance criterion, this challenges the notion that the primary value of the 
archaeological heritage is for research or scientific value. The Act still uses 
the problematic qualifier “traditional” but developments in this area may see 
such terminology fall out of use in future amendments, more clearly tying 
significance to the values of the contemporary Aboriginal community. The 
1988 Act broadens its protections to encompass certain types of materials 
which would typically be overlooked in archaeological protection regimes, 
including a requirement for the central collection and preservation of 
Aboriginal heritage archives132 as well as a requirement to consult with 
Aboriginal organisations and traditional owners in advance of any decision-
making.133 It also moves to a blanket protection for Aboriginal objects and 
sites134 including a stricture against unauthorised sale of Aboriginal objects or 
their removal from South Australia.135  
 
The 1988 Aboriginal Heritage Act has attempted to take a less rigid approach 
to protecting Aboriginal heritage and to prioritising the value of that heritage to 
the Aboriginal community over value to archaeologists or academic 
researchers. The Act does however remain principally focussed on the 
protection of objects and sites, with no clear mechanism for realising the 
community value of that protected heritage. This remains quite evident in the 
most serious test of the South Australian heritage regime, the Hindmarsh 
Island case.136 Despite an apparent legislative intent to recognise the 
significance of “Aboriginal tradition” as a valid reason for cultural heritage 
protection, such protection was not forthcoming from the court or Parliament. 
Flood has stated that “the case demonstrated an inability of our legal system 
to adequately comprehend and respect Aboriginal cultural and spiritual 
values.”137 It is not necessary to fully adopt her feminist reading of the 
circumstances to acknowledge that her point is a valid one. If the Australian 
legal system truly wishes to recognise “Aboriginal tradition” as a valid reason 
for cultural heritage protection, particularly in circumstances where that 
protection will impose upon the rights of other, non-Aboriginal people, then it 
is necessary for the courts, legislators and administrators to develop 
confidence that Aboriginal people are not merely making ambit claims when 
asserting cultural secrecy, or implement culturally sensitive methods of testing 
those assertions while respecting that secrecy. The alternative, that Aboriginal 
people may have to compromise aspects of that secrecy in order to see 
                                            
132  Ibid. Sections 9 and 10. 
133  Ibid. Section 13. Section 42 allows for traditional owners (only) to challenge the validity of Ministerial decisions 
under the Act if there has been a failure to adequately consult the traditional owners in the course of a decision 
being made. 
134  Ibid. Sections 21 and 23. 
135  Ibid. Section 29. 
136  Simons, M. (2003). The meeting of the waters: the Hindmarsh Island affair. Sydney, Hodder.  
 Bell, D. (1998). Ngarrindjeri Wurruwarrin: a world that is, was and will be. North Melbourne, Spinifex.  
 Simons account is a journalistic history of the Hindmarsh Bridge matter, while Bell’s is a feminist anthropological 
work which examines and articulates the social issues arising for the local Aboriginal people out of the case. 
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protection implemented, is less likely to be accepted by indigenous people. A 
‘public good’ framework which recognises such issues and allows for a more 
transparent process of regulation may alleviate some of this conflict. Either 
option is a compromise, but both attempt to balance competing value systems 
in a way which sees heritage appropriately protected without privileging fully 
either view. 
 
6.6 Tasmania 
 
Tasmania was one of the last states to implement heritage legislation for 
either indigenous or non-indigenous heritage protection. Tasmanian 
archaeological heritage is protected through two pieces of legislation, the 
Aboriginal Relics Act 1975138 and the Historic Cultural Heritage Act 1995. 
Some basic protections for Aboriginal heritage previously existed in the 
National Parks and Wildlife Act 1970139 which operated concurrently with the 
Aboriginal Relics Act into the 1990s. Some minor powers relating to 
archaeological sites remain in the National Parks and Reserves Management 
Act 2002,140 although this is not the primary Act for protecting archaeological 
heritage. Tasmania has been an interesting location for archaeological work, 
as it has some of the finest of the Australian convict period archaeological 
sites (such as the Port Arthur site).141 It has also had some of the biggest 
controversies over archaeological heritage, through the fraught relationship 
between Aboriginal people and archaeologists in the 1990s142 and the 
Franklin Dam court action.143 Until very recently Tasmania had also adopted a 
rather unusual approach of stipulating a formula for the maximum expenditure 
which could be required for works to a historical archaeological site, through 
the Tasmanian Heritage Council’s Practice Note No 2: Archaeological 
requirements.144  
                                            
138  Unfortunately, the Tasmanian Parliament did not keep Hansard transcripts of Parliamentary debates prior to 
1979, therefore it has not been possible to examine the depth of Parliamentary discussion of the Aboriginal 
Relics Act however the Hansard for the Historic Cultural Heritage Act has been examined for this chapter. 
 Pers. Comm. Tasmania Parliament Hansard Unit, 7 October 2004. McGowan also laments this lack in her 
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heritage legislation in a changing policy environment." Tempus 6: 301-309. Pg 302. 
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142  Allen, J. (1995). "A short history of the Tasmanian affair." Australian Archaeology 41: 43-48. , Morell, V. (1995). 
"Who Owns the Past?" Science 268 (5216): 1424-1427. , Murray, T. and J. Allen (1995). "The forced repatriation 
of cultural properties to Tasmania." Antiquity 69 (266): 871-877. , Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: 
archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 60-61 
 Murray, T. (1996). Archaeologists, Heritage Bureaucrats, Aboriginal organisations and the Conduct of Tasmanian 
Archaeology. Australian Archaeology '95: Proceedings of the 1995 Australian Archaeological Association 
Conference, St Lucia, University of Queensland.  
143  Bates, G. M. (1984). "The Tasmanian Dam Case and Its Significance in Environmental Law." Environmental 
Planning Law Journal 1: 325-345. , Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people 
and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. , Du Cros, H. (2002). Much more than stones and bones: 
Australian archaeology in the late twentieth century. Carlton, Vic., Melbourne University Press. Pp 104-116. 
 Colley, S. M. (2002). Uncovering Australia: archaeology, indigenous people and the public. Crows Nest, N.S.W., 
Allen & Unwin. Pg 71. 
144  Tasmanian Heritage Council (2000). Practice Note No 2: Archaeological Requirements.  (now revised May 2006) 
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The Aboriginal Relics Act is designed to protect Aboriginal relics, as individual 
objects,145 created before 1876,146 which is taken to be the date that the 
original Aboriginal Tasmanians were alleged to have been exterminated.147 
While this view of the extermination of the Tasmania Aboriginal people is no 
longer widely accepted and there are a significant number of Tasmanian 
people who assert Aboriginality,148 this date persists in the legislation. The 
Aboriginal Relics Act establishes the Aboriginal Relics Advisory Council149 and 
allows for the declaration of protected sites which contain relics150 as well as 
establishing general protections for relics.151 The definition of ‘relic’ does 
include Aboriginal human remains in some instances,152 although steps have 
been taken to return some public collections of human remains to the 
Aboriginal community.153 The Act underwent substantial review and 
amendment in the 1980s, following a boycott of the Aboriginal Relics Advisory 
Council by the Aboriginal community, although the amendments did not go as 
far as predicted.154 Writing during the middle of the Act’s period of operation, 
in 1990, McGowan noted that the Act had largely been used to control the 
activities of archaeologists, rather than developers155 and that the Act was 
established with the idea of conserving the “scientific” value of Aboriginal 
heritage, due to the principally scientific membership of the Relics Advisory 
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for Aboriginal places of significance. Cultural conservation: towards a national approach. S. Sullivan. Canberra, 
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Council. This was exacerbated during the resignations of the Aboriginal 
community representatives in the mid-1980s from the Council, as the Council 
then relied solely on a scientific assessment of the heritage value of a 
place.156 McGowan further noted that the goals of the responsible government 
agency had significantly changed and had moved to protecting both scientific 
and Aboriginal significance and providing a greater determinative role to 
Aboriginal people in the management of protected heritage.157 
 
While Tasmania did consider introducing historic cultural heritage protection 
legislation in 1979,158 it was nearly two decades before the Historical Cultural 
Heritage Act 1995 was passed.159 The Historic Cultural Heritage Act 
established the Tasmanian Heritage Council160 and the Heritage Register.161 
The Act sets out the main purposes of the Tasmanian Heritage Council, which 
includes as its primary function the protection of historic cultural heritage for 
the “benefit of the present community and future generations”, as well as to 
promote public interest, education and tourism.162 The Act sets out the criteria 
for heritage significance.163 Under a traditional, “research significance” 
approach to significance, the most relevant criterion for archaeological 
heritage is criterion (c) “potential to yield information that will contribute to an 
understanding of Tasmania's history”, which was recognised in Parliamentary 
debate as the main criterion related to archaeological heritage.164 During the 
preparation of the Bill, the Aboriginal community specifically requested that 
Aboriginal heritage be excluded from the new Act.165 While ‘archaeological’ 
significance is recognised in the generic definition of “historic cultural heritage 
significance”,166 the Act does not otherwise provide protection for historical 
archaeological sites unless they are listed on the Heritage Register, although 
it does provide generic protection for historic shipwrecks.167 The definition of 
heritage significance is somewhat at variance with wider Australian practice, 
which is itself based on the Hope Report and the Burra Charter. The 
Tasmanian Parliament chose to exclude “aesthetic significance” as a 
consideration,168 and substantial debate ensued as to whether “social 
significance” should also be excluded from the legislation as a criterion too 
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Tasmania." Australian Archaeology 31: 61-66. Pg 64.  
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161  Ibid. Section 15 
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163  Ibid. Section 16. 
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broad to be applied effectively.169 This Act has undergone an extensive review 
in 2005170, however the recommendations of that review have not yet been 
implemented.171 Amongst the recommendations of the Review is the 
amendment of the Act to include aesthetic significance and bring the 
legislation into broad conformity with heritage management practise across 
Australia.172 
 
Tasmania has, in many respects, shown the greatest reticence towards 
heritage legislation, despite the State having some of the most intact historic 
places in Australia. The debates in the Hansard for the Historic Cultural 
Heritage Bill the strongly reflect the view of many parliamentarians that the Act 
should not be seen to erode property rights or impose unfairly upon property 
owners. Substantial debate also ensued as to whether property owners 
should be reimbursed by the government for the cost of engaging heritage 
professionals.173 The debate as a whole provided a fascinating insight into the 
misconceptions regarding the archaeological profession in Australia. Clearly 
there was at least some belief within the Tasmanian Parliament that 
archaeologists existed within the community who would be prepared to 
undertake compliance-based archaeological work, stipulated by planning 
authorities, on a voluntary basis. This reflects ongoing misconceptions that 
archaeologists exist as a part of an academic or philanthropic community, 
rather than as business-people or workers who can expect to be paid for 
assisting clients to undertake legislative compliance-based archaeological 
works. During the debate, other members refuted this view, and felt it 
essential that work to heritage sites be undertaken by appropriately qualified, 
and remunerated, professionals.174  
 
In a recent development, one of the more controversial aspects of Tasmania’s 
archaeological heritage management has been reformed. In the late 1990s, in 
response to concern over the mounting costs of archaeological excavations in 
the State, the Heritage Council issued Practice Note No.2,175 which stipulated 
a mathematical formula for determining the maximum expenditure which could 
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174  Parliament of Tasmania (1995). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard), House of Assembly, Forty-Second Parliament 
- Fourth Session. See particularly the exchange between Messrs Shaw, Wilson and Fletcher during the 
Committee debates. 16 November 1995, Pp 4753-4755. 
175  Tasmanian Heritage Council (2000). Practice Note No 2: Archaeological Requirements.  
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be required for an archaeological excavation mandated through legislative 
compliance.176 One of the stated purposes of the Practice Note was to 
“encourage development solutions which minimise disturbance of significant 
deposits” through a pre-approval assessment and design review phase.177 
However as the costs were set so low, there was little deterrent value. The 
newly revised Practice Note No.2,178 while still emphasising impact 
minimisation to archaeological places, has dispensed with the formula. The 
revised Practice Note No.2 states that while archaeological sites most 
commonly have heritage significance due to their ability to provide new 
information about the past (that is, research significance) they may have other 
values, including social and associative significance. This represents a great 
theoretical advance in the administration and management of heritage in 
Tasmania, although it is too early to know what practical effect this will have in 
the management of historical archaeological sites in the State. 
 
Tasmania’s heritage management regimes for both indigenous and non-
indigenous archaeological heritage have been fraught with controversy, 
however the policy development and proposed legislative changes identified 
in the last year are beginning to address these issues. The recent review of 
non-indigenous heritage legislation has not proposed any radical changes for 
archaeological heritage management, and is recommending the continued 
use of listing as the primary tool for protecting archaeological sites.179 This 
recommendation is based, in part, on the fact that Tasmania does not suffer 
from the same development pressure as other parts of Australia,180 thus there 
is the opportunity to undertake more up-front research rather than reactive 
compliance. Such an approach is certainly desirable, and it will be interesting 
the see if Tasmania takes the opportunity to put such policy and planning 
tools into place in future. Tasmania has illustrated perhaps the worst of the 
politics of heritage management in Australia, particularly in relation to 
indigenous heritage. Moves appear to be underway to broaden the conception 
of the values of archaeological heritage and treat it as a shared concern for 
the broader community. Should this prove successful, Tasmania will be in a 
good position to put ‘public good’ conceptions of archaeological heritage 
conservation into practice for the future. Such a framework, which allows 
consideration of wider issues affected by or affecting archaeological heritage, 
may help to diffuse some of the political concern which surrounds 
archaeological heritage conservation. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
176  This formula was expressed as the archaeological significance of the site, multiplied by the impact of 
development works, multiplied again by the footprint (in square metres) of the new development. Under the 
formula, the maximum expenditure which could be required on archaeological works, irrespective of the 
significance of the site, was AUD$100,000. A representative from the Tasmanian Heritage Office contacted 
during the course of research for this thesis, indicated the formula had been use in the order of 10 times since its 
inception. Pers. comm. James Puustinen, Heritage Research Officer, Tasmanian Heritage Office (12 October 
2004). 
177  Tasmanian Heritage Council (2000). Practice Note No 2: Archaeological Requirements. Pg 1–Preamble. 
178  Tasmanian Heritage Council (2006). Practice Note No 2: Archaeological Requirements (Revised May 2006).  
179  Godden Mackay Logan P/L (2005). Tasmanian Heritage Act Review: A report prepared for Heritage Tasmania 
and the Department of Parks, Tourism, Heritage and the Arts. Sydney, Godden Mackay Logan P/L. Pp 31-32. 
180  Ibid.  
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6.7 Western Australia 
 
Western Australia adopted legislation to protect Aboriginal heritage from a 
relatively early date, however legislation to protect other forms of heritage did 
not follow for nearly two decades. Aboriginal heritage legislation was originally 
proposed in 1968, but the Aboriginal Heritage Bill was not introduced into 
Parliament and passed until 1972.181 Protection for other types of heritage 
was introduced in 1990, through the Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990, 
which established the Heritage Council of Western Australia182 and the 
Register of Heritage Places183 as the primary mechanism for protecting non-
indigenous heritage places.  
 
The Aboriginal Heritage Act 1972 remains the key instrument for protecting 
Aboriginal heritage, which was established to: 
 
…make provision for the preservation on behalf of the community of 
places and objects customarily used by or traditional to the original 
inhabitants of Australia or their descendants…184 
 
The expressed intent of the Act is to protect places and objects of Aboriginal 
heritage significance “for the community”, including the contemporary 
Aboriginal community. The Act links significance to custom and tradition rather 
than scientific value. In this respect, it is similar to the approach of the South 
Australian Aboriginal Heritage Act 1988. During Parliamentary debate, the 
government stated that its intent was to protect Aboriginal sites and objects 
principally to support the social practices of Aboriginal people, but also 
recognised the importance of the archaeological contents of sites to broaden 
an understanding of the Australian past.185 By contrast, the Opposition of the 
day viewed the legislation as primarily focussed on preserving items for 
museums or for scientific study. There was also a clear view, on the part of 
the Opposition, that the Act should not delay the progress of other works or 
development through the protection of heritage sites or objects186 as well as 
an expressed fear that the Act could be misused by “unscrupulous Aborigines” 
to disrupt works.187 This sentiment was echoed nearly 20 years later during 
the debates on the Heritage of Western Australia Bill in 1990.188 In order to 
keep certain projects free from complications arising under the Act, there have 
                                            
181  Parliament of Western Australia (1972). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Twenty-Seventh Parliament Third Session. Speech by Mr Harman (Member for Maylands), 5 
September 1972, Pg 2968 
182  Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) Western Australia. Section 5(1). 
183  Ibid. Section 46(1). 
184  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1972) Western Australia.  Preamble. 
185  Parliament of Western Australia (1972). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Twenty-Seventh Parliament Third Session. Aboriginal Heritage Bill Second Reading Speech by the 
Hon W.F. Willesee (Member for North-East Metropolitan, Leader of the House), 11 April 1972, Pp 471-472. 
These sentiments were echoed in other speeches later in the debate including the Hon W.R Withers (Member for 
North), 20 April 1972, Pg 837 and Mr Ridge (Member for Kimberley), 5 September 1972, Pg 2969. 
186  Ibid. Speech by the Hon G.C. MacKinnon (Member for Lower West), 20 April 1972, Pg 831. 
187  Ibid. Speech by The Hon L.A. Logan (Member for Upper West), 4 May 1972, Pg 1245. 
188  Parliament of Western Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament Second Session. Speech by Mr Lewis (Member for Applecross) 21 August 
1990, Pg 3825. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 6–An overview of State and Territory archaeological heritage protection regimes 184 
been instances where special legislation has been used to exempt areas from 
compliance with the legislation.189  
 
The Aboriginal Heritage Act protects “Aboriginal cultural material” as well as 
“Aboriginal sites”,190 which have quite extensive definitions191 and focus 
particularly on “sacred” places and objects which have “important or special 
significance”192 to Aboriginal people living in accordance with customary 
law193 or which have historical, archaeological or ethnographic value to the 
State.194 Fulcher cites a Western Australian Supreme Court case where a 
“sacred site” was defined based on Aboriginal tradition rather than on 
historical records or physical (that is, archaeological) evidence195 thus within 
Australian case law and emerging heritage management policy there exists 
some scope for the primacy of a community view to take precedence over a 
‘scientific’, archaeological view of a site’s significance. Excavation of 
Aboriginal sites is controlled,196 and sites of particular importance may be 
designated as protected areas under the Act,197 while other “Aboriginal 
cultural material” (such as moveable objects or artefacts) undergo a separate 
process of assessment to be classified as protected,198 with all protected sites 
and objects recorded in a Register.199 Despite these detailed controls, the Act 
has been described as “weak” and in the past the Act has been amended to 
specifically facilitate a development project desired by the government of the 
day.200 
 
The intention of the Aboriginal Heritage Act expressed during debates was 
that consultation should occur prior to an excavation of a site being 
authorised. It was also stated that a certain level of “professional standing” 
would be required before such a permit could be granted: 
 
…I would point out that that the decision to permit an excavation is 
necessarily based on more than an appreciation of the site itself. The 
trustees [of the Act] would certainly be expected to seek local 
Aboriginal opinion before permitting an excavation but the judgement 
would also depend upon such factors as the professional standing of 
                                            
189  A number of areas are exempted from the Aboriginal Heritage Act under the Aboriginal Heritage (Marandoo) Act 
(1992) Western Australia.  
190  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1972) Western Australia. Section 4. 
191  Ibid. Sections 5 and 6 respectively. These definitions elaborate considerably on those initially set out in Section 4. 
192  Ibid. Section 5. 
193  Ibid. Section 8. 
194  Ibid. Section 5(c).  
195  Fulcher, J. (1999). "Changes proposed to the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Protection Act 1984 and their impact on project developments." Australian Environmental Law News (2): 67-69. 
Pg 68. The case is Noonkanbah Pastoral Co Pty Ltd v. Amax Iron Ore Corporation, Unreported, Supreme Court 
of Western Australia, Brisden J, 27 June 1979. This case is examined in the context of judicial reasoning on 
archaeological and heritage matters in Chapter 5. 
196  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1972) Western Australia. Section 16 
197  Ibid. Section 19. Section 20 allows the declaration of protected areas on a temporary basis. 
198  Ibid. Section 40. 
199  Ibid. Section 38. 
200  In 1980 the Act was amended to facilitate the Noonkanbah mining development. See discussion in Toussaint, S. 
(1995). Western Australia. Contested Ground: Australian Aborigines under the British Crown. A. McGrath. St 
Leonards, Allen & Unwin: 240-269. Pp 261-262. Similarly the Aboriginal Heritage (Marandoo) Act 1992 (WA) 
identified a number of areas associated with various developments which were exempted from the provisions of 
the Act. This is a similar, though more heavy-handed, legislative approach to that of the 2005 amendments to the 
NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, Section 3A, which allows the Minister to declare certain 
areas or developments exempt from the heritage provisions of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 and 
Heritage Act 1977. See also discussion of the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (SA) earlier in this Chapter. 
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the institution supporting the work, and the professional competence 
and character of the individuals who will carry out the excavation. 
Archaeological sites are a limited commodity and represent a declining 
resource of our cultural heritage…201 
 
The Act clearly privileges Aboriginal people living a “traditional” or “customary” 
lifestyle, in terms of providing access to sites and objects,202 but such a 
construction belies at least to some extent the fact that Aboriginal people 
living “non-traditional” (as defined by anthropologists and ethnographers) 
lifestyles may well have a legitimate claim to the use and enjoyment of their 
heritage. This again highlights the concerns of Fourmile and others203 
discussed earlier in this chapter, regarding the fallacies inherent in legally 
privileging a narrowly constructed anthropological view of the “traditional” 
Aboriginal in the protection of the remains of the Aboriginal past. 
 
The Aboriginal Heritage Act is criticised by Ritter as not being a particularly 
effectual piece of legislation, which, in his view, is designed to facilitate and 
legitimate the destruction of Aboriginal heritage, rather than preserving that 
heritage for the Aboriginal community.204 This is borne out in the composition 
of the Aboriginal Cultural Material Committee, an advisory body constituted 
under the Act,205 as there is no requirement that the membership include 
Aboriginal persons. However there is a requirement that one of the members 
be an anthropologist with “specialised experience in the field of anthropology 
as related to the Aboriginal inhabitants of Australia.”206 This leaves open the 
interpretation that the Act and the Committee are primarily in existence to 
protect Aboriginal heritage for the scientific (anthropological, archaeological, 
professional) community rather than for Aboriginal people or the public at 
large. This is particularly notable as the Committee is the sole arbiter of the 
importance of Aboriginal heritage places or objects “on behalf of the 
community”,207 although the Act does direct that primary importance be 
attached to sacred or spiritual beliefs with respect to significance, above other 
types of significance, including archaeological significance.208 This granting of 
primacy to Aboriginal spiritual significance over other values is also 
recognised in the classification process for objects.209  
 
Protection for non-indigenous heritage in Western Australia was much 
delayed and the Heritage of Western Australia Act was not passed until 
1990.210 Legislation to protect non-indigenous heritage in Western Australia 
                                            
201  Parliament of Western Australia (1972). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Twenty-Seventh Parliament Third Session. Speech by the Hon W.F. Willesee, 4 May 1972, Pg 1246. 
202  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1972) Western Australia. Sections 7 and 8. 
203  Fourmile, H. (1996). "The law of the land : whose law, whose land." Tempus 5 (1996): 9-17.  
 Jago, M. and N. Hancock (1998). "The case of the missing blanket : indigenous heritage and states' regimes." 
Indigenous Law Bulletin 4 (16): 18-21.  
204  Ritter, D. (2003). Trashing Heritage: Dilemmas of rights and power in the operation of Western Australia's 
heritage legislation. History and Native Title. C. Choo and S. Hollbach. Crawley, W.A., Centre for Western 
Australian History University of Western Australia. 23: 195-208.  
205  Aboriginal Heritage Act (1972) Western Australia. Section 28. 
206  Ibid. Section 28(3). 
207  Ibid. Section 39(1)(a). 
208  Ibid. Section 39(3). 
209  Ibid. Section 40(a). 
210  The first discussions by Parliament regarding heritage legislation took place in 1974. Legislation was not 
introduced for debate however until the Heritage Places Bill 1987 and the Heritage Enhancement and 
Preservation Bill 1989 (which applied to government-owned property only), neither of which successfully passed 
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was prompted by a number of incidents of wanton demolition of heritage 
buildings in other states (particularly Queensland)211 as well as specific 
problems with government-sponsored developments in the state capital of 
Perth, particularly at the Swan Brewery site.212 The legislation engendered an 
enormous amount of debate, perhaps more so than any other Australian 
jurisdiction,213 particularly around the issue of whether landholders should be 
compensated if their property was heritage listed. The Act established the 
Heritage Council of Western Australia,214 the Register of Heritage Places215 
and the criteria for heritage significance.216 A permit is required to affect 
places listed on the Register or subject to a Conservation Order.217 The Act 
does not however specifically protect archaeological sites or objects, unless 
they are listed on the Register, although the importance of this type of 
heritage was recognised during Parliamentary debate.218 The standard for 
listing requires not only that a place meets the significance criteria219 to be 
registered but also that the place has significance for present and future 
generations.220 While listing procedures for placing items on the Register are 
similar to those used in other jurisdictions, removal of an item requires a 
resolution of both houses of Parliament for the removal to take effect.221 The 
effect of this is as much to limit the listing of places, through the establishment 
of a high administrative threshold, as it is to prevent their removal once listed. 
Such a provision requires a great level of commitment at both an 
administrative and political level in order to see a place listed on the Register. 
 
The Act makes special provision for areas to be listed on the basis of 
“scientific” significance, including, but not necessarily limited to, 
archaeological places: 
 
in the case of places of particular scientific or other special interest, the 
extent to which the place has contributed, or may be likely to 
contribute, to knowledge or research222 
 
This clause appears designed to capture the essence of Bickford and 
Sullivan’s archaeological significance criteria, for archaeological work to be 
                                                                                                                             
through Parliament. Parliament of Western Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative 
Council and Legislative Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament Second Session. Second Reading Speech by the Hon 
Kay Hallahan (Member for East Metropolitan, Minister for Heritage), 11 September 1990, Pg 4722. See also 
comments by the Hon P G Pendall (Member for South Metropolitan), 12 September 1990, Pg 4898. 
211  Fisher, R. (1991). 'Nocturnal demolitions': the long march towards heritage legislation in Queensland. Packaging 
the past? Public histories. J. Rickard and P. Spearritt. Melbourne, Melbourne University Press: 55-69.  
212  Churches, S. C. (1992). "Aboriginal heritage in the wild west: Robert Bropho and the Swan Brewery site." 
Aboriginal Law Bulletin 2 (56): 9-13.  
213  Judging by the sheer volume on Hansard surrounding the Bill during 1989 to 1990, as compared to other debates 
examined for this thesis. 
214  Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) Western Australia. Section 5. 
215  Ibid. Section 46. 
216  Ibid. Section 47. 
217  Ibid. Section 64. 
218  Parliament of Western Australia (1990). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Thirty-Third Parliament Second Session. See, for example, comments by Mr P J Smith (Member for 
Bunbury), 23 August 1990, Pg 4113. “What is under the ground is also important. Artefacts are buried on many 
archaeological sites and these sites should be preserved.” See also comments by the Hon Kay Hallahan, 18 
October 1990, Pg 6298. 
219  The Western Australian heritage significance criteria are similar to those used across Australia, although 
somewhat abbreviated. 
220  Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) Western Australia. Section 47(1)(a). 
221  Ibid. Section 54(7). 
222  Ibid. Section 47(2)(c). 
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tied to places which were able to contribute new knowledge of the past.223 
Applied appropriately, this criterion should ensure that no site is listed on the 
basis of dubious scientific value or marginal ability to contribute to knowledge 
of the past. The very tight nature of this criterion may be reflected in the fact 
that there is only one place specifically listed as an archaeological site in the 
Register of Heritage Places,224 although it is likely other places entered within 
the Register have archaeological heritage values. During debate on the Act, 
one parliamentarian indicated there was an expectation that the operators of 
the legislation would act with discretion in its administration,225 to avoid the 
problem of the Act becoming trivialised. The comment appears to anticipate 
the potential for a legalistic approach to the definition of archaeological 
heritage, in a manner which leads to outcomes of negligible value. As noted 
earlier in the chapter, South Australia dealt with this issue through the simple 
method of requiring an archaeological object to also have demonstrable 
heritage significance. This principle is inherent in regimes which require listing 
of archaeological places, in advance (of threat), in order for them to be 
protected, as is the case in Tasmania. 
 
The legal protections for historical archaeological heritage are considerably 
less detailed. While much legislation focuses on its protective value for 
heritage, the Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 is explicit that its goals, 
while including conservation and enhancement of heritage sites, also include 
the facilitation of the development of such sites.226 This stated intent came 
about through a heated debate regarding the need to protect the property 
rights of West Australian landowners. Gerus views the statements of intent in 
the Act as an attempt to strike a balance within the legislation.227 Concern with 
property rights in this manner largely revolved around the issue of providing 
certainty for landowners and developers as to the actual value and potential 
uses of an area which was heritage listed.228 These concerns continue into 
the present day, as can be seen from many of the submissions to the 
Productivity Commission Inquiry. While the stated intent is to “facilitate 
development that is in harmony with the cultural heritage values of that area” it 
is almost impossible to see how such an outcome could be achieved with 
respect to any archaeological heritage protected under this legislation, 
particularly if the focus was on the research significance of a site. This may 
explain why virtually no archaeological sites are listed on the Western 
Australian Register of Heritage Places.  
 
In some respects, the early West Australian Aboriginal heritage legislation 
was ahead of its time, as while it recognised the scientific value of 
                                            
223  See discussion in Chapter 2, as well as Bickford, A. and S. Sullivan (1984). Assessing the research significance 
of historic sites. Site Surveys and Significance Assessment in Australian Archaeology. S. Sullivan and S. 
Bowdler. Canberra, Dept. of Prehistory Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University: 19-26.  
224  A search of the State Register of Heritage Places on 8 August 2006 identified ten places specifically identified as 
archaeological sites, out of approximately 1000 places listed on the Register.  
 http://register.heritage.wa.gov.au/index.html  
225  Parliament of Western Australia (1972). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Legislative Council and Legislative 
Assembly. Twenty-Seventh Parliament Third Session. Speech by the Hon W.F. Willesee, 9 May 1972, Pg 1339. 
226  Heritage of Western Australia Act (1990) Western Australia. Sections 4(2)-4(3) 
227  Gerus, M. (1993). "The Heritage of Western Australia Act 1990 and culturally sustainable development." 
Australian Environmental Law News 3: 31-39. Pg 32. 
228  James, P. C. and J. Mora (1996). Australian Mosaic: A handbook for the conservation of the National Estate. 
Cairns, Mukkamanna Holdings. Pp 18-19. 
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archaeological places, it also linked their significance more strongly to the 
value of the place to the indigenous community. This is commendable, but 
West Australian governments have shown a great willingness to set such 
legislation aside when necessary to facilitate a development project. Historical 
archaeology protection in the State has fared little better, with few places 
registered and no other protections in place. The political dimension of 
archaeological heritage and its perceived threat to other legitimate interests 
further highlights the need for a framework such as ‘public good conservation’ 
which can accommodate these considerations when determining the 
appropriate course for managing an archaeological heritage issue. 
 
6.8 Conclusion–Many laws, many approaches 
 
All Australian jurisdictions have, in different ways, recognised the importance 
of Australia’s archaeological heritage and each provides a protective 
mechanism which may be used to protect that heritage in certain 
circumstances. The diversity of approaches is quite substantial, painting a 
rather haphazard picture of the legislative effectiveness of archaeological 
heritage protection law across Australia. In general, most Australian 
jurisdictions have favoured the protection of archaeological sites through 
placing them on a list or register, rather than by establishing blanket protection 
across the entire jurisdiction.229 The reason, in large part, is the desire on the 
part of many Australian legislatures not to unnecessarily burden landowners 
or the State with the significant unknowns which can arise from the presence 
of archaeological sites on land. Whereas blanket protection for archaeological 
sites tends to err on the side of caution for the interests of archaeologists 
and/or Aboriginal people, the listing approach errs on the side of the property 
owner. There is a middle ground, supported by appropriate significance 
frameworks, which would achieve a better balance of competing factors. 
 
Clearly archaeological heritage remains a poor second cousin to built or 
natural heritage in the eyes of lawmakers. The legislative understanding of the 
significance of the archaeological heritage is almost exclusively based on a 
conception of that heritage as having “scientific” significance to the 
professional archaeological community, or having “traditional” significance to 
indigenous people. Both of those interests reside in the minority and are 
unlikely to sway the popular conscience, and thereby the conscience of the 
legislators, unless archaeological heritage is seen as relevant to the wider 
community. Certain archaeological sites have been used to construct 
community identities (for example, Port Arthur Tasmania or Gallipoli in 
Turkey),230 and the potential exists for archaeological sites to be significant to 
the community at a national, state/territory or local level if appropriately 
presented to the community. Archaeological sites remain difficult to manage in 
a legal sense without creating an enormously burdensome administrative 
system. Legal mechanisms continue to focus on the protection of sites and 
objects first and foremost, as these are the tangible elements of the 
archaeological heritage and those which the layperson, including legislators, 
                                            
229  Although see the NSW and Victorian approaches, addressed in Chapter 7. 
230  Ireland, T. (1996). Excavating national identity. Sites: nailing the debate: archaeology and interpretation in 
museums. C. Paine. Sydney, Historic Houses Trust of NSW: 85-106.  
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most readily associates with archaeology as a discipline. This, particularly, 
fails to cater for indigenous or other community values which may attach to a 
place. 
 
While lawmakers over the last thirty years of debate regarding heritage 
legislation have often been aware of the need to present the archaeological 
heritage to the community, the mechanisms for doing so in Australian 
legislation are not particularly robust. They suffer from a tendency to either 
assume (rightly or wrongly) that an institution (a museum or a university) will 
step into the role of presenting the archaeological heritage to the community, 
or leave the onus on the body administering the Act, but without a specific 
mandate or mechanism to allow effective transmission of the archaeological 
heritage to present and future generations. The recognition of the importance 
of sites to indigenous communities provides a model, albeit an imperfect one, 
to strive for in future legislation in Australia. With Aboriginal heritage, many 
jurisdictions do recognise that there is a tangible link between the physical 
remains of the indigenous past and contemporary identities. If that conception 
is extended to the wider community in a legal sense, management decisions 
can begin to be made about how important a site is to the wider community, 
the ability of a site to present or educate the community about an aspect of its 
own past or how a site may be used to build links between the community and 
its heritage. 
 
Such a model, which tests the public qualities of a site on an equal or superior 
basis to any scientific or research potential begins to lead towards public good 
conservation outcomes. A few of the regimes analysed throughout this 
chapter begin to hint at how such a legislative regime may work, by prioritising 
protective mechanisms around the significance of the site to the community or 
by giving higher consideration to the community values of a site. But none of 
the existing legal regimes point to a clear path in recasting the legal protection 
of archaeological heritage from a focus on scientific value to public good 
value. In terms of achieving public good conservation outcomes, these 
regimes provide limited opportunities, save for the ability to specify conditions 
of consent when a site is authorised to be disturbed, which may be used to 
direct some public benefit from the project, but only in a post hoc manner. A 
‘public good’ framework which explicitly recognises other legitimate concerns 
and weighs them against the ‘scientific’ values for archaeological sites, may 
lessen some of the political concerns about the importance or value of 
archaeological heritage conservation and reduce the governmental propensity 
to establish special legislation to override heritage legislation when politically 
expedient. 
 
Chapter 7 considers two Australian jurisdictions in more depth, examining the 
legal mechanisms and approaches of New South Wales and Victoria to 
archaeological heritage protection. These states, which are the most populous 
and, in the case of NSW, the longest settled by non-indigenous people, have 
the most comprehensive archaeological heritage protection legislation in 
Australia. The approaches between the two states are quite distinct, and 
analysis will demonstrate that even comprehensive legislation does not lead 
to better outcomes for Australia’s archaeological heritage. 
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Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 
 
Two jurisdictions, New South Wales and Victoria, have been selected for 
more detailed study and analysis. These two States have the most 
comprehensive heritage legislation which has been operating uninterrupted 
for the longest period of time. Additionally, as the two most populous states, 
they have been the subject of the greatest development pressures, 
particularly in urban areas, and have the greatest quantity of data for analysis. 
Each state has a different approach in law to managing its archaeological 
heritage, however the mechanisms used have many fundamental similarities. 
Wherever possible, reliance has been placed on published figures of permits 
and approvals issued (from Annual Reports) and, to a lesser extent, the 
original records of the authorities and the databases they use to track this type 
of information. However, during this research, it was noted that there are 
minor discrepancies between various sets of figures. This seems to relate to a 
range of factors, including missing or incomplete original records for the early 
years of administering the legislation, inconsistent reporting practices and 
errors during transcription of data between manual and electronic systems. 
Nevertheless, observable trends are evident in the data. Analysis of these 
jurisdictions demonstrates that, despite the strong scientific emphasis of long-
standing compliance regimes such as these, this has not led to a true 
realisation of the scientific value of archaeological heritage in these States. 
Additionally, it is possible to observe how the quantity of compliance-based 
archaeological work has been ever-increasing, however the quality and 
quantity of the outcomes of compliance have not matched the level of legal 
and administrative effort which has gone into the management of 
archaeological heritage. This illustrates that there are fundamental limitations 
with the scientific protective paradigm, as even in jurisdictions with 
comprehensive legislation and long-running protective programs, the goal of 
protecting archaeology for science has had a very limited effect. A change in 
the protective paradigm, to a ‘public good’ model, opens up the possibility of a 
different range of processes and associated outcomes which may better serve 
both heritage conservation and the public. 
 
7.1 Case Study–Victoria  
 
Victoria is one of two Australian jurisdictions to have implemented specifically 
archaeological legislation, in the form of the Archaeological and Aboriginal 
Relics Preservation Act 1972.1 While this was an early date for the legal 
protection of cultural heritage in Australia, by comparison Victoria had taken 
legislative steps to protect natural heritage and native species in the 
nineteenth century.2 The AARP Act is limited to the protection of Aboriginal 
archaeological heritage and, while somewhat modified from its original form, 
continued in force for the protection of Aboriginal heritage until quite recently. 
                                            
1  Hereafter AARP Act. The other jurisdiction is Western Australia, in the form of the Maritime Archaeology Act 
1973, however maritime archaeological issues are excluded from discussion in this thesis. 
2  Seebeck, J. (1995). "The Conservation of mammals in Victoria - development of legislative controls." Journal of 
Australian Studies (45): 53-65.  
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 191 
It will shortly be replaced by the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006.3 Victoria is also 
the subject of a special section of the Commonwealth Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act 1984, which gives the Commonwealth 
the power to protect indigenous places and objects.4 This power is delegated 
back to the relevant Victorian State Minister.5 A bill is presently before the 
Australian Parliament to amend the ATSIHP Act 1984, to repeal the specific 
provisions relating to Victorian Aboriginal heritage, as a consequence of the 
Aboriginal Heritage Act which has recently passed through the Victorian 
Parliament.6 As these new arrangements are not yet in place, the following 
discussion focuses on the management regime which was in existence prior 
to the passage of the Aboriginal Heritage Act. The Heritage Act 1995 protects 
historical archaeological heritage, as well as buildings and other historic sites. 
The AARP Act is administered by Aboriginal Affairs Victoria, with much power 
delegated to local Aboriginal community groups, while the Heritage Act is 
administered by Heritage Victoria, the government agency which grew out of 
the amalgamation of the Historic Buildings Commission and the Victoria 
Archaeological Survey (VAS) in the mid-1990s. 
 
From the early 1970s, Victoria took a very direct approach to managing 
archaeological heritage, primarily focussed on Aboriginal archaeological 
materials. When initially proposed in 1972, the Government acknowledged it 
was drawing its legislative cues from antiquities legislation in the Middle East, 
and focussed the legislation on “preserv[ing] for posterity knowledge of the 
traditions of the indigenous peoples…prevent[ing] the plundering of 
relics…and to protect such relics from the depredation of vandals.”7 The 
acknowledgement of the Middle East as the source of legislative inspiration 
suggests a particular bias inherent in the Victorian approach to protecting 
archaeological heritage from the outset. Much of the Classical World and the 
Middle East had had antiquities legislation for some time, reflecting perhaps a 
postcolonial determination to protect archaeological heritage from the mass 
export which had occurred particularly to Europe in from the eighteenth to 
early twentieth centuries. Greece, Iraq and Iran all had antiquities legislation 
                                            
3  The Aboriginal Heritage Bill passed through the Victorian Parliament in May 2006. Once its administrative 
structures are in place, including the appointment of the Victorian Aboriginal Heritage Council, it will repeal and 
supplant the procedures under the AARP Act.  
4  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (1984) Commonwealth. Part IIA, Sections 21A to 
21ZA. This section of the Act was added under the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection 
Amendment Act 1987 following the referral by Victoria of powers in this area to the Commonwealth. This situation 
does not exist with other Australian jurisdictions. Smith notes that this resulted from an inability by the Victorian 
government of the day to successfully repeal the AARP Act and give Aboriginal groups direct control over 
Aboriginal heritage, due to State-level political resistance. This was overcome by enacting special provisions of 
the Commonwealth legislation, which could override the State legislation if necessary. See Smith, L. (1996). 
Archaeological knowledge and the governance of indigenous material culture in south-eastern Australia. 
Prehistorical and Historical Archaeology. Sydney, University of Sydney. Chapter 8: Victorian Legislation. Note 
that Dr Smith kindly supplied her thesis to me in electronic form, thus citations of this thesis are to the thesis 
chapter only, rather than to the page. 
 Boer, B. and G. Wiffen (2006). Heritage Law in Australia. South Melbourne, Oxford University Press. Pp 268-270. 
5  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (1984) Commonwealth. Section 21B. 
6  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Amendment Bill (2005)(Cth). Introduced to the Federal 
Parliament on 12 October 2005. Second Reading on 12 May 2006 and still under consideration by Parliament. 
This Bill, while supported by the opposition parties, has been criticised for not going further in fully implementing 
the results of the 1996 Evatt Report into the ATSIHP Act. See speeches by: 
Senator Kim Carr (Labor) 11 May 2006 Senate Hansard, Pp 39ff. 
Senator Andrew Bartlett (Democrats) 11 May 2006 Senate Hansard, Pp 43ff. 
 Senator Rachael Siewert (Greens) 11 May 2006 Senate Hansard, Pp 46ff. 
7  Parliament of Victoria (1972). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Second Reading Speech by Mr 
Hamer, Chief Secretary. 7 March 1972, Pg 3959 
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from the 1930s, Egypt in 1951 and the balance of the region enacting 
legislation in the late 1960s through the 1970s.8 But the countries of the 
Middle East faced very different issues from Victoria, in terms of past loss of 
antiquities to colonial powers and the enormous trade in antiquities from that 
region, which continues today. By looking to the Middle East for a model, 
Victorian legislators built certain assumptions into the domestic legislation 
which may not have been truly relevant to Australia. This can be seen 
specifically in the elaborate and impractical controls on the trade in Aboriginal 
artefacts contained in the legislation. These assumptions were further 
cemented when the protections for historical archaeological sites were passed 
into the Heritage Act, as the Government explicitly adopted a largely identical 
legal approach to that in the AARP Act, with no debate on this aspect of the 
legislation.9 
  
In 1973 the Victorian State Relics Office, later to become the Victoria 
Archaeological Survey (VAS), was established as a government agency with 
responsibility for identifying and cataloguing archaeological sites across the 
State, as well as administering the provisions of the AARP Act.10 Within 18 
months, over 1500 archaeological sites had been identified and the Office had 
established a wide network of site wardens, conducted archaeological field 
schools, and set about establishing “minimum standards” for the undertaking 
of archaeological fieldwork.11 VAS later conducted survey and excavation 
projects for government agencies and the private sector,12 published A 
Planner’s and Developer’s Guide to Victorian Archaeological Sites,13 an early 
attempt at engagement between the archaeological and development 
community in Australia, as well as establishing a training program for 
Aboriginal sites officers.14 Coutts noted that this relationship between VAS 
and landowners later soured, due to the politicisation of the issues 
surrounding Aboriginal sites and a fear that the presence of sites would make 
the land subject to a claim under Aboriginal land rights legislation.15 It is clear 
from the Parliamentary debates in 1972 that the main intent of the legislation 
was the protection of Aboriginal heritage16 and the transmission of that 
                                            
8  Greece: Act No 5351 of 24 August 1932, concerning the search for and preservation of antiquities; Iran: 
Antiquities Law 1930; Iraq: Antiquities Law 1936; Egypt: Protection of Antiquities Act 1951. See O'Keefe, P. J. 
and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. Abingdon, 
Professional Books Ltd. Appendix I: National Legislation 
9  Parliament of Victoria (1995). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Heritage Bill Second Reading 
Speech by Mr MacClellan, 7 September 1995, Pg 151. 
 The Bill was further debated by the Legislative Assembly on 14 and 16 November 1995 with no discussion of 
archaeological issues. Similarly, Legislative Council debate on the Bill on 21, 22 and 23 November 1995 
engendered no debate regarding the proposed archaeological provisions. 
10  Coutts, P. J. F. (1975). "Victorian Relics Office." Australian Archaeology 2: 32-33.  
11  Ibid. Pg 33. See also Victoria Archaeological Survey (1981). Archaeological excavation: notes on principles and 
techniques. Technical Series. Melbourne, Victoria Archaeological Survey.  
12  Coutts, P. J. F. (1980). "Report of activities 1978-79." Records of the Victorian Archaeological Survey. (10): 1-39.  
13  Victoria Archaeological Survey (1977). A Planner's and Developer's Guide to Victorian Archaeological sites. 
Melbourne, F D Atkinson, Government Printer.  
14  Bird, C. and J. Gallagher (1992). The Victoria Archaeological Survey's Site Officer Training Scheme. Aboriginal 
Involvement in Parks and Protected Areas. J. Birckhead, T. De Lacy and L. Smith. Canberra, Aboriginal Studies 
Press: 319-324.  
15  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pp 213-
214. 
16  This general tenor of the debates is restricted to the discussion of Aboriginal heritage and includes one comment 
from Mr. Bornstein (Member for Brunswick East): “to all intents and purposes archaeological relics in the 
continent of Australia are Aboriginal relics.” Parliament of Victoria. 21 March 1972, Pg 4310. 
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heritage to future generations.17 However, VAS and the AARP Act also held a 
limited oversight of historical archaeology following a High Court decision in 
1981,18 although this was outside of its main focus and expertise,19 and 
protections for historical sites were removed from the AARP Act and 
incorporated into the Heritage Act in 1995, as a part of a comprehensive 
legislative review.20  
 
7.2 Protecting Victorian Aboriginal Heritage 
 
The management of Aboriginal archaeological heritage in Victoria is now 
largely in the hands of Aboriginal people, through the delegation of powers by 
Aboriginal Affairs Victoria to a range of local Aboriginal community groups. 
This was always the original intent of the legislation, with the Minister for 
Aboriginal Affairs remarking in 1972:  
 
“one of the principal objectives [of the legislation]…is to encourage 
Aborigines to take part in activities which are based on their pre-history 
and the preservation of their own standards of values…It is my hope 
that the Aborigines will become collectors of their own relics and exhibit 
them for the purpose of educating non-Aboriginal people.”21  
 
These sentiments, while high-minded, indicate a belief that Aboriginal people 
would want to treat their archaeological heritage in much the same fashion as 
an archaeologist, through developing and exhibiting groups of archaeological 
objects. And while self-management of indigenous heritage has been 
supported at the political level, the management of archaeological heritage by 
the Aboriginal community has not necessarily been welcomed by some 
archaeologists over the last three decades.22 
 
                                            
17  Parliament of Victoria (1972). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Speech by Mr Edmunds, 
Member for Moonee Ponds. 21 March 1972, Pg 4317. Although at least one parliamentarian took the view that 
the Government was attempting to “force” people into being interested in Aboriginal heritage. Speech by Mr 
Wilkes, Member for Northcote, 21 March 1972, Pp 4320-4321 
18  Heritage Victoria (2003). Archaeology Administration and Legislation in Victoria: A discussion paper. Melbourne, 
Heritage Victoria. Pg 5.  
 Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Ltd. (1981) 149 CLR 27 
19  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pg 216. 
Speaking from the Perspective of the mid-1980s, Coutts described the AARP Act as ineffective with respect to 
protecting historical archaeological heritage. Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future 
Directions in Cultural Resource Management. Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, 
Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pg 219. 
20  As were provisions relating to historical archaeology in the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1981 (Vic) and the Historic 
Buildings Act 1981 (Vic). Heritage Victoria (2003). Archaeology Administration and Legislation in Victoria: A 
discussion paper. Melbourne, Heritage Victoria. Pg 5. This was an outcome of the 'Planning a Better Future for 
Victorians' Victorian Government policy document. Parliament of Victoria (1995). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian 
Government Printer. Speech by Mr MacClellan, 7 September 1995, Pg 148. 
21  Parliament of Victoria (1972). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Speech by Mr Meagher, 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs. 11 April 1972, Pg 4798. See also similar comments made during the debates in the 
Legislative Council by the Hon. D G Elliot (Member for Melbourne Province), 27 April 1972 Pp 5408-5409. 
22  Allen, J. (1987). The politics of the past: an inaugural address to the La Trobe University School of Archaeology. 
Melbourne, La Trobe University: 1-14. Pg 11.Murray, T. and J. Allen (1995). "The forced repatriation of cultural 
properties to Tasmania." Antiquity 69 (266): 871-877. , Murray, T. (1996). "Aborigines, Archaeology and 
Australian heritage." Meanjin 55 (4): 725-735. , Murray, T. (1996). Archaeologists, Heritage Bureaucrats, 
Aboriginal organisations and the Conduct of Tasmanian Archaeology. Australian Archaeology '95: Proceedings of 
the 1995 Australian Archaeological Association Conference, St Lucia, University of Queensland.  
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The AARP Act provides protections for “archaeological areas”, which must be 
declared and gazetted,23 and for “archaeological relics”, which are subject to a 
limited form of blanket protection across Victoria.24 Declaration of an 
archaeological area requires the consent of the owner or occupier of the 
land.25 An early consideration by Victorian Parliament was that access to 
declared archaeological areas by the public was desirable as was a program 
of public education regarding Victoria’s archaeological heritage.26 The main 
effect of declaring an archaeological area is to restrict access, in order to 
preserve any relics that the land contains. However, limiting the declaration to 
instances where the owner has granted consent for listing makes the power of 
limited effectiveness. This provision reflects the familiar, but often unfounded, 
concern that heritage listing (or indeed any other planning or environmental 
controls) unreasonably restricts the use of an area of land by its owner. This 
reliance on concurrence of the owner appears to be an attempt to adopt a 
conciliatory, rather than coercive, approach to achieving the conservation of 
archaeological sites, particularly on private land, without the unworkable 
requirement of compulsory acquisition of the land.27 This sets up a 
fundamental conflict within the legislation, between the rights of ownership 
and the desire to conserve tangible elements of Australia’s heritage, as an 
opt-in approach will not ensure the conservation of sites of importance. In 
many respects, this is an irreconcilable conflict, if the proposed land uses are 
antithetical to the desired conservation outcomes. But if the question of ‘public 
good’ is considered, in some instances the ‘public good’ of retaining physical 
remains of the past will outweigh the concerns of individual landowners. Such 
public good considerations would not and should not apply by default to all 
archaeological sites, but should be part of a rigorous regime for assessing the 
values of a site at a range of levels. 
 
The protections for archaeological relics are more broadly based than those 
for sites and the AARP Act prescribes a very wide definition of ‘relics’ which 
includes any aspect of Aboriginal material culture: 
"archaeological relic" or "relic" means a relic pertaining to the past 
occupation by the Aboriginal people of any part of Australia, whether or 
not the relic existed prior to the occupation of that part of Australia by 
people of European descent, and without affecting the generality of the 
foregoing, includes any Aboriginal deposit, carving, drawing, skeletal 
remains and anything belonging to the total body of material relating to 
that past Aboriginal occupation of Australia, but does not include a 
body or the remains of a body interred in a cemetery, burial ground or 
place of burial after the year 1834, or a handiwork made for the 
purpose of sale;28 
                                            
23  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria. Section 2, Definitions. Protected under 
sections 15 and 16. 
24  Ibid. Section 2, Definitions. Protected under sections 21 to 23. 
25  Ibid. Section 15(2) 
26  Parliament of Victoria (1972). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Second Reading Speech, Pp 
3960-3961. 
27  This system is similar to that initially proposed by the Productivity Commission in relation to all heritage listings in 
Australia, however that recommendation was withdrawn in the final report. Productivity Commission (2005). 
Conservation of Australia's historic heritage places - draft report. Melbourne, Australian Government.  
28  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria. Section 2. The year 1834 is the year of the 
first permanent European settlement in Victoria. Docherty, J. C. (1993). Historical Dictionary of Australia. Sydney, 
Franklin Watts Australia. Pp 141-142. 
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The lengthy definition in and of itself presents a difficulty in interpretation, as 
its attempt at comprehensiveness takes a ‘shopping list’ approach to the 
nature of relics, without any clear attempt to link them to significance. This 
remains a common definitional problem in Australian heritage legislation, as a 
definition based solely on the physicality of an object does not necessarily 
capture the true nature of its significance. While this may be appropriate in 
overseas jurisdictions, where archaeological objects are the focus of the art 
collecting industry, it is not a sensible approach to the Australian situation. 
The definition is also one clearly founded in archaeological practice, rather 
than value to the Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal community, and has had only 
minor modification since the original commencement of the AARP Act in 1972.  
 
During initial debate, the Bill was criticised for not protecting “archaeological 
deposits.” There was argument strongly in favour of a blanket protection for 
archaeological heritage supported by a permitting system for excavation, 
rather than the approach of requiring the declaration of areas in advance in 
order for them to be protected, based explicitly on archaeological professional 
considerations.29 The influence of professional archaeology is still evident 
within the Act, as protection is extended to “archaeological relics” rather than 
“Aboriginal relics” or “heritage objects”, as has been the case in other 
jurisdictions. While a limited form of blanket protection for Aboriginal relics 
was in the end extended by the AARP Act, the subtleties between an 
archaeological “relic”, “object” and “deposit” were never articulated in Victorian 
legislation, nor in any other Australian legislation. The question of “what is a 
relic?” and “who determines what is a relic?” were questions raised in 
Parliament yet never satisfactorily resolved.30 This underscores the 
fundamental difficulty with much archaeological protection legislation, that the 
need to understand the context of an archaeological object is perhaps of 
greater significance than the individual object itself.  
 
The Victorian courts have commented on the problematic nature of the 
definition of archaeological relics within the Act, during the consideration of a 
case in 1984. The decision, Walker v. Shire of Flinders and Ors,31 revolved 
around an application to subdivide a site with both historical and Aboriginal 
archaeological components, and whether, if the subdivision itself were 
approved under the planning legislation, a permit to disturb any relics within 
the land could in fact be legally issued to the landowner. It seems that, due to 
a deficiency in the Act in force at that time, there was no legal avenue to allow 
the excavation of any relics within the land, and as a result of the appeal, the 
Act was subsequently amended. Significantly, however, the Court observed 
that, even if a relic was not deemed worthy of preservation, it was 
nevertheless protected under the Act, causing the judge to note that “the 
purpose of protecting and preserving a relic which is not worthy of 
                                            
29  Parliament of Victoria (1972). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Mr. Bornstein, 21 March 1972. 
Pp 4311-4312. See also comments by Mr. Bornstein on 11 April 1972 during the committee debates on proposed 
amendments to the Bill. Pp 4796-4797 and the comments by the Hon D G Elliot in the Legislative Council on 27 
April 1972, Pp 5452-5453 
30  Ibid. Speech by Mr Mitchell, Member for Benambra. 21 March 1972, Pg 4316. Raised again on 11 April 1972, Pp 
4803-4803. Further comments in the Legislative Council by the Hon Murray Byrne, Minister for Public Works, 27 
April 1972, Pg 5454. 
31  Walker v. Shire of Flinders and Ors ([1984] V.R. 409). (1984).  See also the commentary on this case by Boer: 
Boer, B. (1985). "Aboriginal heritage in Victoria." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2: 94-97.  
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preservation is not readily apparent.”32 This observation holds true twenty 
years later, as much heritage legislation still does not make an adequate 
differentiation between a “relic” as a thing which meets a legal definition 
versus an object as a component of a site which may have sufficient heritage 
significance to warrant legal protection. 
 
In 1980, there was a minor change to the definition, modifying it to refer to 
archaeological relics from any part of Australia, whereas the previous 
definition referred only to relics originating from within Victoria.33 This was to 
improve controls on trade in ‘portable relics’, defined as “a relic which because 
of its weight and size is capable of being lifted and removed by hand,”34 by 
giving the Victorian government the ability to regulate trade not only in relics 
from Victoria, but also those being brought into Victoria from other States or 
Territories. How precisely the Victorian government proposed to enforce such 
a trade restriction is unclear, as it seems unlikely that relics brought intro 
Victoria from other jurisdictions would be sufficiently distinctive to allow their 
point of origin to be definitively determined to a legal certainty. Nevertheless, it 
does give Victoria the power to intercede in a particularly flagrant transaction 
involving Aboriginal relics.  
 
This strong focus on the anti-trade provisions of the Act, which have existed 
since its inception, may represent some of the legislative “baggage” which 
came from Victoria looking to the Middle East for legislative inspiration. While 
there has been, and undoubtedly continues to be, a trade in Aboriginal 
artefacts from Victoria and elsewhere in Australia, it is nothing like that which 
exists on the vast scale of the trade in Middle Eastern, Asian or Central 
American antiquities.35 Discussion in Chapter 4 of the Commonwealth 
Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act has indicated only a minimal trade 
in Aboriginal (or historical) Australian artefacts and thus this strong focus on 
trade represents something of a missed opportunity for Victorian heritage 
protection, as the protections are infrequently used and do little to protect 
Victoria’s heritage in anything other than a theoretical sense.  
Currently the Act proscribes trade in any ‘portable relic’ from any jurisdiction, 
without consent.36 While trade in portable relics is controlled, their collection 
has always remained uncontrolled. Since its inception, the AARP Act has 
provided an exemption from protection where “a person…picks up or collects 
a portable relic exposed in or upon the surface of land in Victoria”.37 This is 
clearly an unsatisfactory situation as it allows the disturbance with impunity of 
surface-based archaeological sites and the nature of the language used 
creates an ambiguity with respect to when disturbance is or is not an offence 
under the Act. The general relics protections proscribe “excavate[ion of] any 
land for the purpose of uncovering or discovering a relic without consent”38 
                                            
32 Walker v. Shire of Flinders and Ors ([1984] V.R. 409). (1984). At 414, cited in Boer, B. (1985). "Aboriginal 
heritage in Victoria." Environmental and Planning Law Journal 2: 94-97. Pg 96. 
33  Amended by the Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation (Amendment) Act 1980, No. 9405/1980, 
commenced 6 October 1980. 
34  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria. Section 2. 
35  Tubbs, K. W., Ed. (1995). Antiquities: Trade or Betrayed: Legal, Ethical and Conservation Issues. London, 
Archtype Books.  
36  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria. Section 27. 
37  Ibid. Section 27A. 
38  Ibid. Section 22. 
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while the exemption for portable relics allows their collection where they are 
“exposed in or upon” the ground. This requires interpretation as to how 
exposed a relic must be before its disturbance is permissible without consent; 
if a relic is half out of the ground, what is its status, and what of the incidental 
disturbance the removal of that relic may cause to the archaeological site? 
Smith attributes some of this ambiguity with respect to the collection of relics 
to the strong influence that amateur archaeological and collecting societies 
had on the initial drafting of the legislation in the 1970s.39 This is supported by 
Griffiths’ general observations on the strength of the Victorian artefact 
collecting movement in the early- to mid-twentieth century.40 O’Keefe and 
Prott view this particular legislative laxness as unjustifiable, however they note 
similar weaknesses in the US Federal Archaeological Resources Protection 
Act 1979, where the US Congress “did not want to subject Boy Scouts 
[collecting artefacts]…to criminal penalties”.41 Legislators in several instances 
have clearly taken a view that the collection of artefacts is a legitimate form of 
recreation, but by effectively facilitating the collection of relics by non-
archaeologists or the Aboriginal community, the AARP Act offers little 
assistance in the actual protection of archaeological heritage for the 
community, as such collection is not guided in any way by the other values of 
the site or artefact. 
 
By contrast, the Victorian provisions of the ATSIHP Act take an approach of 
focussing on the social value of objects or places to the Aboriginal community. 
Aboriginal “cultural property” includes folklore, objects and places, all of which 
must be “of particular significance to Aboriginals in accordance with Aboriginal 
tradition”, with the definition of folklore encompassing both past and current 
cultural practices.42 Legal protections do not in fact extend to folklore, as this 
term appears only in the definitions while the protective clauses refer only to 
places and objects, however Aboriginal “cultural property” including folklore 
can be the subject of a Cultural Heritage Agreement.43 The inclusion of the 
term folklore within the legislation points to a legislative commitment to 
preserving those tangible aspects of material culture which support the 
intangible aspects such as folklore and other cultural practices. 
 
                                            
39  Smith, L. (1996). Archaeological knowledge and the governance of indigenous material culture in south-eastern 
Australia. Prehistorical and Historical Archaeology. Sydney, University of Sydney. Chapter 8. 
40  Griffiths, T. (1996). Hunters and Collectors: The antiquarian imagination in Australia. Melbourne, Cambridge 
University Press. See Chapter 2 generally, as well as Pp 90-91. 
 While a slight digression from the main topic, this raises a question as to whether the amateur collecting 
community have a legitimate interest in the physical remains of the past. Certainly enthusiasts can be the 
greatest advocates for the value of the past. However the challenge arises when attempting to accommodate 
their interests without compromising the values of archaeological heritage for either Aboriginal communities or 
the wider community. Although that question cannot be answered here, the presence of legislation itself implies 
that unrestricted collection of archaeological materials is not an activity that the community is willing to sanction. 
The issues do need to be looked at in terms of the significance of the sites being disturbed. On high-value sites, 
such amateur disturbance is distinctly problematic, as what may be lost, in terms of scientific, social or 
interpretive value outweighs the interest of an individual collector of objects. On low-value sites, such collection 
probably causes little harm; the problem is distinguishing between high- and low-value sites prior to their 
disturbance. While amateur prospectors for precious metals or gemstones are catered for through the 
establishment of fossicking reserves in some areas, generally requiring an inexpensive license, it would remain 
quite difficult to establish such a system for archaeological sites and it seems most likely that such activities will 
continue to occur outside the law, with individuals interested in ‘real’ archaeology as, opposed to collecting, 
having to confine their interest to acting as field assistants on authorised archaeological projects. 
41  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. Pp 203-204. 
42  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Act (1984) Commonwealth. Section 21A. 
43  Ibid. Section 21K 
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Immediately what this legislative approach does is to link archaeological 
remains to contemporary Aboriginal local community significance in a manner 
unique to Australian heritage legislation, and also different from the general 
approach of the ATSIHP Act to areas other than Victoria. The actual 
protection mechanisms available for Victorian archaeological heritage are 
similar to those elsewhere in the Act, although they are much more detailed 
and provide for emergency,44 temporary45 or permanent46 orders of 
preservation for sites or objects, which are recorded in a Register.47 The 
emphasis within these orders however is on enabling local Aboriginal 
communities to make the decisions about preservation. Consider the focus of 
the section of the ATSIHP Act, regarding the declaration of a permanent order 
of preservation: 
Declaration of preservation 
 (1) If a local Aboriginal community decides, whether after an 
application is made to it or on its own motion, that: 
 (a) a place or object in the community area is an Aboriginal place 
or Aboriginal object; and 
 (b) it is appropriate, having regard to the importance of 
maintaining the relationship between Aboriginals and that 
place or object, that a declaration of preservation should be 
made in relation to that place or object; 
the community may advise the Minister that it considers a 
declaration of preservation should be made.48 
 
The emphasised passages indicate the weight given to community values and 
the focus of the protection is on maintaining a relationship with a particular site 
or object, not just protecting it in an abstract way and is followed up directly by 
the ability for Aboriginal communities to appoint wardens to manage sites or 
objects on their behalf.49 The legislative protection makes an assumption in 
favour of there being a continuous link between the community and an item of 
its heritage; a declaration of preservation does not assume an item of 
archaeological heritage is either reducible to excavated data nor does it 
assume that the protected site or object remains static. The relationship 
between the site or object (which may or may not be archaeological in 
underlying nature) and the community is ongoing and fluid. This runs strongly 
counter to most other approaches to archaeological heritage management 
and protection in Australia, which often pre-emptively assume such heritage 
will be the subject of a one-off exercise–an excavation–or that a site must be 
protected by being preserved untouched. When considered in the context of 
delivering a public good outcome, the acknowledgement of the ongoing 
relationship between archaeological heritage and the community is a critical 
one. The active interaction of the community with the archaeological heritage 
                                            
44  Ibid. Section 21C 
45  Ibid. Section 21D 
46  Ibid. Section 21E 
47  Ibid. Section 21V. The Register is only available for inspection by prescribed persons. While not specifically 
stated, these are likely to be limited to persons authorised under Section 17, Inspectors nominated under Section 
21R, honorary keepers or wardens under Section 21T or members of the Aboriginal community. 
48  Ibid. Section 21E. Emphasis added. 
49  Ibid. Section 21T 
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is necessary for that heritage to remain relevant and to have a life outside of 
an archaeological report. This need not deny archaeologists access to the 
remains of the past for study. However it will influence the nature of the 
actions which archaeologists can undertake to the archaeological record and 
also the outcomes of any archaeological research.  
 
The potential of the mechanisms established for Victorian archaeological 
heritage under the ATSIHP Act is largely untapped,50 however these 
provisions may be repealed in the near future.51 Significantly, the Act points to 
a way forward for resolving the past and, to a degree, ongoing, conflicts 
between Aboriginal and archaeological interests. The Act allows the possibility 
that, where the community relationship with a site or object has been broken, 
or where the site or object has no value to contemporary Aboriginal tradition, 
that site should be accessible for study by archaeologists. Politics and power 
struggles, more than legal impediments, are likely to be the main source of 
conflict in this area and it should be possible to draft legislative clauses which 
allow for the consideration of the community issues first and, where those 
issues do not exist or can be satisfied, a presumption can exist in favour of 
managing the site for its values to the archaeological community. Thus the 
primary consideration is the community value of a site, but where that value is 
not high or is nonexistent, the secondary values of a site, such as scientific 
significance, can take precedence.  
 
7.3 Historical Archaeology in Victoria 
 
Victoria’s legislation to protect historical archaeological heritage provides for a 
more active role in the management of such heritage than any other piece of 
Australian legislation. Since 1995, historical archaeology has been protected 
under the Victorian Heritage Act administered by Heritage Victoria.52 Victorian 
historical archaeology, as with many other Australian jurisdictions, has been 
largely driven by expanding development. The bulk of that development has 
been rural, particularly in the in the Victorian goldfields,53 in contrast to New 
South Wales, where development has concentrated in urban areas. Victoria 
had quite early and extensive gold mining operations from the mid-nineteenth 
century, which left substantial archaeological remains.54 Changes in 
technology in the late twentieth century made it profitable to rework many of 
these ‘mined out’ areas.55 This inevitably meant impacts to the historical 
remains of previous goldmining operations, as large industrial mines using 
                                            
50  Note that the proposed amendments would remove these powers and all such matters would be dealt with under 
the new Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 (Vic). See Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Protection Bill 
(2006) Commonwealth.  
51  Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage Amendment Bill 2006 
52  The Heritage Act 1995 replaced the Historic Buildings Act 1981 and the Historic Shipwrecks Act 1981, as well as 
adopting the functions of the Aboriginal and Archaeological Relics Preservation Act 1972 with respect to non-
indigenous archaeological sites. Parliament of Victoria (1995). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government 
Printer. Second Reading Speech by Mr MacClellan (Minister for Planning), 7 September 1995, Pg 148. 
53  For example, one project by Bendigo Mining in the Victorian goldfields, resulted in 40 Consents to Damage and 
over 12 Consents to Excavate. Pers. Comm. Jeremy Smith, Senior Archaeologist, Heritage Victoria. 14 August 
2006. 
54  Parliament of Victoria (1997). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Victoria’s mining heritage and 
the need for protection of its archaeological remains was extensively discussed in the speech by Mrs Shardey 
(Member for Caulfield) during debate on the Heritage (Amendment) Bill 1997, 9 April 1997, Pp 573-574. 
55  For example, the 1996-1997 Annual Report of Heritage Victoria indicates that there were 3267 sites recorded on 
the Heritage Inventory of Historical Archaeological Sites, of which 48% (1567) were mining-related sites. Heritage 
Victoria (1997). Heritage Council Annual Report 1996-97. Melbourne, Heritage Victoria. Pg 31. 
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mechanical extraction were located on the sites of previous hand-dug small 
mining operations.56 
 
The Heritage Act establishes the Victorian Heritage Council,57 which is in turn 
responsible for keeping the Victorian Heritage Register of significant places58 
and the Victorian Heritage Inventory of historical archaeological sites.59 The 
separation of sites on the Heritage Register from archaeological sites on the 
Heritage Inventory appears to be an artefact of the transfer of archaeological 
powers from the AARP Act, whereas the Heritage Register was based on the 
former Historic Buildings Register and the Historic Shipwrecks Register. The 
Victorian Heritage Register can however include archaeological sites of high 
significance, while the Heritage Inventory includes all known historical 
archaeological sites, relics and collections of archaeological objects. The 
Council has the power to make Interim Protection Orders60 if it considers a 
place to be under threat, as well as authorising permits61 or exemptions62 to 
undertake works to registered places. The Act also provides for the issuing of 
consents to undertake works which affect archaeological sites, including their 
excavation or damage.63 
 
The Heritage Act protects archaeological sites and objects, through a fairly 
well structured definition, although one with certain idiosyncrasies: 
"archaeological relic" means— 
 (a) any archaeological deposit; or  
 (b) any artefact, remains or material evidence associated 
with an archaeological deposit— 
which— 
 (c) relates to the non-Aboriginal settlement or visitation of 
the area or any part of the area which now comprises 
Victoria; and 
 (d) is 50 or more years old— 
but does not include the remains of a ship or an article 
associated with a ship; 
"archaeological site" means an area in which archaeological 
relics are situated;64 
 
Archaeological sites and objects can be protected through listing on the 
Heritage Inventory, a separate list from the Heritage Register, which kept 
under Part 6 of the Act and are then referred to as “registered” archaeological 
relics or sites. Powers of protection for registered sites include the erection of 
                                            
56  Ibid. Pg 31. 
57  Heritage Act (1995) Victoria. Section 7. Section 7(2)(a)(iii) stipulates one member of the Council must have skills 
in archaeology. 
58  Ibid. Section 18 
59  Ibid. Section 120 
60  Ibid. Section 56 
61  Ibid. Section 64 
62  Ibid. Section 66 
63  Ibid. Section 129 
64  Ibid. Section 3. 
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notices65 to prohibit access to archaeological places, as well as a general 
prohibition on damaging a registered site without a consent. The Act also 
protects unregistered archaeological relics (although not unregistered sites) 
unless those relics can be collected from the surface of the land.66 The Act 
gives the Victorian government the ability to take a more active hand in the 
protection of archaeological sites, if warranted, through the ability to direct that 
a certain area be excavated for the recovery of archaeological relics,67 and by 
acquiring recovered relics or erecting structures to assist in their conservation 
if deemed appropriate.68 Additionally, the Act requires that persons 
undertaking a survey for archaeological sites notify Heritage Victoria in 
advance of the survey taking place as well as notifying of the actual discovery 
of any archaeological materials.69 This puts Victoria in an almost unique 
position of being involved in the management of the state’s archaeological 
heritage prior to it even being identified. Such a power should theoretically 
provide Victoria with a strong ability to proactively conserve archaeological 
heritage, as well as providing for a greater period of time to consider the 
archaeological values of a site prior to listing it on the Heritage Inventory. 
 
The Act is set up to protect “cultural heritage”, which is composed of objects 
and sites, and the definition of “cultural heritage significance” explicitly 
includes archaeological significance. Powers exist within the Act to stipulate 
the methodology and qualifications of those wishing to excavate 
archaeological sites70 and Heritage Victoria has taken the step of issuing 
detailed guidelines on the management of archaeological materials.71 The 
ability to mandate methodology and qualifications for archaeological works is 
uncommon in Australian legislation, although South Australia may stipulate 
archaeological qualifications as a condition of consent72 and New South 
Wales has issued guidelines with respect to the qualifications of 
archaeological investigators.73 The need to go to such a level of detail is due 
at least in part to the lack of professionalisation of archaeologists in Australia. 
Australian archaeology has no binding standards or process of professional 
accreditation, unlike professions such as architecture or engineering. The 
need for a power such as this was highlighted by a court case in 1993 where 
a non-archaeologist was granted an excavation permit under the AARP Act. 
The Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal held that there was no specific 
requirement that a person be an archaeologist in order to obtain an 
excavation permit under the Act.74 
 
                                            
65  Ibid. Section 124 
66  Ibid. Section 127. Penalties range from 120-240 penalty units, or up to 12 months incarceration. 
67  Ibid. Section 130 
68  Ibid. Section 133 
69  Ibid. Sections 131 and 132 
70  Ibid. Sections 129(4)(a) and (b) 
71  Heritage Victoria (2001). Archaeological Artefact Management Guidelines. Melbourne, Heritage Victoria.  
72  Heritage Places Act (1993) South Australia. Section 29(1)(a) 
73  NSW Heritage Office (2004). Guidelines for the Qualifications of Excavation Directors. Parramatta, NSW Heritage 
Office. These are guidelines only however and open to challenge, as the NSW Heritage Act does not explicitly 
give the power to stipulate qualifications. 
74  In Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe, the Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal granted a 
permit to excavate for alleged buried treasure, in part on the justification that “it would be difficult to find any 
further historical or scientific evidence [for the treasure] without actual excavation.” Anonymous (1993). "Panama 
Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe." Environmental Law Reporter 12: 153-154.  
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The “archaeological” qualifier allows a value judgement to be applied to a 
potential relic or site, when considering whether to apply the protections of the 
Heritage Act. Archaeologists administering the Act through Heritage Victoria 
therefore have a greater discretion to make a determination as to whether 
something is or is not protected, on the basis of whether it is truly 
“archaeological”. Certainly a still better mechanism would be an explicit 
incorporation of an assessment as to whether the relic or site met the cultural 
heritage significance criteria. But as one of the criteria is “archaeological 
significance”, sufficient flexibility exists within the Act to allow a more well-
reasoned consideration as to whether the legal protections ought be applied in 
particular circumstances. The core principles of the Victorian heritage 
significance regime are set out in the Act and while archaeological 
significance is not explicitly mentioned, one criterion appears to encompass 
the typical “scientific” approach to archaeological heritage: 
 
“[the] potential [of a site] to educate, illustrate or provide further 
scientific investigation in relation to Victoria's cultural heritage.”75 
 
The wording of this criterion is broad enough to allow it to apply to all types of 
heritage, but when considered with the other significance criteria enumerated 
in the Act, this criterion is the one most clearly designed to apply to 
archaeological heritage. So while there is increased flexibility in the 
application of the Act, in accordance with whether a site or object is 
“archaeological”, the conception of the significance of archaeological heritage 
is still largely confined to it being scientifically significant. The Act suggests 
that the realisation of this significance is an active process–through “scientific 
investigation”–rather than as an inherent quality. Similarly, when considering 
whether to grant a consent to excavate or damage archaeological relics, 
Heritage Victoria must consider whether the site can contribute to 
anthropological, archaeological, ethnographic or historical knowledge.76 When 
the penalties under the Act were increased in 2003, part of the rationale was 
to deter people from disturbing archaeological sites and causing “loss of 
information”.77  
 
However, when debating the nature of disturbance, discussion focussed on 
disturbance of objects rather than information or intangible values. In addition, 
the low number of prosecutions put a cloud over the effectiveness of 
legislative deterrence.78 This indicates that, within the minds of Victorian 
legislators, archaeologists remain the arbiters of significance under this 
model, with no clear consideration of the wider significance of archaeological 
heritage. It also demonstrates the continued preoccupation with both 
excavation and the archaeological object, to the exclusion of most other 
considerations. For legislation of this work to advance a ‘public good 
                                            
75  Heritage Act (1995) Victoria. Section 8(2)(e) 
76  Ibid. Section 129(3)(a) and (b) 
77  Parliament of Victoria (2003). Hansard. Second Reading Speech for the Heritage (Amendment) Bill 2003 by Ms 
Delahunty (Minister for Planning), 27 August 2003, Pg 84. These sentiments were later echoed in a speech by Mr 
Wynne, Member for Richmond, during the same debates. 17 September 2003, Pg 536. 
78  Ibid. Speech by Mr Baillieu (Hawthorn), 16 September 2003, Pp 432-33. The speech refers to 4 prosecutions in 
the previous year, all with guilty pleas, with one prosecution for archaeological disturbance unresolved at the 
time. This prosecution is detailed in Minchin, L. (2003). Heritage groups get tough with the raiders of our lost 
park. The Age. Melbourne.  
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conservation’ position, it would need to conceive of the archaeological 
heritage beyond its scientific qualities. The main barrier to achieving this, is 
that this notion of the scientific nature of Australian archaeology has become 
so imbedded in the language and frameworks for archaeological heritage 
management in Australia, it becomes very difficult to even describe 
archaeological heritage in other than scientific terms. Lawmakers, heritage 
managers, the public and archaeological consultants have all been inculcated 
with this conception that has institutionalised a blindness to other potential 
values for archaeological heritage. This is not to say that all archaeological 
sites will have significance beyond their research value to archaeologists, but, 
given the wider public context in which heritage management is undertaken, 
even sites with only research value need to demonstrate that value and be 
weighed against other economic, social and environmental factors which may 
come to bear on a give site.  
 
Despite these inconsistencies, the definitions of historical archaeological sites 
and relics in the Victorian Heritage Act remain some of the more useful 
definitions in Australia. The definitions are qualified by referring specifically to 
“archaeological” relics, objects, deposits or sites, implying that these relics, 
objects, deposits or sites have different qualities worthy of note and 
protection, as opposed to the totality of non-archaeological relics, objects, 
deposits or sites. This is similar to the approach adopted in the 2004 
amendments to the South Australian heritage legislation, which linked the 
definition of archaeological objects to heritage significance, without defining 
that significance in a highly proscriptive manner.79 While this may seem like a 
somewhat pedantic distinction, other jurisdictions have done without the 
“archaeological” qualifier in their definitions and have inadvertently cast the 
net of protection too wide, by encompassing a large range of non-
archaeological items within the definition. This has been a particular problem 
in New South Wales, where a formal legalistic approach to the application of 
the definition of a relic (without the “archaeological” qualifier) has meant that 
literal-minded heritage administrators, local governments, consultants and 
applicants have applied the relics protections in a number of inappropriate 
circumstances, which are discussed in more detail later in this chapter. 
Fundamentally, the definition of a protected archaeological object should be 
based on it having characteristics which make it able to meaningfully 
contribute to the understanding of the past, whether such characteristics are 
inherent in the individual object or derived from the position of the object in its 
context.  
 
The Victorian Heritage Act goes a step further than the majority of other 
Australian heritage legislation by incorporating this distinction, as well as 
considering the archaeological object in its context, through reference to 
“archaeological deposits” and “archaeological sites”. In this respect the 
Victorian Act comes closer to meeting the goals of the three archaeological 
heritage protection principles than most other Australian legislation, through 
well-defined provisions for archaeological sites and objects. Comments by 
parliamentarians at various times during the debates over the Heritage Bill 
                                            
79  Heritage Places Act (1993) South Australia. Section 27(1)(a). 
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and its subsequent amendments indicate that attention remains broadly 
focussed on historic buildings over other types of heritage, including the 
comment “generally, each resident of this great state of Victoria values our 
heritage, in particular our built heritage. In Parliament House we see the 
results of the great gold boom of the mid-1800s. Buildings like this add 
something tangible to the quality of life in this great state”80 and again, 
comments three years later by a different member: “heritage is mainly 
associated with buildings, and we are very conscious that once a building is 
destroyed it is destroyed forever…”81 This indicates that, at the highest levels 
of government, there is a certain amount of belief that the public is interested 
primarily in built heritage, over other types of heritage.82 Such a perception will 
colour the effort governments are willing to direct towards conserving other 
sorts of heritage, including archaeological sites. 
 
7.4 Defining archaeological importance in Victoria 
 
During the 2003 Parliamentary debates on proposed amendments to the 
Heritage Act, one Victorian parliamentarian noted: 
Before going on to mention some of the good things about what we are 
doing in terms of heritage, I simply make the comment in passing that 
we should not simply retain buildings because they are old. This is an 
area where there is sometimes debate, but we need to preserve 
buildings that have some merit and a direct association with our history. 
There is a tendency at times simply to preserve buildings because they 
are old, even though they have no intrinsic merit on their own. It is best 
to err on the side of caution, but over time we have to be able to 
determine what is worth preserving and what is not.83 
This comment, while directed towards historic buildings, holds equally true for 
archaeological sites and applies to any legal regime for heritage protection. In 
most cases, the law protects archaeological sites because they are old and 
below ground; these characteristics alone are enough to make a site 
“archaeological” in the eyes of the law. With historic buildings the process is 
generally different, where a more rigorous test is applied as to whether the 
building is significant and intact. If it is not, often the building will not be 
protected. But the hidden nature of archaeological sites and their need for 
specialist interpretation has allowed decision-making to be made not on the 
archaeological or historic merits of a site, but merely on its physical 
characteristics and its meeting very broad, arbitrary descriptive characteristics 
enshrined in law. Unwittingly, perhaps, archaeologists have embraced a form 
of universal legal protection which does tend to err too far on the side of 
                                            
80  Parliament of Victoria (2000). Hansard, Melbourne: Victorian Government Printer. Speech by Mr Spry, Member 
for Bellarine during debate regarding the Heritage (Amendment) Bill 2000, 25 October 2000, Pg 1131. 
81  Parliament of Victoria (2004). Hansard. Speech by the Hon. J. G. Hilton, Member for Western Port, during the 
debate on the Heritage (Further Amendment) Bill 2004, 13 May 2004, Pg 902. 
82  Although statement to the opposite effect was made later in the debates by the Hon G D Romanes, Member for 
Melbourne: “The Bracks government recognises that heritage is not just about big, iconic public buildings but is 
also about a lot of things that are valued in the community…” Parliament of Victoria (2000). Hansard, Melbourne: 
Victorian Government Printer. 15 November 2000, Pg 1271. 
83  Parliament of Victoria (2003). Hansard. Speech by Mr Maughan, Member for Rodney, 17 September 2003, Pg 
540. 
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caution, founded on a weak argument that “information about the past may be 
lost” if sites are not always excavated under strict archaeological supervision. 
The law should not protect sites merely because they are old and buried, any 
more than it should protect buildings merely because they are old. This legal 
construction in fact debases the notion of the “archaeological” by implying that 
all such materials are of equal interest and value, as the use of the term 
“archaeological” itself should imply that such sites or objects have a value 
beyond the ordinary. Protective mechanisms need to be predicated on an 
assessment of the relative merits of archaeological sites, to remain credible to 
the community. While it is certainly desirable for planning tools such as 
archaeological management plans to be developed by government authorities 
in advance, or for broad-scale archaeological surveys to be undertaken, it is 
unlikely that such tools will exist in all instances. In the absence of such tools 
there must remain mechanisms for government intercession to protect places 
of genuine archaeological or community significance. The Victorian 
Government has noted the community suspicion of the overt 
professionalisation of heritage management, which has often taken heritage 
responsibilities away from the community and is looking for ways to address 
this in the future.84  
This contrasts sharply with the earliest Victorian approach to protecting 
historical archaeological sites, following the High Court’s Alcoa decision in 
1981.85 An examination of the Victoria Archaeological Survey Application for 
Permit to Excavate Historic Archaeological Sites86 from this period is quite 
revealing of the prevailing attitudes of VAS towards the protection of 
archaeological heritage and the key issues. The application form itself ran to 
13 pages, 3 pages of which were standard conditions of consent for 
archaeological excavations. The remaining pages required details clearly 
designed to elicit the applicant’s competence to undertake archaeological 
research and focussed on the research or scientific significance of sites. 
Applicants were required to provide, amongst other details: 
 Academic qualifications 
 Referees of “senior academic standing” 
 Research experience 
 Publications 
 Details of the “research project” 
 Details of the “scientific significance” of the project87 
                                            
84  Heritage Council of Victoria (2003). Victoria's Heritage 2010 - Creating the New Victorian Heritage Strategy. 
Melbourne, Heritage Victoria. Pp 16-17. 
85  Onus v. Alcoa of Australia Ltd. [1981] 149 CLR 27, (1981).  
86  Victoria Archaeological Survey (1981(?)). Application for Permit to Excavate Historic Archaeological Sites, 
Ministry for Conservation (Victoria). While an exact date for publication of this application package cannot be 
established, it must be after 18 September 1981 (the date of the Alcoa High Court decision) and prior to 1993, 
when VAS was dissolved and its Aboriginal heritage management functions moved to Aboriginal Affairs Victoria. 
Smith, L. (1996). Archaeological knowledge and the governance of indigenous material culture in south-eastern 
Australia. Prehistorical and Historical Archaeology. Sydney, University of Sydney. Chapter 8, Victorian 
Legislation, Pg 2. The style and condition of the Application document in my possession suggests an earlier date. 
87  Victoria Archaeological Survey (1981(?)). Application for Permit to Excavate Historic Archaeological Sites, 
Ministry for Conservation (Victoria). Items 5, 6, 7, 8, 13 and 14 respectively on the application form, of 23 total 
items applicants were required to complete. Pp 6-10. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 206 
The purpose of the permit application was to prevent scientifically 
underqualified or unqualified persons from excavating archaeological sites, in 
order to protect the research value of the sites. Interestingly, the Application 
does contain one item regarding whether there has been local community 
consultation and what the views of the local community were regarding the 
proposal.88 The standard conditions on the Application however did not make 
any requirement for the active involvement of the community in the project. 
However, it suggests that VAS took community views into consideration when 
determining an application. Again, the standard conditions were focussed on 
the scientific values of an archaeological site “Condition 8(a)–Applicants for 
Excavation Permits should produce evidence sufficient to satisfy the Minister 
that: (a) the project has some scientific merit…”89 This is a holdover of the 
attitude inherent in the AARP Act in 1972, that archaeology was a science and 
sites needed to be protected primarily for scientific study. While lessened in 
contemporary application, this attitude can still prevail, although Heritage 
Victoria appears to be making an effort to explore the other values of sites 
more fully, by requiring community involvement and public interpretation. 
7.5 Controlling archaeological excavation or disturbance  
The Victorian Heritage Act requires that a permit be obtained to excavate or 
damage an archaeological site. The table below summarises the permits 
issued for archaeological sites under the Heritage Act since its inception in 
1995.90 Data for the period 1981 to 1996, during which historical 
archaeological sites were protected under the AARP Act, was not available. 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
Number of permits to
excavate
Number of permits to
damage
Total number of
permits issued in a
year
Number of permits
issued to
universities
 
Figure 7.1: Permits issued for archaeological works under the Heritage Act 
1995 (Vic), 1997-2005.91 
                                            
88  Ibid. Item 16, Pg 11. 
89  Ibid. Pg 4. 
90  Compiled form the Annual reports of Heritage Victoria and data supplied courtesy of Jeremy Smith, Senior 
Archaeologist, Heritage Victoria.  
91  Aggregated from the Heritage Council Victoria Annual Reports 1997-2005. Reporting methods changed 
throughout the period, with some years reporting total permits while other years breaking down permits by type 
and proponent. The 1999 and 2000 Annual Reports record only the total number of archaeological approvals 
issued in those reporting periods. The 2003 and 2005 Annual Reports do not provide any statistical data 
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While the time period is short, it appears there is a long-term trend towards a 
rise in total applications since the inception of the Act, although the greatest 
rise is in “permits to damage” historical sites rather than permits to excavate. 
Permission to damage a site in this context includes the monitoring and 
recording of a site through means other than a systematic archaeological 
excavation. While the number of university-based research excavations has 
not been consistently reported, it is evident that such excavations are vastly in 
the minority. In 2002, the moat active year for university-based excavations, 
such projects still only represented less than 15% of the total number of 
projects undertaken in the  
State and less than 5% of total projects over the period for which data are 
available.92 The majority of excavations are for development-related activities, 
belying the notion that the Act is protecting archaeological sites for their ability 
to contribute to knowledge or scientific study. The fact that generally less than 
half of total approvals issued are for excavation as opposed to damage, and 
fewer than 10 percent of total approvals are for university-based research 
excavations suggests that Heritage Victoria is being selective in its 
interpretation and application of the archaeological requirements under the 
Act. While the details of each site approved for disturbance have not been 
investigated, the statistics suggest that, in the majority of instances, a cursory 
examination of the archaeological remains of a site is acceptable, rather than 
requiring the full archaeological excavation of every site which contains 
“relics” as defined under the Act. 
 
Victorian Heritage Act archaeological approvals have another unique feature 
designed to produce a definable outcome from archaeological works, through 
the requirement for the lodgement of a ‘conservation bond’ as a condition of 
consent in the approvals process. A legacy from VAS to Heritage Victoria was 
an archaeological conservation laboratory, set up to conserve archaeological 
artefacts obtained through the activities of VAS and other authorised 
excavations. Heritage Victoria now requires applicants to lodge a bond to 
ensure that artefacts recovered from archaeological sites are appropriately 
conserved and are then available for use, display or study. Artefacts generally 
must be lodged with Heritage Victoria at the conclusion of the excavation. 
Limitations are placed on the amount of the bond, with unused funds returned 
to the applicant and, if the work goes beyond the value of the bond, the 
applicant is not required to meet the discrepancy.93 This involves the Victorian 
government deeply in the detail of the excavation process and, while perhaps 
it was originally designed to safeguard the archaeological objects recovered 
from an excavation for scientific study or museum display, the policy now 
assists in providing some form of public benefit from an archaeological 
excavation. While only a small portion of recovered and conserved artefacts 
are ever likely to be placed on display or used for in-depth research, the 
presence of the conservation bond indicates that Heritage Victoria expects a 
commitment to archaeological heritage by those who disturb it, beyond the 
                                                                                                                             
regarding archaeological permits and missing data was supplied by Jeremy Smith of Heritage Victoria. Pers. 
comm. Jeremy Smith, 14 August 2006. 
92  Data are not available on applications rejected under the Act, but it is presumed that university-based 
excavations are in general as if not more likely to receive approval that a development-driven application. 
93  Pers. comm. Jeremy Smith, Senior Archaeologist, Heritage Victoria, March 2004. 
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immediate excavation project. While this approach serves to reinforce the 
institutionalised notion of archaeology as both scientific and the preserve of 
specialists, it does facilitate improved compliance with the original goal of 
conserving such significance. The presence of a government-back facility 
which is responsible for post-excavation archaeological conservation holds 
out greater potential for better quality reporting and a publicly-focussed 
channel for the dissemination of archaeological information to interested 
parties and the public. 
 
7.6 Victoria–Conclusion 
 
The Victorian legislation is perhaps the most comprehensive archaeological 
heritage legislation in Australia, through both the sweeping nature of the 
issues covered and the depth of consideration it gives archaeological 
heritage. Initially the Victorian legislation was strongly based in archaeological 
practice and considerations, but has been applied with a fair amount of 
flexibility in recent years. The Victorian Government's approach of delegating 
authority back to the Aboriginal community for decision-making is an 
interesting one, which will require more detailed examination over a long 
period of time to evaluate its effectiveness. Similarly, it is too early to know the 
effect of the new Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006. This approach does show a 
strong acknowledgement of the community value of archaeological heritage 
and gives precedence to the community value of archaeological heritage over 
the more traditional professional archaeological view. This is not to say that 
the community view is necessarily always the best view, but it does provide 
scope for considering the ‘public good’ when can be wrought from 
archaeological heritage. This approach is contrasted with the approach in 
New South Wales, where a much tighter, more professionally dominated 
approach to the management of archaeological heritage remains. 
 
7.7 Case Study–New South Wales 
 
Archaeological heritage in New South Wales is principally regulated by two 
pieces of legislation, the Heritage Act 1977 and the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act 1974.94 Historical archaeological relics are protected by the 
Heritage Act and Aboriginal archaeological objects by the NPW Act. Both acts 
overlap to a degree in the protection of non-indigenous built heritage and 
Aboriginal cultural heritage, as many built heritage sites are within National 
Parks in New South Wales, and complementarily, amendments to the 
Heritage Act in 1998 expanded its brief to include Aboriginal cultural heritage 
in some instances.95 This is discussed at greater length below. Assisting 
these Acts are overarching pieces of planning and environmental legislation 
within the State, particularly the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 
197996 and the Local Government Act 1993.97 General protections for heritage 
                                            
94  Hereafter NPW Act. 
95 Under the Heritage Amendment Act 1998.References to the Heritage Act, unless otherwise specified, are always 
to the current amended version of the legislation. 
96  Hereafter EPA Act. Heritage is a “matter for consideration” under Section 79C(1)(b) of the EPA Act for planning 
authorities in the determining of development applications. 
97 Local Government Act Section 142. Local councils may not make orders affecting heritage items without 
considering the issue of heritage significance. In addition, the Heritage Council must be notified and given 
opportunity to make submissions, unless exempted from this requirement by the Heritage Council. 
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in these Acts also have implications for non-indigenous archaeological sites, 
although essentially these Acts refer back to the protections of the Heritage 
Act. On occasion, the provisions of the Heritage Act have been overridden by 
other legislation, to facilitate specific State government development 
initiatives, without having to consider heritage as an issue.98 Historical 
archaeological sites can also be protected through listing on Local or Regional 
Environmental Plans99 and under State Environmental Planning Policies.  
 
7.8 The Administration of Heritage in New South Wales  
 
The New South Wales Heritage Office, established under the 1996 New 
South Wales Government Heritage Policy,100 is responsible for the 
administration and enforcement of the NSW Heritage Act, including its 
archaeological provisions. While operating as an independent agency for a 
decade, in 2006 it was reincorporated into the Department of Planning, 
although it retains a separate identity. The Heritage Office services the 
Heritage Council of New South Wales, a body of experts constituted under the 
Heritage Act101 to act as a determining authority with respect to that Act. The 
New South Wales Department of Environment and Conservation102 
administers the NPW Act and its provisions related to Aboriginal archaeology. 
Planning power is vested principally with the Department of Planning, which 
administers the EPA Act and approximately 150 local councils across the 
State, which administer the Local Government Act. In the case of historical 
archaeology, most administration and enforcement of New South Wales’s 
legal provisions falls to the New South Wales Heritage Office. In some cases 
this function has been delegated (for example, to the Department of 
Environment and Conservation for sites within National Parks).103 The issue of 
delegation of powers will be further addressed later in this section. 
 
7.9 Development of Heritage Legislation In New South Wales 
 
New South Wales is one of the first Australian States to introduce 
comprehensive heritage legislation, as opposed to the quite narrowly 
focussed legislation in other jurisdictions in the 1960s and early 1970s. The 
NSW Heritage Act was introduced in 1977,104 partly in response to the 
introduction of heritage legislation at the Commonwealth level, but also in 
response to a growing grass roots heritage conservation movement. This 
movement included such traditional heritage proponents as the National Trust 
of Australia (New South Wales) and members of the public, including both 
                                            
98 E.g. the Darling Harbour Authority Act (1984), which specifically exempted that redevelopment from the Heritage 
Act (see section 23J and Schedule 6). Similarly, the Walsh Bay Redevelopment (Special Provisions) Act 1999 
ratified the existing Heritage Council approval for this project and removed any right of appeal, unless leave was 
granted by the Minister for Planning. 
99 Both Port Macquarie and Richmond NSW have draft Archaeological Sites Local Environmental Plans. 
100  NSW Government Heritage Policy, 1996 
101  NSW Heritage Act 1977, section 7. 
102  The Department of Environment and Conservation was set up in 2004 and incorporates the former National 
Parks and Wildlife Service within its structure. 
103  Under Section 169 of the Heritage Act the Minister may delegate the functions of the Act. The Heritage Council 
itself first received delegated authority to determine applications without reference to the Minister in 1988. 
Heritage Council of NSW (1988) Annual Report. Sydney: NSW Government Printer. Pg 10. 
104  The Second Reading of the Heritage Bill took place on 16 November 1977, delivered by Mr. Haight (Maroubra), 
Minister for Services and Minister Assisting the Premier. Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Pg 9791. 
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working class residents of areas such as Millers Point and The Rocks in 
Sydney as well as upper middle class residents in areas such as Hunters 
Hill.105 It later drew in the trade unions, particularly the Builders Labourers 
Federation and union involvement in heritage is reflected through the 
designation of one Heritage Council seat for a representative of Unions 
NSW.106 The previous attempts at heritage protection had been based on 
local protection mechanisms, of questionable effectiveness.107 At the time of 
debate, there was some concern that heritage protection regimes more 
appropriately belonged within the general planning legislation,108 however the 
Heritage Act has remained a separate piece of legislation. This separation has 
been adopted across Australia, emphasising the symbolic value of separate 
and identifiable heritage legislation to the populace. The New South Wales 
heritage movement was as much about protecting amenity and controlling the 
scale of new development in economically booming areas such as Sydney as 
it was about protecting heritage items themselves. The earliest heritage 
battles which predated the introduction of heritage legislation are well 
documented elsewhere and will not be discussed in detail here, however they 
centred on natural heritage and built heritage, rather than archaeological 
heritage.  
 
The initial version of the Heritage Act included protections for built heritage, 
heritage precincts (conservation areas) and archaeological relics, although the 
last mentioned was a later addition to the original bill.109 Since 1977, the 
Heritage Act has received two major reviews, one in the late 1980s and the 
other in the early 1990s,110 which led to sweeping amendments and reforms 
within the Act in 1988 and 1998111 respectively. The most significant reforms 
to come out of the 1998 amendments were the inclusion of natural and 
Aboriginal heritage in the definition of ‘environmental heritage’, thus 
expanding the Heritage Council’s brief112, the creation of the State Heritage 
Register, which replaced the system of Permanent and Interim Conservation 
                                            
105  Davison, G. (1984). A brief history of the Australian heritage movement. A Heritage Handbook. G. Davison and 
C. McConville. North Sydney, Allen & Unwin: 14-27.  
106  Heritage Act (1977) New South Wales. Section 8(2)(a)(vi). 
107  Including the County of Cumberland Planning Scheme (1951), the City of Sydney Planning Scheme (1971) and 
the Windsor Planning Scheme (1973), constituted under the Local Government Act (NSW). In the period between 
1951 and 1977, only 16 properties were protected, due to the requirement that the State compulsorily acquire the 
property in order to protect it, if the owner insisted. Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr Haigh, 16 November 1977, Pp 9797, 9799. See also 
NSW Heritage Office (2000). Heritage Listings in New South Wales: A Brief History. Parramatta, NSW Heritage 
Office.  
108  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. 
Rozzoli, Leader of the Opposition. 16 November 1977, Pp 9814-9815. The previous Liberal-Country government 
had introduced the Environmental Planning Bill in 1976, which contained limited protections for historic buildings, 
but as it was introduced at the end of the Parliamentary term, the Bill did not get seriously considered by 
Parliament. The new Labor government introduced the more far-reaching Heritage Bill the following year, as 
separate legislation from the planning legislation. Substantial reform in the planning legislation did not occur until 
1979, with the introduction of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act. See also the speeches by Mr. 
McDonald, Member for Kirribilli, 23 November 1977, Pg 10185 and the final speech in reply by Mr. Haigh on 23 
November 1977, Pp 10194-10195. Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 
Forty-Fifth Parliament.  
109  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. 
Rozzoli, Leader of the Opposition. 16 November 1977, Pp 9813 and Speech by Mr. O’Connell, Member for 
Peats. 17 November 1977, Pg 9866. 
110  Department of Planning (1992). Heritage system review discussion paper : a summary of the major issues and 
ideas for improvement identified in the review of the heritage system. Sydney, Department of Planning,.  
111  These amendments were enacted in December 1998 in the NSW Heritage Amendment Act (1998) and 
subsequently came into effect on April 2nd 1999. 
112  Heritage Act, Section 4. 
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Orders and provided protection for sites of ‘State heritage significance’113 and 
the ability to create ‘exceptions’ from the archaeological provisions.114 These 
changes, particularly the creation of the State Heritage Register, represented 
a significant shift in the management of heritage in New South Wales. Part of 
the notion behind the replacement of Permanent Conservation Orders (PCO) 
with the State Heritage Register was a notion that the Register should always 
be a thing in flux–items are added or removed as thinking changes or new or 
better studies are undertaken, whereas under the PCO system the belief was 
that once an item had received a PCO, it would be protected in perpetuity. 
While the concept of the State Heritage Register as a constantly evolving, 
constantly improving entity was an interesting idea, in practice it has proved 
very difficult to remove items from the Register115 and there has been recent 
criticism of the Register being of limited effectiveness and facilitative of 
development over conservation of heritage values.116  
 
The addition of Aboriginal heritage to the brief of the Heritage Council was 
also an important step in changing the thinking regarding Aboriginal heritage. 
Since the first legislative protections for Aboriginal heritage in 1969117 those 
protections had largely been mired in a ‘stones and bones’ conception of 
Aboriginal heritage as archaeological resources, with more limited protection 
for places of contemporary significance for the Aboriginal community. This 
matter was brought to a head in the late 1990s, with a proposal to redevelop 
the Cypress Helene Club in central Sydney. An unremarkable nineteenth 
century building of no particular architectural merit, it had escaped listing as a 
heritage building by the Sydney City Council. The building, and the theatre 
inside, had however been the site of the first Aboriginal Land Rights meeting 
in Australia in 1938 and was known to the Aboriginal community as the ‘Day 
of Mourning’ site.118 It had enormous social significance to the Aboriginal 
community, through its symbolic value as the birthplace of the Land Rights 
movement. But at the time of its proposed redevelopment, the only option 
initially open for its protection was for the site to be declared an ‘Aboriginal 
place’ under the NPW Act, which until that point had never been used for a 
site of contemporary significance, particularly for an otherwise unimportant 
building. This situation prompted the change in the Heritage Act and now such 
sites can be listed on the State Heritage Register.119  
 
                                            
113  Heritage Act, Section 31. Prior to the creation of the State Heritage Register, a Permanent Conservation Order 
provided a permanent statutory protection for a heritage item deemed by the Minister to be under threat. An 
Interim Conservation Order (PCO) provided protection for up to 12 months for an item deemed to be under 
threat. After 12 months, the Minister either had to make a PCO or allow the order to lapse. 
114 Heritage Act, section 139 
115  The process for removing an item from the State Heritage Register is the same as the process for listing, 
including a formal assessment of significance, demonstrating the item does not meet the criteria for State 
heritage significance, a period for public exhibition and submissions and a formal recommendation by the 
Heritage Council to the Minister for removal of the items. While employed as the Heritage Manager of the Sydney 
Water Corporation in 2002, the author underwent this process to remove a number of the Corporation’s assets 
from the Register. 
116  Goddard, J. (2004). "Protection? What protection?" reflections: The National Trust Quarterly (August-October): 6-
8. , Goddard, J. (2004). We can't build the future without properly knowing the past. Sydney Morning Herald. 
Sydney: 15.  
117  Under a previous version of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Act. 
118  Hinkson, M. (2001). Aboriginal Sydney: a guide to important places of the past and present. Canberra, Aboriginal 
Studies Press. Pp 22-23. 
 Eggerking, K. (1997). "Revitalising citizenship: lessons from the margins." Culture and Policy 8 (3): 77-96.  
119  State Heritage Register item #773, protected from 1 November 1996. Note this listing was a conversion from a 
Permanent Conservation Order under the previous system. 
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7.10 The Philosophical Approach of the New South Wales Heritage Act 
 
The New South Wales Heritage Act takes the approach of regulating items of 
“environmental heritage”120 based on their heritage significance. Items of 
environmental heritage can include built, natural, archaeological, movable and 
in some cases Aboriginal objects, sites or buildings. Heritage significance is 
defined in a set of criteria gazetted in 1999, with the goal of being more 
descriptive and specific about the threshold for heritage significance. These 
criteria are: 
 
(a) an item is important in the course, or pattern, of NSW’s cultural or 
natural history;  
(b) an item has strong or special association with the life or works of a 
person, or group of persons, of importance in NSW’s cultural or 
natural history;  
(c) an item is important in demonstrating aesthetic characteristics 
and/or a high degree of creative or technical achievement in NSW;  
(d) an item has strong or special association with a particular 
community or cultural group in NSW for social, cultural or spiritual 
reasons;  
(e) an item has potential to yield information that will contribute to an 
understanding of NSW’s cultural or natural history;  
(f) an item possesses uncommon, rare or endangered aspects of 
NSW’s cultural or natural history;  
(g) an item is important in demonstrating the principal characteristics 
of a class of NSW’s 
i. cultural or natural places; or 
ii. cultural or natural environments.121 
 
This system replaces the previous system of significance assessment of 
historical significance, aesthetic significance, social significance and 
technical/scientific significance, supplemented with the ‘degree’ criteria of 
representativeness and rarity, discussed in Chapter 2 and derived largely from 
the Burra Charter. The intention with this new approach was to provide 
greater guidance than the previous criteria, as well as relating significance 
specifically back to the state of New South Wales. This system also bears 
much in common with the significance criteria established by the Australian 
Heritage Commission.122 
  
Archaeological heritage is not specifically addressed in the above criteria, but 
could arguably be caught by all criteria, it perhaps most clearly relates criteria 
(a), (e), (f) and (g). These new criteria, however, despite broadening the 
interpretation of the nature of heritage items in New South Wales has not led 
to a substantial increase in the number of archaeological sites listed on the 
                                            
120  Derived explicitly from the Commonwealth system. Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary 
Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Pg 9792. 
121  Established 1999. See http://www.heritage.nsw.gov.au/docs/criteria.pdf  
122  Deliberately so. The Hansard debates make it clear the legislation was seeking to implement the principles 
espoused by the Hope Report. See Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 
Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. O’Connell, Member for Peats. 17 November 1977, Pg 9865-9866. 
Scientific, aesthetic and natural significance were originally excluded from the purview of the bill. 
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State Heritage Register. As at June 2004, there were 26 sites listed on the 
State Heritage Register primarily for their archaeological heritage 
significance.123 The establishment of the State Heritage Register was 
intended to make the Act more forward-thinking and less reactive.124 The 
previous system of Conservation Orders only came into effect once a heritage 
item or potential heritage item was under threat, rather than actively seeking 
out and protecting heritage items. Thus by actively seeking to identify and list 
State significant heritage items, there is an inherent assumption that this will 
improve the protection of heritage items. The practicalities of heritage listing 
are such, however, that the full identification and listing of heritage items will 
take many years and is in fact may never represent the totality of sites of 
State heritage significance in New South Wales .  
 
In this regard, the New South Wales Land and Environment Court is in step 
with the intent of the State Heritage Register and heritage listings in general, 
recognising this as an ongoing process, which inevitably will have gaps. A 
1998 Land and Environment Court case highlighted this issue, and concerned 
the identification and attempted listing of a house as a heritage item by a local 
council, in circumstances where developers had purchased the house for 
redevelopment, on the basis that it was unlisted. Justice Talbot observed that 
“the identification and listing of heritage items is an ongoing process which 
evolves over time as relevant information is gathered…No matter how 
laudable the project may be, a council cannot be expected to have adequate 
resources that would enable it to investigate every building in its area at one 
time.”125 Thus it is recognised by the courts in New South Wales, if not 
necessarily the general public or the development industry, that the 
identification of heritage items is an evolutionary, and probably open-ended, 
process. This is as true for archaeological sites as for historic buildings, and in 
fact probably more so. The practicalities of identifying archaeological sites 
require a much greater application of resources than the identification of 
historic buildings. 
 
Archaeological sites of any nature are eligible to be considered for listing on 
the State Heritage Register, or in Local Environmental Plans, but in practice 
very few are in fact listed.126 The vast majority of archaeological sites and 
objects in New South Wales continue to be dealt with under the blanket relics 
provisions contained in Division 9 of the Heritage Act, or, if Aboriginal in 
nature, the provisions of the NPW Act. This dichotomy highlights a problem in 
this most recent set of legislative reforms. The continued use of the relics 
provisions of the Heritage Act is perpetuating a system which has not always 
                                            
123  Based on a search of the Heritage Office Database for the Site Type ‘Archaeological-Terrestrial’ undertaken on 
18 June 2004. There were also 2 sites listed under the Site Type ‘Archaeological-Maritime’ not included in this 
figure. The total number of sites on the Register is in excess of 1500. Results confirmed as unchanged on 13 
August 2006. Notable sites include the site of the original colonial Governor’s residence (First Government House 
site–Item # 1309), Sydney’s first water supply (The Tank Stream–Item #636), the site of the first Australian steel 
production (Lithgow Blast Furnace–Item # 548) and a site of secondary punishment for transported convicts 
(Newcastle Convict Lumberyard site–Item # 570). 
124  NSW Government Heritage Policy, Pg 1. 
125  Woollahra Municipal Council v Andriotakus & Ors [1998] Unreported, NSW Land and Environment Court. Talbot 
J at 7. 
126  26 State Heritage Register listings for archaeological sites out of more than 1400 total listings. Of the remaining 
heritage items, some portion will have associated archaeological deposits or remains, however such remains are 
incidental to the main reasons for listing the items on the State Heritage Register. 
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been adequate over the last three decades and fails to provide any of the 
forward-planning suggested by the creation of the State Heritage Register. 
 
7.11 The Heritage Act and archaeology 
 
The general approach in New South Wales to the protection of historical 
archaeological sites is by reference to the archaeological object, referred to as 
a ‘relic’, which is protected from unauthorised excavation. The NSW Heritage 
Act has provided regulation and protection for non-indigenous archaeological 
sites from its inception, through the ‘relics provisions’.127 The NPW Act has 
separate provisions for the protection of Aboriginal objects.128 
 
In New South Wales, a “relic” is defined as: 
 
any deposit, object or material evidence: 
(a) which relates to the settlement of the area that comprises New 
South  Wales, not being Aboriginal settlement and 
(b) which is 50 or more years old.’129 
 
Relics are protected under two sections of the Heritage Act: section 57 and 
section 139. The protections are essentially identical, however section 57 
applies specifically to relics subject to listing on the State Heritage Register 
(either in their own right or as a component of another listed item or site) 
whereas section 139 applies to unlisted, unidentified archaeological relics 
anywhere in New South Wales .  
 
The main part of Section 139, the ‘relics provisions’ states: 
 
1) A person must not disturb or excavate any land knowing or having 
reasonable cause to suspect that the disturbance or excavation will or 
is likely to result in a relic being discovered, exposed, moved, damaged 
or destroyed unless the disturbance or excavation is carried out in 
accordance with an excavation permit.  
 
2) A person must not disturb or excavate any land on which the person 
has discovered or exposed a relic except in accordance with an 
excavation permit.130 
 
The relics provisions also allow conditions to be placed upon excavation 
permits, designate an appeals process arising from a refusal or against 
conditions, provide a requirement for notification of discovery of a relic and 
                                            
127 Heritage Act (1977) section 4. Until 1987, section 4(b) defined relics as objects dating prior to January 1st 1900. 
This definition was changed to allow for the protection of significant industrial machinery which was under threat 
but which dated from the first half of the twentieth century. See Mackay, R. and P. James (1986). Provision of 
statutory protection for artefacts - a review of the provisions of the New South Wales Heritage Act in relation to 
relics, National Trust of Australia (NSW).  
 Mackay, R. and P. James (1987). "Provision of statutory protection for historic artefacts." Australian Archaeology 
24: 41-47.  
128  As a part of a suite of amendments to the NPW Act in 2002, the term ‘Aboriginal relic’ was replaced with the term 
‘Aboriginal object’. NPW Act 1974 section 5 (Definitions). The NPW Act archaeological provisions are Part 6 
sections 83-91.  
129 Heritage Act Section 4 
130  Heritage Act (1977) New South Wales. Sections 139(1) and (2). 
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give the Minister the power to direct that a relic be conserved, as well as 
allowing the Minister to designate a repository for a relic.131 In the case where 
such a direction order is made, no compensation is payable. Most of these 
provisions, except the power to issue excavation permits and impose 
conditions are rarely, if ever, used. An inspection of Heritage Council records 
revealed that a Ministerial direction regarding the deposition of an excavated 
relic has never been made.132 
 
While the original Hansard debates do not dwell at length on the rationale 
behind protecting archaeological heritage, on the few occasions the issue is 
mentioned, the focus is on scientific significance and archaeological research. 
Archaeology was noted as being a component of the significance of other 
heritage sites133 as well as being acknowledged as significant in its own right: 
“anthropologists will tell you…sites are as important as buildings”, noted one 
member of Parliament.134 By this stage, laws to protect Aboriginal sites and 
objects had been in place for a few years.135 Significant in that comment 
however is the perception that it was the anthropologists, and by implication 
archaeologists, who were the arbiters of that importance; at this early stage of 
heritage protection, Parliament was protecting archaeological heritage for the 
sake of these professional heritage disciplines, rather than for the wider 
community. The general tenor of the 1977 debates around the whole issue of 
heritage conservation was very focussed on the protection of historic 
buildings, primarily, for the public good, with one parliamentarian remarking 
“…our heritage should be preserved for the enjoyment of future generations of 
Australians.”136 
 
In 1999, amendments to the Act allowed the Heritage Council to gazette 
‘exceptions’ to the relics provisions by declaring certain types of relics, certain 
parcels of land or certain types of disturbance work to be excepted from the 
relics provisions.137 These were used in a somewhat vain attempt to remove 
certain types of very common objects from the realm of the relics provisions, 
such as in-service water and sewer mains, which had been captured in an 
overly legalistic interpretation of the definition of relics. In 2001, the exceptions 
powers were further refined through a minor amendment which added the 
power to except a specific site from the relics provisions on the basis that any 
                                            
131  From 1988 to 1998, Section 146B of the Heritage Act provided that all relics should go to the Museum of Applied 
Arts and Sciences (now the Powerhouse Museum). As a matter of policy, however, the MAAS always declined to 
accept collections (Vanessa Mack, former Powerhouse curator, pers. comm.). The power of direction (section 
146B) has never in fact been used. The nomination of the Museum of Applied Arts and Sciences was originally 
suggested by Mackay and James in 1987. Mackay, R. and P. James (1987). "Provision of statutory protection for 
historic artefacts." Australian Archaeology 24: 41-47. Post 1998, Section 146B allows the Minister to designate a 
relic be deposited with anyone deemed to have the “facilities and expertise to conserve the relic”.  
132  Based on a search of the Heritage Office Database for any orders made under Section 146 of the Heritage Act. 
June 2004. A subsequent confirmation with Heritage Office staff has indicated that power has not been used 
since that date. 
133  Referring to Elizabeth Farm in Parramatta. Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates 
(Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. Wilde, Member for Parramatta. 17 November 1977, Pp 9880-
9881. 
134  Ibid. Speech by Mr. Lewis, Member for Wollondilly, 17 November 1977, Pg 9883. 
135  Under the National Parks and Wildlife Act (1974) New South Wales.  
136  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. 
Degen, Member for Balmain, 22 November 1977, Pg 9884. 
137  Heritage Act Section 139(4). These are known as the General Exceptions, the Addisonian Exceptions and the 
Sydney Water Exceptions. See http://www.heritage.nsw.gov.au/03_subnav_01.htm  
 The author was heavily involved in the drafting of both sets of initial exceptions and subsequently went on to 
become the Heritage Manager for Sydney Water Corporation. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 216 
relics contained within the site were of little or no significance.138 As with the 
approach to the Victorian definition of archaeological sites, such a “shopping 
list” approach to regulation inevitably leads to gaps in the protective regime. 
The exceptions are currently undergoing review for precisely this reason.139 
 
7.12 The ‘relics provisions’ considered 
 
On their face, the relics provisions are themselves an extremely strong set of 
protections for both archaeological sites and individual relics. The definition of 
a non-indigenous ‘relic’ is an absolute definition–anything older than 50 years, 
regardless of its heritage significance, is a relic. The qualifying part of the 
definition “relating to the settlement of NSW” has been interpreted extremely 
broadly, capturing more within the ambit of the legislation than was originally 
intended. Section 139, however, only affords protection to relics where land 
will be excavated. Relics above ground must be listed on the State Heritage 
Register to receive protection under the Heritage Act. In theory, the relics 
provisions can apply to any non-indigenous item which has been below 
ground for more than 50 years (for example the footings of a standing building 
from 1955) although their application in this way would be absurd and contrary 
to the legislative intent of the Heritage Act. The problematic nature of such a 
far-reaching definition of ‘relic’ was noted by at least one member of 
Parliament during the 1977 debates, who noted “there would be thousands of 
relics in the homes of people in this State”.140 
 
Referring back to the definition of relic as ‘relating to the settlement of NSW’, 
the definition shows the differences inherent between the legal and 
archaeological professional views of archaeological heritage. The definition 
leaves open the question as to whether “settlement” was a process or an 
event. An archaeologist may reasonably argue that non-indigenous 
‘settlement’ is an ongoing process, which commenced in 1788 in New South 
Wales and continues today. And to an archaeologist, those relics which are 
only just inside the 50 year limit may be of interest–for example, the Tuscon 
Garbage Project in Tuscon Arizona, USA,141 which applied archaeological 
methods to contemporary rubbish deposits in the city dump for experimental 
purposes. A legal practitioner, however, may argue that settlement was a one-
off event, which occurred in New South Wales when non-indigenous people 
‘settled’ in a given locale. Thus, for Sydney, a lawyer could argue that 
settlement took place in 1788 and that later material does not meet the 
definition of relic and thus is not protected under the provisions of the Heritage 
Act. This is only a theoretical debate, as the relics provisions have never been 
tested before the courts in New South Wales. 
 
The main substance of the change to the definition of “relic” in 1987 involved 
the removal of a fixed date for items to qualify as protected relics (1 January 
                                            
138  Heritage Act Section 139(4)(d). 
139  Pers. comm. Yvonne Kaiser-Glass, Archaeologist, NSW Heritage Office. 22 August 2006. The new exceptions 
are anticipated by the end of 2006. 
140  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. 
Maddison, Member for Ku-ring-gai, Deputy Leader of the Opposition, 22 November 1977, Pg 9992. 
141  Rathje, W. L. and C. Murphy (2001). Rubbish! : the archaeology of garbage. Tucson, AZ, University of Arizona 
Press.  
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 217 
1900) and replaced it with a floating age range (greater than 50 years in age). 
Mackay and James argued at the time that Australian heritage legislation 
should include provisions for the control of archaeological objects as 
moveable heritage following excavation, as well as stipulating a repository for 
excavated materials.142 While this suggestion was adopted in the 1987 
amendments to the NSW Heritage Act, the manner of the actual drafting of 
the Act meant that the proposal was ineffective. Mackay and James argued 
that there were a large number of items which were dated from the post-1900 
time period which were highly significant yet remained unprotected by 
legislation. This included individual objects as well as collections of artefacts 
recovered from compliance-driven archaeological excavations. Their 
approach was to widen the net cast in the definition, to capture items which (at 
the time of the amendments) dated in the 1901 to 1947 age range, and 
ensure excavated relics were preserved (preferably in a museum) for future 
scientific research. This minor change aside, there were no other fundamental 
alterations to the definition of “relic” nor to the enabling provisions of the 
Heritage Act. This changed definition still stands nearly 20 years after the fact, 
but administratively is needlessly burdensome, due to its vagueness and lack 
of qualification. A more effective strategy, and one which Mackay and James 
themselves hinted at but did not argue for, would be to link the definition of 
“relic” to the heritage significance criteria. As noted in Chapter 6, this was 
done in the 2004 amendments to South Australian Heritage Places Act, 
specifically to ensure the scope of the legislation was limited. This small 
change limits the possibility of highly legalistic interpretations of the nature of 
a “relic”, in circumstances where the heritage significance of a relic must be 
demonstrated in order to be protected. 
 
The relics provisions do not, of themselves, place any specific limits on what 
can be done to a relic once an excavation permit has been obtained. Permits 
are issued subject to conditions,143 which can place various constraints upon 
what can be done to an archaeological site and which require certain actions 
to be undertaken. This may include the in situ conservation of certain types of 
relics or the need to reassess the significance of the site during the course of 
excavation works. The power to impose conditions also provides the 
opportunity for conservation outcomes to be negotiated for a site, including 
the redesign of a development to avoid significant, intact archaeological 
remains. Relatively standard conditions are imposed on every excavation 
permit issued in New South Wales and additional conditions are imposed on a 
case-by-case basis as required. The standard conditions are principally 
designed to regulate the behaviour of archaeologists (and by implication their 
clients) with respect to good archaeological practice. By placing these actions 
in the context of conditions on a legal document, the ‘excavation permit’ the 
Heritage Office is seeking to bind those who excavate archaeological sites to 
a certain standard of practice. There is little policing of compliance in this 
                                            
142  These ideas were originally contained in a submission to the review of the Heritage Act in 1986, on behalf of the 
National Trust of Australia (NSW). This submission was later reworked into a journal article. 
 Mackay, R. and P. James (1986). Provision of statutory protection for artefacts - a review of the provisions of the 
New South Wales Heritage Act in relation to relics, National Trust of Australia (NSW). , Mackay, R. and P. James 
(1987). "Provision of statutory protection for historic artefacts." Australian Archaeology 24: 41-47.  
143 Heritage Act, section 141(1)(a). 
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regard, however, and there has never been a prosecution for breach of permit 
conditions. 
 
Similarly, the relics provisions do not take into account intergenerational 
equity. Intergenerational equity is, to a degree, implicit in a listing on the State 
Heritage Register, as a listing is meant to be a long-term if not permanent 
protection and provides strict limits as to what may be done to a listed item. 
However archaeological sites are unrepresented as an item class. The very 
terminology of the Act–the “excavation permit”–implies that the appropriate 
way in which to manage archaeological relics is to remove relics when 
desired. Only in very rare cases are archaeological sites retained in situ when 
affected by a development and in the majority of cases only in government-
funded developments144 due to the enormous additional expense in situ 
conservation can require. In some instances, development can be 
reconfigured to limit disturbance to the archaeological fabric of a place, 
although the opportunities for this may be minimal on a highly-constrained 
urban development site. This may also result in a significant impost on the site 
owner, in terms of direct costs or foregone development opportunities, 
however present legal requirements do not provide a robust framework for 
taking such matters into account.  
 
In the absence of a framework or the consideration of wider issues such as 
those discussed above, the conservation outcomes on individual sites are 
inevitably negotiated in a manner which excludes the consideration of wider 
conservation issues. Present regimes can, in some instances, provide for 
localised public benefit outcomes, confined to an individual site or a defined 
period of time (such as public programs during the course of excavation). Yet 
the system remains overly focussed on excavation as the primary 
management tool for archaeological heritage. There are few opportunities for 
considering the wider context for archaeological heritage conservation, such 
as developing conservation strategies for a range of sites or site types across 
an archaeological landscape. In most cases, it will be difficult to identify and 
articulate a longer term public good outcome for the conservation of an 
archaeological site, save for those sites which are self-evidently of high 
importance. A public good conservation framework which considers broader 
values of archaeological heritage across a landscape may provide 
opportunities to transfer the benefits of conservation form one localised site to 
a broader region. However the current structures within the Heritage Act 
militate against this, relying on a site-by-site based approach with limited 
flexibility. 
 
7.13 Protecting Aboriginal archaeological heritage 
 
Aboriginal heritage is protected in New South Wales under the National Parks 
and Wildlife Act 1974, which was substantially redrafted from its 1967 
incarnation and added protection for Aboriginal archaeological heritage, in 
                                            
144  For example the First Government House Site and the Sydney Conservatorium of Music site. See Mulvaney, D. 
J. and Australian Heritage Commission. (1985). A good foundation : reflections on the heritage of the first 
Government House, Sydney. Canberra, Australian Government Publishing Service.  
 Casey, M. (2005). The road to controversy. Object lessons: archaeology & heritage in Australia. J. Lydon and T. 
Ireland. Melbourne, Australian Scholarly Publishing: 148-166.  
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part at the recommendation of prominent Australian anthropologist A. P. 
Elkin.145 Amendments in the Act in the late 1990s replaced the previous 
description of Aboriginal heritage items (Aboriginal relics) with the more 
neutral, but broader descriptor of “Aboriginal objects”. Aside from the 
descriptor, the definition attached did not itself change. This change was 
made to reflect the notion that Aboriginal heritage items were things 
(potentially) in ongoing use and part of a living culture, rather than the lifeless 
relics of a dead or dying culture. Aplin notes that, while the inference could be 
drawn that by including Aboriginal heritage in the same piece of legislation as 
natural heritage the Aboriginal past is natural rather than cultural, the reality is 
likely more pragmatic–that large numbers of Aboriginal sites were known to 
exist within the parks and reserves146 at the time the legislation was 
established. Such sites can also be more easily protected and are less subject 
to direct threats than the even larger numbers of Aboriginal sites off-park. This 
change in descriptor, from “relics” to “objects”, represents an understanding 
by those managing Aboriginal heritage that such objects and places are a part 
of a living indigenous culture. Nevertheless, this did not substantially change 
the nature of the legal protection for Aboriginal heritage items or places, 
where again regulation is focussed on the controlled disturbance of such 
places, rather than any presumption in favour of their conservation. Much as 
with the Heritage Act, the NPW Act provides a blanket protection for all 
Aboriginal objects, whether previously identified or not, anywhere in New 
South Wales. The Department of Environment and Conservation maintains 
the Aboriginal Heritage Information Management System which records the 
locations of all known Aboriginal sites.147 The Act also provides for the 
declaration of “Aboriginal places”, which can be places of Aboriginal social 
significance with little or no physical evidence of the Aboriginal past. 
Aboriginal places must be declared and gazetted, in the same way as heritage 
items listed under the Heritage Act or a local planning scheme.  
 
The limitations to this approach are very similar to the problems with the 
Heritage Act. Blanket protections provide for sweeping coverage of the entire 
state and, given the very broad definition of “Aboriginal object”, potentially 
capture virtually any individual item ever modified or used by an Aboriginal 
person right up until the present day. The definition of Aboriginal object only 
excludes “handicrafts made for sale” and thus, theoretically, any item used by 
a contemporary Aboriginal person, which relates to “indigenous habitation” 
could be considered a protected object. The Heritage Act attempts to get 
around this issue by stipulating that protected objects must be more than 50 
years old, however the problems with that approach have been discussed 
above. Again, there does not appear to have ever been an attempt to protect 
a contemporary product of an Aboriginal person in this way, rather protections 
for moveable heritage items have been used, such as the Commonwealth 
Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act.148 While the likelihood of the 
                                            
145  Parliament of New South Wales (1977). Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) Forty-Fifth Parliament. Speech by Mr. 
Lewis, Member for Wollondilly, 17 November 1977, Pg 9882. 
146  Aplin, G. (2002). Heritage: identification, conservation and management. Oxford, Oxford University Press. Pg 24. 
147  Aboriginal Heritage Information Management System data is typically restricted in terms of its release, due to 
cultural or site security concerns. See the AHIMS website for details: 
 http://www.nationalparks.nsw.gov.au/npws.nsf/Content/Aboriginal+Heritage+Information+Management+System  
148  This has mainly been restricted to Aboriginal artworks by twentieth century artists. 
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NPW Act being used in this way is minimal, it nevertheless represents a 
legislative anomaly, which has the potential to distract from the main purpose 
of the legislation, which is to protect significant indigenous places and objects. 
 
The NPW Act makes the assumption that every “Aboriginal object” will be an 
object of significance to Aboriginal people. While there is no doubt a vast 
array of material which may be of significance to the Aboriginal community, 
there would be an amount which was of little or no interest to Aboriginal 
people or to archaeologists. This can include, at a basic level, isolated finds or 
minor artefact scatters, which presently are protected under the general 
protections for Aboriginal objects. The assumption of importance of 
archaeological objects to the Aboriginal community is a very fine balancing 
act. Clearly the NPW Act was developed with the intention to cast a broad net 
in terms of protection, and errs on the side of caution by potentially protecting 
too much rather than too little. This is consistent with an aim of giving a central 
attention to Aboriginal heritage issues, perhaps in recognition of the past 
dispossession of Aboriginal people. But the situation may arise where objects 
protected by the Act are of no interest to the Aboriginal community. However 
the Act provides no guidance as to how to proceed in such situations. 
 
Such a construction presents a dilemma for heritage managers and raises 
important public policy questions for indigenous heritage protection. The 
nature of the present construction is advantageous to indigenous people in 
terms of providing a statutory avenue for their involvement in management 
issues for indigenous places and objects. In the absence of such legislation, it 
is more likely their interests would be overlooked or excluded. What is 
currently lacking, however, is a transparent framework for identifying what 
places are more or less important to indigenous culture. As noted in the 
previous chapter, the ACT has adopted a policy position that all remains of the 
indigenous past are considered significant by the indigenous community. 
Such a position, while making a strong political statement, presents many 
practical difficulties in its implementation. While there is a need to recognise 
and compensate past dispossession and disempowerment of indigenous 
people, this is unlikely to be successful if undertaken at the expense of all 
other legitimate social concerns. Pardoe has referred to this as the balancing 
of accountabilities between indigenous people and the archaeological 
community.149 The accountabilities are however wider than just these two 
groups and, where such interests are not accounted for, legislation is likely to 
be perceived as unfair on the interest of other parties. As noted in Chapter 3, 
the perception of “fairness” is a factor which undermines the effectiveness of 
environmental regulation. The need, then, is for a framework which allows the 
explicit consideration and balancing of such competing claims when 
determining appropriate conservation action.  
 
 
 
                                            
149 Pardoe, C. (1992). Arches of radii, corridors of power: reflections on current archaeological practice. Power, 
Knowledge and Aborigines. B. Attwood and J. Arnold. Melbourne, La Trobe University: 132-141.  
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7.14 What makes a relic in New South Wales? Historical versus 
Aboriginal definitions. 
 
In New South Wales, differing yet similar definitions apply to archaeological 
materials depending on whether they are of Aboriginal or historic origin. The 
definition of historical relics has been discussed at length above. In 
comparison, the definition of an Aboriginal object is:  
 
any deposit, object or material evidence (not being a handicraft made 
for sale) relating to indigenous and non-European habitation of the area 
that comprises New South Wales, being habitation both prior to and 
concurrent with the occupation of that area by persons of European 
extraction, and includes Aboriginal remains.150 
 
The wording of the two definitions is similar, and suggests an attempt at 
consistency by the legal draftspeople. But looking beyond the overall 
similarities of the definitions, several distinct differences emerge. Firstly, and 
perhaps most obviously, is the removal in the NPW Act definition of any 
reference to time frame. Whereas the Heritage Act requires relics to be more 
than 50 years old, the Aboriginal definition is open-ended. This is certainly 
understandable for the early end of the spectrum, as Aboriginal settlement will 
never be able to be as precisely defined in time as non-indigenous settlement, 
however it does not provide a close-off point. It is unclear whether this was 
just a legislative oversight, or part of an unvoiced assumption that such relics 
related to “prehistory” rather than contemporary indigenous culture. Arguably, 
therefore, anything created by ‘indigenous and non-European’ people 
continues to be an Aboriginal object, provided it is ‘not a handicraft for sale’. 
This may seem a fallacious point, as in archaeological terms, an Aboriginal 
object will have certain intrinsic qualities which make it of archaeological 
interest, however this subtlety is not captured by law.  
 
The NPW Act definition includes human remains, a subject on which the 
Heritage Act is silent, although the Heritage Council has released Skeletal 
Remains Guidelines151 and permits for the excavation of non-indigenous 
human remains are issued under section 139 of the Heritage Act from time to 
time.152 It is inherently questionable, however, as to whether the Heritage Act 
does apply to human remains as they are not specified within the provisions of 
that Act. The notion of human remains, whether Aboriginal or non-Aboriginal, 
as being ‘relics related to the settlement of New South Wales’ also bears re-
examining. While certainly in archaeological terms much can be learned from 
the exhumation of human remains, there are numerous ethical and cultural 
issues which arise.153 Given this, a more prudent approach may be to deal 
                                            
150  National Parks and Wildlife Act (1974) New South Wales. Section 5. 
151  Heritage Council of NSW Skeletal Remains Guidelines 1998. 
152  For example, the excavation of the nineteenth century miners’ graveyard at the Cadia Mine near Orange in 1997-
98, or the excavation of the Destitute Children’s Asylum graveyard at the Prince of Wales Hospital in Randwick in 
1996-98. Both were excavated with excavation permits issued under section 139 of the Heritage Act and the 
Heritage Council took a substantial role in the management of the sites before, during and after exhumation. 
153 Briscoe, G. (1990). "The Politics of Archaeology and Prehistory: The Case For and Against  Reburial of Human 
Remains." Bulletin of the Conference of Museum Anthropologists 23: 123-141.  
  Pardoe, C. (1992). Arches of radii, corridors of power: reflections on current archaeological practice. Power, 
Knowledge and Aborigines. B. Attwood and J. Arnold. Melbourne, La Trobe University: 132-141.  
 O'Keefe, P. J. (2000). "Archaeology and human rights." Public Archaeology 1 (3).  
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with human remains separately from the general accumulated material culture 
of prehistoric and historic cultures which typically comprises the 
archaeological record.  
 
The NPW Act definition also attempts to deal with ‘contact sites’ through 
reference to sites with “habitation…concurrent with the occupation of that area 
by persons of European extraction [and Aboriginal persons]”. Contact sites 
are broadly defined as sites of interaction between Aboriginal and non-
indigenous people and represent the interface, the contact, between two 
cultures.154 These sites, depending on their location in Australia, could date 
from circa 1788 in New South Wales to the early twentieth century for more 
remote areas of Queensland, the Northern Territory or Western Australia.155 
How contact is actually represented in the archaeological record is a matter of 
complex debate–is it the physical presence of the two cultures in the same 
spot, is it a site of transfer of goods, technology or customs, or a site where 
the non-indigenous archaeological record overlays the Aboriginal record? The 
notion of ‘concurrent occupation’ in the legislation is only vaguely defined. And 
while the Heritage Act now provides a broader scope for the consideration 
and listing of Aboriginal heritage on the State Heritage Register, it does not 
adequately address the issue of contact sites or sites with multiple 
archaeological values. 
 
While in some instances Aboriginal people have come to accept, sometimes 
grudgingly, the contribution archaeology can make to the understanding of 
their past, and can assist Aboriginal community goals such as establishing the 
basis for a land claim,156 the protection of archaeological objects, initially on 
behalf of the archaeologist, may have elevated their importance in the minds 
of Aboriginal people. At a minimum, Aboriginal involvement in the 
management of indigenous places gives Aboriginal people an input into the 
planning system which they may not have otherwise had available. The same 
can be said for historical archaeological relics; as they are protected by law, 
an archaeologist must be engaged to excavate them in accordance with the 
law, but from a perspective of actual ability of the protected object(s) to 
provide meaningful information regarding the history of a site or region, the 
value of the actual relic may be minimal. Both approaches have elevated the 
status of the archaeological object out of proportion to the value such an 
object may have had in the absence of protective legislation. In such 
instances, archaeological heritage protection becomes an end unto itself, with 
little underlying purpose save legislative compliance. In New South Wales, 
because of the particularly all-encompassing definitions of archaeological 
heritage and the blanket protections offered by the legislation, this situation is 
particularly pronounced. 
                                                                                                                             
 Paterson, R. K. (2001). "Claiming possession of the material cultural property of indigenous peoples." Media and 
Arts Law Review (3): 193-201.  
154  Torrence, R. and A. Clarke, Eds. (2000). The archaeology of difference: negotiating cross-cultural engagements 
in Oceania. London, Routledge.  
 Harrison, R. and C. Williamson, Eds. (2002). After Captain Cook: The archaeology of the recent indigenous past 
in Australia. Sydney University Archaeological Methods Series, Archaeological Computing Laboratory, University 
of Sydney.  
155  This is recognised in the Northern Territory Heritage Conservation Act through reference to inhabitation by 
Macassan people, as discussed in Chapter 4.  
156  Coutts, P. J. F. (1984). A Public Archaeologist's View of Future Directions in Cultural Resource Management. 
Archaeology at ANZAAS, Canberra. G. K. Ward. Canberra, Canberra Archaeological Society: 212-221. Pg 213 
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7.14 Measuring archaeological outcomes in New South Wales  
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Figure 7.2: Permits issued for archaeological works under the Heritage Act 
1997 (NSW), 1978-2005157 
 
The above chart compares the trends in total excavation permit applications 
under section 140 of the Heritage Act with the total number of Section 60 
applications issued for works to items on the State Heritage Register or 
subject to Permanent or Interim Conservation Orders.158 This data was 
complied from the Annual Reports of the Heritage Council of New South 
Wales. Data for Section 60 approvals between 1994 and 1997, showing an 
apparent declining trend, is suspect, as during those years, the Annual 
Reports did not record the total number of Section 60 applications considered 
by the Heritage Council. This data has been reconstructed using the 
information held in the Heritage Office Database but it is likely that 
inaccuracies remain. Similarly, prior to 1987, the reporting of the total number 
of excavation permits issued under Section 140 was inconsistent. As reporting 
of archaeological approvals for sites on the State Heritage Register was also 
inconsistently reported,159 those approvals for State significant archaeological 
sites are grouped with the general Section 60 approvals. 
 
What is observable is a steadily increasing trend in the number of Section 140 
approvals for unlisted archaeological sites and relics over three decades, with 
a temporary downturn in 2001, which can be attributed to the post-Olympics 
slump in the construction and development industry.160 By comparison, the 
                                            
157  Compiled form the Annual Reports of the Heritage Council of NSW. 
158  In the 1998 amendments to the Heritage Act, the system of Permanent and Interim Conservation Orders (PCOs 
and ICOs) was replaced by the State Heritage Register (SHR). All items with PCOs or ICOs were transferred to 
the State Heritage Register in April 1999. Any reference to the State Heritage Register should be understood as 
referring to a PCO site prior to 1998. These figures are total applications processed, thus including applications 
approved, refused or withdrawn in any given financial year (1 July to 30 June). 
159  Reported only in the 1995 and 1996 Heritage Council Annual Reports, as 10 and 16 approvals for State 
significant archaeological sites respectively. 
160  Sydney hosted the 2000 Summer Olympic Games, which drove a massive construction program for the 5 or so 
years proceeding 2000. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 7–Legislative case studies: New South Wales and Victoria 224 
number of Section 60 applications has remained relatively consistent at 150-
200 applications per year since the late 1980s. However since 2000 the 
number of applications has been consistently over 200 per annum.161 A spike 
is observable around 1988, the Australian Bicentenary Year, where a great 
number of heritage conservation projects were undertaken as a part of the 
Bicentenary celebrations. 
 
Prior to about 1987, the year of a number of substantial amendments to the 
Heritage Act, the Heritage Council’s staff archaeologists were much more 
directly involved in the archaeological work in New South Wales. The majority 
of archaeological projects undertaken in New South Wales in the first 10 years 
of the operation of the Heritage Act were on government-owned sites and 
were often funded in whole or in part by a grant from the Heritage Council.162 
The early 1980s saw a number of Sydney’s most significant buildings and 
sites conserved, with accompanying archaeological works, including Hyde 
Park Barracks, the Royal Mint, New South Wales Parliament House, Sydney 
Hospital and the site of First Government House. These projects raised the 
profile of historical archaeology in New South Wales but saw it mainly 
restricted to publicly-owned sites where there was a reasonable expectation of 
public access, interpretation and ongoing public benefit from the excavations, 
with some of the sites, particularly Hyde Park Barracks and the site of First 
Government House, becoming public museums. It was not until the late 1980s 
and into the early 1990s before there was substantial engagement of the 
private sector with the archaeological requirements of the Heritage Act. 
 
The growth in archaeological applications has been substantially higher than 
the growth in applications for other listed heritage sites. While the Heritage 
Office does not keep records as to the underlying purpose of applications,163 
in terms of whether they are lodged for the purposes of development works, 
conservation works or archaeological research, the anecdotal information is 
that research-based archaeological applications make up an insignificant 
number of the total–perhaps 1-2 applications per year, particularly since 1998, 
where there has been the largest growth in the number of Section 140 
applications. Such research-based applications are a combination of research 
projects by doctoral students at Australian universities and long-term research 
excavations undertaken by Australian academics. This low proportion of 
research-based archaeological works is not inconsistent with the findings in 
Victoria, discussed earlier in this Chapter. Clearly the research-based 
conceptions which underlie the archaeological protections in the New South 
Wales Heritage Act are not being realised in the actual nature of 
archaeological work being undertaken in New South Wales, the vast majority 
of which is development-driven or incidental to other conservation works at 
heritage sites. The main motivation for such work is compliance with legal 
requirements, rather than any research agenda or underlying desire to 
                                            
161  From 1999, these figures include applications assessed under the Integrated Development Assessment scheme, 
established under the NSW Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979. 
162  See the Heritage Council of NSW Annual Reports for 1978 to 1987. For example, in 1981, the Heritage Council 
funded excavations at the site of Old Sydney Gaol (1980 Annual Report, Pg 13) and in 1983 Heritage Council 
staff archaeologists undertook rescue excavations at the Belmore Basins Coke Ovens site (1983 Annual Report, 
Pg 45). 
163  Collection of this type of data only commenced in the beginning of 2004. 
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conserve the archaeological resource. In the absence of a wider conservation 
philosophy which seeks to derive a ‘public good’ outcome from such work, 
there is little motivation for those funding the compliance works to seek any 
longer term archaeological outputs from compliance-driven archaeological 
projects. 
 
This issue was noted in the 2000 Review of Historical Archaeology Planning 
Systems and Practice in New South Wales, undertaken by the Heritage Office 
archaeologists.164 Since that time, the Heritage Office has been taking steps 
to see some benefit derived from the vastly increased quantity of 
archaeological work being undertaken in New South Wales. Some of this has 
been aimed at improving the standard of archaeological work undertaken in 
the State, by establishing criteria for Excavation Directors to obtain approvals 
to excavate archaeological sites.165 Other efforts have been aimed at deriving 
a degree of public benefit from archaeological works, by imposing approval 
conditions requiring archaeological interpretation, public programs during and 
after excavation programs and in situ conservation of archaeological remains, 
particularly on State significant archaeological sites.166 This has been 
particularly observable in such major developments such as the Walsh Bay 
Wharves redevelopment in Millers Point, Sydney, the Sydney Conservatorium 
of Music renovation and conservation works, the development of the new 
Westpac Bank headquarters in the Sydney Central Business District (the 
KENS Site) and the Quadrant apartment complex in Ultimo, Sydney.167 Each 
of these sites saw a range of public programs and in situ conservation options 
implemented, to provide a visible and prolonged benefit to the wider 
community during and following the archaeological excavation programs. Of 
course, not all sites lend themselves to public interaction, nor may they have 
other values which warrant such participation.  
 
Irrespective of these efforts in public interpretation and presentation, there 
remain a number of fundamental problems with the New South Wales 
legislation, which continues to require a large number of archaeological 
approvals with little definable benefit and which remain conceived of, at least 
in a legal sense, as an archaeological research issue. The projects cited 
above, while certainly best practice examples, remain clearly in the minority of 
total projects approved and much of the benefit that has been delivered to the 
public has been due to the fact that these were large developments with multi-
hundred-million dollar budgets; they were certainly not the typical 
development-driven archaeological projects. Fundamental reform of this most 
rigid of heritage legislation is still required to ensure that resources can be 
appropriately directed towards presenting the archaeological past to present 
                                            
164  Allen, C. and M. North (2000). Review of historical archaeology planning systems and practice in NSW. 
Parramatta, NSW Heritage Office: 62. The thesis author was a co-author of that study, but left the Heritage Office 
in late 2000 prior to the implementation of the recommendations. In late 2004, the Heritage Office commissioned 
Dr Tracy Ireland to conduct another independent review of archaeological practice and administration in NSW. As 
of mid-2006, this review has not been finalised or made publicly available. 
165  NSW Heritage Office (2004). Guidelines for the Qualifications of Excavation Directors. Parramatta, NSW Heritage 
Office.   
166  Heritage Council of NSW(2005) Annual Report. Pp 53-55. 
167  Vinton, N. (2002). Interpretation and public archeology: the home of archeology lies in the heart of modern 
communities. Parramatta, NSW Heritage Office. Unpublished report, available through the NSW Heritage Office. 
http://www.heritage.nsw.gov.au/docs/archaeology_interpretation1.pdf  Accessed 13 July 2006. 
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and future communities, rather than limiting such presentation to extremely 
large and primarily urban development projects. 
 
7.15 Conclusions–Different approaches, differing results 
 
Victoria and New South Wales have the most comprehensive legal regimes 
for archaeological heritage protection in Australia, but with substantially 
different approaches. Victoria, while bedded firmly in its archaeological 
professional roots has attempted to refine archaeological heritage protection 
through a tighter definitional approach than that of New South Wales. This 
approach seeks to make some distinction between objects which meet 
definitional criteria as opposed to those which meet some level of additional 
qualitative criteria, a subtlety which has not as yet worked its way into the New 
South Wales legislation for either historical or Aboriginal heritage. Victoria has 
also maintained a list of identified archaeological sites for both historical and 
Aboriginal heritage, although New South Wales only maintains a list of 
Aboriginal sites. In Victoria, at least, such lists can give a better impression as 
to the extent and nature of the archaeological resources of the state, in a way 
not possible in New South Wales. Despite this, it is evident that true research-
oriented archaeological projects are vastly outnumbered by compliance-based 
archaeological work.  
 
The New South Wales regime for both types of archaeological heritage has 
relied primarily on a tight definitional regime, backed up with a rigorous 
permitting process. The number of permits issued for the excavation of 
historical sites, for example, is substantially higher than that of Victoria, yet it 
does not appear that the quality of archaeological work done in New South 
Wales under this regime is inherently better. Both regimes remain focussed 
on excavation of archaeological heritage as the primary management 
technique and do not take into account in any meaningful way the non-
scientific values of archaeological heritage. The Victorian attempt at 
indigenous community management of Aboriginal archaeological heritage is 
an interesting approach which will warrant examination in the future to judge 
its effectiveness. What will be particularly interesting will be to see what 
values the indigenous heritage managers take into account when making 
management decisions about the treatment of Aboriginal archaeological sites.  
 
Comprehensive legislation and extensive compliance-based archaeological 
programs exist in both jurisdictions but the results of this vast quantity of 
archaeological work are not readily apparent. From a public policy point of 
view, it is necessary to consider what good is derived from all of this effort, as 
it has not necessarily led to a better understanding of the heritage of these 
states, particularly for the general public. Further research into the 
effectiveness of past public programs and in situ conservation efforts, while 
beyond the scope of this thesis, would facilitate the development of more 
effective ‘public good’ conservation frameworks for Australian archaeology. If 
the two most populous states with the largest compliance-based 
archaeological programs are not necessarily achieving any public good from 
the archaeological work which is undertaken, serious thought must be given to 
reconsidering these heritage protection regimes at a more fundamental level. 
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Basing future legal change in public good principles, as opposed to 
questionable scientific benefit will be the first step in achieving this.  
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Chapter 8–Archaeology and the Australian courts: a review of the case 
law 
 
8.1 Archaeology and the courts 
 
The preceding chapters have examined in some detail the history, 
development and philosophy behind Australian archaeological heritage 
protection legislation. They argue for a change of focus in that legislation from 
protection of notional scientific significance, to protection and expression of 
the value of this heritage to the wider community, through implementation of 
‘public good’ principles in legislation. What this analysis has demonstrated is 
that the motivation for those who sought the introduction of legislation was a 
range of principles of archaeological heritage protection, which have not 
necessarily been considered by Australian legislators during the drafting or 
enactment of legislation. This has created a disjunction between what 
archaeologists and their supporters were seeking in heritage legislation and 
what is actually being protected. Much legislation focuses on only portions of 
these principles, to the limited benefit of Australia’s archaeological heritage 
and the community more broadly. Most existing legislation also fails to 
recognise the emerging trends in indigenous heritage management and the 
significance this heritage has to living indigenous communities. 
 
The final element in this analysis is the consideration by Australian courts1 of 
archaeological heritage, the protection principles and archaeological heritage 
legislation. The utility and ongoing relevance of legislation of any type is 
guided to a large degree by its examination through the courts. In such 
circumstances, the mechanisms within the law are tested, which may highlight 
the strengths or demonstrate the weaknesses of a particular law. This process 
of testing and challenge may lead to the setting of legal precedents, which will 
guide future judicial decision-making and influence future legislation. It may 
also lead to the amendment or repeal of legislation where that legislation is 
demonstrated to be significantly flawed. With respect to Australian heritage 
legislation, there have been few instances where issues have been brought to 
the courts and a miniscule number of court cases centred on the 
consideration of archaeological issues. 
 
This in itself is interesting, as it begs the question why archaeological issues 
tend not to feature in litigation. During research for this thesis, a search of 
CaseBase, an electronic database of Australian case law, returned fewer than 
half a dozen cases which related to archaeological heritage throughout 
Australia.2 With such meagre pickings, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions 
regarding how the Australian courts view the protection of archaeological 
heritage. Perhaps the existing archaeological heritage legislation has been 
acting as an appropriate deterrent or moral example, as suggested in Chapter 
4, thus limiting the number of court cases through a high level of compliance. 
From the perspective of business and government, the issue of legislative 
compliance should be a principle of good corporate or organisational 
governance generally. Therefore these entities should be seeking to comply 
                                            
1  A term used here interchangeably with tribunal. 
2  CaseBase contains primarily reported decisions. 
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with the letter of existing legislation, if not necessarily seeking to further the 
protection of archaeological heritage. This level of compliance at the corporate 
level in environmental matters more broadly has become a normal part of 
doing business and heritage should fall within that broad environmental 
compliance requirement. It is therefore more likely that breaches of legislation 
resulting in court action will be through the actions of individuals or smaller 
legal entities which lack strong governance and compliance procedures. 
Across the board breaches may occur through ignorance (which may be 
defensible depending on the jurisdiction) or circumstances where the 
protection of the archaeological heritage may be part of a larger political or 
legal agenda, as is seen more strikingly with Aboriginal heritage.3  
 
The courts can only consider those matters brought before them, suggesting 
that there has been a lack of will amongst potential litigants including 
government, interest groups, land owners, archaeologists and their clients or 
the general public, to bring cases to court. This may be simply that the costs 
of court action are too high to justify, or it may mean that there have been few 
breaches of archaeological protection legislation. This latter proposition 
seems unlikely, given the age and breadth of the legislation across Australia. 
It may also be the case that legislative breaches are resolved through out of 
court negotiation and settlement, although there is no empirical data. Cases 
brought by or on behalf of Aboriginal people in different areas of Australia are 
the exception, where archaeological issues relate to broader indigenous 
concerns of cultural sovereignty, recognition of traditional practice, traditional 
ownership and social significance. Several cases of this nature are discussed 
in this chapter. 
 
This chapter analyses four groups of cases in detail, considering how they 
relate to the principles of archaeological heritage protection, and whether the 
outcomes of the cases support a ‘public good’ consideration for 
archaeological heritage management. The cases considered are: 
 
 A Western Australian decision–The WA Dinosaur Footprint cases 
(Latham v R (2000)4 
 A Victorian decision–The Panama Downs case (Panama Downs Pty 
Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993)5 
 And two New South Wales decisions: The Histollo cases (Director of 
National Parks & Wildlife Service v Histollo Pty Ltd (1995-1999)6 
 The Sandon Point cases (various litigants v NSW Department of 
Environment and Conservation and Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd, 
2000-2005, NSW)7 
                                            
3  For example, at Sandon Point in New South Wales, which is discussed further below. 
4  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. Hereafter Latham. 
5  Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported. Hereafter Panama Downs. 
6  Director of National Parks & Wildlife v. Histollo Pty Ltd ACN No 003 054 100 (1995) NSWLEC 132  
 Histollo Pty Ltd v. Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1996) NSWCCA Unreported.  
 Histollo Pty Ltd v. Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1997) NSWLEC 209.  
 Histollo Pty Ltd v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) Unreported.  
 (Hereafter Histollo (1995), (1996), (1997), (1998).  
7  There have been a series of cases regarding the Sandon Point site at Bulli, NSW, with applicant parties including 
variously Allan Carriage, Roy Kennedy, the Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi Aboriginal Corporation and the Sandon Point 
Aboriginal Tent Embassy for the Aboriginal community with the NSW Department of Environment and 
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In the discussion of these cases, the archaeological investigations which 
underlay the cases are not re-examined in detail. For the purposes of the 
discussion in this chapter, the validity of the conclusions of the original 
archaeologists, the exact nature of their findings and methodologies of 
investigation are not at issue; there is no attempt to review and pass 
judgement on the “correctness” of the archaeological work. Rather analysis is 
focussed on the issues as presented to and interpreted by the courts, which 
have not in general sought to adjudicate on the archaeological issues. Rather, 
judicial attention is concentrated on the protective and administrative 
mechanisms under the heritage legislation. This issue is returned to in the 
concluding section of this chapter. 
 
8.2 Background to the cases 
 
These cases, while not providing a comprehensive picture, do begin to allow 
some conclusions to be drawn about the weight given archaeological matters 
by the courts. They also identify some serious drawbacks to various legislative 
approaches, which make gaining convictions or demonstrating the credibility 
of the legislation as a protective mechanism difficult without further 
amendment. The first two cases, Latham and Panama Downs, go to the heart 
of the ‘public good’ question, as they both relate directly in substance and 
impact to consideration of the archaeological heritage in a public sense. The 
third case, Histollo, relates more fundamentally to the protective mechanisms 
which exist for archaeological sites and objects and their effectiveness in 
protecting archaeological heritage from unauthorised impact. The Sandon 
Point cases highlight the conflicts between indigenous and non-indigenous 
people which can arise over the established or purported presence of 
Aboriginal archaeological materials, as well as highlighting some of the 
difficulties which can arise within current legal mechanisms for protecting 
archaeological heritage.  
 
In a legal sense, none of these cases are precedent setting, as none broke 
fundamental new ground in the jurisprudence surrounding the protection of 
archaeological heritage. That said, as the only Australian cases to consider 
archaeological issues they provide the only data which can be drawn upon for 
analysis of judicial perspectives on the issues. As was done in Chapters 5 and 
6, this chapter relies on the written records of the court cases, as expressed in 
the judgement delivered by the presiding judicial officers.8 Unlike Hansard, 
which is a written record of the spoken debates of Parliament, and may 
therefore not always contain well thought through commentary, judgements 
are in the main prepared by judicial officers in a considered manner, following 
the conclusion of the evidence and submissions of all parties, allowing time for 
research and careful thought on the issues at hand. They represent a more 
                                                                                                                             
Conservation and/or Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd as the consent authority and developer respectively. These 
cases will be referred to via the applicant’s name and the year of decision but all cases relate to the same site. 
8  Referred to as “case law”. Cases can be “reported” or “unreported”. Reported cases appear in a published 
volume of law reports and are generally those cases which establish precedent through new legal interpretation. 
Unreported cases are those which, as a general rule, break no new legal ground but rely on established 
precedent. Unreported cases, while unpublished, are sometimes available through various legal databases or 
direct from the court. 
Protecting the past for the public good: archaeology and Australian heritage law 
Chapter 8–Archaeology and the Australian courts: a review of the case law 231 
crafted thought process than is necessarily found in the Hansard records, and 
therefore can be considered a more reliable and authoritative source. There is 
a counter argument to this position, that the views of legislators should be 
given greater weight, as they are the individuals charged by the citizenry with 
creating legislation; under this view, it is the role of judges to interpret law only 
within the parameters set by the legislature. In this particular instance, as 
there are no definitive statements by legislatures around Australia on matters 
archaeological, giving greater weight to judicial reasoning in this instance 
seems appropriate. The cases outlined above, and others, are considered 
from the starting point of the judgements delivered by the court, as well as any 
external commentary (e.g. published articles) which may relate to the case.  
 
8.3 The courts, archaeology and public interest 
 
8.3.1 Latham v the Queen (2000) 
 
The Latham case involved the theft of several fossil specimens from two 
areas near Broome in Western Australia. Latham and a compatriot, 
Illingworth, entered a protected Government-owned reserve in 1996 and, 
using power tools, cut a fossilised dinosaur footprint from the rock in one area 
and two fossilised human (presumably Aboriginal) footprints from another 
area. These footprints were in the rock shelf adjacent to the shoreline and, in 
the case of the dinosaur footprint, was the only known footprint of that species 
(stegosaurus) in Australia. The motive of the thieves was to sell the fossils for 
profit, at one point seeking $AUD250,000 for the footprints.9 Latham 
subsequently pled guilty to the charges in 200010 while his compatriot, 
Illingworth, was tried and acquitted of the theft, on the basis that he had no 
“intent” to sell the item.11 This question of “intent” was a key element behind 
the ultimate acquittal on appeal in the Histollo case discussed later in this 
chapter. As will be demonstrated, the open question of “intent” in a case such 
as Latham and Histollo highlight some fundamental weaknesses in the 
protective mechanisms available for archaeological and fossil heritage. 
 
The issue of “intent” is a key consideration in most criminal proceedings. 
“Intent” is an element of most crimes. The accused must be demonstrated not 
only to have committed to crime but to have done so with intent. The Latham 
case was a criminal proceeding where intent was required to be proven 
“beyond a reasonable doubt”. Latham pled guilty so his intent was never 
tested against this standard. Latham’s compatriot in the removal of the 
footprints, Illingsworth, pled not guilty and was not convicted of a crime. By 
comparison, in civil (non-criminal) proceedings, the standard of proof of intent 
is the much lower “on the balance of probabilities” standard. The third type of 
matter is where an offence is a “strict liability” offence, where intent is not a 
consideration. Under the strict liability standard, only the commission of the 
                                            
9  Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pg 42. 
10  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. Parker J at paragraphs 1 to 5. Latham was subsequently sentenced 
separately to an additional seven years’ imprisonment for drug-related charges. 
 See also Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp vii-viii and Long, J. 
(2002). The Dinosaur Dealers (TV documentary), SBS.  
11  AAP/Reuters media report 21 December 2000, quoted in Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, 
N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pp 16-17. 
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offending act need be demonstrated; what the perpetrator’s intent was is not a 
relevant consideration.12 
 
The theft in Latham was of property considered to be owned by the State of 
Western Australia, however the reserve was managed by its traditional 
Aboriginal owners, who professed a spiritual association with the footprints. 
The dinosaur footprint was recovered by police, however the Aboriginal 
footprints were not recovered, and there was some speculation they may have 
been dumped into the ocean to break an Aboriginal “curse” on the thieves.13 
Latham applied for leave to appeal against the severity of his sentence (two 
years imprisonment) to the WA Court of Criminal Appeal in 2000. A major 
element of the defence’s application for leave to appeal was that, given the 
nature of the offence and the unlikelihood that it would be repeated, the 
sentence should have been suspended.14 Ultimately the appellate judges 
were not persuaded by the arguments advanced, influenced, it would appear, 
by the fact that Latham had a number of other criminal convictions for thefts of 
different nature, albeit no other offences involving fossils. While the technical 
legal arguments related to whether the sentence should or should not have 
been suspended are not particularly relevant to this thesis, the authors of the 
judgement15 made a number of significant comments about the importance of 
the fossil remains to science, the Aboriginal people and the wider community. 
The major relevant issues which the judges touched on were the commercial 
exploitation of the fossils, the importance of the fossils in their context, the 
need for deterrence and the importance of the fossils to science and the 
Aboriginal community. 
 
In the judgement, Justice Parker seemed quite aware of the value of the 
fossils primarily in their context and of the fact that the act of removing them to 
turn them into a tradable commodity removed a vast amount of their scientific 
and social value. A key element of this significance was the value of the 
footprints to the Aboriginal community, in connection with local creation 
myths.16 The Judge felt that Latham had been aware of these factors and had 
proceeded with the removal of the footprints nonetheless: “the applicant 
[Latham] was well aware of the cultural significance of the footprints to 
Aboriginal people, and that this importance was for the footprints when in 
situ.”17 From a legal point of view, Latham then did have mens rea18 or intent 
to steal when the theft occurred. This wilful removal of the footprints from their 
context was seen as one of the particularly egregious aspects of Latham’s act: 
 
The value of the footprints in dollar terms, when removed from their 
natural location, cannot readily be determined…The notion of seeking 
to ascribe to these artefacts a dollar value, while of some relevance to 
                                            
12  A good example of a strict liability offence is a speeding fine, where whether a driver intended to speed or not is 
irrelevant. Being found exceeding the speed limit is sufficient to trigger a penalty. 
13  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. Parker J at 6. 
14  Ibid. Pg 9, paragraph 25. 
15  Parker J, with whom Wallwork and McKechnie JJ concurred. 
16  (2005). The spirit of Lake Mungo Sydney Morning Herald. , Macey, J. (2005). Fossilised footprints hark back to 
Ice Age (radio story). The World Today. , Smith, D. (2005). A step back in time Sydney Morning Herald. , Webb, 
S., M. L. Cupper, et al. (2005). "Pleistocene human footprints from the Willandra Lakes, southeastern Australia." 
Journal of Human Evolution XX: 1-9.  
17  Latham, Parker J at 29. 
18  Latin for “guilty mind”. 
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the applicant's motivation for his conduct, does distort and trivialise the 
true significance of what occurred.19 
 
This act of removal constituted a key element of the diminution of the 
significance of the footprints through the destruction of their context. From the 
perspective of legal principle, the same argument would apply to any other 
archaeological item removed from its context without authorisation. The 
comments by the judge suggest that, where the item draws at least some of 
its community significance from its context, this heightens the impact of 
removal unless removal occurs with the support of the relevant community. 
Damage to the heritage item or archaeological site is a damage done to the 
community, not just to a physical object. This distinguishes Latham’s crime 
from one where the object did not have community significance (for example, 
a car) or where the damage was of a relatively trivial and reversible nature 
(such as vandalism). Long, a West Australian palaeontologist who had studied 
the footprints prior to the theft, also noted the key value of the footprints to 
science was for the information held by their context.20  
 
On this basis, the Judges agreed that a strong deterrent message was 
required in the sentencing of Latham and would be expected by the 
community at large: “by the seriousness of the conduct…[there is]…need for 
general deterrence and what the community would regard as appropriate 
punishment for the type of behaviour in question.”21 As later in the judgement 
it is noted that incarceration should be the punishment of “last resort”22 the 
fact that a custodial sentence was imposed highlights the seriousness with 
which both the original trial and appeal courts viewed the acts of theft. While 
certainly this sentence must have been influenced by Latham’s past criminal 
conduct involving theft, the custodial sentence belies any notion that theft of 
artefacts or fossils from public land is a victimless crime. This case represents 
one of the very few, if not the only instance, where a person has been 
incarcerated in Australia for the theft of in situ antiquities.23 Other factors in 
favour of a strong deterrent message were the isolated and vulnerable nature 
of the footprints, the presence of similar items in the jurisdiction and the 
potential for commercial exploitation for such items once removed from their 
context.24 
 
The case considered the dichotomy between scientific and community 
significance of the fossils and their rarity. Justice Parker noted that the 
“disturbance and removal [of the footprints] significantly adversely affected a 
great deal of their scientific value and uniqueness”25 but went on to state that 
the footprints could not be considered “truly unique” as there were other, less 
well preserved, examples of similar footprints elsewhere in the vicinity, mainly 
                                            
19  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. , Parker J at 5. 
20  Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pg 9. This did not however prevent 
Long from removing the dinosaur footprint, which was on a loose slab of rock, from its context and transporting to 
the Museum of Western Australia in 1994 for study, setting something of a double standard for scientists, even if 
he did take pains to return the slab to its original location due to its significance to the Aboriginal community. Ibid 
Pg 6. 
21  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. Parker J at 8. 
22  Ibid. Parker J at 18. 
23  Long, J. (2002). The Dinosaur Dealers. Crows Nest, N.S.W., Allen & Unwin. Pg 16. 
24  Latham v The Queen (2000) WASCA 338. Parker J at 30. 
25  Ibid. Parker J at 28. 
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in poorer condition below the high water mark. The Judge felt that for the 
footprints to be considered truly unique, no other examples could exist and 
that this was a mitigating factor taken into account during the original 
determination of Latham’s sentence. Had the fossils been “truly unique”, a 
harsher penalty may have been warranted, under the judge’s reasoning, but 
given the significance of the fossils to the community, the question of their 
uniqueness should not have been a key consideration. Despite no direct 
evidence before the court of the traditional owners’ distress at the removal of 
the footprints,26 the appellate judges accepted the significance of the 
footprints to science and, more importantly, the Aboriginal community.27 
Whether the footprints were unique as physical objects was not relevant–the 
footprints figured into the local creation mythos and were irreplaceable in 
terms of their value to community identity and, it could be argued, wellbeing. 
In terms of detriment to the community, the social significance of the fossils 
came most strongly from their immediate association with a living community 
which held them to be sacred. The removal of a sacred item in these 
circumstances is devastating to that community, regardless of whether other 
examples exist elsewhere in the immediate vicinity or in the world. The theft 
represented not just a theft of property but the desecration of a space sacred 
to the community. 
 
The Latham case, while unique in Australian jurisprudence for imposing a 
custodial sentence, does serve to illustrate the seriousness with which courts 
are prepared to view the theft of archaeological or geological artefacts. The 
contribution of the fossils to the ‘public good’ was taken as a given by the 
presiding Judges, as noted through their comments on the high value of the 
fossils for both science and the local Aboriginal community. At no time did the 
Judges focus on the fossils merely as property which had been stolen, but as 
a semi-public resource of which the community had been unfairly deprived by 
Latham and Illingworth’s actions. It is perhaps unfortunate that the Judges 
were not willing to accept the community value of the fossils as the primary 
area of significance, preferring to rely on the scientific value of the fossils, but 
the recognition of the public value of this type of heritage is clear. The Judges 
took a public policy stance on the need to protect this type of heritage for the 
community, a view which differs markedly from the treatment of 
archaeological issues in the Panama Downs case. 
 
8.3.2 Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) 
 
The 1993 Panama Downs case was the latest episode in a tale of treasure 
hunting on the Victorian coast which extended back to the nineteenth century. 
Due to the establishment of heritage legislation, what had become a well 
established traditional pursuit of the mythical treasure became caught up in 
the legal and administrative realm of archaeology. Local legend in Queenscliff, 
Victoria holds that the pirate Benito Bonito stole several life size golden 
statues and other treasure from a cathedral in Lima, Peru in the nineteenth 
century. He then supposedly travelled to Australia and buried the treasure in a 
cave along the Queenscliff coast, blew up the entrance to the cave to conceal 
                                            
26  Ibid. Parker J at 29. 
27  Ibid. Parker J at 28. 
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the treasure from an approaching British warship and fled. Bonito and his 
crew were subsequently captured and executed, save for a cabin boy who 
was supposed to have escaped to Tasmania and become the source of the 
local legend, inspiring many efforts to locate the cave and unearth the 
treasure. Byron notes that, despite there being no records which support this 
story, and it appearing that the legend may have been the result of several 
other treasure stories being “garbled” into the Queenscliff myth, there had 
been “scores” of attempts to excavate for Bonito’s treasure at Queenscliff.28 
The Victorian Administrative Appeals Tribunal decision in this case outlined at 
least ten previous officially sanctioned attempts to find the treasure between 
1931 and 198929 and it is reasonable to assume that other, illicit excavations 
were carried out throughout this period. No tangible evidence for the existence 
of the treasure has ever been presented.  
 
Efforts in search of the treasure had caused such disruption to the Queenscliff 
coastal area that various responsible planning authorities had, since the early 
1970s, generally sought to discourage attempts to locate the treasure, 
although sporadic attempts had been authorised formally or informally through 
state and local authorities.30 The other factor which intervened in the searches 
was the passage in 1972 of the Aboriginal and Archaeological Relics 
Preservation Act, as the treasure objects themselves, if extant, fell under the 
definition of relics under that Act31 and therefore a permit would be required in 
order to search for them. Despite scanty evidence, Bonito’s Treasure had 
been identified as an “archaeological feature” in the management plan for the 
area, which was a coastal reserve.32 This identification of the treasure as 
“archaeological”, while doubtless well-meaning and perhaps intended to 
inspire tourism to the area, gave heightened legal status to the treasure 
despite no firm evidence of its existence. Legal status should have provided 
protection but instead lent an air of legitimacy to future efforts to find the 
treasure, transforming them into archaeological expeditions rather than 
treasure hunts. 
 
As archaeologists are used to working under conditions where historical 
evidence is scant or absent, excavating solely on the basis of local mythology 
is not completely unusual. In this circumstance, the excavations were 
proposed as a commercial venture by a treasure hunting syndicate, rather 
than an archaeological project with scholarly or scientific motivations. The 
sheer number of excavations which had been undertaken over the preceding 
hundred or more years in search for the treasure provided reasonable 
evidence, from an archaeological perspective, that the treasure did not exist, 
at least not in the area where searches had been concentrated. This record of 
failure did not appear to deter commercial treasure-seeking syndicates, the 
                                            
28  Byron, K. W. (1964). Lost treasures in Australia & New Zealand. Sydney, Ure Smith. Pp 62-71.  
 See also Rule, A. (2005). X marks the spot. Sydney Morning Herald Good Weekend Magazine. Sydney: 49-51. 
for a more recent account of the legend and the continuing efforts to locate the treasure. Also pers. Comm. Cath 
Snelgrove (18 January 2005), former archaeologist for the Victoria Archaeological Survey, who gave evidence at 
the tribunal hearing for the Panama Downs case. 
29  Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported. Pg 5. 
30  Ibid.  
31  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria. Section 22. 
32  Swan Bay Marine and Wild Life Reserves–Proposed Management Plan 1991 cited in Panama Downs Pty Ltd v 
Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported.  
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difference now being that they were obliged to treat the endeavour as an 
archaeological one, as opposed to a commercial excavation project. 
Significant professional and ethical issues also arise for archaeologists 
participating in treasure hunts for private gain, however these factors did not 
seem to deter the syndicate. 
 
Panama Downs Pty Ltd, the private syndicate created to fund and undertake 
the 1993 excavations, applied for a permit to excavate for a “buried metal 
object” in a public reserve, which required a planning consent under the 
Planning and Environment Act (Vic) 1987 from Queenscliffe Council. The 
syndicate had engaged a consultant archaeologist33 well known to the 
Victorian heritage authorities to supervise the proposed works. This gave what 
was fundamentally a treasure hunting expedition a veneer of respectability, as 
an “archaeological” endeavour. Despite this, the local planning authorities 
refused to issue a permit, on the basis that the expedition was not a true 
archaeological project and went against the objectives of the Plan of 
Management for the reserve, which stated that no additional search for the 
treasure should be undertaken unless new “historical or scientific” information 
came to light. Given the degree of disturbance to the coast line over many 
decades of searches for the treasure, the local council’s view was that the 
continued quest for Bonito’s Treasure would not be in the public interest. This 
was despite, as the Tribunal members noted, the Council actively promoting 
Bonito’s Treasure as a part of the tourism strategy for the area.34 Panama 
Downs Pty Ltd appealed this refusal to the Victorian Administrative Appeals 
Tribunal in 1993.35 The Tribunal noted that key amongst the initial grounds for 
refusal of the permit were: 
 
1. That there is insufficient additional historical or scientific evidence 
presented… 
4. That the proposed works will cause an undesirable precedent.36 
 
These grounds for refusal were consistent with the objectives of the Plan of 
Management for the reserve. The AAT did not find these grounds compelling, 
and ordered the Council to issue a permit for the excavation under the 
Planning and Environment Act and required Panama Downs Pty Ltd to also 
obtain a permit under the AARP Act from Aboriginal Affairs Victoria.37 
 
It is interesting to note the main appeal issue in this case was not in fact the 
Victorian heritage authorities refusing to issue a permit under the AARP Act, 
but rather the local government authorities refusing general planning consent. 
Ms Cath Snelgrove, a former staff archaeologist for Aboriginal Affairs Victoria 
(AAV) (who appeared for that body at the hearing) recalled that contacts from 
treasure hunters seeking permits under the AARP Act were not uncommon. 
AAV generally tried to discourage such endeavours, which were viewed as 
                                            
33  Mr (now Dr) Iain Stuart, who had previously worked for the Victoria Archaeological Survey. 
34  Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported. Pp 4-5.  
35  Ibid.  
 (1993). "Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe." Environmental Law Reporter 12: 153-154.  
36  Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported. Grounds of Refusal, Pg 2. Emphasis 
added. 
37  Ibid. Pp 10-11. 
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archaeologically dubious. In the Panama Downs case, AAV decided to issue a 
permit due to the AAT’s decision in favour of the syndicate.38 This may be 
because AAV believed it was likely to lose an appeal against a refusal. Due to 
this, the provisions of the AARP Act remain untested by the courts.  
 
Nevertheless, the reasoning by the Tribunal members in this case is 
interesting, as it elucidates the attitudes and understanding of judicial officers 
to archaeological issues. The judgement is itself written in a rather jocular 
style, and the Tribunal members appear more interested in the possibility of 
discovering the treasure than in the consideration of the actual issues raised 
in the refusal of the permit. The Tribunal members remarked: 
 
More recently, of six bore holes drilled under the supervision of Mr I 
Stuart, Archaeologist, on the appeal site, two of them established 
contact with some buried object. It is apparent that the only conclusive 
way of finding what is below the surface and whatever it is is by 
excavation. Even if Benito’s treasure was being sought, we consider it 
would be difficult to provide the archaeological evidence referred to in 
the Management Plan without first excavating. All other forms of testing 
only prove the existence of an object.39 
 
Essentially the Tribunal was prepared to ignore the question of whether 
additional “historical or scientific” evidence had been presented as a basis for 
the excavation, rather than mere speculation. The Tribunal members were 
also prepared to ignore the management objectives for the coastal reserve, 
which included the revegetation of degraded areas. While some physical 
testing was itself undertaken, as the Tribunal noted, there was no discussion 
as to whether that testing was, from the perspective of archaeological 
methodology, appropriate to the circumstances. Neither was their 
consideration as to whether the results of the testing were in fact conclusive 
enough to warrant further physical investigation of the “buried object” which, in 
the absence of more detailed information, was more likely to be a rock than a 
piece of Bonito’s Treasure. What this demonstrates is the Tribunal’s 
misunderstanding of the purpose of archaeology, essentially viewing it as no 
different to treasure hunting. This in itself denies the notional scientific value of 
archaeology as articulated in heritage legislation. 
 
What is perhaps more worrying about this case is the failure of the Tribunal to 
address the public policy issue of allowing the excavation to proceed. The 
local council had noted that allowing the excavation would establish an 
“undesirable precedent”, a notion that the Tribunal rejected, stating that “Each 
application of a similar nature will be and must be judged and considered on 
its own merits.”40 The Tribunal had itself however already established that 
excavation could proceed in the absence of any new scientific or historical 
information, and that essentially the tenuous identification of a “buried object” 
was sufficient justification for allowing the excavation to proceed. This was 
despite the Tribunal itself noting that the area proposed for excavation fell 
                                            
38  Pers. Comm. Cath Snelgrove (18 January 2006). 
39  Panama Downs Pty Ltd v Borough of Queenscliffe (1993) Unreported. Pp 7-8. 
40  Ibid. Pg 8 
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within the boundary of an old rubbish tip site, again significantly reducing the 
likelihood that the “buried object” was in fact part of the treasure. Given the 
Tribunal’s findings, which directed the local council to issue a consent for the 
excavation, the obtaining of an excavation permit under the AARP Act 
became a mere formality.  
 
From a ‘public good’ perspective, this case seriously calls into question 
whether the Victorian authorities viewed the purposes of the archaeological 
protection legislation as anything more than a relatively trivial administrative 
process. By essentially ignoring firstly the outlandish story surrounding the 
treasure and secondly the question as to whether further evidence of the 
existence of the treasure was required, the Tribunal invalidated the “scientific” 
consideration of the excavation work, despite its veneer as an archaeological 
project. By setting the threshold so low, essentially the Tribunal allowed a 
circumstance where any person who believed in the presence of a “buried 
object” should be granted a permit to excavate for that object, despite lack of 
other evidence or other considerations, such as management objectives for a 
place or public policy. It is perhaps fortunate to the discipline of archaeology in 
Australia that this case was so little remarked upon at the time and that there 
has been no attempt to use it as a basis to justify further pseudo-
archaeological excavations in Victoria or elsewhere.  
 
The authorisation of the search for Bonito’s Treasure in circumstances where 
evidence for the treasure was at best tenuous, was counterproductive for 
‘public good’ heritage conservation efforts. The court chose to prioritise the 
potential financial gain of the treasure hunters over the interests of either 
archaeology or any community good. It could in fact be argued that in 
circumstances such as these, the ‘public good’ is best served by the treasure 
not being found; the legend of the treasure continues to contribute to the 
identity and character of the Queenscliff area and, if found or conclusively 
proven not to exist (an admittedly unlikely circumstance), it may diminish the 
value and significance of the place in the eyes of the community. The 
presence or absence of Bonito’s Treasure at Queenscliff is largely moot; to 
date it remains unlocated. The ongoing hunt for the treasure and its elevation 
in stature to an archaeological mystery is problematic in terms of the true 
purpose of legislative protection for archaeological heritage.  
 
8.4 The Histollo Cases–flawed mechanisms for protection 
 
In the framing of archaeological protective legislation, there is a general 
principle to protect against unauthorised disturbance of archaeological 
materials; this has been established in previous chapters. This may be to 
prevent unauthorised archaeological excavation (as a form of regulation of the 
profession), to prevent looting of archaeological sites by amateurs or 
collectors, or to prevent unauthorised damage to sites whether deliberate or 
accidental. This last circumstance is relevant in the matter of Histollo Pty Ltd v 
Director-General of NPWS and the litigation which followed. This series of 
New South Wales cases ran between 1995 and 1998 in the New South Wales 
Land and Environment Court and the New South Wales Court of Criminal 
Appeal. In the original case the defendant, Histollo Pty Ltd, was convicted and 
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received a large fine for unauthorised disturbance of Aboriginal archaeological 
materials under the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (NSW) in the 
Land and Environment Court. This conviction was challenged and the Court of 
Criminal Appeal remitted the matter to the Land and Environment Court who 
again confirmed its earlier decision. Ultimately when the matter was again 
appealed to the Court of Criminal Appeal the conviction was quashed. The 
case is notable for the judicial consideration of whether a person needed to 
have knowledge of and intent to damage archaeological heritage in order for 
the protective mechanisms to operate and a criminal sanction result.  
 
8.4.1 Background to the Histollo cases 
 
In the Histollo cases, the main question was initially whether a landowner had 
disturbed an Aboriginal quarry site (or Aboriginal objects) without first 
obtaining approval. However, the subsequent appeals dealt with the question 
of whether the landowner had deliberately, or knowingly (with mens rea) 
damaged the Aboriginal archaeological quarry site. The landowner had 
purchased the land from the New South Wales government, which had sold it 
subject to a ‘voluntary conservation agreement’41 which provided protection 
for the Aboriginal quarry site on a part of the land. The quarry had been 
identified during the time the land was in the ownership of the New South 
Wales government and an archaeological assessment undertaken over 1985-
86 had indicated the quarry was of sufficient scientific significance that it 
should not be disturbed by the government’s proposal to build a waste 
disposal depot on the site. Due to the identification of the quarry, the NSW 
Waste Management Authority entered into a voluntary conservation 
agreement with the Minister for the Environment, which established a 
conservation zone on the site (containing the quarry) which was not able to be 
developed without consent. Subsequently the Waste Management Authority 
determined the site was unsuitable for their purposes and put the land up for 
sale in 1991, with the conservation agreement in place on title and attached 
as a condition of sale. The background facts referred to by the Court of 
Criminal Appeal suggested that the land subsequently sold to Histollo Pty Ltd 
at approximately three quarters of the value it would have had it not been 
subject to the conservation agreement. 
 
In 1992 staff of the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service, who were 
responsible for administering the voluntary conservation agreement on behalf 
of the Minister, observed earthworks being undertaken on the site. 
Subsequent site inspections revealed that work had been undertaken without 
approval within the conservation zone and damage was done to the quarry 
site and stone artefacts.42 The whole of the quarry area was protected under 
the conservation agreement, while the individual artefacts were protected 
under the general protection for Aboriginal artefacts in Part 6 of the NSW 
National Parks and Wildlife Act.43 In the initial Land and Environment Court 
case, the judge found that damage had indeed occurred, and this was 
                                            
41  Under section 69B of the NPWS Act. 
42  Note that, at the time of the original incident and these cases, the NPW Act referred to “Aboriginal relics” rather 
than the present wording of “Aboriginal objects”. The definition attached to these two descriptors was identical. 
See discussion of this Act in Chapter 7. 
43  National Parks and Wildlife Act (1974) New South Wales. Sections 83-91. 
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sufficient for a conviction and fine. The conviction was challenged in the NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal and the matter remitted to the Land and Environment 
Court. The decision was confirmed. 
 
A further appeal was made to the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal 
in 1998 which subsequently overturned the conviction and ruled that no 
offence was committed. The Judge held that, as the landowner was not aware 
of the precise location and nature of the Aboriginal relics, despite being aware 
of the conservation agreement, he did not have the capacity to know if relics 
were being disturbed.44 He thus had no mens rea or intent to disturb the 
archaeological materials of the quarry site, which the Judge deemed 
necessary for the landowner to have committed an offence. The question of 
whether the disturbance was good or bad for the scientific, Aboriginal or wider 
communities, in terms of impact to that archaeological resource, was never 
considered by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The fact that the site had 
effectively been destroyed permanently, to the detriment of these affected 
communities, did not hold any weight in the decision as the NPW Act was not 
constructed in such a way as to direct consideration of such an issue. The end 
result was however that despite the archaeological site having been 
destroyed, there was no remedy and no penalty, limiting the deterrence value 
of the legislation in such circumstances.  
 
This decision exposed a serious limitation within the National Parks and 
Wildlife Act, which has not yet been remedied, and continues to place 
Aboriginal heritage in jeopardy. As the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the 
act of destruction needed to be an intentional act to breach the legislation, the 
National Parks and Wildlife Service sought amendment to their legislation to 
establish the destruction of Aboriginal relics as a “strict liability” offence. In this 
context, a strict liability offence is an offence for which it is not necessary to 
prove intent. Such offences require no standard of proof, as the legal question 
resolves solely around whether the prohibited act took place, rather than 
whether the perpetrator was aware of the consequences of their actions or 
intended to commit the offending act. In 2001, a suite of amendments to the 
NPW Act were passed by the New South Wales Parliament to address some 
of the deficiencies identified in the Histollo cases, however these amendments 
remain uncommenced as of this writing.45 
 
The National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Act 2001 amended the section 
90 (consent to destroy) provisions, among other changes, to remove the 
question of intent from the legislation. The NPW Act currently still contains the 
intent-based clause: 
90 Destruction etc of Aboriginal objects or Aboriginal places  
(1) A person who, without first obtaining the consent of the 
Director-General, knowingly destroys, defaces or damages, or 
knowingly causes or permits the destruction or defacement of or 
                                            
44  Histollo Pty Ltd v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) Unreported. Unreported, NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Spigelman CJ, Sperling and James JJ at 42-44. 
45  National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Act (2001) NSW.  
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damage to, an Aboriginal object or Aboriginal place is guilty of 
an offence against this Act.46 (emphasis added) 
 
The uncommenced 2001 amendment to this clause reads, by comparison: 
 
(1) A person must not destroy, deface, damage or desecrate, 
or cause or permit the destruction, defacement, damage or 
desecration of, an Aboriginal object or Aboriginal place.47 
 
This amended clause would resolve the main issue raised by the Histollo 
cases by removing the notion of “knowing destruction” and making the 
question one of unauthorised impact alone. To further cement this notion, the 
2001 amendments remove the wording of an approval for “consent to destroy” 
Aboriginal heritage objects and refer to a “heritage impact permit”.48 While the 
current Act does not itself refer to “consents to destroy” by name, any permit 
issued under section 90 has been referred to in that manner by the consent 
authority. The use of the term “heritage impact permit” is predominantly 
psychological and would tend to standardise the language of the NPW Act 
with the language of the NSW Heritage Act for impacts to heritage places. The 
difficulty with the generally accepted terminology for a section 90 consent as a 
“consent to destroy” is highlighted in a judicial remark in relation to the 
Sandon Point cases, which are discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Unfortunately the NSW Government has not chosen to commence these 
amendments for reasons which have never been made public. Yet three years 
prior, in 1998, the NSW Heritage Act had its archaeological provisions 
amended to remove the question of “intent to disturb” archaeological relics 
from that Act.49 Thus NSW Aboriginal archaeological heritage remains subject 
to the risks posed by an intent-based protection regime rather than a strict 
liability protection regime. This situation further serves to highlight the 
limitations inherent in any legislative approach to heritage protection, where 
the wording of the actual legislation may be in the furtherance of heritage 
conservation goals, but the absence of political will to commence the 
legislation hampers a more proactive approach to the issue. In circumstances 
such as these, the actual construction of the existing legislation hampers the 
implementation of any ‘public good’ considerations in the protection of 
Aboriginal archaeological heritage. 
 
8.4.2 Consideration of archaeological issues by the courts in Histollo 
 
In the initial Land and Environment Court case, the judge was principally 
focussed on whether the landowner had been aware of the voluntary 
conservation agreement, whether he had disturbed an area within the 
conservation zone and whether the disturbance of this area had damaged the 
Aboriginal quarry site or individual Aboriginal objects. All courts considering 
                                            
46  National Parks and Wildlife Act (1974) New South Wales. Section 90(1). 
47  National Parks and Wildlife Amendment Act (2001) NSW. Schedule 3, Clause 3. 
48  Ibid. Schedule 3, Clause 4. A “heritage impact permit” is rather unhelpfully defined as “a heritage impact permit 
issued under section 90.” 
49  Heritage Amendment Act (1998) NSW. Amendments to section 139 removed the requirement that a person must 
“knowingly” excavate, damage or otherwise disturb an archaeological relic to be guilty of an offence. 
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the matter accepted, almost without question, that the site could be of 
“significant archaeological interest”,50 despite conflicting evidence on the 
archaeological significance of the site given by a second archaeologist 
engaged to assess the site.51 Similarly, the cases focussed on the site being 
of scientific significance solely–there was never any consideration of the value 
of the site to the Aboriginal community, nor the potential for the site to be of 
interest to the wider community, although the original conservation agreement 
did envisage that access to the conservation zone could be granted for “non-
destructive educative purposes”.52 This suggests that the original 
conservation agreement was predicated on a belief that the ongoing 
conservation of the site and its use for educational purposes served a ‘public 
good’ function. This was however never a consideration for any of the trial 
judges, who focussed solely on the commission of the damage and the intent 
of the landowner. 
 
In the view of the appeal judges, there was a need for a person undertaking 
an activity (in this case, earthworks) to have specific knowledge as to whether 
that activity could damage archaeological relics. It was not enough for the 
landowner to have general knowledge of the nature and location of the 
archaeological materials; he was required to have specific knowledge of both 
the location and nature of the archaeological materials which were protected 
under the terms of the conservation agreement. Under cross-examination, the 
principal defendant indicated he had a general understanding that there were 
“stones of importance” on the site and their general location.53 The Supreme 
Court held that it was not possible for the defendant, as a layperson, to be 
able to ascertain which stones were the “stones of importance” as this was 
specialist archaeological knowledge. While a trained expert was able to 
provide the court with an understanding of the nature of the Aboriginal 
artefacts (“core stones”), the Court felt it was not a reasonable expectation 
that a layperson could make this identification on their own. Given this, it was 
not possible for the defendant, in the Court’s opinion, to have sufficient 
knowledge to be aware the actions of the Company’s agent would damage 
significant archaeological heritage. As the defendant lacked knowledge, he 
did not have ‘intent’ to commit the offence, which led to the court ultimately 
overturning his conviction. This observation calls into question the ability of 
much archaeological, or indeed environmental, protective legislation to 
function effectively if it requires specific knowledge of what is protected to 
prevent illegal damage. This is particularly problematic in circumstances 
where Aboriginal people may wish to keep the precise location of significant 
                                            
50  Histollo Pty Ltd v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife Service (1998) Unreported.  Unreported, NSW 
Court of Criminal Appeal, Spigelman CJ, Sperling and James JJ at 40-41 
51  Ibid. at 18-19. Dr Jo McDonald provided the original 1985 assessment of the site. The site was reassessed as 
being of lesser significance by Mr Neville Baker in 1996.  
While the Histollo case hinged largely on the question of criminal intent of the landowner and accepted the 
archaeological value of the site despite differences of archaeological professional opinion as to its significance, 
other cases have shown a propensity for the courts to make decisions regarding archaeological significance 
without seeking the input of archaeological specialists. In A Hoggett v Willoughby Municipal Council, Unreported 
NSW Land and Environment Court, 1988, Cripps J, at 4, the court ruled that a “few oyster shells” did not 
constitute an Aboriginal archaeological site and therefore did not constitute grounds to refuse a subdivision 
application, without seeking the input of an archaeologist or member of the Aboriginal community. 
52  Ibid.  Unreported, NSW Court of Criminal Appeal, Spigelman CJ, Sperling and James JJ at 40-41. 
53  Ibid. at 42-44. 
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sites restricted, either to prevent unauthorised access and damage or due to 
cultural restriction, for example sites associated with a particular sex. 
 
On the face of it, this case is disastrous for the protection of archaeological 
heritage. The specialist nature of the skills required to determine whether 
something forms part of the archaeological heritage, let alone whether it is of 
social significance to a community, are the hard-won skills of trained 
archaeologists. In most circumstances, it is unlikely that a layperson would 
ever have sufficient knowledge to make this determination, which would 
ground a finding of deliberate intent to disturb the materials. At a level of 
general principle, this indicates that, at a minimum, legal protections for 
archaeological heritage need to be based on a strict liability principle rather 
than one requiring intent to cause damage to protected materials (such as is 
contained in the uncommenced amendments). Lesser protection might be 
offered by a statutory recognition that knowledge of the existence of a 
conservation agreement constitutes sufficient knowledge to ground intent. 
Other options include statutory recognition of reckless indifference, or wilful 
blindness as a basis for a finding of intention to damage, destroy or disturb.  
 
It also serves as an enjoinder to those administering such Acts to ensure that, 
wherever possible, protected places or objects are appropriately identified and 
landowners are given sufficient information to minimise the chances of 
accidental or deliberate disturbance of archaeological heritage. The likelihood 
of this latter proposition being put into widespread effect is minimal, due to the 
vast number of possible sites and landowners across the country. 
Nevertheless, for highly significant places there is a clear need to make 
greater efforts in identification of significant archaeological elements and 
education of the public in order to ensure protection. Additionally, in 
circumstances where the protecting authority contemplated that the site was 
significant enough to have educative value, it was unlikely that this value 
could be realised without further assistance being rendered to the landholder. 
 
8.5 The Sandon Point Cases–consultation and community value 
 
The Sandon Point series of cases is one of the longest running legal 
controversies in New South Wales affecting Aboriginal heritage. At one level, 
the case is fundamentally about a clash of cultures and the failure of scientific 
archaeological values to protect a place which has high social and symbolic 
value to the indigenous community. It is also about differing expectations in 
terms of what level of consultation should occur with Aboriginal communities 
when there may be an impact to known or suspected Aboriginal 
archaeological sites.  
 
Sandon Point itself is a promontory of land in the town of Bulli, approximately 
100kms to the south of Sydney, NSW. The land at Sandon Point has been the 
ongoing subject of housing development and legal action since the late 1990s. 
The land itself was, depending on the perspective, either an industrial 
wasteland ripe for redevelopment, or a meeting and burial place for local 
Aboriginal people which had been mistreated for the last 200 years. There has 
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been ongoing resistance to the development from both the Aboriginal 
community and elements of the wider community since the 1990s.54 
 
8.5.1 Background to the Sandon Point cases 
 
Sandon Point was used as an industrial area servicing the local coal industry 
from the 1860s onwards and included a steam tram line for transporting coal. 
The land had become disused by the late twentieth century and was 
earmarked for rezoning for residential development in the early 1990s. 
Sandon Point borders the coast in part, was within the traditional lands of the 
Wadi Wadi Aboriginal group55 and local tradition held that there had been 
numerous discoveries of Aboriginal burials throughout the site’s post-contact 
history.56 The land at Sandon Point was sold as surplus by the NSW 
Government in the 1990s and by 2001, the developer, Stockland 
(Constructors) Pty Ltd had received development consent through the NSW 
Land and Environment Court to build over 400 houses on the site. Since that 
time, there has been a series of court cases relating to the presence and 
protection of Aboriginal archaeological and social values at Sandon Point. 
None of these court cases has been particularly successful in protecting the 
heritage of the place due to the limited archaeological evidence on what was a 
highly disturbed site and the lack of legal mechanisms to adequately consider 
the social rather than archaeological values of the place and how they might 
warrant protection. Nevertheless, these court actions did raise judicial 
consideration of several interesting issues. 
 
The Sandon Point site was the subject of several studies by professional 
archaeologists, including subsurface test excavation via a permit issued under 
section 90 of the National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974.57 This permit 
uncovered nearly one thousand stone tools, the vast majority of which were 
described by the archaeologists as “waste flakes” (from stone tool 
manufacture), which the Land and Environment Court subsequently accepted 
were of “limited diagnostic value” from an archaeological perspective.58 
Following these excavations, the archaeologists’ findings were provided to the 
local Aboriginal community (some of whom had established an encampment 
on site in 2000–the Sandon Point Aboriginal Tent Embassy or SPATE) to elicit 
“meaningful contributions” regarding the significance of the site. The 
judgement cites the accompanying correspondence to the Aboriginal 
community, which sought views on the “cultural significance” of the site, as 
well as the statutory application under section 90 of the NPW Act to destroy 
the site during development, the future storage and disposition of the 
recovered artefacts and the future conservation of portions of the site. Mr 
Kennedy, the applicant in the initial court action, requested additional time to 
prepare a response and indicated a desire to inspect the recovered 
                                            
54  See for example the Save Sandon Point community website: http://www.sandon-point.org.au/main.htm 
55  Ridge, K. and A. Seiver (2005). "Carriage: An elder's journey through the courts." Indigenous Law Bulletin 6 (9): 
4-7.  
56 Anonymous (2002). The Sandon Point: A Community Bulletin for the Protection of Sandon Point. 1: 4. 
http://www.sandon-point.org.au/pdf/the_sandon_%20point.pdf. Accessed 20 December 2005. 
57  Kennedy on behalf of the Sandon Point Tent Embassy v The Director-General of the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service and Another (2002) NSWLEC 67. at 7-9. 
58  Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi Aboriginal Corporation v Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (2002) NSWLEC 105. at 7. 
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artefacts.59 After a period of several months with no response forthcoming 
from Mr Kennedy or the group he represented as to the significance of the site 
or artefacts, the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service issued a section 90 
consent to the developer to destroy the site. Mr Kennedy sought to have the 
permit declared invalid, claiming he had been denied procedural fairness by 
not having provided the NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service with his 
group’s views on the significance of the site. The court noted that responses 
had been received from at least three other Aboriginal community groups. On 
the basis of the test excavations and these community responses, the 
archaeologists had determined they had adequate information to assess the 
likely presence and importance of any archaeological deposits on the site.60 
Due to this, the court held that Mr Kennedy had been given adequate 
opportunity to provide a response and that any failure to do so on his part was 
not a failure of the process used to determine the section 90 consent.61  
 
The court essentially put the local Aboriginal community on notice that if they 
did not articulate the significance of artefacts to the consent authorities, the 
consent could legitimately be granted based on the scientific, archaeological 
findings. This contrasts with the position in Latham, where the defendant 
conceded the significance of the fossils to the Aboriginal community. Such a 
circumstance highlights an inherent conflict within the legislation, as it raises 
the question for whom is the archaeological heritage being protected–the 
archaeologists or indigenous people? A strict application of the precautionary 
principle, applied to these circumstances, would suggest that in cases where 
the identification was uncertain the court should err on the side of caution62 
and prevent destruction or damage to the archaeological place until further 
research had been undertaken. That said, while we have seen that courts in 
some circumstances do recognise the primary value of Aboriginal 
archaeological sites as being for the indigenous community, courts are not 
generally prepared to accept Aboriginal assertions of significance uncritically. 
Maddock noted that Aboriginal law and custom had been largely ignored 
following colonisation,63 and attitudes towards recognising Aboriginal 
traditional knowledge are slow to change. The most dramatic example of this 
is the disputed nature of ‘secret women’s business’ at Hindmarsh Island in 
South Australia.64 While courts have been prepared to accept that some 
information is culturally sensitive and must be kept confidential, they have still 
required a limited disclosure of information, through closed hearings or similar, 
in order to demonstrate the significance of the place.65  
                                            
59  Kennedy on behalf of the Sandon Point Tent Embassy v The Director-General of the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service and Another (2002) NSWLEC 67. at 43. 
60  Ibid. at 53. 
61  Ibid. at 57-66. 
62  Stein, P. and S. Mahony (1999). Incorporating sustainability principles in legislation. Environmental Outlook No 3: 
Law and Policy. P. Leadbeter, N. Gunningham and B. Boer. Annandale, NSW, The Federation Press: 57-75. Pp 
68-69. 
63  Maddock, K. (1984). Aboriginal customary law. Aborigines & the law. P. Hanks and B. Keon-Cohen. Sydney, 
George Allen & Unwin: 212-237.  
64  Simons, M. (2003). The meeting of the waters: the Hindmarsh Island affair. Sydney, Hodder.  
 Taubman, A. (2002). "Protecting Aboriginal sacred sites : the aftermath of the Hindmarsh Island dispute." 
Environmental and Planning Law Journal 19 (2): 140-158.  
 Flood, E. (1999). "The Hindmarsh Island Case." Polemic 10 (1): 58-63.  
65  Choo, C., Christine (2002). Historical narrative and Native Title. Through a smoky mirror: history and Native Title. 
Canberra, Aboriginal Studies Press, Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, Native 
Title Research Unit: 11-22.  
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There is no evidence in this case to suggest that Mr Kennedy’s failure to 
articulate the significance of the Sandon Point finds was due to the finds 
relating to secret cultural business. Mr Kennedy was undeterred by this loss in 
court and several other court actions were brought by Mr Kennedy and other 
members of the Aboriginal community over the next few years. Shortly 
following the initial court action by Mr Kennedy, the Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi 
Aboriginal Corporation66 initiated separate action against the developers, over 
the alleged presence of Aboriginal objects within excavated soil dumped on 
part of the Sandon Point site.67 These subsequent excavation works had been 
proposed due to the presence of “sub-surface artefact scatters”68 predicted by 
the archaeologists, based on the earlier test excavation work noted above in 
the initial court action by Mr Kennedy. The Wadi Wadi CAC sought to restrain 
any further earthworks on the site until such time as the soil stockpiles had 
been thoroughly investigated for the presence of Aboriginal objects. The court 
noted that the section 90 permit issued for this work was essentially 
archaeological in nature and involved a series of scrapes of the surface soil 
and the collection of artefacts revealed within the disturbed soil through a 
combination of visual inspection and selected wet sieving of samples of soil 
from each scrape.69 These actions represent a typical archaeological testing 
and sampling methodology one which had been approved by the NSW 
Department of Environment and Conservation.70 Subsequent to this work 
being undertaken, a member of the Wadi Wadi CAC undertook a separate 
inspection of the excavated soil and claimed to have discovered a large range 
of Aboriginal artefacts which had been overlooked by the archaeological 
works, including “stone axe heads, blades, many small flakes, Bondi points 
and other materials”.71 The community member, Mr Paggett, who was not an 
archaeologist, used these claimed finds as a basis for describing the site as 
an “ancient and significant tool making site.”72 Had Mr Paggett’s claims been 
verified, the archaeologists who undertook initial testing would have appeared 
to have overlooked much more important archaeological evidence than the 
undiagnostic toolmaking waste flakes previously identified in archaeological 
reports. 
 
It is interesting that Mr Paggett used an archaeological term like “Bondi points” 
in his description of the finds on the site, as this describes a particular type of 
stone tool with specific diagnostic characteristics. Clearly these and other 
archaeological terms used in the Wadi Wadi CAC’s application to the court 
were adopted into the language of the local Aboriginal people, as they are 
technical terms derived from the archaeological literature. This adoption of 
pseudo-archaeological language may therefore be a defence mechanism by 
Aboriginal people seeking to have their heritage recognised and protected by 
the scientific paradigm imbedded in heritage legislation. Such language may 
                                            
66  Hereafter Wadi Wadi CAC. 
67  Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi Aboriginal Corporation v Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (2002) NSWLEC 105.  
68  Ibid. at 4-6. 
69  Ibid. at 8. 
70  The NSW National Parks and Wildlife Service was absorbed within the newly created Department of Environment 
and Conservation (DEC) in 2003. DEC became the consent authority for Aboriginal heritage matters and the 
government party involved in all subsequent legal action. 
71  Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi Aboriginal Corporation v Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (2002) NSWLEC 105. at 11. 
72  Ibid. at 11-12. 
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have been required to get the court to accept that their claim had any basis, 
as essentially the Wadi Wadi CAC was alleging damage to scientific values. 
Given the previous three decades of heritage management practice in NSW 
has been driven by this scientific paradigm, no descriptive language exists 
within the framework of heritage administration to deal with questions about 
the nature and significance of artefacts, other than the scientific language of 
archaeology. Ellis observed this problem in Queensland, where the use of 
archaeological language for site description effectively denied other, social 
values. He also cites examples of archaeological evidence being used to 
discredit Aboriginal claims for the social significance of various places.73 This 
can be seen within the administrative guidelines governing Aboriginal heritage 
issued by the NSW Government74 which, while recognising that communities 
may have different values from archaeologists, provides no framework under 
which those community values can be articulated, assessed and adjudicated 
upon by those administering the heritage legislation.  
 
In this instance, the court noted that the permit issued was for impacts to a 
“sub-surface artefact scatter” and that specific consultation had not occurred 
with the local community regarding the destruction of a tool making site. 
Interestingly, the court did not seek to resolve the difference of opinion 
between the consultant archaeologists and the Wadi Wadi CAC as to the 
exact nature of the archaeological site being destroyed. In archaeological 
terms, loose artefacts in unstratified spoil which had been removed from their 
context were unlikely to be considered particularly significant, yet members of 
the Wadi Wadi CAC were prepared to assert that these artefacts did have 
cultural value. What exactly this cultural value was to the Wadi Wadi CAC, if 
articulated to the court, does not feature in the judgement and may have been 
as simple as the symbolic value that Aboriginal people had inhabited the 
Sandon Point long before white settlement. Under the current administrative 
regime for Aboriginal heritage, however, the scientific values (or lack thereof) 
are likely to prevail over Aboriginal community values, particularly in 
circumstances where the community may lack the descriptive language 
needed to compete with the scientific assessment of a place. This difference 
in values for artefacts was, in the end, irrelevant to the court as the judge took 
the view that, as the section 90 permit authorised the destruction of artefacts 
in the specified area, the exact nature of those artefacts did not matter as a 
question of law.75 The court indicated that, essentially this was an 
administrative question to be dealt with by the National Parks and Wildlife 
Service as the consent authority, and the Wadi Wadi CAC’s action was 
subsequently dismissed.  
 
This reaction by the court, essentially one of indifference to the nature of the 
artefacts and interest only in the question as to whether proper administrative 
procedure has been followed, calls into question the effectiveness of the NPW 
                                            
73  Ellis, B. (1994). "Rethinking the paradigm: cultural heritage management in Queensland." Ngulaig 10. Pp 14-15 
and 20-21. 
74  NSW Department of Environment and Conservation (2004). National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974: Part 6 
Approvals. Interim Community Consultation Requirements for Applicants.  
http://www.nationalparks.nsw.gov.au/pdfs/interim_consulation_guidelines.pdf 
Accessed 4 April 2006. Note while marked as “interim” Guidelines, they remain in effect as of mid-2006. 
75  Wadi Wadi Coomaditchi Aboriginal Corporation v Stockland (Constructors) Pty Ltd (2002) NSWLEC 105. at 15-
16. 
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Act in actually protecting archaeological heritage in circumstances where the 
Act provides only vague definition of that heritage. In this case, the court took 
the view that, as both sides advanced the premise that stone objects found on 
the site were “Aboriginal objects” of some type, their exact nature and 
significance was in fact irrelevant. Inherent in that thinking is an assumption 
that Aboriginal heritage significance is tied solely to the nature of the physical 
objects protected by the Act, rather than what they may represent. The Judge 
reasoned that as Aboriginal objects, they were subject to the Act, but 
administrative permission had been given for their destruction, thus ending the 
legal involvement with the objects. Tied up within this decision is the 
conflicting view of the Aboriginal community member professing special 
knowledge and the professional archaeologist rendering a scientific/objective 
opinion on the nature of the site and its contents. This is in stark contrast to 
the Latham case, where the Judges found the Aboriginal community views 
regarding the stolen footprints to be highly compelling evidence and a 
significant factor in confirming a custodial sentence. From the analysis in 
previous chapters, it is clear that initial legislative intent had been for 
professional archaeologists to be the gatekeepers of what was significant and 
should be protected, within the scientific paradigm. Under such a structure, it 
becomes incumbent upon the archaeological community to objectively 
exercise their professional opinion as to the nature and significance of 
protected objects, from a scientific and social perspective, to guide the 
legislative and administrative response. While in the absence of clear 
professional standards for exercising this professional judgement there may 
be differences in professional opinion and quality of assessment, the 
archaeological industry in Australia has developed around these 
administrative procedures over the last thirty years. 
 
But such a system leaves little room for non-scientific significance to be 
considered, excluding almost any consideration of the ‘public good’ value of 
archaeological heritage. This circumstance is particularly problematic when it 
impacts upon the ability of indigenous communities to exercise any level of 
decision-making or control over the remains of their past. A reductionist view 
of scientific significance implies that the significance of any site can be 
conserved through its excavation, translation into scientific “data”, leading 
ultimately to its final destruction. In the case of indigenous archaeological 
heritage, such a legal construction furthers the disempowerment of Aboriginal 
people, by notionally requiring their involvement in the legal heritage 
management process, but then leaving them no tools or mechanisms through 
which they can reasonably exercise that power, or express the value of 
heritage places to them in a way which will be accepted by the wider 
community. To address this lack, changes in both legislation and 
administrative practice are required, to balance the scientific and community 
values of archaeological heritage. 
 
Sandon Point raises the question as to whether it is essential to know the 
nature and significance of archaeological resources before they are impacted 
upon or destroyed. From the archaeological perspective, the answer to that 
question should certainly be “yes”, as the initial intent of legislation was to see 
appropriate mitigation undertaken where significant archaeological places 
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were to be impacted upon. Both cases represent a sort of victory of 
administrative process over conservation goals, where significance becomes 
irrelevant in an instance where proper process has been followed, or where 
cultural barriers do not facilitate the consideration of significance in a broader 
since than the rather reductionist views which are enshrined in heritage 
legislation. The case also reflects a wider reluctance to recognise Aboriginal 
community connection and customary practices for Aboriginal people who are 
not viewed as living a “traditional” lifestyle, particularly Aboriginal people living 
in an urban context.76 If we return to the original intent of most heritage 
regulation, it is to protect places and objects which have value for both 
scientific enquiry and for the community. This places a moral onus upon the 
administrators of heritage legislation to take both views into account, without 
necessarily giving precedence to one over the other.  
 
A recent case New South Wales Land and Environment Court highlights 
precisely this principle. Anderson v Ballina Shire Council (2006)77 is a case 
where local Aboriginal people sought to overturn a development approval for a 
project which would affect a place of high significance to the local indigenous 
community. Ballina Shire Council sought to rely on the fact that it had 
considered an archaeological report stating that sandmining in the area, over 
an extended period of time, would have destroyed any traces of past 
activities. The Court held that taking into account the archaeological values of 
a place was not a substitute for taking into account the indigenous cultural 
values. Decision-makers were obligated to take both sets of values into 
account as a part of the process of determining whether a development could 
proceed which would impact upon a place.78 But in circumstances where 
legislation narrowly confines the consideration of the issues, as is the case 
with the NSW NPW Act, it is almost impossible for anything other than 
scientific values to be adequately considered. The symbolic and political 
values of archaeological sites in these circumstances cannot be ignored, 
where artefacts may act as symbolic surrogates for other values which cannot 
be adequately protected with existing legislative mechanisms. 
 
8.6 Conclusion 
 
The consideration of archaeological issues by Australian courts has been, at 
best, mixed. Few cases have been brought and the issues have been limited 
in their scope. It was remarked during the Sandon Point cases, that there had 
been no definitive statement even on what constituted a “relic”, leaving large 
gaps in our knowledge as to how such issues may be treated by the courts in 
future. With the small number of cases available for study, it is apparent that, 
while the courts may be aware of broader public issues surrounding 
archaeological heritage, above and beyond scientific concerns, their ultimate 
approach will be constrained by the boundaries of existing legislation and the 
specific circumstances of the individual cases. This has not left a rich field for 
consideration by this thesis. 
                                            
76  Maddock, K. (1984). Aboriginal customary law. Aborigines & the law. P. Hanks and B. Keon-Cohen. Sydney, 
George Allen & Unwin: 212-237. Pp 216-217. 
77  Anderson v Ballina Shire Council [2006] Unreported, NSW Land and Environment Court. Cowdroy J.  
78  Anderson v Ballina Shire Council at 140-147. 
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These cases, while fundamentally quite different in terms of both the 
archaeological heritage at issue and the legislative provisions protecting that 
heritage, highlight a number of key themes. First among them is that the 
courts, while accepting archaeological heritage as a serious matter warranting 
protection are limited in their ability to engage deeply with the nature and 
significance of that heritage. The courts have not shown themselves to be 
particularly concerned with the technical aspects of archaeological heritage, 
either from a scientific or social value perspective.79 This attitude, which has 
tended to accept on face value the sometimes conflicting assessments 
regarding the importance of a place, indicates that it cannot be assumed the 
courts are ever likely to consider the archaeological merits of an issue brought 
before them. What the courts are able to do is consider whether the 
legislation, as it stands, has been correctly applied and that the processes for 
protecting archaeological heritage have been appropriately followed. Thus it is 
incumbent upon archaeologists, rather than the courts, to be determining what 
appropriate conservation outcomes may be for archaeological heritage. This 
places the onus back onto the profession to engage with the legislation and 
policy, or, in the absence of such engagement, to accept the legal provisions 
as they stand. 
 
In such a circumstance, it is imperative that legislation is drafted in a manner 
which allows the consideration of issues which will achieve conservation 
outcomes. It seems clear that the underlying principles of archaeological 
heritage conservation identified earlier in the thesis have not had a strong 
influence in the judicial reasoning in the cases analysed above. If 
archaeological heritage is to be appropriately conserved in accordance with 
conservation principles, it is necessary that they are more explicitly expressed 
in Australian law. By limiting the nature of the issues with which heritage 
legislation deals, or providing definitions of archaeological heritage which are 
overly broad or vague, the future consideration of these principles by the court 
is effectively barred. This limitation curbs both consideration of scientific 
issues as well as consideration of the broader public good. Future 
amendments to heritage legislation which broaden the conception of the 
nature and value of archaeological heritage would facilitate the consideration 
of these issues by the courts. 
 
The corollary which emerges to this is the need for the value of archaeological 
heritage to be clearly articulated when such matters are brought before the 
courts. Of the cases discussed above, only in the case of Latham did the 
                                            
79  This was particularly highlighted in the case of Plimer v Roberts where an academic geologist (Plimer) had taken 
a private court action in the Federal Court of Australia against a fundamentalist Christian (Roberts), who had 
claimed that a particular geological formation in Turkey was the actual fossilised remains of Noah’s Ark. Plimer 
alleged Roberts’ actions to raise money to fund the dissemination of his theories amounted to false and 
misleading conduct under the Trade Practices Act. The case hinged on the question as to whether Roberts’ 
activities were deemed to be “business” within the scope of the Trade Practices Act. While Plimer’s action was 
unsuccessful, both in the Federal Court and in his application for special leave to take the matter to the High 
Court of Australia, the initial trial judge, Justice Sackville, remarked of the dispute over the nature of the 
geological formation itself that “there are some things it is better for courts to not decide”. See Ian Rutherford 
Plimer v Allen Roberts & Anor [1997] 1361 FCA (5 December 1997) (1997).  
High Court of Australia Transcripts - Plimer v Roberts and ANOR S144/1997 (19 June 1998) (1997). See also 
Sackville J’s commentary on this and a related case, as to whether Roberts had infringed copyright in one of 
publications. Sackville J (1997). Summary of David Fasold & Anor v Allen Roberts & Anor [1997] 439 FCA (2 
June 1997).  
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judgement reflect a detailed understanding of the nature and significance of 
the archaeological heritage by the Court. Both the scientific and cultural 
values of the footprints were articulated in a clear, credible manner which led 
the court to confirm an unprecedented gaol term. In the remaining cases, the 
evidence either indicated conflicting scientific views on the value of the 
archaeological heritage or poorly articulated and ultimately unresolved 
community views on the value of that heritage. In such circumstances, the 
outcomes were overwhelmingly negative from the perspective of 
conservation. Where conflicting values existed, the courts felt justified in 
glossing over those conflicts and focusing principally on the underlying 
protective mechanisms within the legislation. This again highlights the need 
for protective mechanisms to be appropriately focussed on the outcomes, 
rather than on the process of administration. In the absence of clear desired 
outcomes, the courts are likely to continue to support the processes allowed 
for under existing heritage legislation, which primarily provide for an orderly, 
legal process for the removal of archaeological heritage rather than its use for 
either scientific or community purposes. Here it is argued that these outcomes 
need to be those which consider the ‘public good’ value of archaeological 
heritage, rather than maintaining the largely illusory position that current 
legislation and compliance-based archaeological practice are facilitating 
research into the Australian past. 
 
Archaeological issues are unlikely to ever make a substantial appearance on 
any court list in Australia. Most issues will be resolved administratively or 
through negotiation. But in those circumstances where issues cannot be 
easily resolved, or where illegal acts have occurred, it is desirable that 
archaeological heritage legislation proves to be effective when presented to 
the courts. The ‘public good’ value of archaeology is recognised to some 
extent in the judgements in these cases, but it is clear the courts are 
constrained from producing either good deterrence or driving ‘public good’ 
outcomes in circumstances where flawed legislation provides few avenues for 
considering a broader range of issues. It is also unwise, if not impossible, to 
ignore the broader social or political issues which may underlie certain types 
of archaeological issues, particularly those involving indigenous heritage, as 
this leads to further dispossession and disempowerment. In the final chapter 
this thread is continued and a range of options canvassed as to how 
archaeological heritage legislation in Australia can be reformed to provide 
‘public good’ outcomes. 
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Chapter 9–Implementing ‘public good’ principles in Australian 
archaeological protective legislation 
 
The preceding chapters have analysed existing legal frameworks for 
archaeological heritage protection in Australia, revealing a dichotomy existing 
between the original intent in formulating protective regimes and their 
subsequent implementation in law. This represents the first such 
comprehensive analysis of these issues on a nation-wide basis. Heritage 
legislation has failed to keep pace with changes in disciplinary thinking for 
archaeology and heritage conservation generally. The earliest discussions in 
Australia on archaeological heritage protection were led by archaeologists 
seeking to formalise protections for their research material, and lobbying 
governments accordingly. From the time of the Hope Report in the early 
1970s, heritage progressively became a part of the mainstream of public 
debate. The focus of lawmakers has been on heritage as a collective 
patrimony and a collective responsibility. The tension between the 
“professional” and the “public” value of heritage has been an ongoing one 
since that period. Certain aspects of heritage were readily adopted as public 
issues, particularly the conservation of prominent buildings and remnant 
natural areas. These had strong publicly-focussed advocates such as the 
National Trust. And while certain aspects of the heritage debate have been 
dominated by professional value–particularly archaeology and architecture–
nothing in the legal research for this thesis has suggested that the legislative 
intent was to protect archaeological heritage primarily for professionalised 
heritage values. The heritage movement in Australia now generally accepts 
the need for public participation in heritage conservation, and that 
conservation is primarily for the benefit of the public. The area of archaeology 
however tended to remain the preserve of the expert, in the form of the 
scientifically-oriented archaeologist. Over the more than thirty years of 
heritage legislation, the whole spectrum of heritage conservation has shifted 
more and more towards the public value of heritage rather than viewing it as 
the preserve of experts. Archaeology has been an area which has lagged 
behind in this regard, allowing old scientific paradigms to be perpetuated in 
contemporary law and policy. 
 
But if heritage conservation, including archaeological heritage conservation, is 
to continue to be valued by the Australian public, it must be made more 
relevant and responsive to public concerns. These include the provision of the 
“useable past”, which Little has argued for,1 as well as other environmental, 
social and economic concerns which may legitimately intersect with 
archaeological heritage conservation. The ‘public good’ protective paradigm 
argued for in this thesis is predicated on the issue of public relevance and is in 
line with observations by policy- and law-makers, as well as some 
archaeologists, throughout the history of Australian heritage legislation that 
heritage belongs to the public. The archaeological record should not be 
viewed as a “representation of past regularities” but rather as containing 
                                            
1  Little, B. J. (2002). Archaeology as a Shared Vision. Public Benefit of Archaeology. B. J. Little. Gainsville, 
University Press of Florida: 3-19.  
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“traces of potentiality”2 which help us to understand ourselves, the past and 
the present. The question then becomes how this “potentiality” can be 
maintained and protected legislatively, in a manner which recognises the 
potential for multiple interpretations. Just as those meanings of the past are 
subject to reinterpretation to maintain relevance,3 so must the law which 
protects the past be reinterpreted and reformed to keep pace with 
contemporary values, societal changes and evolutions in disciplinary theory. 
This final chapter of the thesis identifies a number of areas of law and policy 
reform necessary to effect meaningful change in archaeological heritage 
protection regimes, and sets out a possible future direction for archaeological 
heritage management in Australia. 
 
It is not the role of this thesis to identify specific legal changes which should 
be made in order to implement the model of “public good conservation” 
discussed here. That would be as presumptive as a legal draftsperson 
attempting to rewrite heritage legislation without consultation. What follows, 
therefore, is not a schedule of suggested legislative amendments or model 
clauses and definitions for a new generation of archaeological protective 
legislation. Rather, the thesis seeks to establish that future legislative reform 
which emphasises the ‘public good’ rather than the ‘scientific’ value of 
archaeological heritage, or at least which better balances these competing 
concepts, will provide improved outcomes from compliance-driven 
archaeological work and ensure that the conservation of archaeological 
heritage is both relevant and valued by wider Australian society.  
 
9.1 Archaeology and the public good 
 
The examination of underlying documents of principle and law, such as the 
Burra Charter and the World Heritage Convention4 and the consideration of 
statements by legislators and the judiciary in subsequent chapters, provide a 
strong basis for the argument that heritage conservation is something 
undertaken for the public good. Archaeological heritage conservation can be 
situated within this ‘public good’ paradigm. Whether that is in the form of 
improved civic amenity, the building of national or local identity, or for some 
other reason, heritage conservation is perceived by most to be an activity 
which improves the lives of people and helps to educate them about their 
past. But it is equally true that heritage conservation is not seen as an 
absolute, which must be achieved at any cost. Society needs a reasonable 
balance of conservation and change to prosper and evolve. Thus a moral duty 
exists to make conservation decisions which are in the best interests of the 
public, taking into account both heritage conservation ideals and other social 
objectives such as development. This is the essence of ‘public good 
conservation’.  
 
                                            
2  Jones, A. (2002). Archaeological theory and scientific practice. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Pp 179-
180. 
3  Little, B. J. (2004). Is the medium the message? The art of interpreting archaeology in US National Parks. 
Marketing Heritage: archaeology and the consumption of the past. Y. Rowan and U. Baran. Walnut Creek, CA, 
AltaMira Press: 269-286.  
4  See discussion in Chapter 4. 
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This idea of balancing competing factors is already in use internationally and 
at various levels within Australia, in the form of the sustainability principles.5 
‘Public good’ conservation can therefore be thought of as a specific 
application of the sustainability principles to questions of heritage 
conservation. Whereas the sustainability principles are concerned with high-
level conservation and balancing of economic, social and environmental 
objectives, ‘public good’ conservation should examine the specific 
considerations associated with a conservation project. Here the relevant 
considerations will vary with the significance of the place and the scale of the 
project, thus the ‘public good’ test can be applied to both local, project-based 
conservation questions as well as to larger scale issues of conservation 
policy. Such ‘public good’ tests can apply to archaeological heritage 
conservation as well as to the conservation of elements of the built or natural 
environment. 
 
Chapter 3 identified three key principles of archaeological heritage 
conservation: 
 
 Protection of the archaeological site; 
 Protection of the archaeological object and its context; 
 Transmission of archaeological knowledge to present and future 
generations. 
 
These principles remain relevant to ‘public good’ conservation considerations, 
but must be tempered with additional ‘public good’ values. While not meant to 
be an exhaustive list, these considerations, which are further explored below, 
should include: 
 
 Protection of places or objects with the greatest significance to local or 
national value systems; 
 Conservation of places which have the potential to be meaningfully 
interpreted or presented to the public; 
 Identification of trade-offs which assist both location-specific and wider 
conservation efforts and objectives. 
 
These ‘public good conservation’ principles are more flexible and less 
absolutist than the principles identified earlier in the thesis. They are designed 
to take into account both the public and the archaeological values of places, 
but in a manner which requires a balance to be struck between those values 
rather than inherently asserting that one value system necessarily dominates 
over another. But such a consideration cuts both ways. While some Australian 
legal regimes, such as in the Australian Capital Territory, have established 
frameworks for indigenous heritage protection which give pre-eminence to the 
indigenous values of a place,6 they do not require the next step of tempering 
those values with wider social concerns. These may include competing social 
values for a place, or more mundane concerns of the ability of a place to be 
used or redeveloped. But even if this is a well-intentioned mechanism 
                                            
5  See discussion in Chapter 4. 
6  See discussion of ACT heritage legislation in Chapter 6. 
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designed to account for past wrongs or the previous overlooking of indigenous 
concerns, it does not solve the inevitable management problems, of how 
much change may occur to a place, which will arise for archaeological places 
in the future. Legal protections implemented for archaeological heritage are 
not merely theoretical considerations. The form and shape of the legislation 
will ultimately translate into real world decisions about what is, or is not, 
conserved. Thus for archaeological heritage conservation to be seen as a 
credible undertaking, and for supporting legislation to be perceived as fair,7 
reforms must be both relevant and realistic8 in terms of their desired outcome.  
 
What any good law reform program should aim to do is identify and address 
real problems which exist due to legislative gaps or ineffective or outmoded 
legislation. Now more than ever, law reform will be guided by a desire to 
balance the interests of multiple groups within the community. Thus reform to 
archaeological conservation legislation must take into account both the real-
world problems the legislation is attempting to address and the potential 
impact that legislation will have on the public at large, as well as on 
community and interest groups and individuals. Archaeology as a discipline is 
certainly a matter in which the public is interested. However the legislation for 
archaeological heritage conservation must be fair9 in its impact on the 
community. This is because some members of the community will have a 
deep interest in archaeological matters, and have a desire to maximise 
conservation efforts. Such individuals act as advocates, supplying the 
“enlightened moral criticism” to which Hart referred.10 But many other 
segments of the community will have little or no interest in archaeological 
conservation. At best, they may be indifferent and, at worst, actively opposed 
to conservation efforts due to perceived expense, loss of opportunity or 
philosophical position. Their interests are however relevant, as much of 
Australia’s archaeological heritage is on privately-owned land and the 
legislative compliance regime affects those landowners. If archaeological 
conservation legislation is constructed in a fair manner, this reduces the 
potential for both unintended negative consequences and opposition to 
archaeological conservation. The final report of the Productivity Commission 
has already pointed to the need for such wider issues to be taken into account 
in heritage conservation. True ‘public good conservation’ will need to 
consider, and ideally balance, competing or differing interests within the 
community. A key aspect of this will be clear identification of the nature of the 
public significance of places and the ability to make trade-offs in conservation. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7  Knetsch, J. L. (1990). Property and environmental values. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer 
and D. James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 1-15.  
8  O'Keefe, P. J. and L. V. Prott (1984). Law and the cultural heritage: Volume 1: Discovery and Excavation. 
Abingdon, Professional Books Ltd. Pg 109. 
9  Knetsch, J. L. (1990). Property and environmental values. Property rights and environment protection. B. Boer 
and D. James, Environment Institute of Australia, Inc.: 1-15.  
10  Hart, H. L. A. (1994). The Concept of Law. Oxford, Clarendon Press. Pp 64-68. 
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9.2 Issues with present legal regimes for archaeological heritage 
protection 
 
Current legal regimes for archaeological heritage protection continue to be 
problematic for archaeological heritage management. This may be because 
they rely on outdated concepts of archaeological significance, based in the 
scientific paradigm (as in New South Wales11 and Victoria12) or require prior 
listing of an archaeological place in order for it to be protected. Even those 
regimes which have sought to be progressive about heritage management, 
such as the recent legislation in the Australian Capital Territory13 and 
Queensland14, have tended to promote the recognition of indigenous values 
for archaeological heritage in a manner which does not reduce the vagueness 
or uncertainty associated with other protective regimes. These instances of 
progressive focus on indigenous values have ignored the lessons to be 
learned from management of non-indigenous archaeological sites, that 
treating all heritage places as equally significant does not necessarily equal 
better conservation outcomes. Definitional vagueness is endemic within the 
legislation. Remedying all of these problems would require the type of broad-
scale law reform which is unlikely to happen quickly or uniformly across 
jurisdictions. Thus a range of legislative and non-legislative reforms are 
argued for here in the shorter term, with additional long-term reform strategies 
suggested below. Key to any future reform will be the influence of “soft law” 
instruments such as the Burra Charter and other policy-level tools which can 
forge new directions for archaeological conservation, in the absence of 
legislative reform. 
 
The intangible aspects of culture are almost, by definition, the things that will 
not be left behind in a physical sense, even if a cultural practice is discarded 
or falls into disuse by the originating culture. Heritage legislation can specify 
what aspects or what methods are used to protect the ephemeral aspects of 
the past in an archaeological sense, but the law cannot mandate the 
reestablishment of lost cultural practices, nor indeed ensure that those 
analysing the ephemeral remains found in the archaeological record provide 
any particular kind of insight into the intangible aspects of past culture.15 This 
is not to say that scientific- or research-driven archaeology should be 
abandoned or has fundamentally failed at a disciplinary level. Rather, 
archaeological heritage management, as fostered through heritage legislation, 
has been inadequate to the task of fomenting a research-based discipline as 
envisaged by those advocates of scientific archaeology in the 1960s and 
1970s. The empowerment of communities, be they select communities such 
as indigenous people, groups of local residents or wider portions of society, to 
participate and be informed of the management of environmental and 
planning issues is a trend which is likely to continue if not accelerate. 
Therefore archaeological heritage protection needs to be adapted to deal with 
                                            
11  Heritage Act (1977) New South Wales.  
12  Archaeological and Aboriginal Relics Preservation Act (1972) Victoria.  
 Heritage Act (1995) Victoria.  
13  Heritage Act (2004) ACT.  
14  Aboriginal Cultural Heritage Act (2003) Queensland.  
 Torres Strait Islander Cultural Heritage Act (2003) Queensland.  
15  Leiboff, M. (1999). "The embodiment of culture: the Protection of Movable Cultural Heritage Act 1986 (Cth)." 
Australian Feminist Law Journal (12): 3-19.  
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this into the future. Some archaeologists may continue be inclined to mistrust 
non-professional interpretations of the archaeological past, but must be 
prepared to relinquish the roles as gatekeepers of that past if more 
meaningful management outcomes are to be achieved outside of the 
discipline. Heritage legislation is already causing this to occur, though 
primarily for indigenous heritage places. This requires the recognition and 
understanding of community values and goals in the decision-making 
process, which occurs in some explicitly community-focussed archaeological 
projects.  
 
To achieve this, a broader conception of archaeological value needs to be 
introduced to archaeological heritage management at a legal and policy level, 
which allows for decisions to be made outside of a rigid framework. 
Scientifically-framed definitions of the archaeological past, such as those 
contained in the New South Wales and Victorian Heritage Acts, need to be 
reworked, to recognise that the need for an object to be protected is rarely 
inherent in its age or location, but comes from the other values which are 
ascribed to it. At the same time, the threshold for what is “significant” needs to 
be re-evaluated. One of the invidious consequences of the language of 
heritage significance is that the use of the word “significant” itself is a value 
judgement. In lay parlance, the use of the term “significant” is often equated 
with something which must be conserved. The subtlety between degrees of 
significance and the appropriate conservation response is not necessarily 
self-evident and represents a major area where heritage professionals 
generally make decisions in the absence of an understanding of wider 
community issues or values. But ‘public good conservation’ requires the 
evaluation of a range of options and values when considering the 
conservation or fate of a heritage place or possible heritage place. Not all 
such places are of equal significance and therefore trade-offs can be made. 
This already happens to an extent, with the “scientific” investigation of an 
archaeological place often seen as the mitigation measure designed to 
conserve the significance of the place. However this assumes a simplistic 
translation of heritage value into recorded data. Yet most legal protections 
stop at this point and do not ensure a further outcome beyond data recovery. 
 
More detailed definitions or more widely-cast blanket protections for 
archaeological heritage are not the answer either. What is required is a 
conceptual framework which allows the consideration and evaluation of a 
range of values for a place, which may include the professional values of the 
archaeological profession, the social, cultural and spiritual values of 
indigenous groups or other interested members of the public16 and the other 
non-heritage values which may be ascribed to the place by the lay public. This 
requires both a legislative and a policy response. 
 
 
 
                                            
16  Byrne, D. (2002). An archaeology of attachment: cultural heritage and the post-contact. After Captain Cook: The 
archaeology of the recent indigenous past in Australia. R. Harrison and C. Williamson. Sydney, Archaeological 
Computing Laboratory, University of Sydney. 8: 135-146.  
 Byrne, D., H. Brayshaw, et al. (2001). Social Significance: A discussion paper. Hurstville, NSW National Parks 
and Wildlife Service: 161.  
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9.3 The role of ‘soft law’ and policy 
 
Evans has highlighted the important role of ‘soft law’ instruments in 
establishing guiding principles for environmental and heritage law.17 
Discussion of the Burra Charter18 has highlighted the key role that document 
has played in the formulation and development of Australian heritage law, 
even in circumstances where a jurisdiction has not adopted all underlying 
aspects of the Charter’s principles.19 The Burra Charter shares characteristics 
of the soft law instruments which Evans favours, as essentially a document of 
principle which while not legally binding has become the de facto standard for 
the consideration of heritage significance in Australia. The Burra Charter itself 
has been revised on two occasions since its initial drafting, and it is 
reasonable to believe that Australia ICOMOS sees the Charter as a living 
document which will continue to change and evolve, in line with movements in 
heritage conservation philosophy in Australia. The Burra Charter therefore is a 
key vehicle for the integration of a ‘public good’ conservation philosophy into 
the Australian heritage movement. As a non-legal document and, perhaps 
more significantly, as a largely private-sector document, the Burra Charter 
presents an opportunity to lead heritage conservation practices in Australia in 
new directions. This is particularly the case as the Charter is the accepted 
standard for conservation practice by governments and heritage professionals 
across Australia. No other non-legal document has this level of status, 
however informal that status may be. 
 
The 1999 revisions to the Charter hint at how this can occur, independently 
and in advance of government reforms.20 The 1999 amendments introduced 
the concept of ‘spiritual’ significance to Australian conservation practice, 
recognising that there were aspects of the significance of places which may 
not be embodied in their fabric, nor recognised within the professional-
objective criteria traditionally applied to the assessment of heritage 
significance. While there had been limited recognition of such values for 
indigenous sites, where such values were asserted they had a tendency to be 
overridden by other non-heritage concerns and special legislation.21 Certainly 
part of the rationale for undertaking these changes was to make the Burra 
Charter more applicable to indigenous heritage, although it is still very much a 
fabric-focussed document, poorly suited to managing indigenous heritage.22 It 
would certainly be more desirable for there to be an indigenous framework for 
heritage conservation and protection. However in the absence of such an 
agreed-upon position by a broad spectrum of the indigenous community, the 
                                            
17  Evans, M. (2000). Principles of Environmental & Heritage Law. St Leonards, Prospect Publishing.  
18  See Chapter 4. 
19  E.g. Tasmania’s rejection of aesthetic significance as a heritage criterion. See discussion of the Tasmanian 
legislation in Chapter 6 and Godden Mackay Logan P/L (2005). Tasmanian Heritage Act Review: A report 
prepared for Heritage Tasmania and the Department of Parks, Tourism, Heritage and the Arts. Sydney, Godden 
Mackay Logan P/L.  
20  Such as the recent reforms in the ACT and Queensland, discussed in Chapter 6. 
21  E.g. the Hindmarsh Island Bridge Act 1997 (Cth), which overrode the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Heritage Protection Act 1984 (Cth), briefly discussed in Chapter 5. 
22  Sullivan, S. (2004). "Aboriginal sites and the Burra Charter." Historic Environment 18 (1): 37-39.  
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Burra Charter remains the central instrument of conservation principle for all 
types of Australian heritage.23 
 
In some respects, this was the codification of a notion which had existed, 
however weakly or ill-defined, in some Aboriginal “sacred sites” legislation 
since the 1970s. But while the “sacred sites” legislation was restricted to 
indigenous groups with a demonstrable continued association with a place, 
the manner in which ‘spiritual’ significance has been integrated into the Burra 
Charter allows for a wider application than that of “sacred sites” legislation. 
The Burra Charter notion of “spirituality”, while still largely untested, is broadly 
constructed. ‘Spiritual’ significance is described by the Charter as a part of the 
associations people have with a place which gives the place its significance.24 
The ‘spiritual’ significance of the place should be one of the drivers for 
involving the community in its conservation25, as that type of significance is 
derived from community association. This moves considerably away from the 
professional-objective framework for significance which previously dominated 
the Charter. 
 
By establishing ‘spiritual’ significance as a general community concern rather 
than one restricted to a particular community group (such as indigenous 
people with traditional associations) the Charter opens up a much broader 
framework for the interpretation, and future protection and regulation, of 
heritage based on this significance criterion. This is advantageous for all 
cultural groups which may wish to assert spiritual association with a place as 
a basis for its protection in future, particularly in the absence of any generally-
agreed position amongst indigenous Australians on the conceptual framework 
for heritage protection. As of this writing however, spiritual and intangible 
heritage protections have not been widely adopted within heritage protection 
frameworks, although in certain policy areas there has been some move 
towards the incorporation of intangible values such as spiritual significance 
into the management framework for cultural heritage. It is not possible at this 
stage to say with any certainty whether this principle or indeed any intangible 
heritage principles will find their way into Australian heritage legislation. Such 
a move would likely be highly politicised and will not occur quickly. The status 
that intangible heritage has been given within the Charter provides the 
greatest potential tool for seeing such values incorporated into Australian 
legal frameworks, particularly in the absence of Australian ratification of the 
UNESCO Intangible Heritage Convention. 
 
The Burra Charter remains an influential instrument within Australian heritage 
conservation practice due to its broad acceptance at most government, 
heritage practitioner and community levels. If Australia ICOMOS were to 
recognise the notion of ‘public good conservation’ as an important element of 
future Australian conservation practice, this has the potential to be 
incorporated into future versions of the Burra Charter. As ‘public good 
                                            
23  Natural heritage is principally managed under the principles of the Natural Heritage Charter. IUCN and Australian 
Heritage Commission (2002). Australian Natural Heritage Charter for the conservation of places of natural 
heritage significance (Second edition).  
24  Australia ICOMOS (1999). The Australia ICOMOS Charter for the Conservation of Places of Cultural 
Significance. Burra Charter. Pg 3, Article 1.15 Explanatory Notes. 
25  Ibid. Pg 5, Article 12. 
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conservation’ is however only an emerging concept in heritage conservation, 
it is unlikely such recognition and incorporation would occur for many years. 
But this does not discount the power of such ‘soft law’ tools from influencing 
the shape of Australian heritage legislation in the future, nor does it negate 
the possibility of policy tools being developed within specific jurisdictions to 
advance the implementation of spiritual significance or other emerging 
heritage values in the future. 
 
9.4 Redefining archaeology in law  
 
A major carry-over within the bulk of Australia heritage legislation is the use of 
scientific terms to describe archaeological heritage in legal definitions.26 This 
has particularly manifested itself in a focus on archaeological objects, often to 
the exclusion of recognition of their context. The exception has been in cases 
where archaeological sites have been specifically listed on a heritage register. 
Yet this focus on the object overlooks the fact that archaeological sites gain 
much of their significance and meaning from both the context of the individual 
site and their relationship to each other. Archaeological sites form a part of the 
landscape, as a layer or series of layers which underlie and overlap each 
other, and the contemporary, visible landscape. Parts of the archaeological 
landscape may be incorporated into contemporary landscapes, developing 
new layers of meaning as the places are used and reinterpreted in 
contemporary ways.  
 
In order to truly conserve the archaeological values of places, it is necessary 
to understand this wider landscape context when making decisions about the 
conservation, protection or destruction of such places. In contemporary 
Australian legal practice, the focus has largely been on individual sites and 
their immediate locale, rather than this wider archaeological landscape 
context. To draw example from natural environment conservation, 
conservation efforts do not focus solely on the protection of an individual 
species at an individual site. Rather efforts are made to protect the habitat 
and range of an ecosystem, as well as individual species and specific sites 
which may be highly important for species survival.27 Conservation efforts 
may involve actions to reduce threats or actively conserve and improve both 
the non-living and living environments for species ranges, such as the 
removal of weed species which compete with food plants or protection of 
significant habitat elements such as fallen trees or rock formation used as 
living sites. Protective intervention may also focus on specific sites of 
biological importance, such as breeding or spawning sites, or may focus on a 
species or range of species themselves, through propagation or captive 
breeding programs. Legislative tools exist to facilitate these conservation 
efforts at a range of scales, in the acknowledgement that the conservation of 
biodiversity is greater than the sum of its parts. The archaeological landscape 
                                            
26  See discussion in Chapters 5 and 6, regarding the definitions of archaeological heritage in the State and 
Territory-based heritage legislation. 
27  The Convention on Biological Diversity defines this as: “the variability among living organisms from all sources 
including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they 
are part; this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems.” Convention on Biological 
Diversity 1992, Article 2. 
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can also be viewed in this manner, with individual sites forming parts of a 
greater whole that provides information and meaning to the past. 
 
While there have been limited attempts to develop protective frameworks for 
the historical archaeological landscape in Australia, none has been 
particularly effective as a conservation instrument. A variety of policy- and 
planning-based tools have been used in individual cities to attempt to provide 
this overview, such as the Archaeological Zoning Plans or Archaeological 
Management Plans for central Sydney and Melbourne, as well as similar 
efforts for regional centres such as Newcastle, Richmond and Liverpool in 
New South Wales or local efforts such as the Archaeological Management 
Plan for Port Arthur Historic Site in Tasmania. Even more recent attempts to 
break out of the traditional site-based methodology, such as the Parramatta 
Historical Archaeological Landscape Management Study, which attempted to 
identify and make recommendations for the various overlapping 
archaeological landscapes of an early colonial Australian city, still failed to rise 
above site-based recommendations and did not provide protective or 
conservation strategies for archaeological landscapes. The effectiveness of 
tools such as these has been recently investigated elsewhere28 and it is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to consider such instruments in detail. Yet 
policy and planning tools will always be fundamentally limited by their 
overarching protective legislation. Reform cannot be effective if it is at the 
level of policy alone.  
 
New South Wales continues to focus on the legal protection of individual 
archaeological objects. Victorian legislation is in a better position to manage 
archaeological places as entities. But both States continue to have difficulty 
with legal recognition of the relationship between site and object and the 
broader landscape context. This is a problem of both the legislation and the 
heritage policy and planning tools, which do not assist. For such tools to move 
beyond site-based decision-making and protection, archaeological heritage 
legislation must give recognition to the wider archaeological landscape. 
Effective decision-making must recognise that the relationships between sites 
and groups of sites can be as, if not more, important than individual sites 
themselves. Such recognition will require a move away from the focus on 
protection of individual archaeological objects. With built heritage, the concept 
that the wider heritage values of a place can be greater than the sum of their 
parts, is commonplace. “Conservation areas” have long been used as tools 
for conserving built heritage, recognising that, while individual elements (such 
as houses, structures or other historic features) may be of little significance 
individually, collectively these elements have a greater value as an historic 
landscape, where the relationships between elements are perhaps more 
important and more deserving of conservation that individual elements alone. 
The use of legislative tools to establish archaeological areas or indigenous 
areas has been much more limited in scope, although the relisting of Kakadu 
and Uluru World Heritage areas for indigenous values demonstrates that 
                                            
28  Iacono, N. Z. (2002). "Beyond the breach: advancing strategies for archaeological management plans." 
Australasian Historical Archaeology 20: 39-47.  
 Iacono, N. Z. (2006). Managing the Archaeology of the Modern City. Department of Archaeology. Melbourne, La 
Trobe University. Ph D. thesis (unpublished). 
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social values across a large landscape can be taken into consideration for 
protection. Where Australian archaeological landscapes and their component 
sites can meaningfully contribute to the understanding of an area, they should 
be protected in a manner which ensures archaeological places can be made 
available to the public and presented in a manner which illustrates their 
contextual relationships. 
 
What this requires, in legal terms, is a shift in focus from archaeological 
objects to archaeological landscapes.29 In ‘public good’ terms, individual 
objects have little archaeological relevance or significance beyond curiosity 
value, although they may have financial value to collectors. But when 
understood as a part of a wider archaeological landscape, which has a range 
of historical, social and scientific meanings, it becomes possible for a member 
of the public to understand their position within the archaeological landscape 
and what it means in terms of the development of contemporary society. 
Legislation therefore should refocus both its definitions and its protective 
mechanisms away from object- or site-based controls to a landscape concept 
that emphasises the spatial and temporal relationships between sites. This 
would require the identification of a board range of sites across a landscape 
and understanding how their linkages form a basis for their significance, as 
much if not more that the activities that occurred at each place. There is little 
evidence to suggest that the theft or trafficking in archaeological objects is a 
major problem for heritage conservation in Australia, yet there is a 
disproportionate emphasis on object-based protections in both 
Commonwealth and State/Territory legislation. Protective legislation for 
specific, individual archaeological objects may be important in certain, limited 
circumstances, and thus may need to be retained within legislative structures, 
but should be subsidiary protective mechanisms whose primary function is to 
limit illegal trade or to repatriate significant objects to appropriate custodians, 
particularly indigenous groups.  
 
Legislation will also need to be backed up with policy and planning tools which 
expand upon this ‘public good’ concept and emphasise the conservation of 
places which make a meaningful contribution to the understanding of the 
archaeological landscape. In the past, the emphasis has been on regional 
research frameworks, and, while their continued relevance has been 
questioned,30 efforts persist in some areas to promote them as useful tools for 
archaeological decision-making.31 Yet such documents have never been 
produced in Australia, with localised Archaeological Zoning Plans serving as 
the closest analogue. The utility of such an approach is questionable, in any 
case, due to the difficulty in establishing with certainty that a protected placed 
                                            
29  The World Heritage Centre is particularly working to advance the recognition of cultural landscapes, defined as 
the “combined work of nature and man” under the World Heritage Convention. See UNESCO World Heritage 
Centre (2005). Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the World Heritage Convention. Paris, UNESCO 
World Heritage Centre. Pp 83-85. 
30  Smith, L. (2004). Archaeological theory and the politics of cultural heritage. London, Routledge. Pp 62-70. 
31  In 2006, the NSW Heritage Office, Department of Planning, revised its Archaeological Code of Practice 
document, which sets out the relationships between different parties undertaking compliance-driven 
archaeological work in NSW. The revised draft document continues to suggest that the NSW government will, at 
some future stage, produce regional research frameworks to guide archaeological work undertaken under the 
NSW Heritage Act. It is anticipated that this revised Code of Practice will become publicly available in late 2006. 
The author reviewed this document as a member of the Archaeology Advisory Panel to the Heritage Council of 
NSW in June 2006. 
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would be relevant to such a strategy, as well as the difficulty in ensuring those 
undertaking the compliance-based archaeological work could in fact produce 
useful research within the strategic framework. This is exacerbated by the 
lack of clear professional standards and post-degree training, as well as the 
necessity to operate within a commercial context with attendant time and 
money pressures. Less prescriptive tools may be useful, such as local or 
regional interpretive strategies which have been formulated using public 
consultation, to develop an understanding of issues relevant to communities 
which have associations with the archaeological heritage to be protected. 
 
In addition to policy-level tools such as local interpretive frameworks, the use 
of other legal tools, such as local planning instruments, are critical to the 
successful protection of archaeological heritage and provide a framework for 
the consideration of local heritage issues. Environmental, heritage and 
archaeological matters have become progressively integrated into local 
planning frameworks, as has been discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. All States 
and Territories have some form of planning legislation, which generally 
provides a framework for the consideration of local environmental issues at 
both a strategic and a project-specific level. Often this will include a schedule 
of locally significant heritage places, which provide information and guidance 
on heritage issues for both property owners and local officials in a decision-
making role. Local heritage planning instruments have tended to have a focus 
on built heritage, due to its high visibility and relative ease of identification. 
Archaeological sites, particularly those lacking obvious aboveground 
elements, are generally overlooked. In New South Wales, which has the 
greatest number of Archaeological Zoning Plans prepared, the documents act 
as guiding documents only, and have not generally been converted into 
statutory protections and listings on a local heritage planning schedule32. 
Victoria has taken a different approach, where due to the statutory reporting of 
all archaeological discoveries, local Heritage Overlays33 have been prepared 
by central heritage and planning authorities, which do include archaeological 
sites. These are however often based on opportunistic discovery, rather than 
systematic survey of areas for the purpose of identifying and listing significant 
archaeological sites. 
 
While there are distinct limitations on protective legislation that relies solely on 
the prior identification and listing of archaeological sites, schedules of 
identified, if not necessarily protected, sites remain useful tools. In 
circumstances where systematised survey of a local or wider area has been 
undertaken, it is critical that identified sites are adequately analysed to make a 
decision as to whether they should be specifically protected and listed within a 
planning scheme or other environmental protection instrument. This has the 
distinct advantage of providing a greater deal of certainty in terms of the 
                                            
32  The original intent of the Parramatta Historical Archaeological Landscape Management Strategy (PHALMS) was 
that its results would be incorporated into a planning instrument. While both the Parramatta Local Environmental 
Plan (Heritage and Conservation) 1996 and the Sydney Regional Environmental Plan 28–Parramatta include 
some archaeological sites in their heritage schedules, they do not include all the places identified in PHALMS 
study. See Parramatta Local Environmental Plan (Heritage and Conservation) 1996 Schedules 1 and 2 and 
Sydney Regional Environmental Plan 28–Parramatta Schedule 6. 
33  Heritage Overlays on the Heritage Victoria website (http://www.heritage.vic.gov.au/page.asp?ID=132). Accessed 
26 June 2006. 
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nature of the archaeological place or places, and allows decisions to be made 
based on relationships between such places. In a case where a large number 
of sites are identified across a region, it may be possible to categorise these 
within their overlapping archaeological landscape contexts, and thereby 
determine which sites are critical, desirable or marginal in terms of their need 
for statutory protection. In the past, where this has been done this decision-
making has tended to rely on a scientific assessment of the scientific potential 
of such sites, rather than other considerations. For New South Wales where 
protection is based merely on the presence of archaeological materials, rather 
than the specific merit of those materials, statutory protection has been 
applied universally to all potential sites. There has been no further step of 
undertaking further analysis to understand relationships between sites, to 
facilitate choices as to what sites should be protected and why. The following 
section suggests a possible methodology for making such decisions, in a 
context which examines more than the scientific “potential” of archaeological 
materials, and takes into account wider values including the ‘public good’ and 
community interest. 
 
9.5 A framework for ‘public good’ consideration of archaeological 
issues 
 
If the scientific idiom is to be removed from its pre-eminent determinative 
status within Australian archaeological heritage law, it will need to be replaced 
with a robust framework which provides an alternative method for determining 
the significance of archaeological places. In ‘public good conservation’ terms, 
a key issue will be to determine what value is imbued in an archaeological 
place in the eyes of a local or wider community, or indeed what other issues 
the community may hold in priority above archaeological conservation. This is 
not necessarily an easy task to undertake, particularly in circumstances where 
the archaeological values of a place have not been previously investigated in 
any detail, or where cross-cultural conflict may act as a barrier to 
understanding significance, as may be the case with indigenous sites. It is 
strongly suggested here that any such framework should include the ability to 
develop trade-offs, or offsets for impacts to archaeological heritage places, as 
already occurs with impacts to natural heritage places. A key criticism of this 
approach may be that “archaeological potential” represents an unknowable 
state for archaeological places, requiring their full investigation before 
significance is revealed, thus rendering trade-offs unacceptably risky in 
archaeological conservation terms. While certainly this may be the case in 
some instances, in the vast majority of compliance-driven archaeological work 
in Australia, there is a reasonable amount known about archaeological places 
(particularly non-indigenous places) prior to excavation occurring. And even 
with indigenous places, if sufficient consultation with the relevant communities 
has been undertaken up front, it should be possible to develop an 
understanding of the values of a place without excavation. The Sandon Point 
case, discussed in the previous chapter, illustrates that even in circumstances 
where the values of a place are in dispute between archaeologists and 
indigenous peoples, the court is quite willing to accept the judgement made by 
heritage authorities as to whether a site ought be excavated or destroyed. 
Thus establishing an explicit framework for trade-offs concerning 
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archaeological sites does not present a significantly greater risk than 
presently exists with respect to administrative decisions made on poor, 
incorrect or limited information or where archaeological materials are 
discovered unexpectedly. What a tradeoff framework would allow however is 
some certainty about outcomes and about what value will be placed on 
archaeological heritage by the stakeholder groups and communities.  
 
With respect to this process of shifting focus from scientific to community 
significance, it is not suggested that traditional scientific value assessments 
be abandoned. Rather, scientific significance becomes one of a range of 
factors in the decision-making process. Other factors should certainly include, 
for example: 
 
 Community value or values for the archaeological place–these may 
range from little to no knowledge or interest, to very strong associations 
for historic, cultural or intangible reasons. This may change over the 
course of a project, due to publicity or to what the project uncovers. 
 Ability of the place to be presented and interpreted–does the site lend 
itself to interpretation, is there a commitment to undertake 
interpretation and is the story relevant and meaningful? 
 Context of the place in the archaeological landscape–is this place one 
which is unique and plays a significant role in understanding the 
archaeological landscape, or is it a common type of site or one with 
limited ability to contribute to the understanding of the surrounding 
context?34  
 
These categories are by no means meant to be exhaustive, and will vary in 
application on a site-by-site basis, but do go beyond the present 
archaeological assessment regimes, and are directed in a different manner 
than the scientifically-minded criteria suggested by Bickford and Sullivan in 
the 1980s.35 Thus the focus on archaeological heritage conservation is no 
longer on a binary presence or absence of items, objects or traces of past 
activity which could be described as archaeological, but rather one which is 
focussed on the meaning and value of archaeological places in a wider sense. 
Such an assessment framework also needs to take into account other non-
heritage factors that may be relevant to given circumstances, in a more 
sophisticated manner than the cost formula formerly used for Tasmanian 
archaeological heritage.36 Having an explicit framework for trade-offs based 
on this aggregate of values will allow for more sophisticated decision-making 
by communities, property owners, heritage professionals and those 
administering heritage legislation, and may increase support for the objects 
and goals of the legislation. 
 
The table overleaf sets out how such a framework could look. 
                                            
34  This has been characterised as the “representativeness” or “rarity” of a site, but is often used in a way which 
assumes all similar sites are equally significant. 
35  Bickford, A. and S. Sullivan (1984). Assessing the research significance of historic sites. Site Surveys and 
Significance Assessment in Australian Archaeology. S. Sullivan and S. Bowdler. Canberra, Dept. of Prehistory 
Research School of Pacific Studies Australian National University: 19-26.  
36  Tasmanian Heritage Council (2000). Practice Note No 2: Archaeological Requirements.  
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Within a ‘public good conservation’ archaeological tradeoff framework, there would be five broad types of sites: 
 
Significance Values Expectations Management/mitigation Trade-offs 
Very high 
significance 
 Central to identity or character of an area 
 Central position in the archaeological 
landscape and critical to its understanding 
 Potential to produce unique or new and 
meaningful contributions to the understanding 
of the past 
 High degree of intangible significance to one 
or more communities 
 Retain in situ 
 Keep secret if fragile, culturally 
sensitive or likely to attract 
vandalism or unwanted 
attention 
 Avoidance  
 No or very minimal impact from any proposals 
 Archaeological investigations (if any) to be guided by 
community values and undertaken as research 
exercises, rather than compliance-driven 
archaeological works 
 List on an appropriate heritage register (but 
confidentially if necessary) 
 No or minimal trade-offs 
 Any trade-offs require strong 
community support 
High Significance  High degree of significance to one or more 
communities 
 Prominent position or well known site within 
the community 
 Strong association with the character of an 
area 
 Major site in the archaeological landscape 
 Potential to produce significant new 
understandings about the past 
 Retain in situ 
 Conserve 
 Guided investigation 
 Interpret 
 Celebrate 
 Avoidance 
 Minimal impact from any proposals 
 Archaeological investigations (if any) to be guided by 
community values 
 List on an appropriate heritage register 
 
 Limited trade-offs, which will 
ensure important public, 
community and scientific 
values are protected 
Moderate 
significance 
 Some importance to one or more 
communities, but not a site with a central 
community focus 
 Known to the community 
 Typical site in the archaeological landscape 
 Investigation will contribute to the 
understanding of the past 
 Investigate 
 Interpret 
 Retain in modified form or 
remove 
 Interpret, as a component of 
wider the archaeological 
landscape 
 Substantial or complete removal of fabric 
 Archaeological fabric may be removed from the place 
 Archaeological investigation should be guided by the 
site’s position in the archaeological landscape 
 List on an appropriate heritage register, if retained 
 Some opportunities for trade-
offs, if there is a substantial 
return to the community 
 Trade-offs should be directed 
to other conservation-based 
projects which will benefit the 
community 
Low significance  A site of past activity, but lacking any strong 
continued community association 
 Unlikely to be known to the community 
 Indicative of a past activity that may be 
common or well-investigated archaeologically 
 Limited scope to meaningfully add to an 
understanding of the past 
 Limited investigation, possibly 
only basic site recording or 
monitoring 
 Little scope for meaningful 
interpretation 
 Complete removal of archaeological fabric 
 Archaeological work likely to provide basic data only, 
with little or no scope for conclusions to be drawn 
from the individual site 
 Note existence for the purpose of trade-offs, but do 
not list on a heritage register 
 Good scope for trade-offs 
 Trade-offs can be directed to 
conservation or other 
community-based projects 
(e.g. environmental 
conservation, community 
facilities) 
Minimal significance  A site of transient activity only or in a 
fragmentary state 
 Unlikely to be observable to anyone but a 
specialist 
 Contains material of little social value or trivial 
scientific significance 
 Provides little information about the past–
indicative of a general past activity only 
 Little or no investigation 
 Record site type and basic 
characteristics, little or no other 
intervention 
 No scope for interpretation 
 Complete removal of archaeological fabric 
 Do not list on a heritage register 
 
 Trade-offs should be the 
default position 
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What this frame work establishes, is that the significance of archaeological 
places is tied to a range of values. Some will be scientific-archaeological. 
Others may be community-related. Additionally, archaeological places will be 
affected by or will affect a range of other social, environmental and economic 
issues. Given the fact that the need for, and value of, heritage conservation is 
a moral value adopted by the community, rather than inherent in societal 
morality,1 these other non-heritage concerns are legitimate. Where places are 
at the higher end of the spectrum of heritage value, the presumption should 
be in favour of the conservation. Indeed, for those places of very high 
significance, there should be no debate that such places need to be 
conserved. This is certainly what the Hope Report envisaged when it 
recommended that, in some circumstances, heritage values should override 
other concerns.2 There should also be a strong presumption that such places 
are being conserved for the benefit of the community, and there will be a 
direct benefit to the community from conservation efforts. This may be a 
symbolic or intangible benefit, or something more concrete, such as a useable 
public space or an economic drawcard.  
 
For places of lesser significance, there should be the ability to recognise the 
limits of that significance, and establish trade-offs for allowing impacts to 
those places. This already occurs with biodiversity conservation, where 
impacts in one area may be offset by conservation efforts elsewhere. Having 
a transparent framework for such trade-offs in place allows other legitimate 
interests to be recognised and accommodated, in a way which directs a 
benefit back to the community. For places at the lower end of the spectrum, 
which are often captured by heritage legislation with a low threshold for 
scientific significance, there is no mechanism for enuring any benefit flows 
back to the community. The archaeological work represents an exercise in 
technical compliance only. Such work is that which only establishes the 
“potential” significance of an archaeological place,3 with little scope for ever 
seeing that potential realised. Recognising this inherent limitation in 
compliance-based archaeological work and establishing a mechanism for 
transferring those benefits to something else of value to the community–
conservation at another site, contribution to a public heritage initiative, or 
providing a community-based facility, for example–allow archaeological sites 
at the lower end of the significance spectrum to provide something of genuine 
value back to the community. 
 
While this is not meant to represent a framework which must be rigidly applied 
in order to implement ‘public good conservation’, it suggests a manner in 
which different interests–those of the present scientifically-driven archaeology 
and of ‘public good’ conservation–can be balanced in a manner which is more 
outcomes-focussed than process-focussed. Such an approach has long been 
taken to conservation of natural areas, and New South Wales is establishing 
the first transparent scheme for such conservation trade-offs for natural 
                                            
1  See discussion in Chapter 3. 
2  Hope, R. M. (1974). Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the National Estate. Canberra, Australian 
Government Publishing Service. Pp 24-26. See also discussion in Chapter 4. 
3  Murray, T. (1984). Relativism, conservation philosophy and historical archaeology. Historical archaeology and 
conservation philosophy. Papers from the Historical Archaeology Session of the ANZAAS Conference, Sydney 
1982. M. Pearson and H. Temple. Sydney, Heritage Council of NSW: 2-17.  
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areas.4 The advantages of this approach are numerous. Firstly it creates an 
explicit requirement to draw non-indigenous and indigenous communities into 
the discussion and evaluation of the importance of archaeological heritage. 
While no doubt in many instances there will be little community knowledge 
and perhaps limited interest in archaeological issues, this will begin to embed 
a process which requires the public to be both better informed and involved in 
decisions made about heritage conservation. This seems much closer to the 
intent behind Australian heritage conservation, as expressed in the Hope 
Report and the parliamentary debates on heritage matters across Australia. 
 
In New South Wales there have been efforts made to better involve 
indigenous groups in decision-making about archaeological sites,5 although 
the processes involved are less than transparent at present, and do not 
provide for reconciling disputes regarding significance within the indigenous 
community, let alone considering the wider social or environmental 
conservation issues which may arise. But a framework which explicitly seeks 
communities to identify which sites are the most significant, the most socially 
relevant, and prioritises this at the same level as environmental or economic 
considerations, begins to provide a credible basis for ‘public good’ 
conservation. It allows communities to nominate places which, due to their 
significance, must be conserved, while providing a framework for some return 
to the community for those sites which are not conserved. While ideally this 
should be done in a proactive fashion, any such scheme need to have in 
place sufficient protections to ensure places which are currently unknown can 
be protected once identified. It is worth noting that, in this context, one of the 
communities that can (and no doubt would) make a claim on the value of 
archaeological places, is the professional archaeological community. But 
rather than the current circumstance which gives the archaeological 
community the option of nominating a place to be of “potential” research or 
scientific significance, it requires the archaeological community to engage and 
identify why such places are actually important and how their significance can 
be realised and interpreted for the entire community. 
 
Such a framework begins to build a method for the recognition and protection 
of the intangible values of archaeological places. It establishes conceptual 
boundaries around the types of sites which are desirable to conserve, and 
relates this back to what is perhaps the most important of the three key 
principles of archaeological conservation, that of transmitting the 
archaeological heritage into the future. The conservation of archaeological 
heritage cannot itself be viewed as an absolute–it serves some necessity. 
While for many years that necessity was scientifically-focussed archaeological 
work, it is clear that, firstly, scientific archaeological work has not delivered the 
                                            
4  Referred to as “bio-banking”. This scheme will allow for environmental impacts in one area to be traded off 
against conservation efforts in another area. This is ultimately to be undertaken through an exchange, not unlike 
to sale of greenhouse gas abatement credits. Note this scheme has only been operating as a pilot and there is no 
data, as yet, on its effectiveness. The enabling legislation, the Threatened Species Conservation Amendment 
(Biodiversity Banking) Bill 2006 (NSW), was introduced to Parliament in June 2006 and is still under 
consideration. 
5  NSW Department of Environment and Conservation (2004). National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974: Part 6 
Approvals. Interim Community Consultation Requirements for Applicants.  
 Similar processes will be reinforced in Victoria, once the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Heritage 
Amendment Bill 2006 (Cth) passed through Federal Parliament and the Aboriginal Heritage Act 2006 is 
commenced. 
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insights into the past that were initially anticipated through the legislative 
process, and secondly and more importantly, the legislative intent behind the 
conservation of archaeological heritage was to see it conserved of the benefit 
of the entire community. By moving to a ‘public good’ framework which 
focuses on outcomes which will be beneficial to the community, it moves 
archaeological heritage conservation away from being a technical compliance 
exercise, to an exercise which has a wider benefit than the recording of 
archaeological data of questionable value. It also opens the door for greater 
community participation in the conservation of archaeological places, 
particularly by indigenous communities, to determine what sites are important 
and how they should be conserved. A ‘public good’ conservation framework 
allows communities to insist on the conservation of their most significant 
places, while offering something in return for the loss of those places of lesser 
or marginal value. It is fair to note that such a system would continue to 
provide a privileged place for archaeologists, as their knowledge would allow 
them to easily engage with any new frameworks. But by requiring a 
consideration of issues wider than the discipline of archaeology, it is argued 
that greater balance will be brought to archaeological conservation. 
 
9.6 Implementing ‘public good’ archaeological heritage protection 
 
Implementing ‘public good’ archaeological heritage conservation in Australia 
requires an open debate between archaeologists, heritage managers, 
lawmakers, interest groups and community members. It requires a recognition 
that heritage conservation is itself a public good, one that, if undertaken, must 
bring a broad benefit to the community, not just to specific interests or 
individuals. It must also recognise the limitations of scientifically-focussed 
archaeological practice within compliance-driven heritage conservation. If 
these points can be conceded, then the opportunity and political will may exist 
to evolve Australian archaeology into a truly public discipline. Disciplinary 
evolution in the direction of ‘public good’ conservation will mitigate to some 
extent the potential for legislative roll-back from critics of heritage 
conservation who presently perceive that little is being gained,6 in a real 
sense, from present legal regimes. Existing legal tools which provide the 
scope of the protection of archaeological heritage at a landscape level should 
be put to better use. This should include high-level initiatives to recognise 
significant archaeological landscapes and nominate them for the World or 
National heritage lists, as these provide the most effective tools for protecting 
and managing large areas. With a more sophisticated approach to 
archaeological conservation, it will be possible to conserve a range of 
archaeological places, their relationships and their contexts, rather than 
disconnected sites and objects, or see archaeological heritage merely 
fortuitously protected as a secondary consideration.  
 
At the State and Territory government level, legislative reform is required 
which balances the scientific and research values of archaeological heritage 
with the ‘public good’ values argued for in this thesis. Definitions must be 
redrafted to focus on archaeological places in a manner which protects the 
                                            
6  See discussion in Chapters 2 and 3, particularly regarding the Productivity Commission process and certain 
public submissions. 
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totality of the place and its context, rather than individual components which 
are of little significance individually. These legislative changes need to be 
backed up by significance frameworks, ideally driven by higher-level reforms 
from the Burra Charter or a similar instrument, which explicitly recognises the 
public, social, historical and spiritual values of archaeological places. This will 
require changes in the interpretation and application of legislation to focus on 
the ‘public good’ value of archaeological heritage, while leaving space for 
scientific- or research-based archaeological investigations, where there is a 
real prospect of discovering meaningful information about Australia’s 
archaeological past. 
 
The changes called for here will no doubt be confronting to certain elements 
of the archaeological profession and heritage conservation advocates but will 
lead to a stronger conservation ethic within Australian archaeology, with more 
tangible benefits to the Australian public. It will move archaeological practice 
in Australia away from being a technically-focussed compliance exercise to 
one which endeavours to provide meaning to the archaeological past for 
present and future generations. The existing legislation has received little 
judicial scrutiny. Appropriately, the courts have shown themselves 
uninterested in sites with minimal archaeological significance. With more 
significant places, they have recognised the public aspects of archaeological 
heritage.7 This should provide an indication of the direction for future legal 
reforms, in order to ensure their enforceability. Reform also provides a further 
opportunity to recognise the Australian indigenous past as something with 
contemporary value and relevance, rather than a scientific resource whose 
conservation is inherently contestable. Ideally reforms in indigenous 
archaeological heritage conservation will be constituted in separate 
legislation, giving indigenous heritage greater status and breaking away from 
the conceptualisation of indigenous heritage as a part of nature, or as 
something archaeological. This will require honest engagement on the part of 
both the indigenous and wider communities, to create an opportunity for 
Australia’s pasts to be meaningfully shared and conserved for the benefit of 
the Australian public. 
 
9.7 Conclusion 
 
Colley described archaeology as “a tool which can be used to investigate, 
create, claim or reclaim history” which is neither good nor evil.8 Australian 
archaeology was conceived of and developed as a tool of anthropology and 
later a tool of science. Its purpose was cast in terms of being able to distil new 
insights about the Australian past from the physical remains found in 
Australian soil. Had it not become enshrined in heritage legislation, it may 
have remained a pure tool for academic enquiry and discovery, with only a 
distant relevance to the public at large. But in seeking for formal protective 
mechanisms of the law, Australian archaeology was changed and has 
become an end unto itself, rarely linking back to its original purpose and goals 
of providing meaningful insights into the Australian past. Notwithstanding this 
                                            
7  See discussion on the Latham case as well as Anderson v Ballina Shire Council in Chapter 8.  
8  Colley, S. (1996). "Caught in the web: Cultural policy, cultural places and Australian archaeology." Culture and 
Policy 7 (2): 141-154. Pp 150-151. 
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situation, archaeology, like heritage conservation more generally, has become 
a mainstream issue and a very public concern. Given this, it is only 
reasonable that a certain reflection take place, to determine how the discipline 
will develop into the future. 
 
Archaeology continues to capture the public imagination, whether it is 
indigenous rock art in remote places or early colonial remains amongst the 
footings of an urban office tower or something more exotic elsewhere. The 
public is interested and, perhaps unknowingly, has significant responsibilities 
under existing legal regimes. Given both this interest and this responsibility, it 
is desirable that Australian archaeology serve an important and valuable 
public purpose, in a manner which gives the public an opportunity to feel a 
meaningful connection and a moral ownership of archaeological heritage 
conservation as a ‘public good’ endeavour. This thesis points the way to 
resolving some of the structural, legal and disciplinary problems which 
presently militate against these ‘public good’ outcomes, in a manner which will 
make Australia archaeology relevant to all Australians into the future.  
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